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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Carr, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 401 (02 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/401.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 401

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT TEESSIDE
BRIGHT J CP No: 11EE0028423

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		2 April 2025

LORD JUSTICE SINGH:

Introduction

1. This is an appeal against sentence brought with the leave of the single judge.
2. The appellant was born on 9 January 1999 and was aged 23 at the time of the offending. On 10 November 2023 the appellant was convicted by the jury of two offences at the Crown Court at Teesside. On 21 December 2023 the appellant, now aged 24, was sentenced by the trial judge, Bright J to a total sentence of nine years' imprisonment. The sentence on count 3, which was an offence of causing cruelty to a child, contrary to section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 was six years' imprisonment. There was a concurrent sentence on count 4, an offence of allowing the death of a child, contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 of nine years' imprisonment. It was common ground that the judge should treat count 4 as the lead offence and that the sentences should be made concurrent. The judge ordered that there should be time spent on remand deducted from that sentence, that was 168 days. The statutory surcharge order required was imposed.
3. There was a co-defendant, Michael Daymond. He was convicted on count 1 of murder and on count 2 of causing cruelty to a child. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a minimum term of 20 years less 440 days.

Factual background

4. For present purposes the facts can be summarised as follows. On 30 September 2022 the appellant's two-and-a-half-year-old daughter Maya Chappell was murdered by the appellant's partner, Michael Daymond, following a period of about five weeks of mistreatment of the child.
5. Maya was born in March 2020. Her father was James Chappell. The relationship between the appellant and Mr Chappell was unhappy and ended shortly after Maya's birth. In the summer of 2022 the appellant and Daymond began a relationship. The relationship was intense and they became mutually dependent very quickly. Towards the end of August 2022 they moved in together with Maya at an address in Shotton Colliery.
6. The appellant had a job and would go to work most days, leaving Daymond at home to look after Maya. Before long Maya began to sustain bruises which were noticed by other people. A number of incidents then occurred in August and September 2022 which gave rise to cause for concern. In particular, Maya developed an unpleasant looking, large and pronounced bruise on her pubic mound. Subsequent expert evidence was that this could not have occurred accidentally or have been caused by Maya nipping herself. It was the result either of forceful contact such as a kick, or being pushed onto a hard surface such as the edge of a table. It would have hurt and the person who caused it must have known that.
7. Things came to a tragic end in late September 2022. On 28 September the appellant was at work, leaving Maya with Daymond. On that day Daymond received numerous messages from someone to whom he owed a drug debt. His drug debts had been a problem for some months and was partly behind the reason for their move to Shotton Colliery. Daymond was being chased aggressively for payment. He told the person chasing him that he was due to be paid shortly. Phone records showed that Daymond then made repeated contact with the benefits agency. They told him that his universal credit had been cut off. There was a 16-minute call to the benefits agency just before 2.00 pm. At 2.16 pm Daymond called his mother to tell her that his universal credit had been cut off.
8. Prior to this, on the same day at around 10.30 am, Daymond's step-father had paid a visit. He did not notice any visible bruises on Maya but he noticed that she was behaving oddly and commented that she seemed scared of Daymond. He even considered taking her away with him before he left at around 11.15 am.
9. At around 11.40 am Daymond took a video on his phone of Maya, who was clearly upset, trying to back away into a small box-shape opening in a cabinet in the living room, as if trying to take refuge in a space that would be inaccessible to an adult.
10. During the afternoon Daymond's phone showed more visits to the benefits agency website and attempts to call them. At 3.31 pm Daymond received a further aggressive message about the drug debt. Around five minutes later he made a call to the appellant, telling her that Maya had collapsed and that she should come home. He then called 999. The call handler dispatched help and talked through giving Maya CPR. Medical staff and police attended very rapidly. Despite their best efforts and the efforts of the staff in hospital, Maya did not regain consciousness and she died.
11. Maya was found to have suffered severe, unsurvivable brain trauma. The unanimous opinion of five expert witnesses was that this was caused by Maya having been violently shaken with severe and extreme force. She was also found to have severe and extensive internal haemorrhaging to the small intestine, large intestine and mesentery, probably the result of a blow or kick. There was a further livid bruise over her pubic mound in a similar location to the previous bruising. Her body was covered in innumerable smaller but noticeable bruises. There were multiple bruises to her face and body, consistent with gripping marks. With the exception of a bruise to her left cheek, which had occurred on the previous day, the other bruises had not been seen before. The vast majority must have been inflicted on 28 September after the appellant had left for work.

Sentencing framework

12. For the lead offence of causing or allowing a child to die, contrary to section 5 of the 2004 Act, the maximum penalty was 14 years' custody but for offences committed after 28 June 2022 the maximum penalty is now life imprisonment. The Sentencing Council have issued a definitive guideline effective from 1 April 2023 in relation to offences of this type. Where the child has died, the level of harm inevitably falls into Category 1. Degrees of culpability are placed in four categories: Category A being very high culpability and Category D being lesser culpability. For present purposes the two relevant categories are Category B (high culpability) and Category C (medium culpability).

High culpability may be demonstrated by one or more of the following factors which are listed and which include the following:

• Prolonged and/or multiple incidents of serious cruelty including serious neglect.

• Use of very significant force.

• Deliberate disregard for the welfare of the victim.

• Failure to take any steps to protect the victim from offences in which the above factors are present.

Medium culpability may be demonstrated by one or more of the following:

• Use of significant force.

• Prolonged and/or multiple incidents of cruelty, including neglect.

• Limited steps taken to protect victim in cases with Category B factors present.

• Other cases falling between B and D because

Factors in both high and lesser categories are present which balance each other out and/or

The offender's culpability falls between the factors as described in high and lesser culpability.

13. If a case falls within Category 1B the guideline recommends a starting point of nine years' custody with a category range of seven to 14 years. If a case falls within Category 1C the starting point is five years' custody with a range of three to eight years. The guideline makes it clear, using bold font, that where a case does not fall squarely within one category, adjustment from the starting point may be required before there is adjustment for aggravating or mitigating features.

Sentencing remarks

14. In his sentencing remarks the judge said that the appellant had lied prodigiously and without compulsion at every stage. Her lies were told by someone who knew the extent of Maya's injuries and who had caused them. She continued to lie even when interviewed by the police. It was also clear from the pre-sentence report that she had continued to deny any level of knowledge or awareness of what Daymond was doing in August and September 2022.
15. From the pre-sentence report the judge had also learnt of the appellant's unhappy upbringing. Both her parents had problems with alcohol when she was young. Her father had been violent to her mother and was himself convicted of murder. Perhaps because of this the appellant, who is emotionally needy and immature, craved love. The judge agreed with the observation in the pre-sentence report that the appellant has "limited internal self-control" and is "susceptible to forming dependent relationships that could potentially create an environment to harm a child".
16. Turning to the definitive guideline, the prosecution had submitted that this was a case of high culpability. The defence submitted that it was medium culpability. The judge concluded that it was on the cusp of the two. In terms of harm this had to be Level 1 because Maya had died. The judge said that the category starting point would therefore be seven years six months' custody. The judge then said that the appellant's lies and attempt to blame her own mother were serious aggravating features. The judge was not convinced that there was true remorse in circumstances where the appellant still did not acknowledge her guilt and maintained that she had known nothing and was genuinely deceived by Daymond. Nevertheless, the judge took into account the appellant's age and her previous good character. He also acknowledged that her behaviour was likely to have been affected by her own background.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

17. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Hedworth KC advances the following grounds of appeal. First, he submits that the judge erred in his categorisation of this offending. He submits that this should have been a medium culpability case with a starting point of five years' custody. The level of neglect that Maya suffered at the hands of Daymond was not serious neglect, although it was neglect. The majority of injuries sustained by Maya, excluding the large bruising to the pelvic area, were small areas of bruising not requiring medical attention. Other factors in the higher culpability category are suggestive of much more serious injuries caused in circumstances by the use of a weapon, very significant force, degradation and/or sadism.
18. In developing that ground before this court today, Mr Hedworth has particularly emphasised a passage in the sentencing remarks where the judge himself at page 10D said that:

"... the force used by Michael Daymond, before 28 September, while real, was significant but not serious."

19. That passage needs to be read in its proper context. In particular, as Mr Nolan KC has reminded this court, the judge had earlier said at page 3D that there was the serious incident involving bruising to Maya's pubic mound which could only have been caused by, for example, a kick or being pushed onto a hard surface.
20. In his written grounds. Mr Hedworth advanced a second argument upon which he has realistically not placed great weight before the court today. He submitted that the judge imposed too high a notional sentence in this case. The judge noted that the case fell between medium and high culpability but this should have led to a starting point of seven years' custody if his view was that the starting point should be in the middle of the two categories.
21. The third ground which Mr Hedworth has placed some emphasis on before the court today is that the judge increased the sentence due to the lies that the appellant had told but this risked an element of double counting as this had already been taken into account in assessing the degree of culpability.
22. Finally, Mr Hedworth submits that the judge failed to give appropriate weight to personal mitigation which was powerful in this case. The appellant was only 23 at the time of the offending. She had had a troubled childhood witnessing both parents tackle alcoholism and violence resulting in her father being imprisoned. The appellant had had difficulties at school resulting in her being bullied and leaving school at the age of 14, yet continuing to obtain an education in college. Further, she had suffered domestic violence in her relationship with James Chappell which resulted in post-traumatic stress symptoms and depression, as evidenced by the psychiatric report prepared by Dr Turner.
23. Overall, Mr Hedworth submits that the judge must have had a starting point in mind even above nine years if he then reduced the sentence to allow for personal mitigation. He submits that proper weight being given to mitigation would have allowed for a greater reduction, cancelling out the aggravating factors or an even greater reduction so that the judge should have reached a sentence at its highest of seven years and six months' custody.

Submissions on behalf of the Crown

24. The court has received helpful written submissions in a Respondent's Notice on behalf of the Crown which were briefly developed at the hearing before the court by Mr Nolan KC. He submits that having been the trial judge the judge was perfectly entitled to reach the conclusion that the case fell on the cusp of high and medium culpability. Indeed, Mr Nolan's submission is, as it had been for the Crown below, that in fact this case fell into Category B. But he does not quarrel with the sentencing judge's right to place it at the cusp of the two categories.
25. Mr Nolan also reminds this court that the categories within the sentencing guidelines are not sealed compartments and a mathematical approach is not appropriate. The nominal period of seven-and-a-half years' custody comes within the category range even for a Category 1C offence, a range of three to eight years' custody.
26. Mr Nolan submits that the judge was in the best position to carry out the balancing exercise called for when weighing up aggravating and mitigating factors. He reminds this court that there were three non-statutory aggravating factors in this case: deliberate concealment, blaming others and a failure to respond to warnings. Accordingly, Mr Nolan submits that the sentence, though severe, was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

Our assessment

27. In our judgment the total sentence of nine years can be described as severe but was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The judge was best placed to make the assessment of the appellant's culpability having presided over the trial. Matters such as the seriousness of the neglect of a child are quintessentially matters of judgment and evaluation for the sentencing court. We are unable to say that the judge was wrong to place this case at the cusp between categories B and C.
28. Furthermore, the exercise which the judge then had to perform was not a precise mathematical one. As has often been said in this court, sentencing is an art and not a science. We note that the notional sentence with which the judge began of seven years and six months' custody in fact falls within the category range for a straightforwardly Category 1C offence - that is a range of three to eight years' custody.
29. The judge was then entitled to take account of aggravating factors, including the persistent lies which the appellant had told throughout the process. This did not amount to double counting, as this is not one of the factors that the definitive guideline expressly mentions when assessing whether culpability falls into Category B or Category C.
30. As to personal mitigation, the judge had these matters well in mind. He took them into account. As we have said, the final sentence at which the judge arrived of nine years can be described as severe but that reflected the seriousness of the appellant's offending and this court cannot properly interfere with it.

Conclusion

31. For the reasons we have given, this appeal against sentence is dismissed.