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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> TMD, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 463 (04 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/463.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 463

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT MINSHULL ST, MANCHESTER
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE MARK SAVILL) [06PP0064022]

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		4 April 2025

MR JUSTICE BRYAN:

1. The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this case. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. This judgment has been anonymised accordingly, and the appellant will be referred to as "TMD".
2. On 9 January 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Minshull St Manchester (before His Honour Judge Mark Savill and a jury), the appellant (then aged 38) was convicted on six counts of rape of a child under 13, contrary to section 5(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
3. On 13 May 2024, the appellant was sentenced by the trial judge on each count (concurrently) to a special custodial sentence, pursuant to section 278 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprising a custodial term of 27 years and a one year additional licence period.
4. The appellant appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge on the ground that the sentence passed was manifestly excessive.
5. We turn to the facts of the appellant's offending. Throughout the indictment period (29 July 2013 to 29 July 2021) the appellant had been in a long-term relationship with the aunt of the Complainant. The appellant and the Complainant's aunt had their own children and the Complainant had been left in the care of the appellant and her aunt from a young age.
6. Over a period of some six to seven years the appellant had vaginally raped the Complainant. Count 1 had occurred when she had been 6 or 7 years of age. Count 2 had occurred when she had been 10 or 11 years of age. Counts 3, 4 and 5 had occurred when she had been 12 years of age, and count 6 (a multiple incident count), had occurred when she had been aged between 5 and 12 years.
7. Whilst no threats or force had been used by the appellant, the Complainant had been groomed by him. He had taken the Complainant camping, taken her out on walks, given her money and had bought her things including sweets, vapes, alcohol and cannabis. The vaginal rapes had taken place on numerous occasions (at least 13 in number) in numerous locations. Such vaginal rapes (with ejaculation and without contraception) were usually proceeded by the appellant groping the complainant's thighs, bottom, and breasts and occasionally inserting his fingers into her vagina. The Complainant subsequently became pregnant with the appellant's child and had a termination at the age of 13.
8. The appellant cried and begged the Complainant not to tell anyone. However, she eventually confided in family members and the police became involved. The appellant was subsequently arrested.
9. In interview the appellant denied the index offences. He gave a truly ridiculous account that he had been the victim of some sort of sexual assault by the complainant who had allegedly straddled him and pulled down his trousers whilst he was asleep and inserted his penis into her vagina (no doubt in an attempt to explain away his fathering of her baby). That was no more credible than an earlier account he had given in his original statement whereby he said that he would frequently masturbate whilst watching adult pornography and would wipe his semen onto clothing and the Complainant would then wear such clothing. The jury by its verdicts (involving at least 13 rapes over six years) was not deceived by such lies.
10. The appellant was aged 38 at sentence. He had nine convictions for 15 unrelated offences, spanning from 5 April 2005 to 16 April 2009.
11. There was a pre-sentence report before the court. The author noted that the appellant continued to assert that none of the rapes had occurred, maintained his account of how the Complainant came to be impregnated, and based on his narrative he considered that he had done no wrong. He reported that he suffered from ADHD which can lead to impulsiveness but as the author noted, this would not explain the repeated nature of his offending over a prolonged period of time. He was assessed as a high risk of sexual, emotional and psychological harm to children, in particular the complainant, and medium risk to known adults, as well as a medium risk to himself due to reported self-harming.
12. In his sentencing remarks the judge noted the appellant's grooming behaviour and that he had manipulated a very young child in order to fulfil his own sexual desires which he fixated upon her. The appellant had raped the Complainant on at least 13 occasions, and the judge noted that as the years went by, tragically the Complainant became accustomed and resigned to the sexual abuse perpetrated upon her and simply went along with it. Then as the judge noted, "perhaps inevitably, given the frequency of [the appellant's] abuse and lack of contraception, she became pregnant [at the age of 12] and as a result she then had to experience the unimaginable trauma of the termination of that pregnancy at the age of only 13". The judge noted that the appellant showed little or no remorse at the time for his actions, but was only selfishly concerned about what would happen if people found out. Even when the scientific evidence demonstrated that he was the father and that the conception had occurred when the complainant was under 13, he maintained the same stance, not only before the jury but at the time of the preparation of the pre-sentence report. It was an account which the jury clearly rejected.
13. The judge identified that this was high culpability offending against a very young child who was vulnerable to exploitation. The abuse started at a very young age, which meant that more serious harm was likely to occur. The appellant treated the Complainant as his sexual plaything. He had no regard whatsoever for the innocence or fragility of one so young, with the inevitable stealing of her childhood. Even in the absence of a victim personal statement, the judge had no difficulty in inferring that there was, and would be, long term effects on the appellant's victim. He identified the applicability of Category 2 factors, including the Complainant being made pregnant and having to undergo a termination, although he stepped back from elevating matters to Category 1.
14. In terms of culpability there were Category A factors present: significant planning, extensive and prolonged grooming behaviour, including plying the Complainant with alcohol and drugs as part of that grooming, and an element of breach of trust. The starting point for a single Category 2A offence is 13 years' custody, with a range of 11 to 17 years. However, here there were at least 13 occasions, and the judge took the view that the appellant's offending could properly be described as a campaign of rape against a young child.
15. The judge noted that the appellant continued to deny his guilt and to blame the Complainant. He also noted that the author of the pre-sentence report had assessed the appellant as presenting a medium risk of further sexual conduct offences and a high risk towards the Complainant. The aggravating factors consisted of the lack of contraception and ejaculation. There was little by way of mitigation and such as there was, could carry little weight, given the seriousness of the offending. The existence of the appellant's intellectual limitations neither impacted upon culpability nor amounted to mitigation.
16. In relation to totality the judge reminded himself of the need to reach a just and proportionate sentence to reflect the totality of the offending. He concluded that a determinate sentence of 27 years' imprisonment was appropriate. The judge, after considering all relevant factors, made a finding of dangerousness, but concluded, having regard to the length of the sentence and the fact that the appellant, as an offender of particular concern, would be subject to an additional licence period of one year, that this would be sufficient to protect the public and that an extended sentence was not necessary.
17. The grounds of appeal are that the total custodial sentence of 27 years' imprisonment for a course of offending against a single Complainant was too long and disproportionate to the commensurate sentence for any single offence.
18. It is fair to say that in granting leave, the single judge did not suggest that such ground was anything more than arguable. He expressed himself in the following terms:

"You regularly raped your partner's child when she was aged between 7 and 12. There were significant aggravating features to your offending: for example, you ejaculated inside her causing her on one occasion to become pregnant, and you groomed her. The judge was generous in his categorisation of some of your offending but was right to find that your conduct overall was particularly serious and justified a sentence of 20 years or more. I grant you leave to appeal solely to allow you to advance your argument that the total custodial element of the sentence of 27 years was excessive."

19. We have given careful consideration to the points advanced in the grounds of appeal which were also developed orally by Mr Watkins before us. They are encapsulated in paragraph 13 of the grounds which (after recognising that cumulatively the offending was at least Category 2A) continued in these terms:

"I also acknowledge that this offending might be on the cusp of that which the Council had in mind when speaking of the possibility of offending of such severity, for example involving a campaign of rape, that sentences of 20 years and above may be appropriate. However this was a case, unlike some, involving a single complainant only and was not aggravated by any previous offending. In those circumstances I do respectfully advise that a sentence of 27 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive."

20. We cannot agree that this offending is properly to be characterised as "on the cusp" when speaking of the possibility of offending of such severity, such as involving a campaign of rape, that sentences of 20 years and above may be appropriate. We consider that the judge was right to categorise the series of over 13 rapes, which occurred over an extended period of time from when the Complainant was only 6 years of age to when she was only 12 years old, as a campaign of rape against a young child. A single such offence has a starting point of 13 years' imprisonment, with a range for a single offence of up to 17 years.
21. However, the appellant was not being sentenced for a single such rape, but for at least 13 such rapes each of a child under 13, and each of which justified a sentence of at least 13 years' imprisonment, even before considering the serious aggravating factors of the lack of contraception, and ejaculation, which all too predictably culminated in a pregnancy when the complainant was only 12 years of age (and which appears to be the only reason why the abuse ended). Yet further, the evidence of such rape was incontrovertible in the context of the ultimate pregnancy, and yet the appellant showed a total lack of remorse in maintaining his innocence even at, and after, trial, and there was a conspicuous absence of any real mitigation.
22. Totality includes sentencing for the totality of such abhorrent offending, and that requires the passing of a sentence that was just and proportionate to the totality of such serious offending. Whilst possibly severe, a sentence of 27 years' imprisonment for such serious offending was not manifestly excessive.
23. Accordingly the appeal against sentence is dismissed.