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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Martin, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 494 (28 March 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/494.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 494

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT MANCHESTER
HHJ NICHOLAS DEAN KC
CP No. 06VV0008424

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		28 March 2025

MR JUSTICE LAVENDER:

1. The Crown Court made a direction under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 as follows:

"No matter relating to persons concerned in the proceedings shall, while they are under the age of 18, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as persons concerned in the proceedings and, in particular, their name, their address, the identity of any school or other educational establishment attended by them, the identity of any place of work or any still or moving picture of them."

2. This order no longer applies to the applicant, since he is now 18, but it continues to apply to one of his co-defendants and will continue to apply until 13 November 2025.
3. The Registrar has referred to the full court the applicant's application for leave to appeal against the 22 month detention and training order imposed on him on 24 November 2024 in the Crown Court at Manchester for two offences to which he pleaded guilty in the same court. Those offences were: having an offensive weapon in a public place, contrary to section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (count 7), to which the applicant pleaded guilty on 3 October 2024 and for which the sentence was a four month detention and training order; and violent disorder, contrary to section 2(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 (count 4), to which the applicant pleaded guilty on 23 October 2024 and for which the sentence was an 18 month detention and training order.
4. On 28 March 2024 the applicant, Coby Tristram and Charlie Harrison were actively involved in drug trafficking in the Whitefield area of Bury and were each armed with a knife. The judge described the knives as zombie or Rambo-type knives and as both fearsome and highly dangerous weapons.
5. They encountered two rival drug dealers whom they considered to be encroaching on their turf. The applicant and his two colleagues each produced their knives. The rival dealers ran away. Coby Tristram chased one of them, who stabbed him. Coby Tristram died from his injuries.
6. The applicant was in custody from 4 April 2024 until the sentencing hearing. He pleaded guilty to the offence of having an offensive weapon in a public place on the first day of trial. In addition to the offences to which he pleaded guilty, he was charged with manslaughter, but the judge held at the close of the prosecution case that there was no case for him to answer on that count and that was when the applicant pleaded guilty to the offence of violent disorder.
7. The applicant was 17 years and one month old when he committed the offences. He had been convicted of four offences of possessing cannabis committed between November 2022 and March 2023 and one offence of handling stolen goods committed in November 2022.
8. The pre-sentence report stated that the applicant was remorseful. He had lost contact with his father in 2018 when his father was sentenced to a lengthy custodial sentence. He was excluded from school when he was in year 8. He never fully resumed education. The applicant had been diagnosed with ADHD, with symptoms including impulsiveness, poor decision making, limited concentration and reckless behaviour, but he was not taking any medication.
9. He was referred to the National Referral Mechanism in February 2023 due to concerns relating to potential exploitation. This concluded in October 2024 with a decision that there were conclusive grounds that the applicant had been exploited by way of forced gang-related criminality and drug dealing.
10. The pre-sentence report also stated as follows:

"It is my assessment that Mason was lacking maturity at this time and was seeking acceptance from his peer associates. It is acknowledge (sic) that one of the co-accused was an adult, and as such could have had considerable influence over him. The court should also be aware that Mason was of no fixed abode at this time, as he had become estranged from his mother. There was no oversight by professionals during this period, as all involvement with services had ceased and as such there was no supervision, boundaries or rules in place for him. …"

11. The applicant was effectively homeless. The report said that:

"… Mason was living off his monthly Personal Independence Payment (PIP) and was too young to apply for housing with the Local Authority. This led to Mason staying at random houses and then eventually residing with a local drug user who allowed him to stay with him.

...

It would appear that the main factors relating to these offences are Mason's decision making processes, peer influences and his lifestyle which was problematic at the time. I would suggest that Mason's immaturity also contributed to the decisions that he made. …"

12. The probation officer proposed as an alternative to custody a youth rehabilitation order ("YRO") with the following requirements: a supervision requirement for 18 months, to include offending behaviour sessions, victim awareness sessions, reparation sessions, work with a substance misuse worker and work on the transition from the youth justice system to the probation service when the applicant turned 18; an exclusion requirement, excluding the applicant from Bury; an activity requirement, i.e. intensive supervision and surveillance for six months; a curfew requirement, namely an electronically monitored curfew from 7 pm to 7 am for three months; and a prohibited activity requirement, prohibiting association with those involved in the incident.
13. The following matters were advanced before the judge as mitigating factors: no relevant previous convictions; remorse, as demonstrated by his guilty plea and the loss of a friend; age and lack of maturity as reflected in the pre-sentence report; mental disorder or learning difficulty, i.e. ADHD, albeit that the applicant refused medication; and difficult personal circumstances, i.e. living away from home and at risk of exploitation.
14. The judge dealt compendiously with the circumstances of each defendant by saying that he had taken account of the pre-sentence reports and other documents relating to the defendants, including the sentencing notes prepared by their counsel. The judge noted that the offence of having an offensive weapon in a public place fell within category 1A of the offence-specific sentencing guideline applicable to adult offenders, which has a starting point of one year and six months' custody and a range from one year to two years and six months' custody. He said that the offence of violent disorder fell within category 1A in the offence-specific sentencing guideline for adult offenders, which has a starting point of four years' custody and a range from three years to four years six months' custody. He found that the applicant's culpability fell in category A because the applicant participated in an incident involving serious acts of violence and he used or intended to use a highly dangerous weapon. He acknowledged, however, that care had to be taken to avoid double counting so far as the nature of the weapon was concerned. The judge then said:

"In my judgment, it is clear that the carrying of these weapons needs to be met by a deterrent sentence and that in this case involves the sentences for violent disorder and possession of the offensive weapons being made to run consecutively to each other, although of course the principle of totality needs very much to be borne in mind."

15. The judge noted that the only custodial sentence which could be imposed on the applicant was a detention and training order, which could not exceed two years in total for both offences. The judge said that he had considered with care the recommendations in the pre-sentence report and all that had been said on behalf of the applicant, but that this was a case in which only a custodial sentence was appropriate. He said:

"… A sentence of detention is necessary because of the nature of the offending and the need to ensure that sentences for this type of activity is sufficiently deterrent of others committing offences of this type."

16. In relation to the applicant, the judge said:

"It seems to me that were Mr Mason Martin an adult there would be no reason to distinguish between him and between Mr Harrison in terms of what the appropriate sentences would be, and therefore the sentences that I impose fully take into account Mr Martin's younger age and such mitigating features as are available so far as he is concerned."

17. The judge said that the 18 month detention and training order imposed for the offence of violent disorder was reduced by 10 per cent from 20 months by reason of the applicant's guilty plea. The judge also said that the four month detention and training order for the offence of having an offensive weapon in a public place was reduced from eight months, both by reason of the applicant's guilty plea and to reflect totality.
18. Charlie Harrison pleaded guilty to the same offences as the applicant. He was 20 years and eight months old at the time of the offending. The judge sentenced him to three years and two months' detention for the offence of violent disorder and eight months' detention for the offence of having an offensive weapon in a public place. This was after reductions of one tenth and one third respectively for his guilty pleas. His total sentence was therefore three years and ten months, or 46 months', detention, which was more than double the length of the applicant's sentence.
19. The applicant was released on licence on 5 March 2025.
20. The grounds of appeal are as follows:

(1) The judge failed adequately to take account of the youth and maturity of the applicant, in particular with regard to the over-arching principles in the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People.

(2) The judge failed adequately to consider the contents of the pre-sentence report and did not properly consider the proposed alternative to detention, namely a YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance.

(3) The starting point for both offences was too high.

(4) The judge gave insufficient credit for the mitigating factors.

(5) The judge paid insufficient regard to the totality principle.

21. It is of course necessary in this case to have regard to the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People and also to what was said about sentencing children in R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596; [2023] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 45, especially at paragraphs 49, 52, 55 to 61 and 82 to 88. We do not repeat those paragraphs, but any judge sentencing a child needs to have them very much in mind, together with the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People and in this case the guideline on Bladed articles and offensive weapons (having in public/education premises and threats) – children and young people.
22. The judge did not in his sentencing remarks engage with the circumstances of the applicant and his case in the level of detail which is appropriate in light of the statement in paragraph 1.2 of the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People, that:

"While the seriousness of the offence will be the starting point, the approach to sentencing should be individualistic and focused on the child or young person, as opposed to offence focused. …"

23. Nevertheless, the focus in this court must be on whether the sentence imposed was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
24. We have considered for ourselves all of the factors which are relevant to the question whether, having regard to the need to adopt an approach to sentencing which is individualistic and focused on the applicant, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
25. One of the issues which has been raised is whether deterrence can be taken into account as a factor when sentencing a child. The reduction of crime, including its reduction by deterrence, is listed in section 57(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2020 as one of the purposes of sentencing in the case of adults. For children, there is no equivalent list of the purposes of sentencing. Instead, section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 provides as follows:

"(1) It shall be the principal aim of the youth justice system to prevent offending by children and young persons.

(2) In addition to any other duty to which they are subject, it shall be the duty of all persons and bodies carrying out functions in relation to the youth justice system to have regard to that aim."

26. Section 58 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides as follows:

"Nothing in this Code affects the duties of the court—

(a) to have regard to the principal aim of the youth justice system (which is to prevent offending (or re-offending) by persons aged under 18: see section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998) ... "

27. Given the difference between these provisions, it has been suggested that deterrence is not one of the purposes of sentencing children. However, this court said as follows in R v Smickele [2012] EWCA Crim 1470; [2013] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 64:

"… It is not the law that deterrence can play no part in the sentencing of young offenders. It is certainly true, as we have set out, that considerations of welfare, individual treatment and careful attention to the level of maturity may sometimes make high levels of deterrent sentencing less appropriate. It is also true that some offences committed by young people may be spontaneous and may reflect a young person's more limited self-control. But part of the sentencing process is necessarily about the sending of messages not only to the defendants in court but to others like them. Young men are as able as older men to understand the message that very serious planned crime—and that is what this was—will be met by serious punishment. It has to be. No one who has anything to do with discipline, whether in youth clubs, detention centres, schools, or elsewhere, can doubt their ability to understand that."

28. That judgment was given in 2012 and the guideline has moved on since then, but Mr Enoch did not argue that deterrence had no part to play in sentencing children. Instead he submitted, and we agree, that there needs to be appropriate focus and balance in such cases, having regard to the matters addressed in the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People.
29. Another issue in the present case is whether the judge was entitled to impose a total sentence which, but for the reduction for the applicant's guilty pleas, would have been more than 24 months. The answer to that question depends on whether section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020 applies to the offence or offences for which the detention and training order is imposed. Paragraph 5.14 of the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People provides as follows:

"A DTO of up to 24 months may be imposed on a child or young person if the offence is one which, but for the plea, would have attracted a sentence of detention in excess of 24 months under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000."

30. In the present case, however, section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020 did not apply to either offence. In those circumstances, the reduction for a guilty plea must be applied to a total sentence which is no more than 24 months long, subject to certain exceptions which are not relevant in the present case: see R v March [2002] EWCA Crim 551; [2002] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 98; R v Dalby [2005] EWCA Crim 1292; [2006] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 38.
31. Against that background, we address the grounds of appeal. We do not consider that the judge failed adequately to take account of the applicant's youth or immaturity in circumstances where the judge imposed a sentence on the applicant which was less than half that imposed on Charlie Harrison, who was only three years and seven months older than the applicant. For substantially the same reasons, we do not consider that the judge failed adequately to consider the contents of the pre-sentence report or did not properly consider a YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance as an alternative to detention.
32. The applicant was one of three young men who produced zombie or Rambo knives on the streets of Bury and chased others with them in an incident which led to a fatality. The judge was entitled to conclude that a non-custodial sentence would have been inappropriate in such a case.
33. We do not consider that what has been called the starting point for either offence was too high. In fact, the judge did not adopt a starting point for either offence. The starting point, properly so-called, is a starting point taken from the relevant offence-specific guideline. The judge did not adopt such a starting point in the applicant's case. The notional sentences to which he referred in the applicant's case were well below the starting points in the applicable sentencing guidelines for adult offenders.
34. Nor do we consider that the judge gave insufficient credit for the mitigating factors or paid insufficient regard to the totality principle. We repeat that the judge imposed a sentence on the applicant which was less than half the length of the sentence imposed on his co-defendant, who was only three years and seven months older than him. Mr Enoch submitted today that the sentences should not have been consecutive, since the possession of the knife was an important factor in assessing the seriousness of the violent disorder. However, whether the sentences were concurrent or consecutive, the question is whether the total sentence was consistent with the totality principle and in our judgment it was.
35. In addition to the grounds of appeal, we have considered the following issue. It is arguable that the judge adopted a total sentence before reduction for the applicant's guilty pleas which was slightly longer than 24 months. For the offence of violent disorder, he said that he reduced the sentence by 10 per cent from 20 months to 18 months. For the offence of having an offensive weapon in a public place, he said that the appropriate sentence would have been eight months, which he reduced both by reason of the applicant's guilty plea and for totality. He did not specify, as he should have done, what the sentence would have been but for the reduction for guilty plea. However, the guilty plea was entered at trial, so a reduction of no more than 10 per cent would have been appropriate. It could be argued, therefore, that the judge started with a total sentence of a few weeks longer than 24 months in order to arrive, by the reduction for the applicant's guilty pleas, at a total sentence of 22 months. However, we do not consider that this gives rise to an arguable ground of appeal. It was very generous of the judge to reduce the sentence for the offence of violent disorder by one-tenth when the guilty plea was entered at the close of the prosecution case. The judge would have been entitled to decide that a total sentence of 24 months should be reduced by two months by reason of the applicant's guilty pleas.
36. For all of these reasons, we dismiss the application for leave to appeal.