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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> A Local Authority v M & Ors (Placement Order) [2019] EWFC 50 (24 May 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2019/50.html Cite as: [2019] EWFC 50 |
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Sitting at the Central Family Court
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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A Local Authority |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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A Mother |
1st Respondent |
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- and - |
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A Father |
2nd Respondent |
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- and - |
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RP (by her children's Guardian) |
3rd Respondent |
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- and - |
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LR |
4th Respondent |
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Ms Julie O'Malley (instructed by Sweetman, Burke and Sinker) for the 1st Respondent
Ms Jo Porter (instructed by Freemans Solicitors) for the 2nd Respondent
Mr Kieran Pugh (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for the 3rd Respondent
Mr Tom Wilson (instructed by Goodman Ray) for the 4th Respondent
Hearing dates: 21st – 24th May 2019
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Theis DBE:
Introduction
Relevant Legal Framework
'What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh in its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options'.
'[48] The validity of the status quo argument is certainly well established in the pre-CA 1989 authorities. In D v M (Minor: Custody Appeal) [1982] 3 All ER 897, Ormrod LJ said:'… it is generally accepted by those who are professionally concerned with children that, particularly in the early years, continuity of care is a most important part of a child's sense of security and that disruption of established bonds is to be avoided whenever it is possible to do so. Where, as in this case, a child of two years of age has been brought up without interruption by the mother (or a mother substitute) it should not be removed from her care unless there are strong countervailing reasons for doing so. This is not only the professional view, it is commonly accepted in all walks of life.'
Factors in any particular case relating to the status quo will fall to be considered in a case to which CA 1989, s 1 applies under s 1(3)(c) where the court must have regard to 'the likely effect on [the child] of any change in his circumstances'.
[49] In more recent times the prescient observations of Ormrod LJ, which were made at a time when the early work of John Bowlby and others on 'Attachment Theory' was available, have been borne out by the enhanced understanding of the neurological development of a young child's brain that has become available, particularly, during the past decade. As a result, the importance of a child's attachment to his or her primary care giver is now underpinned by knowledge of the underlying neurobiological processes at work in the developing brain of a baby or toddler.[50] In the context of 'attachment theory', the wording of ACA 2002, s 1(4)(f), which places emphasis upon the 'value' of a 'relationship' that the child may have with a relevant person, is particularly important. The circumstances that may contribute to what amounts to a child's 'status quo' can include a whole range of factors, many of which will be practically based, but within that range the significance for the child of any particular relationship is likely to be a highly salient factor. The focus within CA 1989, s 1(3)(c) is upon the 'likely effect on' the child of any change. The focus in ACA 2002, s 1(4)(f)(i) is upon 'the value to the child' of any particular relationship continuing.
[51] It is not my purpose in this judgment to express a view upon the relative importance of attachment/status quo arguments as against those relating to a placement in the family. Each case must necessarily turn on its own facts and the weight to be attached to any factor in any case will inevitably be determined by the underlying evidence. In any event, for reasons to which I have already adverted, it is not necessary to do so in this case as, unfortunately, the judge does not appear to have engaged in any real way with the effect on the children of moving them from the care of their primary, and only, attachment figure or with the value to them of maintaining that relationship.'McFarlane LJ continued, at [53-54]:
'[53] In the context of 'change', the changes listed by the judge are all practical, environmental or cultural, whereas, from the focus of a two-and-a-half year old child the most important change is likely to be that his 'mother' has dropped out of his life. That is so with respect to the changes listed during the checklist analysis and also later during consideration of the positives and negatives of each option (see para [28](a) h above). The welfare checklist requires regard to be had to the effect on the child of such a change and, I am afraid, there is no indication in the judgment that any regard was had to that factor. In like manner, as I have already explained, there is no consideration of the 'value' of the relationship with Y during the judge's analysis under ACA 2002, s 1(4)(f).
[54] Conversely, when the judge came to list the positive features with respect to Y, the fact that the children had established a strong and entirely beneficial primary attachment to her is not mentioned when it should surely have been at the top of the list; the fact that they were attached to her and she was not simply their current foster carer was, on her side of the case, what the case was all about, yet it does not feature as a factor. The judge's reference to the establishment of 'a family life together' which is entitled to 'proper and full weight' has the ring of an argument based upon rights rather than, more importantly in the context of the children's welfare, their emotional reality.'
'59.…In Re M'P-P, McFarlane LJ was underlining the statutory obligation on courts to identify relevant relationships and consider the value to a child of those relationships continuing. In many cases, the relationship arising for consideration will be with the birth family. But there is no reason why this requirement should not extend to other relationships identified by the court as relevant, including a relationship with a foster carer. For the reasons identified by McFarlane LJ, where, as here, a child, particularly a child of this age, has formed a strong bond with a foster carer, it is manifestly in the child's interest for the court to consider the likelihood and value of that relationship continuing. I am quite sure that Sir James Munby P was not intending to suggest otherwise in…Re T…For my part, the court's statutory obligation when considering an application for a placement order is to identify any relevant relationship and consider the likelihood of that relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so may extend to a relationship between a child and foster carers who have put themselves forward as prospective adopters.60. I do not accept that the appeal is based on the assertion that it was a fait accompli that the foster carer would be positively assessed for adoption and matched with R. There was certainly no guarantee that LR would be approved as an adopter. It was, however, the local authority's case before the judge that adoption by LR was their preferred and proposed option. There was, therefore, plainly a likelihood that the relationship would continue and it was therefore important for the court to take that factor into account.'
(1) That at the final hearing of care proceedings the court is not considering the merits of a particular adoptive placement. As Re T sets out the trial judge is concerned with adoption in principle and should not undertake a direct comparison between an adoptive placement and other placements.
(2) However, Re B and Re RP make clear that in circumstances where information is known about the likely adoptive placement and there is a factor 'concomitant' with it which is plainly relevant, there is nothing in the above principle which requires the court to ignore that factor.
(3) One such factor may be that the proposed adoptive placement would enable a relationship of value to continue, which in accordance with s 1 (4) (f) ACA 2002 the court needs to take into account. This includes taking into account the relationship between the child and a foster carer/adopter, as is the likelihood that the status quo in terms of placement and attachment figure would continue.
(4) It follows that in such circumstances factors in the welfare determination must include the benefit to the child of the status quo in terms of placement and continuity of primary attachment figure, and the detriment to the child of being removed from that person's care.
(5) Ultimately the court must undertake the necessary balancing exercise, attaching such weight as is considered appropriate to those relevant factors, while resisting being drawn into a comparison between the two placements.
Relevant Background
(1) that RP's father had accessed pornography websites showing pictures of teenage girls;
(2) that in 2016, when sharing a bed with the mother and W, RP's father had touched W's private parts;
(3) that the boundaries within the household were wholly inappropriate and that, as a result, W was exposed to a sexualised regime of care which caused or contributed to her vulnerability to child sexual exploitation;
(4) that without significant insight and change, the mother would be unable to protect her children from such exposure in future;
(5) that the mother had consistently failed to cooperate with the local authority and deliberately tried to subvert the relationship between W and the staff at her residential home;
(6) that the children had been exposed to domestic abuse between the mother and RP's father, and that there had been a toxic relationship between the adults about which they had sought to minimise the evidence;
(7) that in October 2017, the mother had removed K and O from the school roll for two weeks, saying she did not want them talking at school about what was going on at home;
(8) that over a period from June 2017 to January 2018, W had been beyond parental control;
(9) that W's emotional neglect had caused her to harm herself by cutting on a number of occasions;
(10) that in November 2017, the mother, RP's father and the maternal grandmother had colluded to hide the three children from professionals and to arrange the abduction of K and O to Poland.
The Evidence
Discussion and Decision
Care and Placement orders
Care Order and placement in Poland
SGO in favour of LR
(1) RP's wishes, if she were old enough to express them, would be to be cared for in a safe and secure environment with emotionally warm carers that are able to develop and promote her changing developmental needs. She would wish to have her sense of identity in relation to her cultural heritage preserved, her mother and siblings are Polish and her father Romanian. This aspect is likely to become increasingly important for her as she grows older.(2) RP is described as a clever and engaging child, and her needs include those relating to her cultural heritage, including her language needs. Whilst recognising the impact on her needs of being brought up in the UK rather than Poland, where she would experience her cultural needs and the Polish language first hand, there are other ways those needs can be met if she remains living in the UK, which would be more than a superficial exposure to such matters. This would be through the work that would be undertaken with any prospective carers to ensure those needs are met, including maintaining exposure to the Polish language and culture. In this case there are already established links with the authorities in Poland that will enable arrangements for indirect contact to be put in place between RP and her mother and siblings. The revised local authority plan provides a more creative and child focussed way for sibling contact to be maintained in a way that meets RP's needs for security and stability. The revised plan includes suggesting attempts are made to create a 'talking book' as both RP and O, in particular, like books and this would make contact and communication more enjoyable and effective. Also, for there could be the exchange of videos and/or photographs. This would be facilitated through the Permanence Team at the local authority.
(3) RP has a relationship with her parents and siblings that has been maintained through contact. Whilst there have been gaps in the parents contact the evidence demonstrates that despite those gaps RP has a bond with her parents. It is recognised that if the court makes a placement order that regular contact with the parents will be lost and will be limited to two occasions of written contact a year. RP's existing relationship with her siblings is more equivocal due to the extended periods when there has been no contact and the unsatisfactory nature of the skype contact, despite the best efforts of the older children to engage RP. It is recognised that the sibling relationship is one that will remain important for RP both in the short and long term and should be maintained in a way that is consistent with RP's welfare. The established involvement with the Polish authorities and the revised local authority plan provides a way those needs can be met.
(4) RP's relationship with LR is described as a strong attachment, not only to LR but to her wider family. RP is still very young, she identifies with LR as her primary carer which bearing in mind her age is a very significant relationship in her day to day life and is an important part of her emotional and psychological development. The likelihood is that if the court makes a placement order that relationship will continue, as the Children's Guardian said in oral evidence the likelihood of that was 'extremely high'.
(5) The evidence of the social worker and the Children's Guardian, which I accept, is that any move from LR's care would be devastating for RP and likely to cause her considerable emotional and psychological harm. Whilst it is recognised steps could be taken to ameliorate such harm through planning and managing a transition, with ongoing contact, that is going to be more difficult in this case if RP was to move to Poland due to the distances.
(6) RP's needs are for security, stability and permanence so she can build on the secure attachments she has made to date. Even taking into account the enormous benefits for her cultural heritage, with the ability to maintain her relationship with her mother and her siblings through direct contact the likelihood is that a move to Poland will cause her considerable emotional and psychological harm due to the inevitable severance of her attachment with LR as her primary caregiver and the inevitable loss of that relationship. In her report, which I accept, the Children's Guardian said 'the impact [of a move] would be devastating for [RS] and it is likely she would struggle to attach to another carer in the timescales that are appropriate for her'. If the court made a placement order it is likely RP's relationship with LR will continue. I take into account the evidence, which I accept, that supports LR's long standing and continued commitment to contact between RP and her siblings and her parents and the assessment of the social worker and Children's Guardian of her willingness to do that in the future. The concerns raised by the note of the previous Guardian in September will need to be explored with LR, but the balance of the evidence supports her continuing commitment to contact and ensuring RP's cultural needs in the widest sense of both her parents are met. As the Children's Guardian states in her report 'LR is extremely positive about sibling contact and understands the relevance and importance of it. LR was very open with the children visiting her home when they returned from Poland in June 2018…she would not be opposed to future contacts taking place within her home in the future if it was felt appropriate and safe to do so'.
(7) I recognise the established principle that judicial and social care provisions in other member states should be treated with mutual respect. The information about the placement details in Poland suggest that there would be a period of inevitable uncertainty for RP whilst consideration was given whether to terminate parental rights and, if so, to consider an adoptive placement. Such uncertainty, even with the benefits of being placed in Poland and being in close proximity and having contact with the siblings and the mother, would be contrary to RP's welfare in circumstances where she will also have had her attachment with LR severed by the move and the detrimental consequences for RP's emotional and psychological health that I have found would flow from that.
(8) Whilst it is right an SGO would have the benefit of preserving RP's legal relationship with her birth family it would, in my judgment, expose RP to the risks inherent in any future applications. Both parents have maintained their opposition to RP remaining in LR's care, as they said in evidence they would continue to seek RP's placement in Poland and would use any legal means to achieve that. The history of abduction can't be ignored neither can the recent posting of video clips accompanied by messages complaining about orders or decisions made in these proceedings. Whilst I accept they have taken no active steps to undermine RP's placement with LR, the findings made by HHJ Rowe Q.C. related to RP as well. Having heard both parents give oral evidence it is clear their negative feelings about RP's continued placement with LR are not far below the surface. Additionally, as has been demonstrated in the evidence, the mother is not someone who has a history of co-operating with professionals. She has lied on many occasions, most recently in her statement about securing a full-time job with an agreement attached. When faced with different evidence from the Polish authorities she accepted was this was simply untrue and had been concocted by her. Neither parent could provide even the most basic information about where they were staying here, their evidence was vague and evasive. I consider if an SGO was made there is the real risk of repeated applications to the court, which even if managed by the court, would have the effect of undermining the stability of the placement to the detriment of RP's welfare needs.
(9) The court must weigh in the balance the importance of family ties including the right of the child to preserve its identity in accordance with Article 8.1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, they should only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and only when nothing else will do. I accept everything should be done to preserve personal relations and support restoration of family relations but that can't take place in a vacuum, without regard to the lifelong welfare needs of the child. Having regard to the lifelong welfare needs of RP any order other than a care and placement order, endorsing the plan for her to be placed with prospective adopters is contrary to her lifelong welfare needs. I agree with the conclusions of the Children's Guardian.
(10) I fully recognise and weigh in the balance the loss for RP if a placement order is made of her legal relationship with her birth family and her loss of her Polish nationality but I am satisfied her welfare needs require the stability and security that can be provided with the placement order and her other welfare needs regarding her cultural heritage, language and contact with her birth family can be met in other ways.