IN THE BARNET COUNTY COURT	No. BT13C00034
St Mary's Court
Regent's Park Road
Finchley Central N3 1BQ
Wednesday, 30th April 2014

In the matter of the Children Act 1989
In the Matter of C (a child)

Before:

HER HONOUR JUDGE VENABLES
Re ; C ( a child )

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(In Private)

This judgment was delivered in private. The Judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment ) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons including representatives of the media must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

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MR. X (instructed by Legal Services, London Borough of Enfield) appeared on behalf of the Applicant .

MR. Y (instructed by the Official Solicitor) appeared as Litigation Friend on behalf of the Mother (A).

THE SECOND RESPONDENT  Father (B) did not attend and was not represented.

MS. Z (instructed by Wilsons) appeared on behalf of the Guardian.

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J U D G M E N T
(As approved by the Judge)
JUDGE VENABLES: 

1	This is a tragic case relating to the welfare of a very small baby C born on 15th August 2013.  His mother is A and his father B.  The baby's Guardian is Ms. Paula Kelly.

2	I give this extempore judgment at the conclusion of the final hearing of the local authority's applications for care orders and placement orders.  The mother is represented through the Official Solicitor by virtue of being without capacity.  The father, who has been joined to these proceedings and previously appeared by counsel, is neither present nor represented today.  All other parties are represented by their advocates. I have had an opportunity of reading the court bundles and the report of the Guardian, recently received.
3	The mother has been diagnosed as having treatment resistant schizophrenia and the view of the professionals is that she is unlikely to ever live independently.  She has chronic delusions, she has seen herself as God's messenger and is actually a man from Egyptian times.
4	At the time of the baby's birth she had been detained under s.3 of the Mental Health Act in the G Hospital.  Her pregnancy was detected whilst she was in hospital.  The baby, unfortunately, developed an infection during his delivery which required antibiotics, but that infection has been addressed.  C was discharged from hospital into foster care on 21st August 2013, where he remains.  He has never, therefore, been in the care of either his mother or his father.
5	The mother accepted that she had given birth to C and said that the baby had not been planned.  Her attitude to the pregnancy and to the baby was ambivalent at best.  Initially she did not seek contact or ask about the baby and, indeed, when the professionals sought to discuss the baby with her, she became distressed.  Because of the nature and severity of the mother's illness, she was not assessed as a carer, but contact did, however, commence after the mother expressed a wish to see C.  Eventually, however, the local authority obtained an order enabling them to refuse contact.  The mental health worker was concerned about the impact of contact on the mother's mental health and the local authority were concerned about the child's welfare arising from the mother's ongoing delusions.  The mother herself reported that she did not seek contact beyond the first few weeks of the baby's life believing  that her baby had been ‘swapped’ for another child.  
6	It took some time for the father to be identified.  Initially he was identified only by his first name and it took a little while to identify who he in fact was.  B was  then approached and DNA tests were taken, which confirmed parentage, and that discovery brought about some delay in this process.
7	The father in fact has another child with whom he has no contact.  
He is himself a vulnerable adult.  He lives with his mother on whom he is reliant.  He underwent a parenting and cognitive assessment through the Moorfields Centre.  The parenting assessment was negative.  
Dr. Powis, the psychologist working as part of the centre, reports that the father has low borderline intellectual function.  He was diagnosed as ADHD by 
Mr. Shuttleworth, the clinical psychologist.  Dr. Powis reports that the father's presentation is consistent with autistic spectrum disorder and that whilst there are many parents who are able to offer good enough parenting for children whilst they themselves struggle with the difficulties arising from ADHD and autistic spectrum disorder, the difficulties for B are pronounced.  He has significant social difficulties, struggling even to manage his own needs, requiring prompts from his mother to deal with matters such as feeding, dress, routine.
8	The paternal grandmother, who was assessed as part of the wider family, has also been negatively assessed.  She has not formally challenged that assessment.  When B was advised of the view of the Moorfields Unit there was an angry outburst.  He has not worked with the local authority since being informed of the outcome of their assessment and has not sought to take up contact.  So whilst he has not formally challenged the outcome of the local authority's assessment; this court treats him as opposing the local authority's plans.
9	The local authority in the early stages of these proceedings did approach members of the mother's extended family, albeit without the overt consent of the mother.  The reason the local authority did so was to ensure that all opportunities for placement within the family could be considered.  The members of the mother's wider family were not able to offer themselves as carers for C to support the care of C within the community.
10	It is against this background then that I must consider the local authority's applications for a care order and placement order, with the care plan being that of adoption.  The local authority plan is for indirect contact on an annual basis.  The Official Solicitor, who appears on behalf of the mother, does not oppose the plan of the local authority.  The father, as I say, will be treated for the purposes of this hearing as opposing that plan.
11	There is no doubt that s.31 of the Children Act is made out. The threshold is not in dispute.  Thus, looking at the welfare evaluation and all realistic placement options, and considering the lifelong welfare of Baby in the context of the Adoption and Children Act, I must look to determine what is the appropriate plan.  If the local authority's plan is for a care order and placement order, it is necessary for the court to consider the first principles as indeed it must do at every stage of the process.  The Convention right to respect for private and family life, has a key principle  which is that the aim should be to reunite the family when circumstances enable that to be achieved, and energy and resources should be devoted towards that end.  Severing contact and the relationship between a child and their family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child.  The Supreme Court in the matter of Re B: Child care proceedings [2013] UKSC 33 emphasised that  non‑consensual adoptions are a  last resort, only to be made where nothing else will do and to be made only in exceptional circumstances or where motivated by the overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare.  My paramount concern is the welfare of C and as the local authority seek a placement order, that is his welfare throughout his life.
12	In determining where his best interests lie, I have to have regard to the checklist in s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 and s.1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  The court always has to weigh very carefully in the balance the incalculable benefit to a child in being cared for by a member of the family, and in this case particularly his father, but the court cannot ignore the assessments of Moorfields, including that of Dr. Powis.  The court has weighed very carefully in the balance the written evidence of the social worker and the very thorough analysis of the Guardian, who supports the making of care and placements orders.
13	C is not of an age or understanding where his wishes or feelings could be a determinative factor.  He has never lived with either parent and is thriving as a small baby in care.  I am in no doubt that he would wish to be with the family if that were safe and consistent with his welfare, but C requires a permanent and settled home which provides him with a safe and secure environment, which meets all of his needs and which provides a solid basis for his future life to meet his full potential.
14	The welfare need is immediate and cannot wait.  He will experience lifelong losses resulting from his ceasing to be a member of his birth family and becoming an adoptive child if the local authority plan is implemented.  That of course includes an impact upon his self-esteem and his sense of identity.  A plan of permanency by way of adoption, however, can bring advantages and a lifelong committed and enduring relationship with prospective adoptive family members.  The court has to take into account the significant potential for harm if C were to be returned to the care of either of his parents, which by virtue of their very significant but individual personal difficulties, cannot reasonably be supplemented in the community to make any form of supported care viable.
15	Looking at the wishes of the father as they were last stated, I fully understand his wish to be able to care for C in the future, and there is no doubt that he cares, but given the risks, the court has to say that the value of C's relationship with both his mother and his father can be sustained by appropriate life story work.  Sadly, the court  has to conclude that because of the parents  personal difficulties they cannot meet the needs of C and there is clear and compelling evidence from the professionals which the court is persuaded by and which leads the court to  make the orders as sought by the local authority for both care and placement orders. 
16	I should add that in considering the placement options, where family is not a viable option, the court has of course looked at whether or not foster care is viable  for this child.  Fostering is a less interventionist option and falls short of severing the legal ties with the birth family.  It is more likely to provide a vehicle for maintaining contact with the natural family.  A placement order, however, would ultimately make C a permanent part of the adoptive family, to which he would then belong throughout his life.  Adoption would very probably feel very different for C from being with long term foster carers.  It would also protect C from ongoing involvement with the agencies throughout his minority as would necessarily follow if he were placed in a long term foster placement.  Thus, I am satisfied that his overriding welfare requires and justifies intervention in the family.
17	I have to go on to consider the issue of dispensing with consent.  Section 52(1)(b) of the 2002 Act provides that the consent of the parent with capacity can only be dispensed with if the welfare of the child requires it.  In this instance the mother does not have capacity to give consent.  
I treat B as having the capacity to do so.  I consider that in the circumstances C’s welfare requires his consent to be dispensed with, and I therefore go on to dispense with his consent and to make both the care and placement orders.

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