Case No: NE15C00591 
In the FAMILY COURT at
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE   

 
The Quayside
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 3LA  

8th April 2016
B E F O R E:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE SIMON WOOD

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Re X/Y

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Compril Limited
Telephone: 01642 232324
Facsimile: 01642 244001
Denmark House
169-173 Stockton Street
Middlehaven
Middlesbrough
TS2 1BY

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

JUDGMENT
Introduction

1.	The court is concerned for the third time with the welfare of the X and Y children, two sib-sets of three, unrelated biologically, but thrown together by the marriage of the X children’s mother, M, now aged 32 and a divorcee and the Y children’s father, FY, now 35, a widower.  

2.	The X children whose father, FX, is 37, are A, B and C and the Y children, D, E and F.  

3.	On 26th November I gave judgment in a substantial contested interim care application in which Northumberland County Council sought the removal of all six children from the care of M.  I found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the children had been and were being exposed to emotional harm from the acrimonious relationship between M and both fathers, as a consequence of which the children had, to a greater or lesser extent, been prevented from having a relationship with their fathers.

4.	On 27th January, having directed an early fact finding hearing because of the seriousness and controversy of the allegations made by M against both fathers, I gave judgment dismissing all but one of the allegations, that being against FY, which he had accepted, and expressed the court’s concern as to the very serious nature of the harm to which the children had been exposed by M, which had, effectively alienated them from their fathers.  

5.	Beginning on 4th April, I conducted a welfare hearing, on the local authority presenting plans which are supported by each of the fathers and the Children’s Guardian, Wendy McGaughey.  In respect of A, a care order with a plan of long term foster care, albeit with a medium to longer term plan of rehabilitation to his paternal family, with his younger siblings going to reside with FX, and his now wife, FWX, their stepmother, under a child arrangements order, underpinned by a supervision order.  

6.	In respect of the two younger Y children, the plan is for them to join their older sister, D, who, since May 2015, has been living with her maternal grandmother, MGMY, under a special guardianship order, also to be underpinned by a supervision order.  

7.	Save in respect of B, these plans are opposed in their entirety by M, who seeks to continue to care for the five children presently in her care, albeit offers to do so under a supervision order.  

8.	The background and the findings are set out in detail in the substantial judgments from December and January, each of which has been transcribed and will, if not already there, be published on BAILII, so I do not intend to repeat it here.  

9.	The scope of this welfare enquiry has been altogether more limited.  I have only heard from the key social worker, SW; from Dr Young, a consultant clinical psychologist, who Her Honour Judge Hudson directed to assess M and the children, before my involvement, back on 9th November.  I have heard from M, briefly from each father and from the Children’s Guardian.  That said, the issues could not be more important, so the relatively limited nature of the enquiry does not in any sense reflect on its significance.  

The Law

10.	Care proceedings involve two principal questions – first, are the threshold criteria for making a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 satisfied?  Secondly, if so, what order should the court make?  Section 31(2) provides:

“A court may only make a care order, or supervision order, if it is satisfied that (a) the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him, if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable expect a parent to give him.”

11.	In this case, it is not now disputed that the threshold criteria under section 31 are satisfied.  My findings in the proceedings, in particular the hearing in January, lead inexorably to the conclusion that on the relevant date, namely the date on which these proceedings started, these children were suffering significant harm and that it was attributable to the care that had been afforded to them by their mother.

12.	The findings in this case, as I indicated in January, could not be more serious.  This mother has caused significant emotional harm to all six children.  She has alienated them from their fathers; she has damaged their sense of identity and, in the case of the X children, alienated them from their stepfather.  The court found that FX had not caused M any harm.  Save in relation to the one incident in which FY admitted slapping M on 31st August 2014, as well as the many arguments between him and M which had been harmful to the children, the court accepted that otherwise FY had not caused M any harm.  

13.	In reaching that decision, I found M to be not just an unreliable, but a dishonest and manipulative witness.  The complexities of her presentation, noted in previous assessments which baffled the then experts, were echoed by the court, and have not been better illuminated, despite the considerable efforts of Dr Young, who reported after the judgment and later was able to see that the court had, quite independently, reached strikingly similar conclusions to her own.  The contrast with the fathers, again noted from a professional point of view by the experts with regard to FX in the earlier proceedings, but also by the local authority, the Guardian and the court, in respect of both parents, remains a noteworthy feature.  

Issue for this Hearing

14.	The response of persons subject to a fact finding hearing is always key to the way forward.  The fathers each accept the judgment in January, as one might expect.  Having indicated to SW that she maintains the allegations I dismissed, and noting the local authority’s concern, M’s considered response was set out in her statement as follows:

“I know what happened to me within my relationships with FX and FY.  I was not able to establish that in court, beyond a finding that FY was physically abusive to me on 31st August.  I may not accept Judge Wood’s findings in respect of my historic relationship with FX, but I do agree that my stance with regard to contact has served to alienate the boys from their father.  I am sorry that that is the situation, but I felt that in keeping the boys from their father, I was protecting them from the abusive behaviour that he had shown towards me and his bullying of me to effect contact.”

15.	That is what she largely repeated to me in the course of her evidence, to which I will come, by reference to her inability to prove her allegations.  Of course, in setting out the law as I did in the fact finding judgment, at paragraph 22 I quoted in full Lord Hoffmann’s well known passage as to the court’s treatment of facts in issue.  In short, the value of zero was returned in respect of M’s disputed allegations and so those facts are treated as not having happened.  M’s response is not really adequate in seeking to justify what she now admits was alienating behaviour, based on facts that did not happen, yet alleged facts that she continues to believe are true.

16.	Having thus harmed the children, the central question is therefore whether, going forwards, as she argues, she can meet the children’s welfare needs despite that past and that non-acceptance of the court’s findings.  M says that with the passage of time, with greater maturity on her part and that of FX, she can and she seeks to persuade the court that she has already gone a significant way to demonstrate that she can be relied on to cooperate.  Set against the dramatic change in the circumstances of each of the children, save for D, proposed, that is obviously the central balancing question.

The Children

17.	Before turning to the oral evidence received, I should say something about each of these children, by way of identifying their needs.  A, who is now 14 years 8 months old, is by common consent the most troubled of them all.  His alienation from FX is complete.  He refers to him by the letter (his initial).  He does not identify with the name X, but rather that of Y.  I will come to what turned out to be a significant issue as to the names by which the X children are known in a little while.  A has been known to services for several years, dating back to the time that the family lived (out of the area) with referrals for a constellation of concerns; very disturbed sleep; very disturbing nightmares; preoccupation with death; threats of self-harm.  No specific diagnosis appears ever to have been made, but he has required considerable support with regard to his emotional and behavioural development, as well as needing specialist psychological support to address his entrenched negative views of FX and paternal family.

18.	His mother described him to Dr Young as “complex, very anxious, with odd compulsive and rigid regimes”.  Dr Young found, in exploring family relations, that it was very difficult to gain any sense of his relationships.  There was no sense of balance of positive or negative feelings towards them.  They were either extremely positive, “idealised” she said, particularly his mother and the other children, or extremely negative about FX and FY who are “shut off or rejected with no opportunity for repair”, both excluded entirely from the family relations exercise.  

19.	Despite M describing very serious behavioural issues which affected his psychological wellbeing, she said that in the six months previously these had all cleared up without intervention, raising a question in Dr Young’s mind as to whether they had existed at all.  In common with all of the children, Dr Young identified the inability of them to have thrived emotionally within their care giving environment due to adult conflict and, in A’s case, he had been denied an alternative picture of FX .  In short, there was, to her, clear evidence that he is demonstrating alienation brought about by the denial of contact, alongside allegations that have not been proved, with A aligning himself exclusively with M.  

20.	B, now 13 years one month, is a guarded boy, functioning academically below age related expectations, currently on a personal educational plan.  A boy subject to many health appointments, such that fictitious or induced illness was suspected, but ultimately not proved, likewise, he has an ambivalent attitude to FX, albeit not as extreme as that of A.  Dr Young identified him as having been alienated as well.  He also presented with idealisation of family relationships.  Dr Young described him as “emotionally guarded, a troubled young boy, emotionally needy of adult attention”, something that was also noted by his school.

21.	C, now 11 years 10 months, is a boy with a diagnosis of ADHD, having been treated for such from maybe as early as 2008.  There is a question raised about that diagnosis by FX and Dr Young as the assessment on which the treatment that has followed was based has never been seen.  He remains under the monitoring of the Children & Young Persons’ Service and the local authority has identified the need for specialist psychological support in the event of him moving from M’s care.  The X child who most readily cooperated with Dr Young, she found him not overly preoccupied with the involvement of the services, which C attributed to FY, who he said was “grumpy, shouty and wacky”.  Close to his family, FX and FY were banished to outer circles; he attributed very positive statements to M and siblings, but there was little to distinguish them and Dr Young struggled to build up a real sense of the dynamics of his family relationships as well.  Academically the most able, he is nevertheless functioning below age related expectations and he, too, is on a personal educational plan.  The most confident and emotionally open of the three, he was the least embroiled in the negative narrative held about FX, but he too had a very negative view of FY.

22.	Turning to the Y children.  D is now fourteen and a half and left M’s home eleven months ago.  Apart from, I believe, one contact she has not seen her again.  The local authority commented on the extent to which D opened up when she went to live with her grandmother, in contrast to her presentation before.  MGMY describes how introverted she was on arrival and the difficulties she had in enforcing boundaries, which in turn led to tantrums.  Her emotional health is not good, with behaviour and mood regressing following contact with extended family.  Dr Young found her hard to engage, polite but wary.  She described an on/off relationship with M, but prior to her father separating from M she said she could not think of anything that she did not like.  Dr Young described real concerns for her emotional wellbeing; a girl who struggles to share feelings, who has swung from a very negative view of FY, when he and M separated, to an unrealistic, idealised view of him now, despite what has been his inconsistency over contact.  

23.	E, 13 years one month, has been found to be an integral part of both her maternal and paternal biological families, as well as that of her step-maternal family.  She engaged well in assessment and was at ease talking to Dr Young.  She recognised problems within the family – FY moving out; FY and M screaming and shouting at each other when arguing.  She is reported to have taken the departure of D badly and, along with her father leaving, she has struggled emotionally to make sense of what has happened, such that Dr Young identified a risk of her being emotionally estranged if she is not supported going forwards.  

24.	F, who is 11, the youngest of the six, is a child about whom M had reported some developmental issues and he attributes his current circumstances to FY, “in case he hits us”.  Whilst FY had never done that, he described lots of arguments in terms of him having to hide under his bed with his teddy.  Dr Young described him as emotionally sensitive.  School report him dissolving into tears most days at the slightest thing.  Functioning cognitively at a low level, struggling to cope with everyday expectations, Dr Young said of him:

“A very confused little boy, whose head is all over the place.”

25.	Apart from her individual comments about each, Dr Young said to me:

“When I left this family, I felt I did not have a great understanding of them.”

26.	Expressing varying levels of concern about each, with the answers from the X children regarding attachments being particularly unsatisfactory.

“They were all very nice about each other.”

27.	Despite describing the use of tools designed to bring out positives and negatives, these were all lacking.  That observation was echoed by SW, who described them as:

“Emotionally immature children with additional needs due to the losses they have suffered; their instability; their many home moves and adult conflict.  Furthermore, all of them have confused identities, which are conflicted.”  

28.	This, therefore, sets the scene for the determination that the court has to make.  

Social Work Evidence

29.	SW is a young and relatively new social worker, having qualified in 2013.  This is a case, and indeed family, that would present significant problems for the most experienced social worker and, without in any way criticising her, I question whether it was fair or reasonable to allocate it to her, in late 2015, against such a formidable and complex history.

30.	She is the author of all of the care plans, the parenting assessment of M and the local authority final evidence.  It is a considerable piece of work and in advancing the plans that she does, she has, in the court’s judgment, been well able to identify its essential features.  Since the judgment, she highlights M’s response to it, noting the lack of significant incidents since it was given.  She also draws attention to FY’s inconsistent approach to contact, in part at least attributable to his work, which has nevertheless caused distress to his children, whose reaction causes her to point to his present inability to prioritise their needs, above those that he may have.  In any event, she draws attention to the fact that the police investigation that was instigated last summer has not resolved.

31.	FX’s consistent contact, by contrast, with B and C, is noted, with B presenting challenging behaviours and FX’s enduring concern about M’s emotional care of both boys, is highlighted.  D’s refusal to have contact with M and A’s refusal to work with SW over contact with FX are also highlighted.  She records M’s more positive approach and engagement, since the judgment in January, albeit she struggles to ascertain whether this is genuine or, as she put it, “disguised compliance”.  She emphasises there is no issue with regard to M’s basic care, but the history remains with no greater understanding of M’s mental health, despite the recent assessment of her.  

32.	The assessment of FX and his wife is positive, hence her recommendation of a child arrangements order in respect of the younger X children, underpinned by a supervision order.  

33.	The assessment of FY is negative, on the grounds of his failure to protect the children at the time of the marriage; limitations in his parenting capacity; his commitment to contact; his ability to understand and meet the additional needs that the children present, are all telling against him – an assessment that he has, for present purposes, accepted.

34.	She did not carry out the special guardianship assessment of MGMY, but draws attention to it, noting that it was positive. 

35.	Following the fact finding hearing, like Dr Young, she notes a bizarre presentation in terms of the children’s devotion to M, with no negative views, the lack of balance and the power and control which is exercised by M in – as she puts it – “such an unhealthy way.”  Hence, her conclusion M cannot meet the children’s emotional needs and the need to find alternative placements.

36.	She is highly alive, however, to the difficulties that this present.  All save for D wish to live with M.  So the fall out of an enforced move will be significant.  A, presently, hates FX, but despite the evident distress that it will cause, it is her view that a move to foster care will, on balance, harm him less than his continued exposure to M’s care.  If it goes well, as she hopes, she would like to see it result in a move to paternal family care in due course.

37.	There are also practical difficulties.  MGMY lives in a two bedroom flat.  She needs to move but cannot until it is known that the children can live with her.  No permanent foster carer has been identified for A; a bridging placement alone has been identified at the present time.  Set against that, the Y sibling group has been split up with harmful consequences.  Although the X group will be split up, the work with A can only in the local authority view take place outside M’s care.  

38.	So, in a detailed BS analysis, in which the pros and cons of the realistic options are closely analysed, she explains how the local authority arrives at its care plans and despite the considerable change in the circumstances of each child, concludes that such is necessary to begin the process of healing the harm caused over such a long period of time.  

39.	SW was cross examined on the basis that none of this is either necessary or desirable, because the harm that she seeks to avoid is outweighed by the harm that it will cause and it is unnecessary because M has demonstrated an ability to cooperate, to work with professionals and to promote contact.  She was able to develop the positives that M offers, in terms of basic care, physical presentation, emotional warmth, their good routines, the easy interaction also witnessed by Dr Young, who had observed a family meal.  There were positive reports recently from school regarding the support that M offered the children.  She acknowledged that the children viewed themselves as being close and there was no dispute that M loves the children all equally.  She sees the Y children as her own, but she was also able to acknowledge that E has a clear understanding of the fact that she had a biological mother and now a step-mother.  

40.	SW insisted that there is confusion about these children’s identity.  I will come to the issue of names separately.  Whilst she accepted that she and M might have got off to a bad start when she took over the case, she could not help but think that M’s present engagement and cooperation was attributable to the litigation rather than any fundamental change of heart.  She gave examples of what she called M and her parents’ “passive aggression”; challenging her; putting boundaries in the way of progress, despite for example, helpful ideas, belatedly put forward, such as promoting A’s contact with his paternal grandparents, from whom he is also, through no fault that anyone can detect of theirs, estranged.  She was suspicious of this and the other examples, but her underlying concern was that such positive signs as there were, were attributable to litigation rather than enlightenment and expressed her fear as to what will happen when the litigation ends.  

41.	More directly to Mr Rowlands on behalf of FX, she said there was no evidence of acceptance of the judgment.  Indeed, as she went on to say to Ms Henley, on behalf of the children, she maintains the allegations.  The court’s finding of her responsibility for manipulation could equally apply to her behaviour now.  In short, there was no evidence that the risks previously identified had been reduced.  She accepted that, by contrast, none of these concerns applied either to FX and his wife, or MGMY, whom it is proposed should live with them and their needs well.  

42.	Also to Ms Henley, SW said that M’s views were shared by her parents, whom she described as “openly hostile”, as well as being unable to assist with tasks such as contact handover, handing over children to the paternal family, even if that was to MGMY or FWX.  She said that nothing had happened in the lifetime of this and the previous litigation in terms of progress without pressure; the dishonesty of M was an enduring concern and there was still no clear picture of these children who have been indoctrinated and manipulated.  

The Psychological Assessment

43.	Dr Young confirmed her opinion was unaltered by the judgment or the work that has been done since.  As a consequence of her findings about the emotional wellbeing of each child, she supports the care plans.  I have already recited a significant part of her views about each child.  Of M, she found her as enigmatic as other professionals have in this long history.  The amnesia made psychological assessment very difficult.  She had to be cautious about accepting M’s account.  She struggled to make sense of the incident in Merseyside when M ended up hospitalised, trying to understand the impact of M’s mental health and emotional difficulties of the children.  M kept reverting to how things were better now.  A complex history and emotional presentation, but it was difficult to comprehend the underlying aetiology.  What she said was:

“It suggests a degree of psychological fragility and a pattern of poor coping and defence mechanisms in regard to stressful events, at times resulting in dissociative symptoms, for example memory loss and deliberate self-injurious behaviour.”

44.	Of her relationship histories, she said that there was a pattern of M forming quickly intense relationships without taking time to appraise them.  She had been unable to attend to the emotional needs of her children, or safeguard them emotionally.  She struggled to manage feelings about her partners or maintain boundaries about what is or is not appropriate for the children in her care to know.  The positive X children’s contact with FX, when it eventually happened, was irreconcilable with their previously expressed negative views.  

45.	In identifying concern about M’s capacity to meet the children’s emotional, not practical care, she said this:

“This assessment raises concerns about M’s ability to manage here close, intimate relationships and the messages this communicates to the children.  Historically, it is my view that the children have not been protected from adult issues and their own views and feelings have been inextricably caught up in those of the adults, making an understanding of their needs complicated.  This is particularly evident in the relationship difficulties between A and B and their father and latterly in all the children’s expressed views about FY when he left the family home.  At present it seems E and F and being supported to continue a relationship with their father and this is positive.  But, given the allegations that M has made against FY and in light of a similar pattern of concerns in relation to FX, I think one has to question her capacity to promote this relationship in the longer term.  

More generally, there seems a theme whereby the children are struggling to integrate the different aspects of their family identity and this reflects M’s struggle to manage the breakdowns in her own relationships, where those who leave the family home are somehow cut off from existing relationships.  This has also been D’s experience, although I acknowledge the local authority has had a role in determining contact plans and I understand there has been very limited contact.  D’s exclusion from the family raises issues about M’s capacity to manage the challenges of adolescence; the extreme nature of her and M’s response – removing the bedroom door – is concerning.  D at that time was in a difficult place emotionally, having lost her father in the context of her other life experiences, and this raises questions about how the other Y children may be managed if such issues arise for them.

For E, in particular, she currently has mixed emotions about her father, which are likely to intensify if the current situation with regard to contact ensues.  The assessment raises concerns about the sibling relationships between D, E and F.  Since D left the family home their relationship appears to have become more difficult, as D is realigning her family identify as somewhat separate from E and F.  In the light of their mother’s death and an inconsistent relationship with their father, I think it is important that they are supported to enjoy close relationships with one another as much as possible.”

46.	On the nub of the issue facing the court, Dr Young said this to me:

“In order to rectify the harm, long term plans have to be about long term emotional stability, in an environment equipped to manage emotional needs. Looking at the evidence to hand, the question is whether M can promote the children’s individual emotional needs in the context of a relationship with their father.  The job of any resident parent, and it comes with responsibility, is to allow them to have permission with other significant adults.  With the X children, this has been severely lacking; it has improved but it remains problematic.  Only one X child is going regularly and happily to their father.  My view is it is really important that we promote the sibling groups.  E and F live very separate from their biological family; they need to have that promoted, moving forwards, as part of their identity.”

47.	In acknowledging the difficulty of the impact of separation, she said:

“They have been a sibling group since 2008; there will be an impact.  It is difficult to say though what relationships are, because all are glowingly nice about each other.”

48.	In cross examination by Mr Worrall, Dr Young acknowledged the impact of separating the children from M, albeit emphasised that it would depend upon how it was done.  The practical problems – the lack of immediate long term placement for A; the lack of accommodation for MGMY – were recognised by her, but on balance were manageable, in her view, against the alternative of leaving the children in a placement with a mother who could not support or promote a move, with which she did not agree.  She went on to give sensible, practical advice as to how to manage matters.  Not, for example, to change everything at once and to keep other aspects of life as unaltered as possible.  

The Mother

49.	So that brings me to M, who, as at the fact finding hearing, was really central to this hearing.  She has filed a lengthy statement from which I have already quoted in full what she said about a comprehensive, 138 paragraph judgment which I accept would, or should, have made painful reading.  Noting the plans supported by Dr Young, she challenges their necessity and set out the following are a catalogue of complaints, justifications, maintenance of beliefs and criticisms of FY, FX, SW and the local authority.  Indeed, the only positive relationship reported is with the relatively recently appointed child support worker, Keith Herron.  She identifies the harm which she believes the local authority plans will cause the children, describing it as “deeply harmful and ill thought out” and argues that she will cooperate with any steps designed to keep the children together, with her pointing out the additional risk posed to the children of FX, given his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis and of the Y children of MGMY’s history of problem drinking.

50.	In a separate statement she produced a series of references from no doubt worthy people who describe her parenting in glowing terms.  In her oral evidence, she emphasised that her cooperation since Christmas had been complete. She stressed the closeness of the children’s relationships.  Asked in examination in chief about the importance of A knowing FX, though I had to bring her back from a discursive response involving memory books and his reaction, but pressed, she eventually accepted that it was important, the relationship, or knowing FX, but said that she had only realised last year just how important it was, because it was part of who he is.

51.	She emphasised that whilst going at A’s pace, she was “more encouraging in bringing it up before him”, and had at Christmas suggested making a fly for his paternal grandfather, as well as taking A in the car when dropping his brothers off for contact.  Work that she felt she could build on.  That said, progress over FX’s name was slow.  It appeared that A had referred to FX by name on three or four occasions, but he remained the letter (his initial) in Dr Young’s assessment.  

52.	She said she encouraged B to go to contact when he had been reluctant and she had supported both E and F when FY had been inconsistent regarding his contact.  

“I’ve been promoting it without fail even when it’s not happening.”

53.	Cross examined, she denied that she had been obstructive from November to January with SW.  Taken to a detailed attendance note of SW, which the local authority relied on in support of that assertion, she denied that, as at 1st December, she had been obstructive regarding SW’s proposals to engage with A.  She denied that she or her parents had been obstructive or challenging; she denied that she had been unhappy giving SW unrestricted time with the children; and she denied that she was seeking to control SW, for example by wanting to know in advance everything that the social worker was going to say to the children.  

54.	Ms Woolridge explored with M her reaction to the judgment.  

“I believe the judge came to a fair conclusion and that I wasn’t able to get across what I wanted to.  I don’t say it is wrong, but I don’t fully acknowledge everything.  I wasn’t able to prove everything in court.”

55.	Pressed, she conceded it was painful to read:

“I still believe both men were abusive.”

56.	Findings that she had lied, manipulated and caused the children significant emotional harm made her:

“Angry and upset and a hundred other different feelings as well.”

57.	Specifically of the finding she had been dishonest:

“I was not able to convince the judge I was telling the truth.”

“Likewise, with Dr Young, I answered her questions as best I could, but there was an awful lot to go through.”

58.	Asked about whether she took any responsibility for A being alienated she said:

“I do, but I’ve been trying to put it right for the past three or four years.  I’m a lot older than I was in 2010.”

59.	Again, pressed, she accepted that she was maybe more than 50% responsible for that alienation.  Asked by Mr Rowlands if she had caused the children significant harm, her response was, “As to?”  Pressed, she said:

“Some things I haven’t handled properly, it’s not a simple question.”

60.	Specifically put to her, had she caused emotional harm, her response was:

“Hindsight is an amazing thing.  Of late, I haven’t stopped A, it’s down to him, I’ve promoted contact for three years.  I wasn’t the only person opposing, FY supported me.”

61.	Saying that part of the criticism should be laid at the door of FY:

“For two years, I have been fully compliant and fully supportive of all contact offering extra contact with family members.”

62.	Asked if A was alienated from his grandparents, she did not demur, but said:

“I don’t know why, he’s nothing against them, he was just never included in the local authority contact.”

63.	Asked by Ms Henley if A was afraid of FX, “I have never asked him”, was her response.  Pointing out that M had, in her evidence, described school as a place of safety, and going to the father’s house but being in the car made him feel safe, she said:

“I think he is afraid of what happened, seeing his dad hit me.”

64.	When it was put to her that the court had found that had never happened, she said it was A’s view:

“I haven’t poisoned him, I am still in a place that it did happen.”

65.	She denied that she had indoctrinated A. 

66.	Each father gave evidence about the discrete issue of the name change and I will come to that.  

The Children’s Guardian

67.	Finally, the Children’s Guardian gave evidence.  Of all the professionals, she has had by far the longest involvement, being appointed a rule 16.4 Guardian on 19th July 2013.  As I said in closing, for a long time she was a lone voice because she has consistently advocated from well before the care proceedings were taken that the only solution was for the children to be removed from M’s care, owing to her long standing concern.  So no one has been under any illusions as to her stance.  

68.	In her initial analysis, she disagreed with the local authority care plan of maintaining the placement at home.  Indeed, the local authority was challenged at the interim care hearing, on the basis that the Guardian had been instrumental in changing its care plan, something it denied, despite the unsatisfactory approach I described in the November hearing.  

69.	In her final analysis, the Guardian notes her increasing concern and the recurring theme of guarded children and an inability to gain insight into family life, despite extensive work and scrutiny.  She attributes that lack of insight to M, who manages to portray a picture of harmonious family life, lacking dissent, which is a false picture, because it is achieved by her ability to control and manipulate the children to a harmful degree.  

70.	Noting her alarm at M’s inability to reflect on the fact finding judgment and her dismissal of the concerns, she shared the local authority view that M’s current cooperation is neither purposeful nor enduring, drawing on her long history of failure to engage and then only doing so under duress.  Her trenchant view extended to FY, whom she also believed had failed to protect, hence her inability to support the placement of the Y children with him.  Despite M attributing her relationship with FY as the cause of her problems, she believed that M continued to pose a significant risk to the children.  In her oral evidence, she developed her belief that M’s cooperation has had to be gained by coercion, describing the experience of painfully slow progress; the thwarting of hearings by non-attendance; the failure to give instructions and resisting proposals.  She could not engage her; she found her to be passive and distant and likewise she found it difficult to engage the children, having to take quite exceptional measures to tread around issues, indeed even to meet with the children.  

71.	Mr Worrall challenged her pessimistic view of M’s ability to change by reference to her acceptance of at least a part in the alienation.  Of it, Mrs McGaughey said “a limited acknowledgement, but a step forwards”.  As to cooperation since December, Mrs McGaughey felt it would have come to a halt, absent the pressure.  “I would need to reflect on my involvement” and she gave a list of past issues by way of examples.

“I feel her approach is that she is being forced to address things, but outside I’m not convinced that she has the motivation to respond proactively.  Supervision would underpin a placement with her, but it is not sufficient.  M lacks insight and motivation to address things, save under duress.”

72.	She said that if M had encouraged a reluctant B to go to contact she did not accept that she had done it of her own volition and she said that if M offered support to the Y children when FY did not turn up for contact, then that would reflect well on her.  But she had never witnessed what Mr Rowlands suggested was a sea change.  

Further Findings

73.	Having made findings of fact almost universally negative towards M, there have been few further findings I have been asked to make in this hearing.  But M asserts cooperation and invites me to trust her to give her a chance to avoid what everyone acknowledges would be the devastating effect of the change of the circumstances of the children, explicit in the local authority plans, and so further assessment of her reliability, her openness and honest is required.  

74.	As it happens, a further issue has arisen, that affords the court another opportunity to test her veracity in the world following that judgment.  That is the issue of the X children’s names.  Without being critical of anyone, this point has been rather overlooked up until now, despite an order made on 26th November requiring evidence relating to this issue to be provided by M.  It has, in the event, taken up a good deal of the court’s time this week to unravel, but documents now produced provide the following incontrovertible facts.

75.	(i)	On 24th August 2010, in Deeds of Change of Name – a deed poll – M changed the surnames of each of the X children to Y.  

(ii) 	On a date before 5th June 2015, M applied for passports for each X child; passports that were issued by the Passport Office in the name of Y.  

(iii) 	On 27th May 2015, in anticipation and in support of the passport application, M asked FX to provide written confirmation of his acceptance that the passports be in the name X-Y.  FX acknowledges that he gave that consent.  He says that he did so in the belief that the children were still called X legally, but identified themselves as X-Y, in view of the long association that they had had with FY, during his marriage to their mother.  He denies absolutely knowing anything of the Deed Poll.  

76.	M said:

(i) 	 It is her belief – and I remind listeners she has no memory on which to draw, but relies on what FY told her, because of her amnesia – that FX consented to the change of name from X to Y, sometime prior to August 2010.  

(ii)  	The court in private law proceedings directed that the name X needed to be on all documents, hence the papers refer to X-Y.

(iii)	FX consented to the passports being in the name X-Y and provided a form of consent in support.  

(iv) 	However, the passports were returned by the Passport Office in the name Y.  

That that was so, was, first of all, a mistake by the Passport Office; secondly, overlooked by her and thirdly, only discovered when the travel agent noticed that the surnames did not match the bookings and on it being too late to get the passports amended.  Instead, she paid to alter the names on the travel bookings.  

77.	Just what has gone on?   M’s assertion that FX consented to the change of name of his children from X to Y in August 2010 is incredible, in the literal sense of the word.  This is, the court finds, a further and important part of the jigsaw that begins with:

(i)		on 9th June 2010 the unilateral stopping of FX’s contact with his children; 

(ii)		on 16th July 2010, M’s application for a non-molestation order, making allegations of the utmost seriousness, all of which have been discredited by the findings of this court; 

(iii)	 	it now ends on 24th August 2010 with M applying to change the names of his children to Y.  I find it is inconceivable that FX would have consented to a name change in such circumstances, or indeed in any circumstances.  

78.	M’s claim that his agreement to a change of name pre-dated the stopping of contact is untrue and is unsupported by any evidence.  She claims her knowledge of that alleged agreement came from FY.  He denies that absolutely, but he produces evidence that, if credible, would entirely contradict M’s alleged recollection.  Admittedly very late, he produced and showed to me electronically letters which were completed on “example letter 4B” template of the UK Deed Poll Service website.  It reads as follows, after noting the Y family address in (withheld).

“To whom it may concern.  Dear Sirs, I the undersigned having parental responsibility for AX, consent to his name being changed to AY.  I have a non-molestation order the children’s father dated from 16th July 2010 to 16th July 2012.  He has had no contact with the children due to this order and his violence towards named above and myself.  He is not to know of where we are, that is why we are changing surnames.  Yours faithfully, M.”

That is signed with an electronic signature.  Identical letters were produced in respect of each of the other two children.  The fact of the non-molestation order and the dates are correct.  Paragraph 7 of the Deed Poll service website reads, so far as is relevant, as follows:

“7.  Changing a child’s name when the mother has good reason for not wanting to contact the father for his consent.  To change a child’s surname when the father’s whereabouts is known, we usually need either the father’s consent, or a court order that gives the mother permission to change her child’s name without the father’s consent.  However, if the mother has good reason for not wanting to contact the father for his consent, it may be possible to change her child’s surname without the father’s consent or a court order.  Examples of situations where we will accept a Deed Poll application from a mother in such circumstances are …”

	Then there are four bullet points.  

•	The mother has fled the family home to escape violence or abuse from the father and is at risk or fearful of being located.

•	The mother is fearful of contacting the father because of past abuse, physical or mental, towards her or her children.

•	The father is in prison for a serious offence such as murder, rape or other sexual offence and the mother and children do not wish to be associated by name to the father.

•	Where the court has issued a no contact order or a non-molestation order.

	The passage goes on to indicate the need to send a letter in the form of example letter 4B, which is obviously a template within the website and the need to send such information as orders and so on in support.  

79.	M challenged the veracity of the documents produced by FY, which he said he had sent to FX in August 2015 – the challenge was to FX –on the basis that he, as an IT expert, had the ability not just to fabricate such a document but to make it appear as if it had been sent in August 2015, when in reality it was of very recent manufacture.  FX denied that saying that only a Microsoft insider was able to do that.  I should mention that when printed out, the document bears the date 7th April 2016.  That was the date it was printed out, yesterday.  FX explained to me how, despite appearing on the screen as bearing the date 16th August 2010, that is to say just before the Deed Poll application was made, the program itself alters the date automatically on being printed.

80.	I accept that explanation.  M has no evidence of any such interference, either in terms of its presentation on the computer, or indeed of fabrication.  The height of her evidence is that FY told her that FX had consented and FY gave evidence about this and was very clear that FX was not consulted at all.  

81.	I have no hesitation in concluding that M’s account is not to be preferred.  It stretches credulity to breaking point to consider that FX would consent to a change of his children’s names.  He had readily agreed to FY having delegated parental responsibility in 2008, at the time when he and FY said relations were good and he did so on the practical and pragmatic basis that it made good sense that FY should have the ability to exercise parental responsibility in case of an emergency.  It was, on his part, a commendable exercise of parental responsibility in his children’s best interests.  That was as much as FY needed.  There was no purpose in a change of name, which, as courts have repeatedly said, is an essential part of a person’s identity.  As far back as the House of Lords decision in Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] UKHL 18, it was made plain that there should be no change of name of any child unless there is some evidence that it would lead to an improvement from the point of view of the welfare of that child.  

82.	The timing of the application is absolutely devastating.  It forms the third part of the triad of events; stop contact, a non-molestation application with allegations of the utmost seriousness and a change of name.  It makes M’s intentions absolutely clear, even without regard to the letters accompanying the application.  Still further, I accept that, despite their late production, the letters from which I have just quoted are genuine.  True, they contain an electronic signature, but they were online documents.  But they form the essential ingredient to support the application without the consent of the father, in accordance with the guidelines, and that is exactly what M did.  It is consistent with all of her actions before and in the years following, to write FX out of his children’s lives.  I am afraid that this was manipulative.  In the court’s judgment it was a conscious, deliberate act, pursuant to a course of conduct that has caused the X children so much harm and M’s attempt now to attribute consent to FX, to suggest that he has manufactured documents which I am satisfied come from FY, gives the court a worrying insight into her thinking and thought processes now.  Even at this late stage, at the point where she is claiming some degree of enlightenment, she cannot take responsibility for her behaviour.

83.	M’s contention that, in three instances, the Passport Office produced incorrect passports is fantastic.  The documents that she asked FX to produce, purporting to consent to the name X-Y on the passports, were, I am satisfied, another manipulative ruse.  Such documents, handwritten by FX, would not have begun to satisfy the Passport Office, who were being asked to issue first passports for these children.  They required full birth certificates and an enrolled Deed Poll or change of name deed.  But by the time they were requested by M from FX, the court had directed her, on 11th May 2015, to bring their passports and birth certificates to the next hearing.  She did not do so and it was overlooked by everyone.  In a pretence that their names had not been changed, but feeding FX’s belief that the children had come to be known as X-Y, something he was pragmatically prepared to accept, she somehow thought I was satisfied that this might cause the issue to go away.

84.		I do not believe for a moment that FX’s letters were sent to the Passport Office.  They would have counted for nothing had they been sent, given the strict criteria set out in their guidance, nor do I accept M’s protestations that neither she nor the children looked at the passports or noticed any mistake.  The children would not have noticed any mistake, of course, because they are legally called Y and they know it.  I agree with Ms Henley that a first passport is an event for most children.  M knew it was in the name of Y, because that is exactly what she applied for and I am afraid her evidence was quite simply untrue.
  
85.		That M then goes on to deny that these children have issues with their identity, just illustrates the extent of her lack of insight.  By frankly devious means, she has unilaterally changed the names of the three X children.  As I have said, names are part of their identities and the law is very clear as to the considerable restrictions around the ability of anyone to change a name.  M’s approach has been cavalier and has had no regard for their welfare, the essential requirement for a name change.  What she chooses to do with her own name is a matter for her, but in changing it, she appears to have had no regard for the effect on her children.  

86.		Separated from FX, but living with FY, she reverted to her maiden name.  Having married FY and given her children his name, relying on A’s violent objection to references to his own father and birth name, on separation from FY for equally scandalous reasons, she again reverted to her maiden name without any regard for A, whose objection to FY appears to be almost as great as that to FX.  Thus, A has been saddled with a name that is not his by birth; is not his mother’s who has rejected it for her maiden name and A too, it seems likely, has rejected it because of the belief as to the harm that FY did his mother.

87.		The picture is really completed by his younger brothers who, M told me quite cheerfully, were happy to be known as Y, when they were with her, and X when with FX.  In other words, they have two different identities, depending on which parent they are with.  In claiming it did not cause them the slightest problem, the lack of insight is complete.  

88.		There was another window provided just this week.  C, having gone to stay with FX on Monday night, brought his teddy, Bugsy.  FX records him as saying this:

	“Bugsy is a funny name for a teddy, but I can’t change it now, because you shouldn’t change people’s names.”

89.		Although not arising since the judgment, another area of concern explored in this hearing has been M’s approach to D.  I do not doubt that D’s behaviour may have been challenging.  It would not, in the circumstances, have been surprising.  But the evidence suggests that she was unceremoniously given her marching orders and her bag packed with MGMY’s name and address on the label, like Paddington Bear.  Whatever the rights and wrongs of that, M’s explanations or justification for what followed are interesting. 

90.		First, it was the local authority’s fault that there was no contact between D and the rest of the family.  They said it was best to let her settle in.

“Time after time I’ve asked but nothing’s been arranged.”

91.		Secondly, it was only for a couple of weeks so that is why her remaining clothes were not sent, adding that, when they were ready to be sent, she knew that D had grown out of them.  No timescale was given, but one can be imagined.  

92.		Thirdly, it was the local authority’s fault that D was denied the chance to join the family holiday in Turkey, in the summer of last year, the first holiday abroad that she had been promised.

93.		Fourthly, despite D’s birthday being in September, she did not get her birthday card or present until Christmas.  Asked why she did not simply post it:

		“I didn’t think that this was allowed.”

That was despite D living in a family placement.  

94.		Fifthly, despite her objections, still seemingly raised, to MGMY’s unhealthy relationship with drink, she thought it was alright to send D to her for a couple of weeks.  

95.		Sixthly, her issue in respect of Christmas contact, which the court had to direct at the hearing before then, was not an obstacle to sibling contact for the Y children.  

96.		Ms Henley was scathing in her criticism of M’s treatment of D, based on this history and, it seems to the court, with good reason.  D was, quite simply ejected, not just from the family home, but from the family, in May 2015.  She has remained cast out ever since, in every way imaginable.  Her fate has been that of FY and of FX.  It is another example of everything being all black or white.  Yet, in the attempts at self-justification and rationalisation, what Ms Henley called her “callousness” to the girl – and M had told Mr Rowlands that D was like a daughter to her – the depth of the emotional harm which this mother is capable of, is demonstrated.

97.		There are other insights.  Just this week, B told FWX that D was obese, because MGMY lets her eat whatever she wants.  Just this week, with no thought to this litigation, or its possible outcome, B disclosed that his mother had let him open his letter of acceptance at High School, a school that he will not be able to attend if he has to go and live with FX.  Questioned about it, M seemed incapable of comprehending the need for any strategy designed to manage such expectations.  

Discussion

98.		So does the court have confidence that M is now doing any more than the minimum to demonstrate compliance?  I put it that way because there is plainly no sea change and no turning of a new leaf.  A memory box nine years after MY died, however much E may realise she has had two different mothers, has, as Ms Woolridge says, got to be seen in the context of everything else that has happened.  There is, I find, no meaningful reflection on the findings, rather a way of rationalising them clinically and accepting a minimal responsibility in the context of the whole.  There was no sharing of insight with Dr Young, or the court.  The pattern of criticising others continues.  The unwillingness to accept responsibility, other than on a minimal basis, is complete.  I am wholly unpersuaded that in saying she accepts that stopping contact has played more than a 50% part in alienating the X children so spectacularly, that there is any solid basis for assuming that M can, or will, work in an open, honest, proactive way with the local authority, or anyone else, because fundamentally and despite what she says, I do not consider that this mother, in her heart, accepts that she is in any significant way responsible.  

99.		Her presentation remains as great a mystery as it was in January.  Mr Rowlands reminded me of what I then said and invited me to consider that the court is still none the wiser.  He is correct and the court in feeling its sense of inadequacy that it cannot understand this mother’s capacity to inflict emotional harm on her children, is ultimately in good company with all the professionals, including the very thoughtful Dr Young, whose own professional frustration was so apparent, however disappointing to the court that she was unable to shed greater light.

100.		Watching and listening to her during this hearing, the complete lack of any appropriate emotional response is startling.  Both her body and verbal language radiate an unwillingness to accept the harm done, responding to a devastating judgment with the words “the judge came to a fair conclusion, I don’t say it was wrong”, fencing with Mr Rowlands over whether she caused significant harm, “some things I’ve not handled properly”, the minimisation is extreme.  

101.		Throughout the denial of responsibility and ready placing of it elsewhere, for example, on Mr and Mrs X senior, against whom A had nothing, but the local authority failed to include in contact plans; or on D, who the local authority told her not to contact, is the antithesis of real acceptance that she has alienated these children.  She is still lying to the court, as the main issue graphically illustrates.  For an intelligent woman to assert that she only realised the importance of promoting the paternal family last year, against a history of six years of litigation where that has been the sole issue, is a very worrying statement for someone who seeks to convince the court of her assured future cooperation.

102.		The court is, however, involved in a balancing exercise and the other side of the scales also contain deeply unattractive features, explored in the evidence.  The plans necessitate the splitting up of the remaining five children, who have been together since 2007.  I do not doubt the significance of their relationships with each other; separating them, against their will, would harm them.  Whilst for the Y children it will enable the three of them to be reunited, the wisdom of which M questions based on issues between D and E.  A, the most vulnerable and troubled of the six has nowhere to go other than foster care.  Various descriptions of the likely effect were given, but no one doubts it will be absolutely devastating for him.  For all, separation from their mother, to whom each of the five emphasises their closeness, but particularly for A, who will also be separated from his family and siblings, will be the greatest emotional upheaval experienced in already eventful short lives and likely to be bewildering to them.  

103.		For the younger X children it will involve a change of school and separation from established friendship groups, in circumstances where B is still in a state of heightened euphoria about his anticipated move to a High School that he will not be able to attend.  For each of them, the circumstances in which they would be able to enjoy time with M would have to be radically different to that to which they are accustomed.  

104.		In her closing, Ms Woolridge, for the local authority, emphasised the local authority’s extreme reluctance to change the living arrangements, but nevertheless pointed to the high degree of necessity now established by the evidence.  What each professional has emphasised is the need to plan and manage it and this has been the subject of considerable criticism and not just by M.  I have emphasised that I have no criticism of this social worker.  I think she has been placed in a position she ought not to have been; this is a hard case, as I have said for the most experienced of social workers and with the best will in the world she does not have that experience.  The resources that have been made available do not, in the court’s judgment, match the scale of the undertaking proposed.  The only positive additional resource has been that of Mr Herron, who happily has been accepted by M and A, and I very much hope will be able to continue and be close at hand in due course.

105.		There is no excuse for this local authority, which has known the date of the final hearing since 26th November, not to have found a specialist foster care placement that A so badly needs.  The need to minimise disruption ought to be self-evident, but it was emphasised by Dr Young.  Mr Worrall points to the risk of a badly planned move, especially to a bridging placement, with the risk of that failing, with the inevitability of further harm and the risk, for example, of harm by A absconding, of which he has a history at school, quite apart from the problem of destabilisation.  The need for a foster carer to be as fully briefed as possible was accepted; it is still unclear that such a brief is to hand.  

106.		Whilst there is greater sympathy for the position of the local authority so far as MGMY is concerned, whose home of 20 years is simply too small for three children, because of the difficulty beyond everyone’s control of seeking re-housing without the certainty that children are coming to her; the financial support package only arrived on Wednesday or Thursday and, in terms of capital support, is inadequate.  To put MGMY under housing and financial pressure at a time when she is selflessly having to give up a much loved and cared for home, of which she is rightly proud, in order to take on the care of her grandchildren, when the whole focus needs to be on them, is not a promising start.

107.		Each child needs therapy to a greater or lesser extent.  Although some has been identified, it is not clear that anyone has yet been referred.  SW acknowledged the need to do work, particularly with the Y family and suggested what she called a mini family group conference to assist with the re-integration of them and to determine what support is needed.  That is separate and apart, obviously, from the housing issue.  It is not clear to me how SW is going to be able to spread herself between six children, in three different placements, with such diverse issues.

108.		I found the evidence of Dr Young and the Guardian particularly helpful.  Neither was impressed, it seemed to me, by the planning, but nevertheless held strong opinions about the alternatives, because of the extent of the harm that was being caused by M was such that, whatever the shortcomings, the children should move forthwith.  Specifically with regards to A, Dr Young said that were his move to be delayed it would cause complications.  To leave him with M pending a better solution would depend on her accepting and supporting the plan for removal and work.  She said it would put M in a difficult position, not many parents could do that.  Having found her to be psychologically fragile, she anticipated that the impact would be devastating for M.  Assessment of her included M’s ability to cope with stress and she noted the history of suicidal ideation and injurious behaviour.  So, her considered view was:

“If they have to move, an immediate move would be the best decision.  Leaving them in place would reinforce the dynamics we are trying to alter.  It would be very hard for both children and M.”

109.		The Guardian agreed.  Whilst she also thought that some form of preparation should have happened, she emphasised that that was in an “ideal world”.  Such a world, sadly, does not exist here.  There was not the level of cooperation necessary and she doubted whether, with her own emotional fragility, M could provide the necessary support essential for the preparatory work to be helpful.  

110.		In terms of A’s placement, the local authority has in fact come up with a compromise, that may, by accident rather than design, have more merit than at first blush the failure to identify a permanent placement would suggest.  An experienced male, short term foster carer, with considerable experience of teenagers, can take A immediately.  I understand that A would be the sole child.  Although this will inevitably mean another move, he can stay with this carer for up to six months.  He lives in a suitable location for A’s school.  He sounds as if he is as well equipped, if not more so, than most foster carers to cope with the likely considerable distress, “to ride the initial storm”, as the Guardian graphically put it.  

111.		But there is this further point.  A remains a closed book.  It has not been possible to assess him and it is the combined professional view that he cannot be assessed in M’s care.  Thus, the plan to find a potential long term foster placement at this stage could be said to have been inherently flawed because, it seems to the court, there could be no certainty about matching being carried out with any more than the vague hope that it would turn out to be right.  

112.		It seems, therefore, that the disadvantage of a further move has to be set off against the benefit of intense work in this particular and seemingly suitable placement.  If that is successful, the local authority plan to move to paternal care – likely the grandparents – may yet be achievable, albeit the failure of the local authority to complete that assessment, due on 1st February, is another criticism of local authority planning which has absolutely nothing to do with this social worker.  

113.		So the disadvantages of the plans overall and the shortcomings identified are plain; some are inherent, removing children from a long-established carer is always a deeply painful event.  Others were, however, avoidable, but have heightened the anxiety that Dr Young, the Guardian and the court have.  

Decision

114.		I identified the two questions that the court needs to consider in making a care order, which it is asked to do, in respect of A.  But the same second question, what order should I make, applies also to B and CX and E and FY, in respect of the orders that are sought for them.  In answering the question, in each case, I apply the well established legal principles that are not in dispute.  I bear in mind the rights of M; each father and each child, under Article 8 of the Convention, to respect for family and private life.  Under section 1 of the Children Act 1989, the welfare of each child is my paramount concern; delay in making decisions is likely to prejudice their welfare and of course a checklist of factors is provided to be taken into account when determining where their welfare lies and what orders should be made.  

115.		The wishes and feelings of each child are very clear.   They wish to live with M. Given their ages, that is a very significant fact.  Whilst there have been historic concerns about both physical – that is to say health – and educational needs, which more recently have been addressed, the case is now focused acutely on emotional needs.  Much time has been spent in discussing the likely profound effect on each child of the profound proposed change in their circumstances.  The background of this blended family and the very considerable disruption and, in both cases, the losses in the lives that each child has experienced, is highly relevant.  Most recently, that includes the loss, occasioned to all, by D’s leaving the family home.  

116.		The harm that they have suffered has been identified in the two previous judgments and the further findings made today.  The acute issue has been the capability of the key adults; the ability of Mr and Mrs X and MGMY to meet the needs of B and C, D, E and F contrasts favourably with that of M.  Taking heed of Mr Worrall’s siren caution against causing more harm by making orders than not and noting M’s willingness to submit to a supervision order, I am nevertheless persuaded that the unprecedented harm that M has caused and the complete lack of confidence that this is recognised by her, or that she is equipped, as Ms Woolridge put it, “to turn the juggernaut round”, I am completely satisfied that there is no alternative but to accede to the local authority plans.  

117.		I bewailed the failure of the authorities, including the court, to bring about enduring change long ago, particularly back in 2011, which has resulted in – again Ms Woolridge’s expression – this extremely slow burn tragedy, enduring for years longer than it should, as well as the inexplicable local authority delay in issue proceedings, however much they had understandably, but ultimately wrongly, wished to avert this outcome.  But on all of the evidence, whatever failures have occurred, the need to act urgently has never been more pressing.  I accept the orders the court will make will cause more emotional harm, but balancing it against, as Ms Henley said, the staggering level of harm that M has caused, the balance falls decisively in favour of the plans.  

118.		I propose to say very little about contact.  Inconsistencies in the care plans were noted and are to be corrected, but the principles are clear: goodbye contacts, a steady but staged reduction and the maintenance of sibling contact.  My approach coincides exactly with that of Dr Young, whose evidence I accept.  M asks for much more contact.  I am satisfied that the suggested levels are appropriate.  It is easier, as Dr Young said, to increase it than decrease it.  

119.		Contact has to meet the children’s needs.  The priority must be to establish the children in their placements and contact, whilst maintaining the link with M, has to be commensurate with that primary aim.  The risk of too frequent contact, particularly with a mother who presently does not accept the plans, is self-evident.  It will delay settling in, it may destabilise, it is likely to confuse children who will already be significantly confused by the turn of events.  Each needs to learn a new narrative and this mother is presently incapable of supporting that, let alone delivering it.  

120.		The importance of reviews cannot be exaggerated.  Needs will change from time to time and they will vary from child to child.  This court cannot be prescriptive, but I expect the local authority to be as proactive in the cases of all the children, as if they were all looked after children.  It cannot be left to FX and his wife, or MGMY, to navigate this particular minefield.  

121.		On the issue of names, I am quite satisfied that, legally, the names of A, B and C must revert to X and I so declare.  I accept Dr Young’s advice that in A’s case, whatever the legal position, X cannot be forced on him at present and it would be beyond his ability to cope with.  Therefore, I give permission for him to continue to be known at school, by his doctor and by anybody else to whom this may matter, as Y, or X-Y, if he will tolerate that, until such time as the subject can be addressed in line with his needs.

122.		I will make whatever order is appropriate to revoke the parental responsibility delegated by FX, in respect of the X children, to FY.

123.		I also accept and urge on the local authority Dr Young’s advice that, so far as can be achieved, other aspects, particularly of A’s life, be kept the same as possible, to maintain as much stability as can be achieved, in what will be a difficult time.  Furthermore, whilst therapy is needed, it has to follow a period of settling in for each.  

124.		I urge the local authority to ensure that resources are in place for all of these matters.  This judgment should go to the independent reviewing officer, to whom, I anticipate, the Guardian should continue to have access, as I expect she will, so far as she can, keep an eye on what is happening, notwithstanding the formal end of her involvement today.

Conclusion

125.		This has been a shocking and highly distressing case.  In 2012, Drs Cawthorne and Torrres struggled to provide a coherent explanation for M’s behaviour.  In my judgment, in January, having tried hard to understand M and cautioned myself against playing the amateur psychologist, I was unable to identify a logical narrative for her behaviour but hoped that Dr Young might yet do so.  She was not so able, to her own professional disappointment.

126.		Yet again, I am driven to the conclusion that Mr Rowlands was right in submitting that it is not possible to apply logic to utterly bizarre, but ultimately deeply harmful, behaviour.  I do not doubt that M’s friends, her family, her step-father who is in court, for whom this must have been exceedingly painful, and those who have written the glowing testimonials to which I have referred, paying tribute to her parenting skills, will be bewildered by the court’s findings, when they set them alongside the woman they believe they know.  But the harm that she has inflicted on these six children is incalculable.  It is harm of a pernicious sort because it hides behind a façade that is ultimately unreal.  People can understand, or can visualise at any rate, parents who break their children’s bones in frustration; this is harm of an altogether more subtle nature.  

127.		The harm is evident most obviously in A who, as Ms Randhawa said in closing, is the cautionary tale for the other five children.  Beyond the visceral hatred M has developed for each of the fathers, it is difficult to explain.  Like the children, life is seen in black and white, with no shades in between; you are in or you are out.  If you are out you are cast to the outer darkness.  A has done that to FX and FY.  D has herself, by failing to conform, suffered the same fate as both of M’s husbands.  It is a chilling story and I accept it is hard to believe, when compared with the apparently normal domesticity that M is so well able to present, but which has concealed a dark side that has inflicted this immeasurable harm.  I hope that she can access help, but help is only of benefit to those who recognise that they need it and are prepared to accept it.    

128.		The journey for these children, each of them, will be long and arduous and one’s heart, frankly, aches for them.  But I am satisfied that the orders that I direct – a care order for A, a child arrangements order for B and C to Mr and Mrs X, thereby conferring on her parental responsibility, and a special guardianship order, subject any remaining argument that I will hear in a moment, for the three reunited Y children, all supported by supervision orders for 12 months – are the orders that give these children the best prospect of recovering from that harm and the opportunity, belatedly, to grow up as emotionally secure and grounded teenagers, young people and adults.  I wish them, their carers and those who are to support them, well.  

129.		I thank the advocates for their considerable help during the course of this case.  I will direct a transcript, as before, on an anonymised basis, the cost of which is to be shared equally by all parties.  I direct it goes to the independent reviewing officer; it should go to the head of service at the local authority.  I will hear argument as to who else should receive it, but I anticipate it should go to the general practitioner, school, any therapists and A’s foster carer should have the opportunity to read it in due course.  

End of Judgment

We hereby certify that this judgment has been approved by His Honour Judge Simon Wood.

Compril Limited