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Cite as: [2025] EWFC 33 (B)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWFC 33 (B)
Case No: MB21P50045

IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING IN MIDDLESBROUGH

20 February 2025

B e f o r e :

HHJ.G.MATTHEWS KC
____________________

Between:
Father
Applicant
- and -

Mother
Respondent

____________________

Sarah Phillimore, Counsel (instructed by Fergus Poncia, Solicitor) for the Applicant
Manveet Chhina, Solicitor, of Jung & Co Solicitors for the First Respondent
Helen Simmons, Solicitor, of Hewitts for the 2ND Respondent child though his Children's Guardian, Helen Hale

Hearing date: 23 December 2024
Draft judgment circulated to the parties' representatives on 13 February 2025
Final judgment handed down at a hearing on 20 February 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

  1. The court is once more concerned with the welfare of one child, who I shall refer to as A. He is 5 years of age. This judgment represents the final determination of issues in long running proceedings concerning this little boy and his parents. The litigation has been exceptionally difficult and this final order is urgently needed to secure the arrangements for A's welfare. The court's previous judgments have been published and are required reading as the foundation for this evaluation. Unfortunately, at the last gasp an application has been made by a member of the press for disclosure of the Father's name. This application will be dealt with at a further hearing but protracts the pressure of proceedings for both parents.
  2. It is agreed that A should continue to live with his Mother, with whom he has resided since birth and that the court should make a "live with" order in her favour. The parents have never been married to one another and only lived together for a very short period. It is now agreed that the Father should have no direct or indirect contact with A, for reasons which I will set out later in this judgment and that a "no contact" order should be made by the court. What remains in dispute is whether:
  3. a) Father's Parental Responsibility [PR], granted during the first set of legal proceedings, by DDJ.Goudie on 13.8.20 should be revoked OR restricted in specified ways;

    b) A barring order under s.91(14) Children Act 1989 should be made restricting Father's unfettered right to apply to the court for s.8 orders during the balance of the child's minority or for a lesser period;

    c) A Non-Molestation Order should be granted by the court to protect A and Mother from any unwanted interference by Father.

  4. On the 23.12.24, I heard evidence from A's Guardian, Helen Hale who was cross-examined on behalf of Father in relation to the proportionality of removing Father's parental responsibility, the length of the s.91(14) barring order and the welfare issues for A of not having knowledge of his Father. Mother, Father and the Children's Guardian submitted written documents in advance of that hearing. It was agreed that no further evidence was necessary or appropriate in the circumstances. Judgment was reserved to be sent out in writing.
  5. Miss Phillimore on behalf of the Father set out the legal principles which apply to the applications before the court in her Skeleton Argument and this was agreed by the other advocates as an accurate statement of the law. It is right to observe that Father's position has refined in the lead up to this hearing. He had originally hoped that there would be a re-introduction of direct contact to A on a supervised basis but conceded this position at the final hearing, likely as a result of advice and the opposition of A's Guardian to such a course. His statement dated 24.7.24 asked the court to order supervised contact, until a further assessment could be made. That was in my judgment in the light of the court's very serious findings and the history of the proceedings, a position which was lacking in realism and insight.
  6. Father's solicitors stated in an email dated the 24.7.24 [216] that he agreed with the court's findings and acknowledged that such behaviour took place. However, bearing in mind that the findings of the court were lesser than those sought by the Mother, given her inability to complete her evidence, there is no indication from him as to what he says was the complete picture of his behaviour toward her.
  7. As a result of Mother's inability to continue her evidence and be fully tested in cross-examination, I was only able to make findings about sexual matters which she had confided to her friend during the parents' relationship. Father says that he accepts the findings in relation to him being coercive and controlling [196]. The impression is that he has simply accepted the findings which the court has made, rather than reflect on the totality of his conduct toward Mother, the full truth of which he will be aware, but the court is not. He asserts that he is now having a period of reflection and engaging in therapy through the NHS. I cannot consider that the Father has yet been open with the court about the extent of his behaviour or indeed his acceptance of the court's findings in the circumstances.
  8. The Mother has opposed direct contact taking place for some time. The last occasion on which father and son had direct contact with one another was in November 2022 at a contact centre. Subsequent video contact ceased abruptly in June 2023 after Father made, what I found to be a false allegation against Mother's partner, who was supervising those sessions. Father can only look to himself for the failure of this form of contact in my judgment. This is one example of a series of poor decisions made by the Father, during these proceedings.
  9. Background

  10. The application before the court is actually one of enforcement brought by Father in respect of a contact order made by DJ.Davies on the 27.5.21. Rashly, as I have previously found, Father sought to enforce this order on the 24.6.21, when he perceived matters not to be progressing as he thought appropriate, so soon after the original order was made by the court. The enforcement proceedings have therefore been extant for three and a half years which is obviously, far too long. The first application by Father was made on 22.2.20, when A was only nine months of age. He has therefore been subject to litigation for virtually the whole of his short life, bar those nine months.
  11. In the course of the current application, the Mother made allegations of domestic and sexual abuse against Father and the court determined that there should be a fact-finding hearing, although this course was opposed by Father. The first fact-finding hearing was tried by a District Judge who did not find proven the serious sexual abuse allegations made by the Mother. However, she did make other findings with regard to the Father's conduct, which was concerning. I allowed an appeal against the District Judge's decision by the Mother and determined that it was appropriate to re-try all of the allegations, although the Father made some concessions in respect of the findings in the court below, having denied these matters previously.
  12. My fact-finding judgment from June 2024, concludes that Father perpetrated serious sexual abuse against the Mother and those findings have not been subject of an appeal by him. Father says that he accepts the court's findings [193], although he stated this previously in relation to some of the court's earlier findings and that acceptance proved to be untrue when he was tested in evidence.
  13. Mother has suffered significant physical and emotional health problems during the course of these protracted proceedings. She required an intermediary to assist her during the second fact-finding hearing and yet still was unable to complete her evidence at the trial. This indicates something of the level of fragility of the Mother. This is dealt with in my substantive fact-finding judgment from June of last year.
  14. Information post-dating that judgment has been submitted to the court on behalf of the Mother. A report from a Highly Specialist Counselling Psychologist dated the 5.8.24 indicates that Mother's stress levels are considered high enough to supress her immune system's functioning. Mother reported suffering from trauma symptoms in the form of hypervigilance and nightmares. She is recommended to engage in trauma treatment after the proceedings have concluded.
  15. Mother's GP, provided an update and summary of the issues with which the Mother has been dealing since 2019. She has been under significant pressure as a result of uncertainties with regard to her physical health which has necessitated genetic testing, amongst other significant interventions. Mother continues to suffer a wide range of symptoms linked with her diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome, which is distinct from the stress resulting from these proceedings.
  16. Mother has been under immense physical and psychological stress for a very lengthy period which in the opinion of her doctor has placed her at high risk of burn out. Her score on the Impact of Events scale indicates the presence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ["PTSD"]. A letter from a Consultant Liaison Psychiatrist dated 18.12.24 indicates that what Mother describes has reached the diagnostic criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, linked to her experiences with Father, which Mother states is the cause of her PTSD.
  17. I am satisfied on the basis of all of the evidence which I have in relation to Mother that her psychological problems are genuine, are very significant and are likely long-lasting. The length of the period during which she has endured these problems and the degree of the pressure which she has been exposed to, are a fair indicator as to the probability of a long recovery. In addition to her psychological health, the Mother also has to cope with her physical health problems, which renders her even more vulnerable. It is impossible to know exactly when she is going to recover sufficiently to feel strong enough to cope with Father having some involvement in A's life but it is reasonable to infer that this will take some considerable time.
  18. The key findings of the fact-finding judgment can be summarised as follows:
  19. i) Father raped Mother on one occasion when A was in the bedroom with his parents;

    ii) Father was on another later occasion, sexually violent to Mother, beating her until she was bruised and then took photographs of her injuries, considering this to be funny;

    iii) He sexually assaulted her on a further subsequent occasion;

    iv) There was a power imbalance in the relationship with Father subjecting Mother to coercive and controlling behaviour by being physically, sexually and to an extent emotionally abusive;

    v) After separation, he has subjected the mother to a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour by using the Police, Children's Services, Cafcass and the court at times against her to secure his aim of achieving contact with his son;

    vi) Father has subjected Mother to psychological harm since separation and A has been distressed at times, such distress has been caused or exacerbated unnecessarily by him.

  20. The litigation has obviously been gruelling both emotionally and financially for both parties. However, the Father has exacerbated this process by his conduct and his failure to accept that his behaviour toward the Mother has been unacceptable. As a result of his litigation conduct, I made a substantial costs order against him in the sum of £80,000 which, to his credit he has paid. This represented only approximately half of Mother's costs incurred. However, in my judgment he does not seem to have internalised the extent of the impact upon the Mother of this conduct, not only during the relationship, but in the way that he has pursued the litigation against her.
  21. Mother asks the court to make a barring order under s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989 for the rest of A's minority and to revoke Father's parental responsibility. Mother does not believe that he can play any safe or active role in their son's life, given the abuse he has subjected her to and the resulting and lasting trauma and harm. She is deeply concerned that Father may access A's GP records and attempt to use those against her or seek out the school which he attends and collect him one day without her knowledge. Mother considers that this is a real fear because of the way that Father has attempted to mobilise professional resources against her and feels he is capable of anything. A Non-Molestation Order throughout A's minority to protect them both is also applied for.
  22. Father submits that there is no evidence before the court which supports the making of a Non-Molestation Order. He concedes that the court will not make an order for direct contact at this time. In respect of the application for a barring order, he agrees that such an order should be made but only for a period of three years, rather than throughout A's minority which is said to be disproportionate. Father opposes his PR being extinguished but agrees that it should be restricted.
  23. It is conceded that the court is balancing the needs of the Mother to parent without excessive anxiety and distress with regard to the Father, whilst recognising that limitations on the exercise of PR should be governed by the welfare of the child. It is asserted that Father is "interested in and committed to A's welfare" and that it will be of benefit to A over the course of his life to know that his Father exists and is so committed. The point is made that if at some point in the future A does initiate contact with his Father, it will be of benefit to him to have had, even some limited information about A's development and interests. Father intends to continue further psychological/therapeutic intervention so that he can, "better understand his behaviour and reactions". It is now many months since the fact-finding judgment was circulated but it not clear what actual form of work he has embarked upon. No details have been provided to the court.
  24. Miss Phillimore argued in her written document and in her cross-examination of the Guardian that to deprive Father of all or any information about A's development appeared to be a "punitive" approach toward him rather than an assessment of what would best meet the needs of A, not merely in the short term but also in the medium to long term. I make it clear that there is no element of punishment in this court's approach to the applications before it. The court is conducting an assessment of welfare but also importantly, risk in respect of the Father, his past behaviour and the potential for the future, seeking to protect A but also his Mother.
  25. The Legal Considerations which apply to the applications before the court

  26. The Father's PR may only be removed by order of the court pursuant to s.4(2A) of the Children Act 1989. The child's welfare is the paramount consideration, although the court is not required to consider the factors set out in s.1(3) as this is not an order specified under s.1(4). Mr.Justice MacDonald has helpfully distilled the applicable law in this regard in D v E (Termination of Parental Responsibility) [2012] EWFC 37 .
  27. However, the Court of Appeal made clear in Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166 that, although there is no requirement to consider the checklist factors, the court is not prevented from doing so and this may prove a helpful analytical framework, not least because welfare has to be considered and reasoned. As the cessation of PR is an order of the court, there must be consideration as to whether making such an order is better for the child than making no order at all under the "no order" principle in s.1(5) CA 1989.
  28. Both wanting to have and exercise, parental responsibility is, or can be, a laudable desire which is to be encouraged rather than rebuffed in the words of Singer J in Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048. However, this depends upon whether the holder uses this appropriately or indeed whether the fact of holding it could cause difficulties for the other parent. The holder of parental responsibility should not use this as a weapon, anymore than a dissatisfied parent should apply to have it revoked as a tactic. The court should use parental responsibility as an appropriate step in the regulation of the child's life where the circumstances really do warrant it and not otherwise.
  29. The Court of Appeal indicated in Re D Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166 that "the paramountcy test is overarching and no one factor that the court might consider has any hypothetical priority", per Ryder LJ. The factors which might be considered to be relevant on an application for PR, may be relevant in a particular case but are not to be taken as a substitute test to be applied – Re M (Parental Responsibility Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 969.
  30. In considering whether to make a barring order the court must consider the text of s.91(14) and the amendments thereto as set out in s.91(14) A. I have reminded myself of PD12Q and PD12J para 37A.1. Such orders must have as their foundation welfare considerations taken in the context of the court's evaluation as a whole. In this case it is agreed that it is appropriate to make such an order after such lengthy and gruelling litigation. However, the length of period is what is in issue. The order is a protective filter not a bar on applications. Proceedings under the Children Act "should not be used as a means of harassment or coercive control, or further abuse against a victim of domestic abuse or other person, and the court should therefore give due consideration to whether a future application would have such an impact".
  31. PD12Q provides assistance as follows with regard to length:
  32. "4.1 Sections 91(14) and 91A are silent on the duration of a section 91(14) order. The court therefore has a discretion as to the appropriate duration of the order. Any time limit imposed should be proportionate to the harm it is seeking to avoid. If the court decides to make a section 91(14) order, the court should explain its reasons for the duration ordered".

  33. The application for a Non-Molestation Order ["NMO"] is made on the basis that the Mother is concerned as to what the Father may do after the proceedings are concluded, given that he is likely to be frustrated that he will not be having contact with his son. She fears him attending at her premises or at A's school or sending material to her home or trying to access information about A.
  34. The Father submits that there is no basis upon which the court can make such an order. An NMO is made under s.42 of the Family Law Act 1996 ["FLA 1996"] and can be granted in response to a free-standing application or in any family proceedings to which the respondent is a party, where the court considers that the order should be made for the benefit of any other party to the proceedings or any relevant child.
  35. Significant changes were introduced to NMOs with the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 ("DVCVA 2004"). The procedure for accepting undertakings as an alternative to an order was changed so that undertakings are now restricted to circumstances where it appears to the court that the respondent neither threatened nor used violence against the applicant or relevant child. NMOs provide the judge with a wide discretion to consider the particular facts of a case and establish whether "molestation" is made out. The impact of coercive and controlling behaviour upon a victim, in what may appear in other instances to be innocuous behaviour, but which is abusive to the individual, will be crucial in considering whether the court should intervene.
  36. Clearly, the court should use its powers under the Family Law Act 1996 with caution and the primary focus should be upon the "harassment" or "alarm or distress" caused to those on the receiving end of any alleged conduct. There does not have to be a positive intention to molest (Re T (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1889) and "molestation" does not imply necessarily either violence or threats of violence but can cover any degree of harassment. The conduct has to be of a nature or degree that justifies the intervention of the court.
  37. Section 42(5) of the Family Law Act 1996 states that:
  38. "(5) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this section and, if so, in what manner, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and wellbeing –

    (a) Of the applicant; and

    (b) Of any relevant child."

  39. This section is clearly focussed upon protection. In Re T as set out above, the President of the Family Division ["PFD"] made an NMO against the Mother of a child in foster care, who had taken steps to contact her child. These efforts had been intercepted and so there had been no direct interaction, nonetheless the order was sought to protect the child in circumstances where it was found that the mother's conduct would be "positively harmful"; this was more than sufficient to justify the court exercising its powers under s.42 FLA 1996.
  40. 34. NMOs can often be used to give a breathing space after which tensions between the parties may settle down so that it is no longer needed but in other cases, it may be appropriate to be imposed for a much longer period (per Lady Hale Re B-J (Power of Arrest) [2000] 2 FLR 443). "There are obviously cases…. in which the feelings between the parties, who separated long ago are such that a long term or indefinite order is justified". The court must of course bear in mind that given the criminal sanction for breach of an NMO, the gravity of creating a long-lasting order is accentuated. The vast majority of orders will be short term in nature and long-term orders will exceptional, where the court takes the view that, on the facts, the requirement for protection from abuse has no foreseeable "end-date". (Manjra v Sheikh [2020] EWHC 1805 (Fam); [2021] 1FLR 106, per Cobb J).

    The Guardian's Welfare Analysis

  41. Since the outcome of the finding of fact hearing the Guardian has filed a s.7 report dated the 11.9.24 and an addendum analysis dated 11.10.24. A Position Statement was also filed for the hearing on 23.12.24. A is described by her as a "brilliant little boy, who is kind, funny, cares for others and has friendship groups, whose presence is of great value to the class and wider school community". It is clear to her that the Mother is providing excellent care to A who is thriving, despite the enormous pressure upon her of these proceedings and her own health problems. She has been able to shield and protect A from the wider issues. The Guardian opines that it is to Mother's credit that A is such a balanced, creative and intelligent little boy.
  42. However, the Guardian is deeply concerned about the impact upon the Mother of the proceedings. The medical evidence which has been filed in respect of her indicates that the litigation should be concluded in order to allow her an opportunity to commence her recovery and for further support to be provided. The financial impact upon her was significant which placed her and A's accommodation at risk and her PTSD has been magnified as is apparent from the evidence exhibited to the Mother's statement dated 22.8.24.
  43. Father is also accessing counselling for support via his GP and this has been continuing for some time already. In addition, he reports suffering from panic attacks as a result of the stress of the proceedings. However, he has been able to return to work. Father sought to persuade the Guardian that his relationship with A should be re-built and that he would carry out additional work as directed and guided by the court.
  44. The Guardian concluded that Father lacked insight into the harm which he had inflicted upon Mother and that the timescales of any meaningful work which he might take part in would be beyond the timescales of what was proportionate. It would not be appropriate for the proceedings to continue indefinitely, awaiting the successful completion of work by the Father. This is particularly pertinent as Father has already had an opportunity to complete work and has also had many months since the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing to engage in further work.
  45. The Guardian was very concerned that Father continues to question Mother's diagnosis of PTSD despite the evidence produced on her behalf. She regards this as a barrier to having confidence that he is capable of change in how he views his own behaviour to the extent where it would no longer impact upon Mother's physical and emotional health. In my judgment, there remains a lack of true and meaningful acceptance of his actions and the ramifications of those for the Mother and A. This is likely one of the reasons why he is so reluctant to accept the significance of Mother's health problems now as he does not want to recognise his own responsibility for some of those.
  46. The Guardian sees no route by which the Father/son relationship can be re-built because of the gravity of the findings and the consequent significant impact this will have upon the Mother. A is very vulnerable as a result of his age and is completely dependent upon his Mother, not simply for his physical care but she is the centre of his emotional world. Ideally, he would have a good quality and regular relationship with his father and his extended paternal family. No doubt A would wish this to happen if all things were equal but given his age, he has not been asked to express his wishes in this regard.
  47. The Guardian was robustly cross-examined on behalf of the Father suggesting that she had failed to carry out a sufficiently detailed welfare analysis as she had not weighted heavily enough the psychological importance of A understanding his origins. I reject this criticism. The Mother has been prepared to agree to keep Life Story work for A at her home. I am satisfied that she will introduce this material to A at an appropriate time. A does need to know who his Father and Paternal family are and that they cared about him. However, the elephant in the room which the Father's criticisms of the Guardian sidestep, is the reason why A cannot see his Father and this cannot be ignored. Mother will have to address this in a child centred and sensitive way.
  48. Father stated that he was not seeking contact, "in the near to medium future" but that he may wish to do so at some point. He may do so but the court will determine that issue in the light of the situation at the time and the welfare considerations for A. The Father's submissions seemed to be aimed at keeping the door open for his future application.
  49. The Guardian did not consider that providing him with school reports and photographs was in A's best interests. Whilst this is something which the Father would wish to happen, the potential benefit in the long term to A of Father having some knowledge of his history is outweighed by the potential harm which could flow from Father's misuse of this information and the Mother's fears associated with such disclosure. I appreciate that it is difficult to put a positive case on behalf of the Father in this situation but the Father's submissions do not properly acknowledge the seriousness of the findings, the extent of the damage to Mother, the way he has behaved and the failure to properly accept this and effect change. The welfare based response to this is not punitive but protective.
  50. Analysis

  51. All of A's needs, physical, emotional and educational are being met by his Mother. The Father has never played any significant parenting role in his life other than in some limited contact periods. The Guardian is confident that Mother will continue to care for A to a high level. I accept this assessment without reservation on the basis of the unchallenged evidence in respect of Mother's track record of care for her son. No changes are proposed to his living and school arrangements at present. There is no need for any changes to be made and they would not be in his best interests at present. A has not had any contact with his Father for a long time and does not appear to question its absence. However, he may do so in the future and this may cause a sense of loss. I bear that in mind in approaching this decision.
  52. The very significant feature of this case is the likely impact upon the Mother's health and emotional well-being of any re-introduction of direct contact to the Father, which I find is so significant that this currently poses a barrier to Father having any relationship with his son. Further and importantly, the prospect of any further litigation, after these mammoth proceedings, is likely to cause the Mother significant further distress. Proceedings bring her into indirect contact with Father which she finds re-traumatising.
  53. Mother has managed to withstand these proceedings but has appeared to come quite close to breaking point, having collapsed at court on one occasion in January 2023 and not having been able to complete her testimony in February 2024. The impact upon her which can be fairly assessed to be very significant, will likely directly rebound upon A, because she is his main carer, both in terms of his physical and emotional care. The Mother's perspective with regard to her reaction to the litigation is set out in her statement dated 12.6.24. In my judgment any further litigation or involvement with Father for the foreseeable future is highly likely to cause a damaging collapse by the Mother. This would impact directly on A.
  54. The risk of this occurring if Father were to be re-introduced in any way, can be assessed to be a high in my judgment and the welfare balance tips against a re-introduction of contact to Father because of the high risk of undermining A's very positive living situation. This is not a risk worth taking. The proceedings have taken far too long to resolve and at present I cannot foresee a point in the future, when Mother will have sufficiently recovered to be able to cope with any involvement with A by Father.
  55. Nor can I anticipate when the Father will have changed his attitudes to make him appropriately respectful towards the Mother, her role in A's life, her decision making and behave toward her in a reasonable manner. The work Father previously carried out, was not at all effective and his bland assurances that he had learnt from his mistakes, proved to be completely hollow. The issues here are two-fold. It is not simply Mother's current fragility but that of Father's attitudes and behaviour. Even if she were to recover to a manageable level, he has the potential to de-stabilise her again as a result of his attitudes, poor judgment and decision-making.
  56. Father has a great deal of work to carry out in my assessment for him to truly appreciate the depth of harm that he has inflicted upon Mother and that it is he who has damaged his relationship with A by failing to treat the Mother with respect, both during the relationship and during the proceedings. Father is not going to have any direct or indirect contact with A for many years as a result. It is not simply the physical, emotional and sexual abuse which Father inflicted upon Mother during the relationship but his manipulative and abusive attitude and behaviour during the proceedings which influence the court's decision making.
  57. The issue for the court to consider is how long should be the barring order which the court imposes in all the circumstances of this very difficult case. Even in my experience, this has been an exceptional case, not only in its progress but also in its complexity. The resulting emotional scars from participation in such a case will not heal quickly for any participant but for one of Mother's vulnerability, this is in my judgment likely to be a very long process. This is a separate and additional matter to the healing necessary after the abuse at the centre of the fact-finding.
  58. The principle of a barring order has been conceded by the Father, albeit on a limited timeframe of 3 years. The Mother supported by the Guardian argues for a whole minority term. I bear in mind that whilst the Father has been fighting hard in court for contact to A using every tool in his armoury, he has not made enquiries about A's welfare, health or for school information, other than on one occasion. He has not sent indirect contact in the form of cards and presents since the breakdown of video contact in June 2023.
  59. I also bear in mind that the Mother, to her credit, has agreed to hold Life Story Work which the Father provides for A, at her home. It was thought that this may need to be held at Cafcass offices and that this could only be retained for seven years because of GDPR but this was a misunderstanding. It is positive that there will be such material available to A in his home. Mother agreed to do this, despite her views about Father because she was of the view that this would be to A's benefit. This is strong indicator of her objectivity, despite everything and bodes well for the future and how A will be reminded of his paternal family.
  60. I take into account in reaching a decision on this point: my factual findings; the Father's responses thereto and the fact that no direct or indirect contact is going to take place for the foreseeable future. Importantly, I factor in my conclusions as to the harm that would be caused to Mother and the child, in the event that Father was to have further involvement in the child's life. I do not consider that it is in A's best interests for the Father to have involvement in his son's life for a very substantial period. The barring order in my judgment is necessary for the whole of his minority as it is acting as a filter to prevent an unmeritorious application being made by the Father, which will likely cause significant distress to the Mother and consequently threaten A's stability.
  61. I have considered very carefully whether this is disproportionate in all of the circumstances. I bear in mind that the proceedings have taken almost 5 years in total to resolve and I agree that the Mother needs a long period of calm, in which to heal and during which she can be assured that Father will be absent from her life and that of A. I have been concerned to balance whether such a lengthy barring order is necessary to safeguard this child's welfare and that of his carer against the longer-term welfare interests of A. As he grows older he may start to question why he doesn't see his Father and the rest of the paternal family.
  62. A may feel that loss keenly and be distressed thinking that the paternal family don't care about him and question whether the cause of this relates back to him in some way. I have considered whether a barring order which for example took A into his senior school period would be a proportionate response to the perceived risk here. That would mean that A would be almost a teenager before his Father could apply to the court without filter. Three years is far too short a period in the circumstances.
  63. A barring order for say seven years until A is twelve years old would be a very lengthy period during which a great deal of change could potentially occur. It would be hoped that mother may have been able to recover her health and confidence within this interregnum. However, what cannot be ignored is the real reason for the absence of paternal contact, which is that his Father raped and beat his Mother and she is utterly traumatised by this and cannot face any involvement with him.
  64. At some point A is going to have these matters explained to him in a child-centred way, that his Father seriously hurt his Mother and that is the reason why he does not see him. I have concluded that the burden should be upon the Father to demonstrate why he should be granted leave to bring a s.8 application before the court, rather than him wait until the period has expired to issue. Having considered a shorter period, I was concerned about Father issuing in A's teenage years and the potential disruption such an application would likely bring and could not conclude that this was in his best interests.
  65. I do not envisage any application made by Father being likely to be entertained positively by the courts without very profound evidence of a dramatic change in his attitudes and corroboration of this from an authoritative professional. It would be preferable, however, in my judgment if father accepted a lengthy absence from the Mother and his son's life, not as a punishment, but to recognise that there is a need for them to be left in peace.
  66. Whilst Father says that he accepts the findings, there is no solid evidence to conclude that he does agree that his behaviour was totally unacceptable. He seems to have merely accepted that the court has concluded that it was. There has been no tangible acceptance of responsibility for sexual assault and violence. There has been no apology for that or acceptance of wrongdoing.
  67. After considerable thought, I have come to the conclusion that the barring order should be made for the whole of A's minority because of the very serious nature of the findings and the dramatic impact the behaviour has had upon the Mother. This is an exceptional case in every respect, which is why I have concluded that the child's welfare requires this exceptional course. A must be protected by securing his life with his Mother until he becomes sixteen years old.
  68. Any application by Father should be made ex parte, initially, to the Designated Family Judge for Cleveland and South Durham as I no longer sit in that area. The Mother should not be notified of the application unless and until the judge dealing with this determines that there are grounds for renewed judicial investigation. She should not be troubled with notification in respect of any unmeritorious applications as this would frustrate the purpose of the barring order.
  69. Parental Responsibility

  70. Revocation of Father's Parental Responsibility is something which Father argues is not proportionate as his PR could be limited in order to reassure Mother. It was argued that Father should be told for example if his son was dangerously ill or had died. This is an extreme and hopefully highly unlikely situation, which as an example does not assist the court to determine whether it is appropriate to remove Father's PR. In my judgment, it is appropriate to revoke Father's PR in all the circumstances of this case, not as a punishment but because it is highly unlikely in my judgment that these parents will ever be able to co-parent A, even after a very lengthy barring period has expired.
  71. Mother [and indeed A] is a victim of domestic abuse. She has found the proceedings re-traumatising and this has been graphically demonstrated for the court in her presentation at court hearings and also by the content of her statement dated 12.6.24. The excessive length of the proceedings, the way in which Father has conducted them and the intimate and humiliating nature of the issues in evidence have no doubt have had a cumulative impact upon the Mother which has been profound. I am satisfied that the events of the last six years will have likely marked Mother emotionally for the rest of her life. Sadly, her much loved son is a permanent reminder of his Father, who abused her.
  72. A's welfare is my paramount consideration and I do not consider that it is beneficial to him for his Father to retain his PR. That would be more likely to be negative in all of the present and foreseeable circumstances of this case. It is preferable and in this child's best interests to positively make an order revoking his Father's PR. A's welfare is so intrinsically bound up with his Mother's welfare that for the short to medium term at least, they are effectively inextricable. I cannot predict how things will develop in the longer term but this will remain a far from straightforward trajectory given the serious findings which A will become aware of in due course.
  73. If Father did not currently hold PR, I do not consider that the court would be likely to grant him it, knowing what it does now and having made the findings in relation to his conduct both prior to and during the proceedings. This is a matter which I consider that I should take into account in reaching this decision. The situation now is radically different to that in May 2021 when DJ.Davies made the order for contact. I do not consider that there is any element of the bundle of responsibilities which comprise PR which Father can or could exercise now or for the foreseeable future.
  74. I have considered whether his PR could be limited as has been suggested on his behalf. I understand why this is submitted but it does appear a rather desperate attempt to cling on to some part of A in all of the circumstances. I have taken into consideration that there was previously some evidence of attachment between Father and son, independently observed in the direct contact sessions. However, this was lost by the failure of video contact in June 2023 as a result of Father's false allegation against Mother's partner.
  75. Thereafter, Father has failed to send indirect contact by way of Christmas and birthday gifts to A. No explanation has been given for this lack of commitment on his part. I take into account that Father has paid maintenance for his son, although this is dealt with through the Child Maintenance Service. I reject what I consider to be the rather specious argument that if Mother does not find the payment of financial support "triggering", this undermines her position that Father's involvement in A's life in other ways, triggers her PTSD and distress.
  76. Financial payments for the support of the child are a right and an entitlement, which subject to variation applications, can simply be paid by bank transfer without incident. The sharing of PR or applications for child arrangement orders are completely different in my judgment, as they may entail active involvement with the Father and intrusive investigation of her and the child's life. I have little if any confidence in Father's ability to work co-operatively and respectfully with Mother in the future and even more importantly, she would find this totally unpalatable and highly stressful. I have reminded myself in approaching this decision of the welfare checklist factors. PR is not a concept of which A will be familiar nor will he be concerned with this for many years, if ever. PR comprises a bundle of legal rights and responsibilities which all Mothers and most Fathers have for their child/ren. The most important practical roles are providing a home and protecting and maintaining the child.
  77. However, naming a child, ensuring a child's education, their health and social welfare, choosing their religion, managing their discipline and property are other significant responsibilities. Father has played a very small role in A's life thus far and sadly what he has done has been confrontational, resulting in A's Mother expending tens of thousands of pounds. There have been a number of flashpoints during his short life. Apart from some very limited contact periods, A will not have been conscious of his Father playing any significant role in his life. He has never lived with his Father for any prolonged period.
  78. All A's day to day needs are met by his mother. He also has other needs: not to be involved in further court proceedings, causing him to be subject of intrusive visiting by professionals; for his Mother to be able to provide her best care for him; for her not to be financially crippled by litigation to the extent that his home is placed at risk and to have certainty and stability in respect of his Father's involvement (or otherwise) in his life.
  79. Revocation of Father's PR will have little if any direct impact upon him at this point in his life in my judgment. Nor will it have a significant direct impact upon him in the foreseeable future. The Father used his PR to gain access to A's medical records during the course of the litigation in an attempt to rebut Mother's case. Father has weaponised professional agencies and the court in a manipulative and controlling way by exaggerating allegations, thereby creating conflict and instability.
  80. I am concerned that in the future, frustrated by being sidelined in his child's life he may attempt to use PR as a lever to secure information which might undermine Mother. Unfortunately, this is the way that he has operated during the proceedings. I don't see that there is a way of realistically limiting his PR which will provide the security and certainty which Mother needs. She is very intimidated by the prospect of Father retaining any such rights. It is now in A's welfare interests to revoke Father's PR in order to prevent such actions in the future, which would likely prove highly damaging to Mother and thereby A. I am confident that in the extreme situation of A's death, the Mother would have the humanity to notify the Father.
  81. Non-Molestation Injunction

  82. Father offered an undertaking to the court which the Mother was not prepared to accept. In the context of these proceedings and Father's behaviour, I understand why this was not taken up. He submits that there is no evidence upon which to conclude that such an order is merited. I have concluded that the court has the power to and should make an order for the protection of Mother and A. Her fear of what he may do is a significant factor for her and that fear is likely to undermine her confidence as a person and as a parent to A. In my judgment, the court's role at this stage of the proceedings is to protect A's welfare, maintain the stability of his home life and safeguard Mother's ability to meet his needs consistently throughout his minority.
  83. This order supports and reinforces the orders for no contact and the barring order and will run concurrently throughout the period of A's minority. This package of orders will place the burden upon Father to demonstrate that he has changed dramatically and that he can play some part in A's life without causing emotional harm to the Mother and thereby A. In my judgment, the burden should be upon him to demonstrate this, rather than simply await the end of a specified period.
  84. In my assessment of the Father, he lacks judgment where Mother and A are concerned and has demonstrated this on numerous occasions, both prior to and during the proceedings. One of the most recent examples of this was patent in his final statement submitted for the fact-finding hearing in which he chose to approach Mother's ex-husband for negative information about her and then decided to recycle this information into his statement, whilst criticising her as a Mother and also her elder children. This commentary was clearly not germane to the issues which the court was to determine and was simply character assassination. It is hard to comprehend why Father considered this course of action to be appropriate, other than he wanted to denigrate her.
  85. I have concluded previously that the Father will say or do anything to achieve his aim of getting contact with his son. I am told that his mental health is suffering now. He is likely struggling not only with the loss of his son from his life understandably, but also with his inability to control the situation. Father was quite hard to control during the course of the proceedings in that he didn't listen or adhere to the court's directions not to record Mother at contact handovers for example and he weaponised professional agencies against her to achieve his aim, misleading those agencies about her actions at times. The poisonous content of his final statement, which breached the specified page limit and had to be pruned by the court, is cited above. These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive of Father's behaviour and attitudes, which are referred to in more detail in my fact-finding judgment.
  86. Father's evidence during that hearing revealed him to be obtuse and dogmatic in his approach. I simply don't know what he may do after the conclusion of proceedings in his desperation to have involvement in his child's life. He has shown little regard for the potential impact upon A in some of his behaviour in the past and similar errors of judgment could be disastrous for Mother's recovery and consequently A. I would not like to think that Father would resort to hanging round outside the child's school for example. It would not be difficult for him to find out where A is being educated.
  87. Father should not be able to access medical or school records for A as he may misuse that information as he has done in the past. I am afraid that I don't have confidence in Father not to make more similar bad decisions in his frustration, despite the geographical distance. A Non-Molestation injunction sends a clear message to him as to what he should and should not do in relation to Mother and A. He is not being restricted from doing anything that he should not be doing in any event as he lives a long way away and has no reason to visit the area near to where Mother lives.
  88. Father should not be near Mother's home nor contact her in any shape or form nor indeed A, as such contact is triggering for Mother in relation to her PTSD and causes her significant distress and anxiety. Mother is afraid of what he may do next, even now and this is a fear which she should not have to live with. He has been legally represented through the proceedings and yet has made such poor decisions. I am concerned as to the wisdom of his future actions when not represented and particularly given his currently expressed mental fragility.
  89. In my judgment, Father's conduct during these proceedings has been "positively harmful" toward Mother from the time when he served her with enforcement proceedings during a contact visit, only weeks after an order had been made in his favour. This aspect of the court's findings is entirely separate from his proven behaviour during the course of the relationship. He has been established to be capable of being and having been coercive, controlling and manipulative. Any such reoccurrence of this type of behaviour would be "positively harmful" to Mother and by extension to A in the future.
  90. Therefore, I conclude that an order is necessary throughout A's minority as there is a significant risk that Father may take inappropriate steps to either contact A or gain access to his world or information about him. Father spoke often during the course of his live evidence to the court about his "frustration" about being shut out of his child's life. I consider that this frustration is likely to be felt all the more keenly after the conclusion of the proceedings when no further avenues are open to him. The NMO is necessary to safeguard both Mother and A's physical and emotional well-being given the impact which Father has already had upon the Mother and by extension, A.
  91. Any proven breach of the order I propose to make could result in a significant sanction, such as imprisonment but would also likely prove fatal to any application for leave in respect of the barring order. The terms of the Non-Molestation order as drafted by Mother's solicitor were not subject of dispute, rather the need for such an order was challenged. I propose to endorse the draft order with an end point of June 2035, being A's sixteenth birthday.
  92. This, in my judgment, should provide the Mother and A with a full package of protection for a significant period when taken together with the no contact order, the revocation of PR and the s.91(14) barring order. I am satisfied that this is a proportionate response to the risk from Father, which I have identified. I have considered each application separately and but have come to the conclusion that each separate aspect is required protection for this child.
  93. 20 February 2025


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