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	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> Sandwell Children's Trust Applicant v T & Ors [2025] EWFC 51 (B) (28 February 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2025/51.html Cite as: [2025] EWFC 51 (B)

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IN THE FAMILY COURT AT BIRMINGHAM
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

		28 February 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. I am concerned with P who is aged 6 in relation to the Local Authority's application for public law orders.
2. These proceedings emanate from longstanding private law proceedings (BM19P08735, BM19P09615, BM21P70320, and BM21P50129) culminating in the local authority issuing care proceedings and, on 27 October 2023, a contested hearing for an interim Care Order with removal of P from her mother's care.
3. I do not intend to rehearse the history of the private law proceedings; suffice to say I defer to my judgement given on the occasion of the removal hearing that can be found at internal pages 408 – 438 of the bundle.
4. Suffice to say, at that hearing I reminded myself that at an interim stage, whilst removal was a serious order, I was not making a final determination as to the long-term future welfare of P.
5. Before the court on that occasion there was a wealth of evidence emanating from the private law proceedings, including three S.37 reports and two reports from Dr Gregory (Psychologist) who gave evidence before the court over the course of 3 days as to the significant emotional harm P had suffered, and was likely to continue to suffer, if she were to remain in her mother's care.
6. I was satisfied that the therapy and work that P needed to undertake to rebuild her relationship with her father could not be undertaken whilst she remained in her mother's care.
7. I determined that the mother displayed limited insight and was satisfied that, whilst P remained in her care, the chance of the mother promoting father's contact was negligible, and that the harm that P would continue to be exposed to would be significant and prolonged.
8. Dr Gregory gave evidence that the issues the mother had were entrenched and longstanding, her views on the father being rigid, and her ability to work with professionals compromised.
9. The Children's Guardian's evidence was of the clear view that the mother was unable to promote a positive image and relationship with the father and provide P with the requisite emotional permission in which this could be progressed.
10. There was limited evidence to suggest a successful prognosis for positive change and therefore removal was both necessary and proportionate.
11. Accordingly, I was satisfied that whilst P remained in her mother's care, the chances of promoting father's contact would be negligible and the harm that P would continue to be exposed to would be significant and prolonged.
12. Father accepted at that time that any transition to his care needed to be handled sensitively.
13. Following the removal and the making of the interim Care Order, I directed parenting assessments and Theraplay, alongside life story/identity work, to commence as soon as possible following settlement in an intermediate foster placement.
14. The removal itself was made more traumatic for P by the mother and her family videoing it, which exacerbated P's distress. The whole process took 2 hours, albeit once removed, P quickly settled.
15. The foster carer logs it is fair to say (and not unexpectedly) does show that P did experience difficulties in settling in their care but nothing of significance, save perhaps 3 incidents recorded at internal pages 1193, 1198 and 1199, albeit of equal significance is that P wanted a picture of her and her father in her room.
16. The local authority was of the view at that time that contact between P and her mother should be determined by the therapist once Theraplay had got underway, and closely monitored. Furthermore, there should be no transition into father's care until the parenting assessment of him had been undertaken.
17. By order of 20 November 2023, I directed an Independent Social Work Assessment of both parents, an update as to the recommended therapy and mother's contact. Matters were timetabled to an Issues Resolution Hearing. (The 26-week timetable for the proceedings expiring on 22 April 2024)
18. Due to the Local Authority's non-compliance with these directions, the Guardian filed an application.
19. At the subsequent hearing on 9 January 2024, it was recorded that the maternal uncle and aunt had been subject to a positive initial viability assessment as potential carers and were in the process of being assessed as connected persons.
20. It was also recorded that Dr Gregory had been approached to revisit P's therapeutic needs; father was having indirect contact with no safeguarding concerns, however, there had only been limited contact with the mother.
21. Concerns were expressed as to the lack of progress following the interim Care Order and it was determined that unless Dr Gregory advised otherwise, supervised direct contact should commence immediately for the father and thereafter for the mother, subject to a robust safety plan and working agreement with direct work to be undertaken with P prior to contact with her parents.
22. The IRH was therefore re-timetabled to accommodate this.
23. Following on from this several applications were made:

a. Mother's application to discharge the interim Care Order (13 Jan 2024)

b. Mother's application for a S34 contact order (17 Jan 2024)

c. Father's application in relation to further non-compliance in relation to the failure to instruct the independent social worker (1 Feb 2024)

24. It also transpired that P had been moved to the home of the maternal aunt and uncle without the court's oversight, the Guardian's input, lack of disclosure as to the assessment and no prior discussion with Dr Gregory.
25. Father was also concerned that no work had yet commenced with P. However, the one face to face contact he had had on the 1 February 2024 had been positive. It was envisaged that mother's contact would commence within the next 4 weeks (it being reported, quite understandably, that P was sad at not seeing her family)
26. At a professional's meeting it was felt that P's placement needed to be stabilised and a stepped approach was advocated to relationship building, The Independent Reviewing Officer expressed the view that the lack of contact was likely to leave P feeling abandoned. Life story work was needed to understand why she had been removed from the care of her mother (and her maternal grandparents whom she also resided with) and they queried the recommendation as to suspending mother's contact if there was no plan as to immediate transition into father's care.
27. At a hearing on 8 February 2024, I expressed concern as to the move of P to her maternal uncle and aunt without notice to the parents and the involvement of the court, the child's guardian, and Dr Gregory and without sight of the connected persons assessment. I further expressed concern as to the local authority's failure to arrange direct contact between P and her parents since the removal hearing in October 2023 as well as the failure to undertake direct work with P since being placed, despite the clear recommendations of Dr Gregory and my clear directions in the matter. Accordingly, with her approval, I listed this matter before Lieven J.
28. The parent's applications were adjourned to the next hearing.
29. Following that hearing I received communication that the Social Worker had, of their own volition and without restoring the matter back to court, stood down the Independent Social Worker in relation to the assessment of the father who therefore, having filled the gap with other work, was now unable to complete that assessment within the court-imposed timeframe.
30. At the hearing before Lieven J on 15 February 2024, mother made clear that she opposed any move of P to the father without a parenting assessment. The court adjourned matters to seek the input of Dr Gregory on the matter with a recital that mother's contact should commence on 26 February 2024.
31. The report from Dr Gregory dated 16 February 2024 notes the positive changes in P's behaviour since her move from her mother's care and reiterated that she will need life story work alongside Theraplay.
32. At the adjourned hearing on 21 February 2024 before Lieven J mother represented herself. The court determined that P should move to her father's care and that the mother's contact should be suspended during the implementation of a transition plan of between 2 – 4 weeks, following which there should be indirect contact and thereafter supervised contact.
33. It was also recorded that the Local Authority no longer intended to undertake an independent social work assessment of the father but would assess him as part of their final evidence. It was further recorded that life story work would be commenced, although Theraplay would not start until the final placement had been determined.
34. A prohibited steps order as to the non-removal from the father's care by the mother was made (endorsed with a penal notice) and the matter re-timetabled to an Issues Resolution hearing (albeit it was recognised that such an order cannot co-exist with a Care Order and should be phrased as an injunctive order as recorded in the recitals to my order of 28 August 2024 (S9(1) Children Act 1989))
35. The mother then made applications for enforcement on 20 March 2024 and 5 April 2024 which were refused on paper as being totally without merit. (A C79 enforcement application only applies to S8 orders; in any event, there was no S34 order in existence as such applications had been adjourned by order of 8 February 2024).
36. The mother had also applied for a non-molestation order under Part IV Family Law Act 1996 against the father which I similarly dismissed on paper subject to the provisions of FPR18.11.
37. The next hearing on the 5 April 2024 was listed of the court's own initiative due to a number of online posts emanating potentially from the mother which were of concern. At that hearing I made various injunctive orders.
38. At the hearing on 22 April 2024, which had been listed by order of 21 February 2024 for an Issues Resolution Hearing, the matter was treated as a Case Management hearing and listed for a further Issues Resolution and re-timetabled accordingly.
39. Whilst there was no formal parenting assessment of the father, the parenting assessment of the mother was negative.
40. It concludes that mother shows no insight, and has disproportionate fixed views of the father, rigidity of thinking and is unlikely to work openly and honestly with professionals. It recommended that mother's contact should initially be indirect by way of short videos with the father to encourage P to respond. Once a period of stability is established, consideration could be given to progression to direct family time by way of stepped arrangements. To that end, the mother will need support and should access therapy.
41. The local authority, in light of this, sought a 12-month Supervision Order with placement with the father (with whom she had been placed since February 2024).
42. It was observed that P was happy in her father's care, albeit was confused as to the delay in contact between her and her mother and maternal family.
43. In the local authority's view, the mother had created a self-believing negative narrative towards the father which did not reflect the reality.
44. The mother disagreed with the parenting assessment and sought P's return to her care.
45. The father confirmed that P is settled at school and in his care and seeks to care for her in the long term. Indirect contact has been positive, and he accepts P would benefit from seeing her mum, but such contact needs to be professionally supervised.
46. The Guardian's view was that, whilst she is supportive of the Local Authority's plan, she would propose this be under a Care Order as opposed to a Supervision Order.
47. The adjourned Issues Resolution hearing took place on 22 May 2024 at which the mother remined unrepresented. In the exercise of the court's case management powers, as set out in the recitals to that order, the matter was set down for a 1-day final hearing.
48. At that hearing the issue of designation as to local authority was highlighted due to the father residing in the Flintshire area and P now being placed in his care. It was noted that the final threshold document remained in dispute in so far as the mother was concerned.
49. The Guardian supported there being direct contact between the mother and P, professionally supervised on a fortnightly basis and subject to review.
50. The mother's application for discharge of the interim Care Order was formally dismissed.
51. Theraplay and life story work remained outstanding (3 therapists had been contacted)
52. Flintshire Local Authority, in compliance with my order, filed a statement confirming acceptance of designation if P were to be subject to a Supervision Order, but curiously not if made subject to a Care Order.
53. They confirmed that they would undertake Theraplay, but life story work could only be undertaken from the date of delegation and therefore it would be more appropriate for Sandwell MBC to undertake this.
54. Face to Face contact between P and her mother could be facilitated once a month, subject to review, with additional monthly video contact.
55. The mother then re-instructed solicitors following the hearing and filed an urgent application requesting the court to consider the following:

a. The Mother's appeal to the interim Care Order made in October 2023 (this was the first time the court had been made aware of such an application)

b. Mother's S34 application in relation to the Local Authority's failure to promote mother's contact.

c. Extensive disclosure in relation to purported gaps in the evidence.

d. Release of the papers for the purposes of a potential Human Rights Act application.

56. In response, Sandwell MBC confirmed that it would facilitate mother's contact on a supervised basis fortnightly for 1 hour 30 mins with the maternal grandparents joining towards the end of mother's contact. This was to remain supervised due to mother's perceived lack of insight, albeit it was noted that the current travel arrangements for P were not sustainable in the long term.
57. Before progressing contact the mother would need to undertake work to improve her level of insight.
58. It is fair to say that the mother has been consistent throughout that she does not require pastoral support/work and has not actively sought it.
59. On 19 August 2024, contact took place between P and her maternal uncle, aunt and cousin, with the father and team manager in attendance for 6 hours, which was positive. In relation to this the Local Authority was satisfied that in the future this contact could be arranged by the father.
60. As to therapeutic support, it was recommended that play therapy and life story work should commence only once P's final placement had been secured. It was considered that an updated assessment was not necessary as work had already been undertaken whilst she had been in placement with her father with matters being subject to ongoing review. There were no immediate concerns as to P's wellbeing.
61. The Local Authority remain concerned as to mother's social media postings and its associated risks and therefore say P's school and GP details should remain anonymised.
62. The Guardian confirmed that P remained settled in Father's care; she was progressing well and there were no safeguarding concerns. Contact with her mother was positive but should take place at a venue closer to where P lives due to distance and travel time and remain supervised.
63. At the hearing on 28 August 2024. listed to deal with the mother's application, I retained the final hearing date on the 17 September 2024 but reconstituted it as a further Issues Resolution Hearing to also deal with the mother's S34 Application with consequential directions.
64. At the hearing on 17 September 2024 an approved witness template was agreed for a 3-day contested hearing, the issues being identified as follows:

a. Can P remain in the care of her father or be returned to the care of her mother?

b. If public orders are necessary (and the threshold is crossed) what orders are appropriate, and who should be the designated local authority?

c. What should be the spend time with arrangements in relation to the parent with whom P does not live with?

d. Should there be a S91(14) order and if so for what duration?

65. Consequential directions were made as to the recommended work that the mother needs to undertake and how it can be accessed, the filing of a Care/Supervision plan (to be agreed between the two local authorities) along with an agreed contact plan to include venue, duration, frequency and Supervision and what the mother needs to evidence before contact can be progressed into the community, with an updated working agreement as to mother's contact.
66. I determined that if no application was made to restore mother's S.34 application by 22 November 2024 it should stand dismissed. No application was forthcoming.
67. Mother's application for the release of the papers for a Human Right's Act 1998 application was adjourned to the final hearing.
68. It was noted that mother's contact was currently taking place the last two weekends of each month.
69. It is worth noting that following on from that hearing, mother initially refused to sign the amended working agreement in relation to contact, however this was ultimately signed, although this led to a gap in that contact.
70. As directed, the Local Authority filed their statement in relation to the recommended work that the mother needs to undertake as recommended by Dr Gregory and the Independent Social Worker. It identifies the following:

a. Parenting work

b. Therapeutic Work

c. Motivational Work

71. Albeit it was commented that Dr Gregory felt that any therapeutic work was unlikely to be successful due to mother's lack of motivation. It also noted that the mother does not accept the assessment of her and does not wish to engage in the recommended work. Accordingly, such work was likely to take a significant amount of time due to mother's lack of insight.
72. Notwithstanding this, appointments were offered to discuss the recommended work and 3 dates in October 2024 were provided, but the mother did not respond.
73. The contact schedule proposes fortnightly supervised contact on a Saturday for 2 hours, to include the maternal grandparents for the last hour every other contact (namely monthly) The venue will be near to P's address. The mother will need to show adherence to the contact plan and working agreement before any changes are made. The first review will take place following the final hearing.
74. The final Supervision plan proposes that P remains in the care of her father under a Child Arrangements order backed up by a 12-month Supervision order in favour of Flintshire. There will be ongoing support provided by monthly visits and Child in Need Meetings.
75. Both Local Authority's maintain that a Supervision order is the most appropriate order as there are no concerns pertaining to father's care and therefore, they do not see the need to share parental responsibility.
76. It is accepted that robust support is required for the contact arrangements, however, they argue that there is no reason why this cannot be provided for under a Supervision order, which if needs be, can be extended to up to 3 years.
77. The mother's position remains that she seeks P's return to her care, or in the alternative, a shared lives with order or a meaningful spend time with order to include unrestricted unsupervised contact to incorporate staying contact over weekends and holidays.
78. She seeks disclosure of P's address, GP and School. She also seeks a Specific Issue Order so as to change of P's surname from 'C' to 'C-T'.
79. She opposes the making of a Care Order but would support a Supervision Order in favour of Flintshire, but not Sandwell due to the criticisms she levels at them.
80. She also sought an adjournment of the final hearing and my recusal from the same. I dealt with both those applications as preliminary issues on Day 1 of the hearing and dismissed them both for the reasons given in a separate oral judgement.
81. She also seeks for the appointment of another Independent Social Worker to revisit the assessments of her.
82. She denies the assertion of alienating behaviours. Her concerns emanate from father's lifestyle and behaviours, and safeguarding concerns that she maintains have not been addressed (alcohol abuse, mental health problems, inability to promote contact and share information, lack of a sufficient support network, parenting ability, father's relationship with food and financial instability) She also raises recent issues reported by the school on respect of P's behaviour and regression.
83. She maintains the removal of P from her care in October 2023 was wrong and unfair and that her subsequent appeal was never dealt with.
84. P was subsequently placed with the father without proper checks and assessments and without P having undertaken any of the recommended therapeutic interventions.
85. Since separation her contact has been limited and not promoted. There has been a lack of exploration around the need for continued Supervision or the progression of contact.
86. She maintains that the recommended work that she should undertake is not necessary.
87. The father is concerned that a Supervision Order alone would not sufficiently protect and support P and indeed manage mother's contact.
88. P is making excellent progress in school, and he remains committed to sharing information albeit redacted. Weekly play therapy sessions with P finally commenced on 9 January 2025. Life story work will be undertaken by the Social Worker.
89. Mother's contact is positive (this is backed up by the contact notes I have read) albeit the father still has concerns as to boundary setting and communications. He remains concerned as to mother's lack of insight which needs to be addressed before contact is progressed.
90. The Guardian's final recommendations confirm that P remains settled at school and in her father's care where she has been for nearly a year and doing well. The father has demonstrated that he is well able to meet her needs and she is developing well. There are no concerns in relation to his care. P is happy where she is and enjoys seeing her mum.
91. It is accepted that there was a lengthy period where P did not have contact with her mother and maternal family, with whom she previously resided with before her removal.
92. It is the Guardian's view that when P lived with her mother, she was deprived unjustly of having a relationship with her father and she undermined her relationship with him. The Guardian is of the view that the mother exhibited alienating behaviours by way of emotional manipulation.
93. The mother's views of the father and that of her parents remain negative and this poses a real risk to P if she were to have unsupervised contact. Those views have not wavered.
94. The mother fails to recognise the reasons why P was placed outside her care, seeking to apportion blame to others and regarding her parenting as being nothing other than perfect.
95. Her relationship with her parents is insular, an environment that P was previously exposed to. The mother herself presents as emotionally vulnerable whose relationship with P was enmeshed and unhealthy.
96. None of the professionals support a return of P to mother's care or that there be unsupervised contact at this stage. The Guardian recommends a Care Order as opposed to a Supervision Order.

ISSUES

97. The following issues remain to be determined as per my order of 30 January 2025:

a. Threshold

b. Can P remain in the care of her Father, or should she return to the care of her mother and under what order?

c. In the case of any public law orders, who should be the appropriate designated local authority?

d. What the spend time arrangements should be in relation to the parent with whom the child does not live?

e. Whether a direction pursuant to S.91(14) should be made, and if so in relation to which type of application and over what timescale?

f. Whether any further injunctive orders should be made, including where appropriate a Prohibited Steps Order?

g. The release of the papers for a potential Human Rights Act Application

h. Disclosure and Release of information pertaining to P namely, residence, GP and School.

i. Mother's applications for a change of name and instruction of an independent Social Worker.

ORAL EVIDENCE

INDEPENDENT SOCIAL WORKER

98. The main issue for the Independent Social Worker in their assessment was the ability of the mother to meet P's emotional needs in relation to promoting a relationship with her father. As the assessment continued the more entrenched the mother became, as did her rigidity of thinking.
99. Although there is no factual matrix in relation to mother's narrative and views of the father (Domestic abuse and substance misuse within the relationship) the Independent Social Worker was of the view that the mother's reaction to these concerns felt disproportionate when compared to the perceived level of risk.
100. Mother's inability to change her mindset would expose P to this and could cause significant harm if it continued over a prolonged period. The mother was unable to see this as an issue from her own perspective. The situation is entrenched and there has been little, if any change, and at present the mother is unable to work in partnership with the local authority.
101. The Family needs continued support to prevent exposure to future risk of harm, particularly through the management of family time which is elevated if left solely to the father. A 'buffer' is needed between the parents as to decision making, either by way of a Supervision Order or a Child in Need plan.

SOCIAL WORKER

102. The Social Worker accepted that the mother's feelings of marginalisation by the local authority had some basis and that communication and consultation had not been what it should be (the delay in arranging contact post the removal hearing being an example)
103. The Social worker accepted that contact was positive, albeit there were several restrictions regarding the number of gifts that mother was allowed to bring to any one contact which led to some decisions being taken, such as restricting games like 'pass the parcel' and taking craft items home which had been made during contact sessions.
104. Before contact could progress beyond supervised contact, the Social Worker was of the view that the mother needed to gain insight into her past behaviours to avoid repetition by undertaking the recommended therapy, completing it successfully and applying what she has learnt.
105. As for the progression of supervised contact in the community, the current arrangement would need to be sustained and the schedule of expectations adhered to (they have only been in place since 25 October 2024). The timescale for this was difficult to assess at present. The monitoring of contact needs to continue due to the risk posed as to potentially negative communications with P. If the mother's narrative relating to the father was conveyed to P this would be harmful. Progression to contact in the community changes the dynamics making monitoring more challenging.
106. As to there being no formal findings in relation to the mother's concerns pertaining to the father, her allegations are extremely broad and encompasses not just domestic abuse and substance misuse but the father's living arrangements and business interests.
107. At present there are no issues in relation to father's care of P. Although there is no formal parenting assessment of him, his care of P, by way of empirical evidence, has been tested over a prolonged period.
108. The presenting risk as far as the mother is concerned remains her lack of insight and her unwillingness to undertake the recommended work. There is a pattern of the mother not engaging with anyone who does not share her viewpoint.
109. Furthermore, due to mother's extreme views and past behaviours, it is unlikely that she would promote father's contact and history would repeat itself.
110. The Social Worker supports the ongoing sharing of information with the mother but in an anonymised format.

Care Order v Supervision Order

111. In relation to the question as to what type of order is appropriate, it is accepted that the family will need support following the conclusion of proceedings to protect P from the emotional harm that mother poses to her.
112. It was put to the social worker that under a Supervision order the Local Authority does not have Parental Responsibility and no decision-making powers in relation to the management and progression of contact arrangements. It is clear the parents are unable to co-parent.
113. The Social worker responded that such difficulties often present themselves in private law proceedings and that there are orders within the courts armoury that can be made to bolster and enhance the father's position. This would include some or all of the following:

a. Prohibited Steps Order (Preventing removal from father's care, from the locality and school)

b. The imposition of S.11(7) conditions

c. A robust working agreement

d. A S.91(14) direction

e. Continuance of injunctive orders, including potentially orders under Part IV Family Law Act 1996 if needs be.

114. Under a Care order, as the father is the primary carer, the Local Authority would defer to him in any event, and he should be given parental autonomy.
115. A Supervision order can be extended, or a Care Order applied for if needs be, however, it was contended that the father would have limited input into the decision making in relation to this.
116. It was put to the Social Worker that, due to the level of risk, a Supervision Order does nothing to alleviate those risks and that a mechanism is needed to protect P (an example being given in relation to the face book postings). Mere advice and assistance would not be sufficient. The management of contact is a real risk and 'flash point', if the management of contact and the decision-making process in relation to this was the sole province of the father there is a real danger that matters would regress and revert to the same situation as within the private law proceedings. In response the Social Worker contended that the dynamics have now changed as P is now living with the father, and whatever order is made the Local Authority will continue to act as 'broker'.
117. The placement with father is a long-term placement and there is no need to monitor it, and even under the current interim Care Order regime, the local authority's involvement as to the exercise of parental responsibility has been 'light touch', delegating much of the decision making to the father. However, it was put to the social worker that there were exceptions in relation to the management of contact (e.g. excessive gifts)
118. The main concern relates to the management of contact, which is currently working well, however, it was put to the social worker that, due to mother's unpredictability, there is a concern that if final orders are made, which the mother does not accept, her reactions and behaviours may escalate.
119. It was accepted that a Care Order is more intrusive and further proceedings would be necessary to discharge it, however, subject to a S.91(14) direction, under a Supervision order in the event of a disagreement it is open to the mother to file a further application.
120. The social worker was also asked as to the commitment of the Local Authority as to the funding of therapy for P beyond the agreed 32 weekly sessions (at present only 3 sessions have taken place).

MOTHER

121. The mother accepts that the lengthy private law proceedings would have been emotionally harmful to P. However, she does not accept that she has exhibited alienating behaviours and does not accept the factual basis of the threshold document. Nevertheless, she would support a Supervision Order, as opposed to a Care Order, due to the stigma that attaches to the latter.
122. She does not feel the need for any restrictive orders and wishes for there to be a 'middle ground' venue in relation to contact, and seeks its progression if P were not to be returned to her care.
123. She does not accept that she has refused the offer of therapeutic work and would accept the proposed package.
124. The lack of progression of father's contact during the private law proceedings she lays at the door of the father, maintaining that he refused contact as a means of pursuing full care of P.
125. P's behavioural issues at school, prior to her removal, she explains, were due to her starting a new school and the involvement of social services. However, she maintains that this was improving (albeit she was challenged that the evidence is suggestive that it was only after a period in foster care did the incidents start to diminish)
126. She disputes that P has been made privy to negative influences in relation to her father, and disputes what the Children's Guardian reports in relation to what P has purportedly told her and what other professionals have observed.
127. She does not accept that P is presenting well in her father's care and cites the observations of the school, albeit was challenged that she omits to counterbalance this with a number of positives. She remains concerned that P's needs will not be met in father's care and therefore the concerns she has voiced throughout remain.
128. She was challenged concerning family members videoing P's removal from her care which was far from covert.
129. She does not accept the findings of District Judge Webb following the breakdown of contact on 30 October 2021 (a final order having only been made on 12 October 2021) which records the poor behaviour of her and her family, and seeks to justify the same.
130. She was challenged about a book she had presented to P during contact about an adopted stray Cat ("The Cat Book")
131. She was challenged about the Facebook postings which were made following the placement of P in father's care which she denied she had any involvement with.
132. Those postings reference the following:

a. The father being a dangerous man.

b. That he has abused the mother and P

c. He is an alcoholic.

d. He has previously starved the child.

e. He planned to kidnap her.

f. He has a narcissistic personality and has suicidal tendencies.

FATHER

133. The father spoke about issues concerning P's weight and dental care which, to be fair, mirrors some of mother's concerns and provides credence to them.
134. He accepts that mother's contact with P is positive.
135. He remains concerned in relation to the sharing of information that would lead to P's whereabouts being made known to the mother given the Facebook postings, for which a police marker remains in place.
136. Whilst he accepts that the length of the private law proceedings was emotionally harmful to P, he believes he tried his best to resolve matters.
137. He accepts that the mother does have some legitimate grievances against the local authority (lack of involvement in LAC reviews and the promotion of contact following removal)
138. He sees the importance of communication going forward however, due to mother's stance, it is difficult for him to see how matters can progress positively in that respect. He has been subject to a relentless barrage of allegations and co-parenting remains all but impossible.
139. Communications remain cautious, fragile, and apprehensive. The mother struggles to remove herself from an adversarial stance. She takes minor issues and elevates them into more serious ones necessitating ongoing professional input which elevates father's stress levels and indirectly impacts on P. There is ongoing work that needs to be done in this area, subject to the mother being willing to undertake this work.
140. His overall concern is the mother's rigidity of thinking which makes decision making between the parents difficult; an issue which has been longstanding.
141. He is happy to be flexible regarding a mid-point in relation to the venue for contact.
142. P's recent behavioural issues, as reported by the school, he does not accept relates to his care but may stem from P's life experiences (of course, therapy has only just commenced)

Care Order v Supervision Order

143. Following 3 years of private law proceedings with little by way of progress, the father feels that the imposition of a Care Order was the single biggest factor in improving P's wellbeing and safeguarding her. He does not feel that a Supervision Order would provide sufficient robustness as the situation has not improved in so far as the mother's perspective is concerned, and would place P in a vulnerable situation (The local authority's speedy response to the Facebook postings being an example) When a Care Order is in force, there is a collective shared responsibility.
144. A Supervision order provides advice and assistance only and the father is concerned that without enhanced local authority involvement via a Care Order, there is a real risk of history repeating itself. Despite such an order being invasive, he feels it imposes a more robust duty on the local authority. P is not 'out of the woods' yet and he is concerned as to the risks of future destabilisation.

CHILD'S GUARDIAN

145. The Guardian describes, that when first meeting P, she presented as being very anxious and having the weight of the world on her shoulders. She agrees with Dr Gregory that she has an enmeshed relationship with her mother being not the typical parent/child relationship. Their roles were interchangeable, and there appears to have been a significant amount of over-sharing of information.
146. Since removal from mother's care, she has come a long way. She now possesses a good understanding of her identity with both sides of her family.
147. She is settled in school and has a good friendship group which is in stark contrast to when she was in the care of her mother, when peer relationships were presenting difficulties.
148. P still presents difficulties as to the role of the non-caring parent due to her lived experiences and regrettably the much-needed therapy is in its infancy.
149. The mother needs to complete the recommended therapy before contact can be progressed even to supervised in the community due to issues of monitoring. The Guardian's view was that this was essential to break the cycle and change mother's perceptions, which have been longstanding throughout both the private law and these proceedings, and despite the involvement of a multitude of professionals, without it, P would be exposed to emotional harm. Such therapy will need to address the impact on the child of certain parental behaviours. The Guardian has no confidence that the mother would promote father's contact if P were to be returned to her care.

The "Cat Book"

150. As to this, the Guardian was of the view that, on a superficial level, the book seemed harmless, however, on a deeper level, it clearly deliberately triggers an emotional response, the language being highly emotive.

Mother's challenge to the Guardian's approach to the case

151. The Guardian was challenged by mother's counsel that she has approached the case with a pre-conceived notion that the mother was difficult which the Guardian refutes.
152. She was challenged that a previous social worker who worked on the case raised concerns about the guardian, and other professionals, directly with the mother to the effect that they were determined to move P away from the mother's care.
153. She was challenged as to why there was no parenting assessment of the father prior to the move of P to his care. Her explanation accords with the orders of Lieven J of 15 and 21 February 2024 and following the input of Dr Gregory and there being no safeguarding concerns pointing otherwise.

Change of Surname

154. As to mother's specific issue application for a change of P's surname, this is not supported by the Guardian. P has had a lot to contend with in relation to her identity (Indeed, life story work and Theraplay has only just commenced) After such length of time, such a change would not be in P's welfare.

Care Order v Supervision Order

155. For the Guardian this will be the first period of time in P's life in which she has enjoyed stability (She is now 6)
156. The 'Glue' to this has been the Local Authority 'holding the reins'. They have had to exercise parental responsibility in many ways during the course of these proceedings, in conjunction with the father, to enable P to transition, and ultimately invest in father's care and for this not to be undermined (e.g. contact, control of gifts and the "Cat Book" concerns). Whilst the father, of course, exercises Parental Responsibility, it is shared with the Mother, and he would be greatly assisted by being able to use the Local Authority as a 'shield' and deflect decisions, where necessary, given the enhanced Parental Responsibility the Local Authority would have under a Care order (S.33(3)), due to the family dynamics and potential ramifications for him and P.
157. A Supervision Order is a totally different type of order with different statutory obligations and capacity to act to support the child (e.g. using S.34 to manage contact in a flexible way to meet P's needs)
158. The Guardian feels that without a Care Order the situation could deteriorate, given the history of mother making allegations and the high level of conflict that this case has engendered. A Supervision Order, focussing as it does on assisting and befriending, is insufficient in her view. The management of future family time is very much a 'flashpoint'.
159. The local authority would be the protective "buffer' in relation to any action the mother may take following the conclusion of these proceedings (the Facebook postings being a prime example of the potential lengths the mother can go to when she feels aggrieved)
160. Although the direct risks to P may well have been mitigated due to the move to father's care, the Guardian feels that it is essential for the local authority to remain involved to navigate any future difficulties, and to be proactive in doing so and with immediacy if needs be.
161. The local authority having parental responsibility provides an important 'buffer' regarding the exercise of parental responsibility between the parents, and more particularly the management of contact.
162. It was put to the Guardian that it was common for parents to be disgruntled following the conclusion of proceedings and to vent their angst on social media (albeit the steps the mother has taken in this case it has to be said are at the more extreme end of the spectrum) A Care Order, the Guardian felt, would provide a rapid response which the father may lack the resources and know-how to pursue.
163. Whilst a Care Order does not prevent further applications being made (S.34 and S.39) (albeit they are restrictions by virtue of S.91(15), S.91(17) which potentially could be extended by the usage of S.91(14)) the process is different involving as it does, the local authority, Guardian, and the court.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

SANDWELL MBC

164. The local authority submits that P has been subjected to emotional harm over a prolonged period spanning almost the entire period of her young life due to the mother undermining P's relationship with her father by way of disrupting contact. Her hostility towards contact and repeated unsubstantiated concerns about the father demonstrate her consistent intention to disrupt contact which has caused emotional harm to P.
165. Her actions within the proceedings in relation to filming P's removal and the Facebook posting and mother's failure to acknowledge the impact of this and potential consequences of the latter is deeply concerning.
166. P has settled well in her father's care, and he is meeting all her needs consistently. There have been no concerns about his ability to care for P and meet all her care needs, including emotional needs, and he has promoted P spending time with the mother.
167. Both local authorities do not consider a Care Order is proportionate. The plan for monitoring and support would be no greater under a Care Order than under a Supervision Order.
168. The local authority recommends there should be a Child Arrangements Order for P to live with her father, subject to a Supervision Order for 12 months. In addition, the local authority recommends a Prohibited Steps Order to prevent P being removed from father's care, or anyone he has entrusted with P's care and a S.91(14) direction made to prevent further proceedings being issued in relation to P for a specified period.

FLINTSHIRE CC

169. Flintshire County Council now accept that, whether a Care Order or a Supervision Order is made, they should be the designated authority if the child is to remain with the father in Flintshire.
170. All professionals involved with the family agree that P suffered harm in the care of the mother, and that the dynamics between the parents and aspects of the mother's behaviour continues to pose a risk of harm to P, particularly to her emotional wellbeing and sense of identity. However, the Court should scrutinise the degree to which the risk of harm remains for P and the support that can be put in place to address those risks.
171. Like Sandwell, they consider that a Supervision Order best meets P's needs and is the most proportionate order to make.
172. The support that is required for this family can be equally delivered through either a Supervision or a Care plan as in reality, there is no difference in the type of support that will be provided to the family on the ground.
173. P appears to be settled and happy in the care of her father, she is settled in school and is enjoying positive contact with her mother. P has also commenced the recommended therapy.
174. Quite properly they defer to the judgement in Re JW [2024] EWCA Civ 944 and the need for proportionality when considering the necessity for a child placed at home under a final Care Order and the Public Law Working Group Report (April 2023) and the expectation that, in every case where a supervision order may be made, the local authority will prepare a clear and detailed Supervision Support Plan which is tailored to the needs of the child. It also requires that the plan should be clear as to the provision of resources to underpin each element of the plan, and that the plan should be seen as a living instrument and be kept under formal 'robust' review during the life of the supervision order.
175. They also cite Re F (A Child) (Placement Orders: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 as to how risk should be evaluated in the context of proportionality namely (albeit in the context of placement for adoption):

'(1) The type of harm that might arise.

(2) The likelihood of it arising.

(3) The consequences: what would be the likely severity of the harm if it did come to pass?

(4) Risk reduction/mitigation: would the chances of harm happening be reduced or mitigated by the support services that are or could be made available?'

176. They further defer to The Services and Wellbeing Act 2014 which applies in Wales. Local Authorities in Wales operate Care and Support plans rather than Child in need plans – and pursuant to s21, the Local Authority are under an ongoing duty to assess the needs of any child in their area who may be in need of support, and then to meet any assessed needs for Care and Support, particularly if the child is at risk of abuse and/or harm (s37). Pursuant to s54, the support to be provided must be drawn up into a Care and Support plan.
177. It is accepted that risks of emotional harm still pervade through contact arrangements through ongoing behaviours of the mother and the dynamics between the parents. All parties agree that the parents will need professional support to manage the risks posed and to ensure that P is able to continue to enjoy a relationship with both parents. However:

a. The mother has not, to date, attempted to visit the father's home or P's school since she was placed with him.

b. It is accepted that the risk remains of the mother undermining the placement with the father and causing P emotional harm as well as posting information on social media.

178. Clearly, if the mother's behaviours continued to such an extent that either she physically attended at the father's home, or school and tried to remove her, or that the mother's behaviour had such an impact on either the father or P that the placement broke down or they had to move, that would be significant. However, it is argued that the risks of both eventualities appear increasingly remote, and, in any event, these risks can be easily managed by private law orders and, if necessary, injunctive orders.
179. It appears to be the more pervasive/subtle risks posed by the mother in contact and in the poor dynamic in communication with the father that are causing the real concern. However, just because there is a backdrop of significant harm and an interim Care Order being required, does not necessarily mean that such harm will once again rise to this level or have the same impact.
180. These risk however are now at their lowest level now that P is in her father's care.
181. Therapeutic and life story work will continue. Advice, assistance and support will continue and will be subject to ongoing review, including the ongoing professional supervision of contact.
182. In essence, there is nothing exceptional about this case justifying a 'Care Order at home'.
183. There is no need for the Local Authority to share parental responsibility so as to act as a 'buffer'. Any risks and challenges to the father's exercise of his parental responsibility can be dealt with by private law orders.
184. A Supervision Order for 12 months is a substantial period and is enough time for P to complete therapeutic work, and for the mother to substantially embark on therapy, and for contact to be properly reviewed in a meaningful way.
185. Moreover, a Supervision Order can be extended for up to three years and the new guidance is clear that the review process must be robust.

MOTHER

186. The mother seeks for P to be returned to her care. She does not believe that P would require any support if this were to happen.
187. She disputes that P's welfare needs are being met adequately by the father.
188. If the court determines that P cannot return to her care, she seeks for P to be made the subject of a Supervision Order as opposed to a Care Order. Like both Local Authority's she asserts that there is nothing that can be achieved by way of a Care Order which cannot be achieved under a supervision order.
189. If P is not returned to her care, she seeks an increase in contact, for supervision to be reduced and for her contact to ultimately progress to that of overnight weekend contact with extended contact over the school holidays.
190. She asserts that she should be permitted to engage with school and health services so that she can be properly informed about P's health and education and be able to attend school for events such as parents' evening.
191. She believes that she has been treated unfairly by both the court and professionals.
192. She does not accept the threshold document as pleaded by the local authority and refutes any suggestion that she has alienated P from her father. She argues that where contact has not taken place, this has been as a result of Father's efforts to control and manipulate his way towards achieving his goal of having P move to live with him, for which he has been ultimately successful.
193. She bemoans the fact that within the initial private law proceedings, or indeed since, a properly conducted finding of fact hearing never took place so as to ensure that there could be an accurate and full risk assessment undertaken in relation to her allegations towards the father as experienced by her during their relationship, and thus provide a factual matrix in which to make welfare decisions.
194. She maintains her criticism of the Guardian as to unconscious bias.
195. She seeks for P's name to be hyphenated as a way of supporting her identity which is crucial to her sense of belonging.
196. She maintains that there is no justification at all for any injunctive orders either by way of an order under Part IV Family Law Act 1996, S.91(14) Children Act 1989 or a prohibited steps order.
197. Apart from the Facebook postings (for which she states she was not responsible for posting) the justification for such restrictions is pure speculative and without evidence.
198. The mother has also made separate submissions which are contained within an Annex document. Of particular relevance is her assertion that the father has previously disclosed to CAFCASS that he had planned to 'kidnap' P, albeit there is no record of any such threat having been made.

FATHER

199. The father defers to the assessment of Dr Gregory:

'Overall, T presents as having very little insight into the impact of her behaviour upon her daughter and entirely denies third party accounts of her behaviour, despite evidence suggesting that issues arose in at least four separate contact centres as a result of her behaviour. T does not seem to accept any professional opinions which do not align with her narrative and struggles to remove herself from the adversarial nature of contact disagreements to reflect upon her own behaviour and its impact on her daughter.'

200. None of the professionals have raised any concerns regarding the father's care of P, nor that he poses any risk to her, nor his ability to meet her holistic needs.

Change in surname

201. This is opposed by the father. P has been known by the same surname since birth. She is now aged 6. There is no welfare justification for such a change.

Further Assessment of the mother

202. This is opposed by the father. There is a comprehensive independent assessment of her which was challenged by mother's counsel under cross-examination and whose assessment of the risk posed by the mother remains the same. The mother has also been assessed by a psychologist and multiple professionals, all of whom have reached the same conclusion. There is no evidential gap,

Disclosure of P's school, GP and address

203. This is objected to by the father.

Care Order v Supervision Order.

204. The father supports the guardian's proposal that the matter is finalised under the auspices of a Care Order rather than a supervision order, the case clearly falling within the "exceptional" category such that the local authority need to continue to share parental responsibility following the conclusion of these proceedings.

CHILD'S GUARDIAN

205. Having heard all the evidence, her recommendations remain the same, namely that P should remain in her father's care and agrees with the Local Authority's plan in relation to the mother's contact.

Further Assessment of the mother

206. This is not supported by the Guardian there being no identifiable gap in the evidence. The application should be dismissed.

Change of surname

207. This is not supported as being in P's best interests and should also be dismissed.

Threshold

208. Quite properly the Guardian refers to the case of Re A (No2) (Children: Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947:

"Judges are entitled, where the evidence justifies it, to make findings of fact that have not been sought by the parties, but they should be cautious when considering doing so."

209. The Guardian asserts that on a holistic analysis of all the evidence, the court can and should make findings to support its conclusion that P is at risk of significant harm in mother's care.

Care order v Supervision Order

210. The Guardian is clear that she does not consider a Supervision Order/Child Arrangements Order would meet P's needs.
211. The Guardian considers that the only order which will safeguard P's welfare at this juncture is a Care Order, whereby the Local Authority share parental responsibility with the parents, this being an exceptional case justifying the same.
212. She justifies this by highlighting the following amongst other things:

a. The potential for the mother to undermine the placement, either covertly or by more subtle means (e.g. "The Cat Book")

b. Mother's failure to undertake the recommended work to address her lack of insight and rigidity of thinking.

c. The previous measures mother has gone to, without consideration as to the impact on P, when she has a sense of grievance (e.g., Facebook postings)

213. When the safety net of court scrutiny falls away, the Guardian is concerned that the potential risks to P will increase. Furthermore, the scope and likelihood for further conflict or disagreement is high.
214. The making of a Care Order gives the local authority the ability to overrule either, or both parents, to ensure that decisions are consistently made in the best interests of P and is both necessary and proportionate.

Care Plan

215. There should be a review of P's therapeutic needs prior to the conclusion of the funded 32 sessions as there may need to be a decision taken as to further work beyond those sessions.
216. The Care Plan is silent on the psycho-educational work that has been proposed for the mother and the therapy recommended by Dr Gregory. The Guardian invites the local authority to set out within the Care Plan what is proposed, and the expectation that contact cannot progress to unsupervised, until the mother has successfully completed that work.

JUDGEMENT/FINDINGS

Parental Alienation

The Law

217. "Most experienced Family Court judges would acknowledge that there is a category of private law Children Act disputes which present profoundly difficult challenges to the court, and which frequently cause judges near despair as they endeavour to achieve a positive and enduring outcome for the child. Descriptive language is used to highlight the complexity of these cases – for example, implacable hostility, intractable dispute, high conflict dispute."

(Re D (A Child: Parental Alienation) [2018] EWFC B64)

218. 'Implacable hostility is exactly that: a case where one parent has become (usually irrationally and for poor motives) implacably opposed to contact taking place between a child and his or her absent parent. That is . . . or may be very different from a case where a child has become alienated from a parent.'

(Re B (a child) [2016] EWCA Civ 1088)

219. It is therefore possible to differentiate between two concepts; using parental alienation to mean a child who is resistant to a relationship with a parent for no particularly valid reason, generally with the encouragement of the other parent, and using intractable hostility to mean a refusal to allow contact with a parent even though the child may welcome it.
220. 'Parental alienation' itself is not a condition identified in either of the major international indexes - the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) albeit it may get a mention in ICD-11 within 'caregiver-child relationship difficulties'.
221. Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the Family Division, in a speech to the Families Need Fathers conference in 2018, 'Restoring confidence in family justice' [2018] Fam Law 988, said the following:

'In time gone by, there was similar debate as to whether a diagnosis could be made of "Munchhausen's Syndrome by Proxy" in such cases the focus of the family court, rightly, moved away from any psychological/psychiatric debate in order to concentrate on the particular behaviour of the particular parent in relation to the particular child in each individual case. If that behaviour was found to be abusive then action was taken, irrespective of whether or not a diagnosis of a particular personality or mental health condition in the parent could be made. In my view, "alienation" should be approached in the same way…………….. it is likely to be emotionally harmful for the child to grow up in circumstances which maintain an unjustified and wholly negative view of the absent parent.'

222. There is no single definition of parental alienation, but the most common understanding refers to the unwarranted rejection of one parent and alliance with the other, characterised by the child's extreme negativity toward the alienated parent due to either deliberate or unintentional actions of the alienating parent so as to adversely affect the relationship with the alienated parent.
223. A working definition is:

'the unwarranted rejection of the alienated parent and an alignment with the alienating parent, characterised by the child's extreme negativity toward the alienated parent due to deliberate or unintentional actions of the alienating parent'

224. Alternatively:

"When a child's resistance/hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent……………the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate. It is the process that matters, not the motive……….signs of alienation ……………….. may include portraying the other parent in an unduly negative light to the child, suggesting that the other parent does not love the child, providing unnecessary reassurance to the child about time with the other parent, contacting the child excessively when with the other parent, and making unfounded allegations or insinuations, particularly of sexual abuse.'

(Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568)

225. "Parental alienation …………….. can describe a child who is estranged from a parent for justifiable reasons; if that parent presents as a risk to them. It can describe the motivation or actions of one parent deliberately acting to manipulate and control their child so as to reject the other parent. That process can also take place deliberately or inadvertently, a parent unconsciously transferring onto their child their fears about the other parent or fears of losing control. It can describe the behaviour of a child who appears to reject a parent completely with no rational basis'.

(S and T (care proceedings following private law dispute) [2021] EWFC B54)

225. Signs that alienation is present include:

• one parent portraying the other negatively;

• one parent providing unnecessary reassurance to the child about time with the other parent;

• one parent contacting the child excessively when with the other parent;

• one parent making unfounded allegations or insinuations against the other parent.

• one parent unjustifiably limiting or restricting contact or undermining contact.

• one parent forbidding discussion about the other parent.

• one parent creating the impression that the other parent dislikes or does not love the child or has harmed them or intends them harm.

226. 'There are children who show an extraordinary degree of animosity towards a parent with whom they once had a loving relationship. Most of these children will show some or all of [a cluster of psychological responses]. Within an individual child (and between children in the same family) the presence of the features can vary rapidly over time and place, but in their full manifestation are so surprising and unique as to be unforgettable. The proposed term 'Alienation' applies only to the cluster of psychological responses in the child with no need to presume a deliberate campaign of denigration by one parent. There is now research data supporting a multifactorial aetiology for 'Alienation' following parental separation, involving contributions from both parents and vulnerabilities within the child.'

(Re S (Transfer of Residence) [2010] EWHC B19)

227. It is however now recognised by Cafcass as arising 'when a child's resistance/hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent'.
228. To that may be added that the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate. It is the process that matters, not the motive'.

(Re A (Children) (Parental Alienation) [2019] EWFC B56)

229. In other words, a child's wishes and feelings are tainted by a false narrative.
230. In Re C ('Parental Alienation'; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 it was said as follows:

'Much like an allegation of domestic abuse; the decision about whether or not a parent has alienated a child is a question of fact for the Court to resolve and not a diagnosis that can or should be offered by a psychologist. …………… "parental alienation" is not a syndrome capable of being diagnosed, but a process of manipulation of children perpetrated by one parent against the other through, what are termed as, "alienating behaviours". It is, fundamentally, a question of fact……………..

What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of 'alienating behaviour' should be the court's focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label 'parental alienation' can be applied."

231. Reference can also be had the Consultation: Draft Guidance on Responding to allegations of alienating behaviour August 2023 – FJC.
232. A court will need to be satisfied that three elements are established before it can conclude that alienating behaviours had occurred:

a) the child is refusing, resisting, or reluctant to engage in, a relationship with a parent or carer;

b) the refusal, resistance or reluctance is not consequent on the actions of the non-resident parent towards the child or the resident parent; and

c) the resident parent has engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child's refusal, resistance, or reluctance to engage in a relationship with the other parent.

233. Where alienating behaviours are alleged, the court requires those making the allegation to identify the evidence upon which they rely. To that extent, the behaviour of a child is not evidence of the behaviour of an adult, so the behaviour of a child should not be used to evidence adult behaviours and the fact that a child is resistant to spending time with a parent, does not automatically mean that the child has been exposed to alienating behaviours from the other parent. Alignment and attachment issues can result in resistance, reluctance and refusal without any alienating behaviours perpetrated by an adult.
234. Questions to be addressed include:

a. Is there evidence the child is refusing, resistant, or reluctant to engage with a parent? (First Element)

b. Is the second element evidenced?

The child's reluctance, refusal or resistance is not consequent on the actions of the non-resident parent towards the child or the resident parent. Children who show resistance or unwillingness to maintain or build a relationship with a parent who has been abusive towards them or towards the other parent, may be found to have a justified response to that parent.

c. Is the third element evidenced?

One parent has engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child's refusal, resistance or reluctance to engage in a relationship with the other parent. (Evidence of Manipulation)

235. The court must be cautious when invited to agree a default finding that a parent who fails to establish allegations of domestic abuse or abuse of the child has therefore engaged in alienating behaviour. The absence of an alternative explanation does not lead automatically to an explanation in terms of alienation. Failed or false allegations of abuse against a non-resident parent will not constitute alienating behaviour unless there is evidence that the subject child has been manipulated (on the basis of those false/failed allegations) into an unjustified resistance or reluctance to engage with the allegedly abusive parent.
236. Crucially, it is when there is no known justification for the hostility/rejection of a parent in combination with evidence of psychological manipulation that it may be determined that the child is in what is sometimes referred to as an 'alienated position' in the family dynamic.

Mother's Grievances

237. I accept that whatever has been said concerning mother's views of professionals, matters have not been aided by communications between the local authority and the mother not being what they should have been. Going forward, this needs to change and there are lessons to be learnt.
238. The delays following the initial removal hearing in relation to sourcing and accessing therapy for P and in progressing P's contact with her parents is most regrettable, and which I myself expressed dissatisfaction with during successive hearings.
239. This was further exacerbated by mother's lack of involvement at LAC reviews.
240. Criticism has also been levelled at the Child's Guardian as to her pre-conceived notions towards the mother. I reject those criticisms. Mother's ability to work with and accept advice from a number of professionals has been a general trait throughout this case. I accept that this has been fuelled by comments made to the mother directly via an email (out of office hours on a Sunday evening) by a former social worker who is no longer in the employment of the local authority.
241. However, in my view such communications were wholly unprofessional and with the backdrop that that Social Worker had clearly strayed beyond her remit by unilaterally standing down the court directed independent social work assessment of the father. I therefore attach no weight to it at all but accept that this did nothing to aid mother's perceptions of professional's views towards her and her feelings of marginalisation.
242. I also do not accept there has been procedural unfairness in these proceedings, she has been represented more or less throughout and when not, this has been of her own choice. I cannot comment as to the issues of the purported appeal to my order made at the outset of these proceeding, as of course such appeal would not be dealt with by the judge who is being appealed.
243. I equally refute her argument as to the need to investigate and make findings as to the allegations she maintains against the father. I remind myself that there was a final child arrangements order dated 12 October 2021, prior to my involvement, following a full welfare investigation and for which there has been no appeal.
244. Moreover, in evidence, the independent social worker accepts that although there was no factual matrix in relation to mother's narrative and views of the father, they were nevertheless of the view that the mother's reactions to these concerns felt disproportionate when compared to the perceived level of risk.
245. The decision to conduct a fact-finding hearing is a judicial decision and one of Case management. A fact-finding hearing should only be ordered if the court takes the view that such a hearing is truly "necessary" for the ultimate welfare decision that the Court has to make and applying the factors set out in A County Council v DP, RS, BS (2005) EWHC 1593 see also Re P (A CHILD) (2019) EWCA Civ 1346) and as approved and developed by the Court of Appeal in Re H-D-H and C (Children: Fact-Finding) [2021] EWCA Civ 1192 alongside Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 and Re K (2022) EWCA Civ 468.
246. In essence, I determine that such an exercise is neither necessary nor proportionate.

'a finding of fact hearing should not be undertaken unless it is going to make a material difference to the welfare outcome and the orders which may be made'.

(Derbyshire County Council v AA and others (University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust intervening) [2022] EWHC 3404)

247. In my view such a diversion will not make any material difference to this case given the overwhelming evidence I have read and heard.

Mother's evidence

248. I find that much of mother's evidence consists of deflection, evasion and justification of her own narrative and position. This is in stark contrast to the father who I found an honest, measured, and impressive witness.
249. The mother puts the blame on others and takes no responsibility herself. A typical example is her assertion that father's contact did not take place due to Father's own efforts to control and manipulate his way towards achieving his goal of having P live with him, for which to me makes no logistical sense and which is not borne out by the evidence.
250. She finds it difficult to identify the many positives that professionals have observed in relation to father's ability to meet P's holistic needs.
251. She lacked insight as to the effects on P of recording her removal from her care following the interim care hearing.
252. She does not accept the assessment of her by Dr Gregory yet picks and chooses those elements which she feels supports her own narrative in relation to Dr Gregory's assessment of the father.
253. Her refusal to sign the amended working agreement, with the benefit of hindsight, was not a child-focussed decision, which she again fails to recognise, it being seemingly apparent that she was more concerned as to the impact on her parent's contact than that on P in contact not taking place whist matters were resolved.
254. Her evidence in relation to the Facebook postings was especially concerning. She displayed an astonishing lack of insight as to the potential repercussions of the same, contextually justifying the unjustifiable.
255. I am satisfied that, if not posted by her, it was with her encouragement and direction, containing information that only she would be privy to.
256. As for the "Cat Book", on one level this appears to be innocuous. However, on a 'deeper dive' this clearly would have "pulled the heartstrings" of a 6-year-old child. I am satisfied that the mother knew what she was doing in this respect in relation to manipulation of P's emotions.

Application for further Assessment

The Law

257. Section 13 Children and Families Act 2014 imposes a duty to restrict expert evidence to what is necessary to assist the court in resolving the proceedings justly, i.e. it must be relevant and necessary.
258. Necessary' is given its ordinary English meaning:

"The short answer is that 'necessary' means necessary … If elaboration is required … it "has a meaning lying somewhere between 'indispensable' on the one hand and 'useful', 'reasonable' or 'desirable' on the other hand", having "the connotation of the imperative, what is demanded rather than what is merely optional or reasonable or desirable."

(Re H-L (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 655; Re P (Placement Orders; Parental Consent) (2008) EWCA Civ 535)

259. In making such an assessment the court should also have regard to the overriding objective set out in rule 1.1 FPR and Section 13 of the Children and Families Act 2014.

Determination

260. In my determination, there is already ample evidence before the court to enable it to arrive at a just welfare decision. There is no gap in the evidence and the necessity test is not met. In fact. I would go further and add that the previous lower test of 'reasonably required' is also not met in this case. This matter needs to conclude for P's sake.
261. The application is therefore dismissed.

Change of Name

The Law

262. Regulation 9(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Regulations 1987 provides that:

"the surname to be entered shall be the surname by which at the date of the registration it is intended that the child shall be known."

263. Thus, the registration of a child at birth is an indication of the name by which they shall be known, not only at that time, but in most cases henceforth for the future (see Re C (Change of Surname) (1998) FLR 656)
264. The issue of a child's surname is often an extremely emotive issue with both party's expressing strong opinions on the subject matter as it has both symbolic and practical significance being a significant symbol of identity and of a child's relationship with its parents.
265. The Courts view any such application to change a child's name as a matter of extreme importance being a 'profound and not merely formal issue' and will not accede to such a request lightly.
266. If the application, as it is in this case, made pursuant to Section 8, (as opposed to Section 13 of the Children Act) the Court must apply the 'paramountcy principle' in Section 1 including the 'welfare check list' (S1(3))
267. The correct test to apply therefore is to ask whether such change is in the interests of the child. (See Re C (Change of Surname) (1998) 2 FLR 656)
268. The main case law on the issue of change of name is that Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] 1 FLR 1167 which held as follows:

1. Changing a child's name is a serious matter and not one for unilateral action "a surname….given to a child at birth is not simply a name plucked out of the air. It is a biological label that tells the world at large that the blood of the name flows in its veins."

269. The welfare checklist applies in such matters and such change should not be ordered "unless there is some evidence that this would lead to an improvement from the point of view of the welfare of the child."
270. The name in which the child was registered at birth was a factor to be taken into account but is not necessarily a decisive one.
271. Further guidance was also given in the case of Re: W, Re: A, Re: B (Change of Name) [1999] 2 FLR 930:

a. One of the factors which the Court should have regard to will be the registered surname of the child and the reasons for that registration. However, although registration is a relevant and important consideration it was not in itself a decisive factor as there may be other relevant considerations such as factors that may arise in the future, reasons for such a change as well as a change in circumstances since the original registration.

b. Reasons given for changing or seeking to change a child's name based upon the fact that the child's name was not the same as the parent making the application did not generally carry much weight.

272. In Re W (Change of Name) (2013) EWCA Civ 1488 it was held that a change of name is a question of upbringing to which s 1 CA 1989 applies. The test is one of welfare analysed by reference to the welfare checklist thus the test of 'future benefit' propounded by Dawson v Wearmouth is not strictly accurate.

Determination

273. Mother's argument that P's name should be hyphenated as a way of supporting her identity and is crucial to her sense of belonging is rejected.
274. P is 6, she has been known by her current surname for the whole of her life. Such a change at this stage would be confusing to her and is not necessary to support her identity and belonging when she already has an established relationship with her mother.
275. She needs stability, therapeutic support, and life story work. Such a change is not in her welfare and best interests and in my view would be confusing and add an unnecessary layer of complexity to life-story work. The application itself endorses, in my view, the mother's lack of insight and is accordingly dismissed.

Threshold

The Law

276. The statutory threshold for state intervention is:

(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm;

and

(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm is attributable to:

(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to them if the Order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect the parent to give to them.

277. "Harm" includes ill treatment which includes not only sexual abuse but other forms of ill treatment which are not physical such as the impairment of health or development and impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another.
278. "Health means physical or mental health"
279. "Development means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development".
280. When making a finding of harm, it is important to distinguish between "significant harm" and simply "harm".
281. For example, in this case the lengthy private law proceedings would have been emotionally harmful to P but can that harm be categorised as significant based purely on duration? I suggest not necessarily by itself in the absence of other extraneous factors, however, as the section 37 report dated 19 October 2022 points out, there have been ongoing court proceedings since P was only six months old.
282. "Significant Harm" requires 'something more than the commonplace human failure or inadequacy". It must be "considerable, noteworthy or important".
283. "Where the question of whether harm suffered by a child is significant turns on the child's health or development, his health or development shall be compared with that which could reasonably be expected of a similar child." (S31 (10))

283. "Is likely to suffer" means "a real possibility………. a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored in relation to the nature and gravity of the feared harm…."

(Re H & R (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) (1996) 1 FLR 80)

284. There is no time limit upon when the harm may be likely to occur, the court taking both a medium and longer term look as well as to the child's immediate future.

(Re B (Care Proceedings: Appeal) (2013) UKSC 33)

285. The term 'attributable to' connotes a causal connection between the harm or likelihood of harm on the one hand and the care or likely care. There has to be a link between the facts relied upon and the conclusion that the child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.
286. "Is suffering" and "likely to suffer" means "at the moment of the hearing or at the commencement of the proceedings" i.e., when protective measures are taken.

(Re M (A Minor) (Care Orders: Threshold Conditions) [1994] 3 WLR 558)

287. Information acquired subsequent to the issue of proceedings can also be taken into account in aid of meeting the criteria.

(Re G (Care Proceedings: Threshold Conditions) (2001) 2 FLR 1111)

288. There is no requisite mental element to accompany the actions or inactions which caused, or is likely to cause, significant harm. In other words, the conduct of the parents giving rise to the harm, or the likelihood of harm is not required to be intentional or deliberate as the threshold criteria is child focused the motivation and abilities of the parent not forming part of the criteria.

(Re B (Care Proceedings: Appeal) (2013) UKSC 33; Re H-C (Care Proceedings: Appeal from Care Order) (2014) EWCA Civ 536)

289. S 31(2) itself consists of two limbs. One looks back, the other forward.
290. The first is that the subject child is suffering significant harm.
291. The second is that they are likely to suffer significant harm.
292. The prediction that a particular child is likely to suffer significant harm in the future must be based upon the establishment of actual past facts of abuse which have been proved to the requisite standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities.

(Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (2008) UKHL 35)

293. Predictions about future facts need only be based upon a degree of likelihood that they will happen which is sufficient to justify preventative action.

(Re S-B (Children) (SC) [2010] 1 FLR 1161)

294. Thus:

a. The Court should identify as precisely as possible the nature of the harm which the child is suffering or is likely to suffer.

b. The Court should also identify why and in what respects the harm is significant.

c. The Court should identify the respects in which parental care is failing, or likely to fail, short of what it would be reasonable to expect.

d. Where harm has not yet been suffered, the court must consider the degree of likelihood that it will be suffered in the future. To that extent the court has to be satisfied on the evidence that the harm is likely rather than merely there being a 'risk' of such harm.

295. Any findings made must be established on the evidence available to the Court, including inferences that may be properly drawn from that evidence, and not on suspicion or speculation.
296. Judges are also entitled, where the evidence justifies it, to make findings of fact that have not been sought by the parties, but they should be cautious when considering doing so.

(Re A No.2 (Children: Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947)

Determination

297. The central issue in this case is the mother's ability to protect P from emotional harm and promote the father's relationship with him.
298. Dr Gregory's evidence at the contested removal hearing was that the issues mother has, and her perceptions of the father, were entrenched and longstanding, resulting in an enmeshed and unhealthy relationship with P, leaving it unclear whether she would ever be supported to become fully independent.
299. Mother's negative views of the father have not wavered throughout both the private law and public law proceedings (a period of 6 years, the age of P herself)
300. The consequential risks to P remain and have not lessened, if anything, they have become more entrenched.
301. This is further exacerbated by a complete lack of insight on mother's part. Without such insight, there is little hope of effecting meaningful change.
302. She is unable to recognise that, whatever concerns she may have in relation to the father's care of P over the course of the preceding 12 months, these concerns are not at a level to justify a safeguarding risk, and that the contrary evidence points to P being safe and thriving in her father's care. I find that the father is better placed to meet P's future developmental and emotional needs than the mother.
303. The mother has created a false narrative which to her has become the reality. If P were to continue to be exposed to that it would cause significant emotional harm.
304. The mother maintains that she has not refused the offer of therapy to address the professionals' concerns. However, I do not accept that. The evidence is clear. As recently as October 2024 she made no attempt to accept the offer of appointments to discuss this.
305. Accordingly, I find the threshold for making public law orders crossed.
306. In my view, having reviewed the totality of the evidence in this case (including the evidence I heard over the course of 3 days at the initial contested removal hearing, and indeed this hearing, and a bundle comprising of 1264 pages) the amended threshold document, in my view, only 'scratches the surface' as expanded upon in the findings I have made in relation to the emotional harm P has suffered in the care of her mother, and remains at risk of suffering, due to her internal world view of the father and the impact of this in promoting a relationship with him.
307. The section 37 addendum report dated 27 January 2023 records that the mother was seen to undermine contact creating emotional distress. It was also reported that P appears to have been subject to coaching and that there were concerns in relation to the impact on maternal grandfather insofar as videoing P's distress, during contact. In essence, P needed Mum's permission for contact to take place.
308. Mother's contention within the private law proceedings was that contact traumatises P and she needs a break from the proceedings until she is 12 years of age, a break of eight years which would have all but eroded any relationship she might have had with the father during her formative years.
309. Dr Gregory in their report dated 30 May 2023 concludes that P's resistance to contact was attributable to either the indirect or direct influence of the mother and the maternal grandparents and that P has internalised the mother's and maternal grandparents' anxieties and appears not to have any emotional permission to have contact with her father.
310. A section 16A risk assessment dated 5 September 2023 concluded that the child, in the view of the author, was suffering parental alienation at the hands of the mother and maternal grandparents causing her emotional harm. For example, on a visit on 21 August 2023, it was clear that both Mother and the maternal grandmother were extremely negative about the father in the child's presence.
311. The Guardian reinforces this in her report prepared for the interim removal hearing and dated 18 October 2023; being of the view that P had been fed a negative narrative about the father, evidenced by the Guardian's visit on 31 August 2023 where the family were unable to hide their antipathy towards him and that the mother sought to undermine the father to P and was oblivious of the impact of this. In essence the mother was fixated in safeguarding concerns that have no basis which sadly remains the case.
312. In relation to the issue of alienation, and in conducting an analysis on the basis of the evidence before the court, I answer the questions that I am required to thus:

a. Is there evidence the child is refusing, resistant, or reluctant to engage with the father?

Historically, there is clear evidence of this at the time these proceedings were instigated, hence the fact that an immediate move to the father's care was not proposed.

b. Is the child's reluctance, refusal or resistance consequent on the actions of the father towards the child or the resident parent?

The evidence before the court is an unequivocal no.

c. Has the mother engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child's refusal, resistance, or reluctance to engage in a relationship with the father (i.e. Evidence of Manipulation)

On the evidence before the court, I find that this is indeed more likely than not the case.

313. Accordingly, I find that the mother has exhibited alienating behaviours as follows:

a. The mother has created a consistent long-standing self-believing negative narrative towards the father which has not diminished over the passage of time and despite professional input.

b. The mother has consistently made unfounded allegations or insinuations against the father. (District Judge Webb himself made critical findings in relation to the behaviour of her family, and the face book postings provide stark evidence as to the strength of mother's feelings the latter action clearly putting the father and P herself at risk of significant harm)

c. The mother has unjustifiably limited, restricted contact and undermined contact by both direct and indirect means.

d. There is clear evidence of emotional manipulation over an extended period such that the mother has undermined the child's relationship with the father causing emotional harm and distress which is exacerbated by the enmeshed and insecure attachment she has with her daughter due to her own hyper-anxiety.

314. I thus find that significant emotional harm has been caused to P due to the behaviours of the mother which have directly, or indirectly, impacted on P through the mother's enmeshed and insecure relationship with her and, if P were to be returned to her care, would continue.

Care Order v's Supervision Order

The Law

315. '. . . the court should begin with a preference for the less interventionist rather than the more interventionist approach."

(Re O (Supervision Order) [2001] EWCA Civ 16)

316. '. . . the judge may not make such an order without considering the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and must not sanction such an interference with family life unless he is satisfied that that is both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order would achieve the essential end of promoting the welfare of the children.'

(Re B (Care: Interference with Family Life) [2003] EWCA Civ 786)

317. I County Council v TD & Others [2017] EWHC 379 (see also Re FC (A Child: Care or Supervision Order) (2016) EWFC B90) establishes the following:

a. The fact threshold is established does not automatically lead to the making of orders; the welfare of the children is paramount in making such decisions to include the welfare checklist and no order principle;

b. The court can make a Care Order notwithstanding the LA's care plans: it is for the court to decide which is more appropriate, but it should not make an order that the Local Authority does not seek unless there are very cogent reasons for doing so;

c. Equally the court must give full reasons where it disagrees with the recommendation of the Guardian;

d. The protection of the child is the decisive factor when deciding whether to make a Care or Supervision Order and a care order should be made only where it is necessary for the protection of the child;

318. The key differences between a Care Order and Supervision Order are:

a. Under a Care Order the Local Authority can remove the child without further order from the court, subject to any direction the Court may give;

b. A Care Order will give the Local Authority parental responsibility;

c. Subject to it being discharged, a Care Order will last until the child turns 18 whereas a Supervision Order lasts for one year with the ability to extend it for a maximum of three years;

d. Under a Care Order there are LAC reviews and an Independent Reviewing Officer overseeing the case, but this does not apply under a Supervision Order.

319. Re JW (Child at Home under Care Order) [2023] EWCA Civ 944 establishes the following:

a. It had never been the case that a Care Order should be used as a means to ensure that a local authority met its duties with respect to children in need, nor should it be used to influence the deployment of resources.

b. The PLWG recommendations and guidance could be reduced to the following short points:

i. A Care Order should not be used solely to achieve the provision of support and services after the conclusion of proceedings.

ii. A Care Order made on the basis that the child would be living at home should only be made when there were exceptional reasons for doing so. It should be extremely rare for risks of significant harm to a child to be judged as sufficient to merit the making of a Care Order, but nevertheless as risks that could be managed with the child remaining in the care of their parents.

iii. Unless, in an exceptional case, a Care Order was necessary for the protection of the child, other means of providing support and services had to be used.

iv. Where a child was to be placed at home, the making of a Supervision Order to support reunification might be proportionate.

v. Where a Supervision Order was being considered, the best practice guidance in the PLWG April 2023 report had to be applied. In particular, the court should require the local authority to have a Supervision Support Plan in place.

vi. The impact of the 26-week time limit requirement under the Children Act 1989 Pt IV s.32(1)(a) meant that the decision regarding what final order to make could occur at a comparatively early stage where a child had been removed from home, but a rehabilitation plan was being implemented. In such cases, there could be grounds for extending the 26-week deadline. However, where children were settled at home and the reinforcement and development of protective measures over an extended period was taking place, the court should make a final order rather than extending the proceedings over an extended or indeterminate period.

c. The decisive factor in determining which order to make is the protection of the child; a Care rather than Supervision Order should be made only if the stronger order is necessary. Proportionality is key and a Supervision Order should be made to work where that is the proportionate order. An essential difference between the two is that under a Supervision Order the court's power to require a parent to discharge parental responsibility in a particular manner is limited – there is no power to impose conditions on a parent but, rather, the order rests primarily on consent. That is in contrast to a Care Order where the authority may determine how others discharge their responsibility.

d. Repeating the guidance in the PLWG report, a Care Order on the basis that a child lives at home:

'should only be made when there are exceptional reasons for doing so. It should be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to a child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a Care Order but, nevertheless, as risks that can be managed with the child remaining in the care of parents' and 'unless, in an exceptional case, a Care Order is necessary for the protection of the child, some other means of providing support and services must be used'.

320. See also Re B and G (Children) [2023] EWFC 220 (paras 22 – 36)

Supervision Orders

321. In relation to Supervision Orders in particular, I need to look at the effects of making such an order as far as its statutory basis is concerned.
322. The provision of the statute provides that whilst a Supervision Order is in force it shall be the duty of the supervisor to advise, assist and befriend the supervised child, to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to give effect to the order and, where the order is not complied with or the supervisor considers that the order may no longer be necessary, to consider whether to apply to the court for its variation or discharge.
323. The Supervision Order may include certain requirements for the supervised child to comply with certain directions given by the supervisor namely; with the consent of a responsible person to require the responsible person to take reasonable steps to ensure that the supervised child complies with those directions; with the consent of a responsible person to require the responsible person to take reasonable steps to ensure that the supervised child complies with any requirement to submit to a psychiatric or medical examination; with the consent of a responsible person to require the responsible person to take the supervised child to a place specified in the direction for the purpose of taking part in certain activities.
324. I emphasise that the provisions of a Supervision Order is directed, in a number of instances, to the supervised child and is subject to the consent of a responsible person.
325. 'A responsible person', in relation to the 'supervised child', means –

(a) any person who has parental responsibility for the child; and

(b) any other person with whom the child is living.

326. A Supervision Order does not confer parental responsibility on the local authority and does not give the local authority power to remove the child. Of course, under Schedule 3 subsection (2) of the Children Act 1989, Supervision Orders may include certain requirements, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they are rarely used due to issues of enforceability.
327. A Supervision Order may last for a period of up to one year. An extension can be sought for up to three years and, in relation to that, the case of A Local Authority v D & Ors [2016] EWHC 1438 confirms that the court's power to extend a Supervision Order does not depend on the Supervision Order, which is sought to be extended, being current or for an extension to have been made prior to the expiration of the existing Supervision Order.
328. A Supervision Order expires when a final Care Order is made, or the child obtains the age of 18 years, or an order is made requiring the return of the child to another country under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, or upon successful application for a discharge of the order.
329. By way of further observations and comment, in a report published in April 2023 entitled "Recommendations to Achieve Best Practice in the Child Protection and Family Justice Systems: Supervision Orders" there was a difference of opinion as to whether Supervision Orders provide any additional support and access to services over and above the services offered under the child in need framework.
330. Within a report entitled "Recommendations to Achieve Best Practice in the Child Protection and Family Justice Systems" published 1 March 2021 it was mooted that Supervision Orders were seen as a relatively feeble tool that needed to be made more robust and useful.
331. The report set out three overarching principles in an attempt at ensuring a Supervision Order is as effective as possible: firstly, the child's welfare is paramount; secondly, children are best looked after within their families, with their parents playing a full part in their lives, unless compulsory intervention in the family life is necessary; and thirdly, any intervention should be necessary and proportionate. This means actions taken should be no more than is needed to achieve the aim of keeping the child safe and well.
332. Supplementing these overarching principles are six core principles to a Supervision Plan: partnership and co-production with children and families; multi-agency and multi-disciplinary working; clear, tailored plans including to address ongoing risks along with the findings and conclusions of the court proceedings; resource clarity; formal and robust review; accountability.
333. The report suggests that recitals to the final Supervision Order should be used to highlight the core principles, for example: why the order was made for a specific length, that the parents agree to a Supervision Order support plan and actions set out, the local authority agrees to provide and co-ordinate the services and support in the plan and the local authority confirms each part of the Supervision Order support plan is resourced and funded.
334. The Best Practice guidance aims to do all that it can without a statutory framework to focus minds and provide as much clarity as possible to the support plan and core principles to underpin it.
335. However, considering the anecdotal lack of use of Schedule 3 subsection (2) of the Children Act 1989, due to the lack of enforceability, nothing in the Best Practice guidance impacts that particular concern.

Determination

336. The Independent Social Worker is of the view that this family needs continued support to prevent exposure to the future risk of harm, particularly through the management of family time. However, in my view, it extends beyond that given mother's past actions and behaviours.
337. A 'buffer' is clearly needed between the parents as to decision making, either through the medium of a Supervision Order or a Care Order. The question is which is the more appropriate order given the history, risks, and dynamics in this case?
338. I agree with the Guardian, that there is a real concern that the conclusion of these proceedings will not spell the end of what can be described as a relentless campaign by the mother to, as she puts it, "have her voice heard" by all means at her disposal, resulting in some highly questionable actions which themselves has put P at grave risk of significant harm.
339. It is clear to me that emotions are still raw, and tensions remain. The mother has proved to be unpredictable in her responses to events and decisions made. In my view, it will take a significant amount of time, as yet unquantifiable, to bed down and a period of reflection and calm is called for.
340. I accept that the management of contact, and indeed any other decisions the father may take in exercising his parental responsibility, is a potential 'flashpoint' and given the history of this case; this is not just about the parents inability to co-parent, but the mother in challenging almost every decision of significance the father may wish to make in the exercise of his parental responsibility going forward which I do not believe can be fully dealt with by way of private law protective orders.
341. The allegations mother has made against the father have been relentless, and I accept emotionally draining for him, and in turn ultimately, if it were to continue, indirectly have a negative impact on P.
342. Within these proceedings, the mother has pursued several applications as recited in the order of 30 January 2025, not all of which have been justified.
343. As to the combined arguments of both local authorities' as to why I should make a Supervision Order I respond as follows:

a. The mother has not, to date, attempted to visit the father's home or P's school since she was placed with him.

The fact is, she is unaware of his whereabouts, but we have the extremely serious Facebook posts that were made following P's placement with her father, as sanctioned by the court, which resulted in injunctive orders, and there is a real concern as to what action the mother may take following my judgment. I do not accept, given the evidence in this matter, that such an eventuality can be described as remote.

b. The risks to P are now lower as she now lives with her father.

To a certain extent that is true. She is not exposed to the emotional harm she once was, but the potential risks, due to mother's lack of insight and acceptance of professionals' concerns, remain the same, particularly given that she has to date not been willing to address the recommended therapy to alleviate this.

344. Something more than just advice and assistance is needed. In my view, support and intervention is needed at an enhanced level. I therefore accept the arguments before me that a Supervision Order would not provide sufficient robustness. I accept the father's evidence that the situation on the ground remains fragile and that P is 'not out of the woods' yet. Her therapy is in its infancy and there is a real potential for future destabilisation given the history over the course of the preceding 6 years. It is difficult to see what has changed throughout that time from mother's perspective.
345. I accept the Guardian's view, and indeed the father himself, that the father's parental responsibility needs to be supplemented by that of the local authority in the context of this case by way of a Care Order, due particularly to the following by way of example:

a. The potential for mother to undermine the placement either directly or by more subtle means (e.g. "The Cat Book")

b. Failure to undertake the recommended work to address her lack of insight and rigidity of thinking.

c. The previous measures mother has gone to without consideration as to the impact on P when she has a sense of grievance (e.g., Facebook postings)

346. I accept that when the safety net of court scrutiny falls away following my judgment, which undoubtedly the mother will not accept, the potential risks to P will increase and the scope and likelihood for further conflict or disagreement remains high.
347. As stated in Re JW (Child at Home under Care Order) [2023] EWCA Civ 944, the protection of the child is the decisive factor when deciding whether to make a Care or Supervision Order, and a Care order should be made only where it is necessary for the protection of the child. In my judgement this is such a case, and the 'stronger order' is necessary.
348. On reading all the papers, and hearing the oral evidence over the course of 3 days and given my involvement throughout this matter, including the private law proceedings, this is unquestionably an exceptional case justifying a Care Order, notwithstanding that P resides with her father, such that the local authority need to continue to share parental responsibility following the conclusion of these proceedings, and is both necessary and proportionate.
349. Applying the test in Re F (A Child) (Placement Orders: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 and Re K (CHILDREN) (PLACEMENT ORDERS) (2020) EWCA Civ 1503 as recently restated in Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93) I address the assessment of risk and proportionality as follows:

a. The type of harm that might arise.

This is primarily emotional harm through manipulation and actions taken to undermine the placement but could also include exposure to physical risks if the face book postings were to be repeated or similar drastic action were taken.

b. The likelihood of it arising.

On the civil burden of proof (balance of probabilities) being more likely than not, it is my judgement that this is very much a potential risk and cannot be discounted as not being likely.

c. The consequences: what would be the likely severity of the harm to P if it did come to pass?

The harm would be significant.

d. Risk reduction/mitigation: would the chances of harm happening be reduced or mitigated by the support services that are or could be made available?

I am not satisfied that support services provided under the auspices of a Supervision Order would be sufficient to reduce or mitigate these risks. A Supervision Order relies on parental consent. The parents shared parental responsibility puts the onus on them to resolve future issues, albeit with the advice and assistance of the local authority. Hitherto this has created a hostile environment with P at the centre of it for most of her life. This cannot and must not be allowed to continue. In my view the Local authority need to share parental responsibility for the time being.

350. As the issue of designation to Flintshire is agreed I do not need to formally determine that issue.
351. However, having regard to the statutory test for designation under a Care Order set out in Section 31(8), and in particular the court having to first consider, under s.31(8)(a), the authority in which the child was ordinarily resident and in applying Northamptonshire County Council v Islington County Council [1999] 2 FLR 881; Re C (A Child) v Plymouth County Council [2000] 1 FLR 875; London Borough of Redbridge v Newport City Council [2004] 2 FLR 226 and more recently Re G (Designation of Local Authority) [2024] EWCA Civ 1565, designation to Flintshire being the authority in which the child is ordinarily resident seems unquestionably the correct decision.

Family Time/Mother's Contact & Restrictions and sharing information

352. It is accepted that mother has had, what some may describe, as unusual restrictions placed on her contact in relation to gifts for P.
353. This has led to a ban being placed on innocuous games such as 'pass the parcel' and P taking home Art and Craft work made during contact sessions.
354. In my view, a common-sense approach is required. Apart from special occasions, such gifts and craft items need to be limited to single items, with a moderate increase on other special occasions such as Birthdays, Christmas, and Easter.
355. The focus must remain on maintaining P's relationship with her mother. This should not be dependent on material things but love, emotional support and mutual affection.
356. I accept that before contact can progress beyond supervised within a formal setting, the issues mother has, as identified by professionals, needs to be addressed by her successfully undertaking and completing the recommended work and demonstrating a change in her mindset. Such contact also needs to take place within a reasonable commuting distance to where P lives.
357. Again, for the reasons I have alluded to, whilst it is extremely important that the mother receives information as to P's educational progress and health, for now, any information leading to the disclosure of her whereabouts must remain redacted until it is adjudged that the risk in the mother undertaking actions which could either directly or indirectly expose P to harm have lessened.

Injunctive Orders including S91(14) direction

358. On the basis of the order I have made, there is no need for me to consider the other raft of orders put forward to bolster a Supervision Order, save consideration does need to be given as to whether the injunctive orders made earlier on in these proceedings should continue including a S91(14) direction.
359. The former consist of the prohibited steps order of 21 February 2024 against the mother and her parents (made by Lieven J in relation to non-removal of P from father's care and the jurisdiction, and attending his home or P's school) and that of 5 April 2024 against the mother and her father (made by me in relation to the Facebook postings) (which I accept should have been framed as injunctive orders, as pursuant to S 9(1) CA 1989, no court shall make any section 8 order, other than a child arrangements order to which subsection (6B) applies (which in this case it doesn't), with respect to a child who is in the care of a local authority)
360. I am minded not to renew any of the injunctive orders (by virtue of ss 49 and 50 of the Children Act 1989, protection is readily available) save in relation to the mother in respect of Facebook postings which shall last until further order (given my findings at paragraph 313(b) above)^
361. As to a S91(14) direction this provides as follows:

"On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court."

362. Such a direction is no longer the 'exceptional order' it once was (see Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact: s.91(14) Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ 1749; S91A Children Act 1989 as inserted by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 s.67; F v M [2023] EWFC 5 and Re F (Children) [2023] EWFC 212) and that moreover, it is a filter as opposed to a bar.
363. However, I am not minded to make a S91(14) direction at this stage, given the order I am making; indeed, no such order is being sought by any party on the making of a Care Order, albeit, it is in my power to do so in relation to a potential application under S34 and S39, given that the mother's application for discharge of the interim Care Order was dismissed on 22 May 2024, and therefore S91(15) no longer applies, and her S34 application dismissed on 22 November 2024, and therefore S91(17) still applies until 22 May 2025.

Care Plan

364. This should be amended in line with the Guardian's recommendations.

Release of the papers

365. Permission is given for the papers to be released to solicitors/counsel for any potential application pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998.

Permission to Appeal

366. An extension of time is given for any application for permission to appeal to 28 March 2025.

Publication of Judgement

367. In accordance with the Practice Guidance: Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments issued by the President of the Family Division on 19th June 2024 I consider it is appropriate for this judgment to be published.
368. I have carried out the "balancing exercise" set out in Re J (A Child) [2013] EWHC 2694, which has regard to the interests of the parties and the public as protected by ECHR Articles 6, 8 and 10, and determined that, in the circumstances of this case, the judgment should be published on a fully anonymised basis.
369. This concludes my judgement.

DJ Stephen Parker