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Case No: CO/1770/99
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
CROWN OFFICE LIST
Liverpool Crown Court
Queen Elizabeth II Law Courts
Liverpool L2 1XA
Friday 7th April 2000
B e f o r e :
THE HON MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY
Application for permission to apply for judicial
review
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REGINA
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v -
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LIVERPOOL
CITY COUNCIL
ex parte Karl BARRY
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(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2HD
Tel No: 0171 421 4040, Fax No: 0171 831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
__________________________________
Mr Vincent Fraser (instructed by Liverpool City Council for the
Respondent)
Mr John de Bono (instructed by Kilner Polson for the Applicant)
__________________________________
Judgment
As Approved by the Court
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Liverpool City Council (the Council) is the
licensing authority for the grant of public entertainment licences within its
area pursuant to section 1 and schedule 1 of the Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. Such licences are required for "public
dancing or music or any other public entertainment of a like kind" (schedule 1,
paragraph 1(2)). Currently, there are over three hundred and fifty such
licences in respect of premises in Liverpool. They customarily have door staff
who control entry to and security on the premises. For some years there has
been concern in Liverpool and elsewhere about the quality of door staff on
premises with public entertainment licences. This is apparent from Home Office
and Police studies and is summarised in the present proceedings by Mr. Culkin,
a solicitor employed by the Council, in his affidavit:
"In recent years there has been a marked tendency for organised criminals to
seek to control door staff on licensed premises. This has led to violence both
within licensed premises and outside. The control of door staff has been seen
as a means for controlling the supply of illegal drugs within licensed premises
and has also involved other illegal activities such as extortion and money
laundering."
Between 1990 and 1992 the Council engaged in a consultation exercise with
licensees, their solicitors and the Merseyside Police. As a result, the
Council resolved to impose a condition in public entertainment licences from 1
December 1992 which required a licensee to maintain on his premises a register
of all security staff employed at the premises and to make the register
available for its inspection during licensed hours by appropriate officers of
the Council and the Police. This scheme was not successful. The licensees
accepted that it was not possible for them to operate a successful registration
scheme. Accordingly, in December 1995 the council resolved to impose a new
condition on public entertainment licences which was based upon registration of
attendants and security staff not by the licensees but by the Council itself.
The most important part of the condition was in these terms:
"The licensee .....shall ensure that no person is employed, engaged or present
as an attendant/security person in or about the premises unless they have been
registered for such purpose by Liverpool City Council prior to commencement of
their duties."
Later in December 1995 a Home Office Circular 60/1995 published guidance for
such registration schemes. The scheme which the council had resolved to adopt
did not conform in all respects with the guidance in the Home Office Circular.
Accordingly, there followed a protracted period of reconsideration and further
consultation. All this received extensive coverage in the local press and in
the trade press. During this period, many other local authorities in the
surrounding area and much further afield adopted and implemented such schemes.
Eventually the council adopted the final version of a scheme which was
implemented as and when each public entertainment licence came up for renewal
after March 1998. The Council's Licensing Officer wrote to all licensees in
the following terms:
"The City Council is to start registering all attendants and door staff
required as a condition of your public entertainment licence as from 1 April
1998.
In order to comply with the licence condition you should ensure that any
attendants or security staff you employ apply for registration with the local
authority as soon as possible. To assist you a copy of the council's guidance
notes on the scheme are attached. "
The scheme has operated with widespread acceptance. In the twelve months from
April 1998 to March 1999 the council received 865 applications for
registration. Of these, 721 were approved. 72 were still under consideration
at the end of the year. 52 met with refusal when not approved by the Police.
Of those 52, 32 availed themselves of a right of appeal to an Appeals Panel
and 18 of the appeals were allowed.
The Applicant is a self employed door attendant who works at an establishment
in the City centre known as the Beluga Bar. On 15 September 1998 the Council's
Licensing Officer wrote to the licensee of the Beluga bar in the terms to which
I have referred. Soon after receiving the letter, the licensee passed it to
the Applicant. The Applicant opposes the registration scheme. I shall have to
return to the chronology which followed his receipt of the letter. It resulted
in his lodging an application for permission to apply for judicial review on 5
May 1999. When the application for permission came before Mr Justice Turner on
paper he directed that it should be renewed in open court upon notice. The
Form 86A seeks to challenge a decision of the council to impose a mandatory
condition for the grant of public entertainment licences that all attendants
and door staff be registered with the Council and in particular a decision "on
about 15 September 1998 to start registering attendants and door staff under
the said condition". In its original form the relief sought is
certiorari in respect of the condition and the latter decision and/or an
order of prohibition to prevent the condition or registration from being
implemented.
The test to be applied upon an application for permission.
At the hearing of this application for permission, which occupied virtually a
full day, I had the benefit of detailed submissions on behalf of both parties.
In addition to the evidence relied upon by the Applicant, there is an affidavit
on behalf of the Council with 260 pages of exhibits. In these circumstances
Mr. Fraser submitted that the appropriate test is not whether the Applicant's
case is arguable but whether it reaches the higher threshold referred to in
Mass Energy Ltd. V. Birmingham City Council [1994] Env. L.R. 298
where Glidewell LJ said (at pp 307-308):
".....we have most, if not all. of the documents in front of us; we have gone
through the relevant ones in detail - indeed in really quite minute detail in
some instances - in a way that a court dealing with an application for leave to
move rarely does, and we are thus in as good a position as would be the court
at the substantive hearing to construe the various documents.......[I]n my
view, the proper approach of this Court in this particular case, ought to be -
and the approach I intend to adopt will be - that we should grant leave only if
we are satisfied that Mass Energy's case is not merely arguable but is strong;
that is to say, is likely to succeed."
See also Scott LJ at p. 311 and Evans LJ at p.318. Although their Lordships
were considering the matter in the Court of Appeal, there is no reason why, as
a matter of principle, the same approach should not equally apply in
appropriate cases at first instance where permission is sought: see
Regina v. London Docklands Development Corporation, ex parte Sister
Christine Frost (1996) 73 P+CR, 203. In my judgment, the present case
is such an appropriate case and I shall apply the test propounded by Glidewell
LJ, where appropriate.
I should add that, as the hearing progressed, I canvassed with counsel whether
I should simply treat it as a substantive hearing on the basis that all the
evidence was before me and I was hearing comprehensive submissions. Such a
course was supported by Mr. Fraser but Mr. de Bono, whilst accepting that I had
the power so to proceed as a result of my case management powers, urged me not
to do so on the basis that, if the application proceeds further, he would wish
to seek further information about the scheme and its operation from the Council
under Part 18 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Although I am sceptical about the
potential of such information, I have decided to treat this as no more than an
application for permission, albeit one to which the Mass Energy
approach is appropriate. With this in mind I shall turn to the grounds of
challenge. Not all of them were spelt out in the Form 86A but I agreed to hear
them nevertheless.
Is the creation of a scheme ultra vires?
In creating the scheme, the Council has sought to use powers which arise under
Schedule 1, paragraph 11 of the 1982 Act which provides:
"The appropriate authority may make regulations prescribing conditions
applicable to all, or any class of, entertainment licences, that is to say
terms, conditions and restrictions on or subject to which such licences, or
licences of that class, are in general to be granted, renewed or transferred by
them"
Mr. de Bono submitted that that provision, which exists to enable general
conditions to be applied to entertainment licences, does not provide a basis
for an authority to regulate by registration doorkeepers who are not parties to
such licences. He referred to the scheme as having been "introduced by the
back door", adding that it is of a type which had not been envisaged at the
time when the 1982 Act came into being. In this connection he referred to the
contemporaneous Home Office Circular 62/1982. That document described the
purpose of the public entertainment licensing system as being
"to introduce a uniform system of control to ensure public health and safety
over places of public resort and to minimise the nuisance to the immediate
neighbourhood."
Mr. De Bono submitted that the scheme, the purpose of which is crime prevention
in relation to drugs offences and violence, is not designed to ensure public
health and safety and that a power which was conferred for a specific purpose
has been resorted to in pursuit of an improper or collateral purpose.
Moreover, if Parliament had intended to confer upon local authorities the power
to regulate doorkeepers in this way, the Act would have included an express
provision to that effect, as it had done, for example, in relation to the
licensing of private hire drivers by section 46 of the Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.
In my judgment, comparisons with other Acts are even less fruitful than
comparisons with other parts of the 1982 Act itself. As Glidewell J said in
Regina v. Huntingdon District Council, ex parte Cowan [1984] 1
All ER 58, the different parts of the 1982 Act - public entertainment licences,
the control of sex establishments and the provisions relating to take-away food
outlets - look very much "as if they have been separately drafted, almost as
though they were parts of separate statutes, certainly as though they were
separates codes without reference one to the other" (p. 64). Thus, the
provisions in relation to public entertainment licences are "a self - contained
code" (ibid). In the present case I do not consider it
significant that the Act contains no express provision regarding the regulation
of doorkeepers. Moreover, the wording of Schedule 1, paragraph 11 is in its
terms non-specific, no doubt in order to enable local authorities to respond to
changing needs. When such changing needs are considered in the light of
Circular 62/1982, I have no doubt that the regulation of doorkeepers is an
aspect of ensuring public health and safety. Drug trafficking and violence are
clearly inimical to public health and safety. Accordingly, I conclude that it
is not even arguable that the Council lack the vires under
Schedule 1, paragraph 11, to introduce a doorkeepers' registration scheme in
conjunction with a general condition on public entertainment licences.
Is the scheme unlawful as being unduly oppressive?
In submitting that the scheme is unduly oppressive to licensees and/or
doorkeepers, Mr. de Bono relied on the following statement of principle from de
Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, para. 13-046:
"Official decisions may be held unreasonable when they are unduly oppressive
because they subject the complainant to excessive hardship or an unnecessarily
onerous infringement of his rights or interests."
The argument was that the scheme is so oppressive and onerous because it
infringes the Applicant's right to work and to respect for his privacy.
In my judgment, neither the principle set out in de Smith (the correctness of
which I do not doubt) nor the authorities relied upon by Mr de Bono in support
of it (Hall & Co. V. Shoreham-by-Sea UDC [1964] 1 WLR 240 and
Regina v. North Hertfordshire DC, ex parte Cobbold [1985] 3 All
ER 486) have any bearing on the present case because it is not arguable that
the scheme is unduly oppressive or unnecessarily onerous, nor that it infringes
any identifiable right of the Applicant.
Does the scheme unlawfully fetter the Council's discretion?
Mr. de Bono's next argument was that, in reality, Condition 21 operates as a
blanket rule and, as such, is an unlawful fetter upon the discretion of the
Council. Clearly there is a legal principle which proscribes the fettering of
a discretion in relation to licensing and other administrative and
quasi-judicial decisions. However, Schedule 1, paragraph 11 permits the
prescribing of general conditions.
It is necessary to refer to some of the evidence regarding Condition 21.
Along with all the other standard conditions which have been prescribed by the
Council it applies "unless it is expressly excluded or varied by the Council".
In his affidavit, Mr. Culkin states that:
"The Council accepts that it will not always be appropriate to impose a
standard condition"
He points out that, in respect of Condition 21, the Council has provided
delegated authority for a waiver in certain circumstances. These are where
premises do not have a Special Hours Certificate, and/or where entertainment is
not provided beyond 11.45.p.m., and/or where the total capacity of the premises
is less than seventy five persons, and/or the premises comprise a church hall,
a community centre or educational establishment. In addition, he states that
in other cases an applicant may apply for a waiver of the condition.
In my judgment, it cannot be said that, as a matter of form, the Council have
created a fetter upon their discretion. Mr. de Bono's alternative submission
was that, whatever the form, Condition 21 operates in practice as a fetter in
that, apart from the specific exceptions to which I have just referred, the
evidence does not include any reference to an exclusion or variation of it. In
the course of his reply Mr. de Bono accepted that he faces an evidential
difficulty in relation to this submission. Although he sought to base his
submissions on the fettering of discretion upon such authorities as
Regina v. Flintshire County County Council County Licensing (Stage Plays)
Committee ex parte Barrett [1957] 2 WLR 90, Regina v. LCC ex
parte Corrie [1918] 1 KB 68 and Regina v. Barry DC ex parte
Jones 1916 TLR 556, those authorities each contained matters of form or
practice in the evidence which explain the decisions. Indeed, Mr. De Bono was
at pains to point out that it was because of the evidential difficulties that,
if permission were granted, he would seek to augment the evidence by the part
18 procedure.
I have to deal with the present application on the material before me. I have
come to the conclusion that it is simply not arguable that the scheme operates
either in form or in practice as an unlawful fetter upon the discretion of the
Council.
Does the Council have the power to charge a fee for
registration.
The Council charges successful applicants for registration a fee of £50.
The purpose is to cover the cost of administering the scheme. Mr. de Bono
submitted that there is no power to impose a charge. He based his submission
on McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd v. Richmond upon Thames
LBC [1992] 2 AC 48 which concerned a charge levied on developers for
consultations relating to speculative development proposals and described as
"pre-application advice". The local planning authority sought to justify the
change by reference to section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 which
provides:
"Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this section but
subject to the provisions of this Act, a local authority shall have power to do
any thing (whether or not involving the expenditure, borrowing or lending of
money or the acquisition or disposal of any property rights) which is
calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of
any of their functions."
Lord Lowry, having reviewed the authorities, particularly Attorney
General v. Wilts United Dairies (1922) 38 TLR 781 and Hazell v.
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1, said (at p. 70):
"It is, accordingly, clear that the consideration and determining of planning
applications is a function of the council, but the giving of pre-application
advice, although it facilitates, and is conducive and incidental to, the
function of determining planning applications, is not itself a function of the
council.
Thus, it is one thing to say that the giving of pre-application planning
advice facilitates or is conducive or incidental to the council's planning
functions but it is quite another thing to say that for the council to
charge for that advice also facilitates or is conducive or incidental to
those functions."
Referring to section 111(1), Lord Lowry said (at pp 70-71):
"The rule is that a charge cannot be made unless the power to charge is given
by express words or by necessary implication. These last words impose
a rigorous test going far beyond the proposition that it would be
reasonable or even conducive or incidental to charge for the provision
of a service."
His Lordship adverted to the large number of discretionary functions for the
provision of which express statutory authority to charge has been enacted but
"would not be prepared to say.......that, in the absence of an express
statutory power, there can never be a case in which the power to charge arises
by necessary implication". Finally, having observed that the council were
contending for a subsidiary power arising under section 111(1) on the basis
that it was calculated to facilitate, or was conducive or incidental to the
discharge of one of its functions, he added (at p.75):
"To charge for the exercise of that power is, at best, incidental to the
incidental and not incidental to the discharge of the functions."
The decision to charge for pre-application advice was therefore quashed.
Mr de Bono submitted that the application of the same reasoning to the facts
of the present case points to the registration scheme being unlawful: whereas
the licensing of public entertainment is a function, the registration scheme is
not - at most it is incidental to that function and the charge is "incidental
to the incidental".
Mr. Fraser emphasised that Lord Lowry expressly left open the potential for
cases in which the power to charge would arise "by necessary implication". He
relied on Regina v. Greater Manchester Police Authority, ex parte Century
Motors (CA, unreported, 24 March 1998) in which the Court of Appeal
upheld the imposition of a charge upon Automobile Association Developments Ltd
and through it upon vehicle recovery operators who participated in a scheme for
the recovery of broken down, abandoned and stolen vehicles on behalf of the
Greater Manchester Police. Beldam LJ (with whom Schiemann LJ and Sir
Christopher Slade agreed) said (Transcript. pp 28-29):
"I turn to consider Century Motors' complaint that the sums which AADL agreed
to pay the Authority as a contribution towards the cost of the administration
of the scheme and the charges which AADL required vehicle recovery operators to
pay as a call out fee or as a handling charge are unlawful. I agree with
Popplewell J that they are not.....
The agreement only requires recovery operators who join the rota to pay the
handling charge and the charge imposed by AADL for inspection and examination
of their premises and equipment to assess their suitability. Recovery
operators do not have to apply to be put upon the rota. Unless they apply they
are not liable to make the payments.....I do not consider that these
requirements amount to an unlawful imposition."
Whilst it is true, as Mr. de Bono observed, that McCarthy &
Stone was not analysed or even mentioned in the judgment of the Court
of Appeal in Century Motors, it is unthinkable, having regard to
the constitution of the Court and counsel involved in the case, that it did not
form the basis of submissions and adjudication on this point.
Mr Fraser advanced the following propositions on the basis of McCarthy
& Stone and Century Motors. (1) Section 111 can
provide authority by necessary implication in appropriate circumstances, albeit
not where it is "incidental to an incidental". (2) Licensing under the 1982
Act is a function of which the imposition of conditions is an integral part -
in reality, there is no such thing as a licence which is wholly unconditional.
(3) Here, the power to charge arises by necessary implication, partly because,
as in Century Motors, there are cost implications, the Council
having taken on staff and acquired a computer specifically for the operation of
the scheme. (4) It is fairer that the cost be borne by applicant doorkeepers
rather than by licensees because an individual doorkeeper may work for several
different licensees. (5) The facts of the present case are comparable with
those in Century Motors.
On this issue I have come to the conclusion that, whilst the case for the
Applicant is arguable, it does not reach the higher threshold referred to in
Mass Energy in that it is neither "strong" nor "likely to
succeed". In my judgment it is highly probable that Mr. Fraser's submissions
would prevail. All the relevant material is before me and I have had the
benefit of detailed submissions from both sides. If this were a substantive
hearing, I would determine this issue in favour of the Council.
Does the scheme unlawfully delegate the licensing function to the
Police?
The evidence of Mr. Culkin is as follows:
"If a person applies to be registered by the Council for the purposes of the
scheme he is required to provide relevant details about his background and any
relevant convictions. The details provided are checked by the Police who
advise the Council whether or not they consider the applicant to be suitable
for registration under the scheme. In assessing the applicant's suitability
the Police take into account the Home Office guidance and the provisions of the
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. If the applicant is considered suitable he is
required to pay £50 which covers the cost of administering the scheme and
he is then issued with a registration certificate and photo identity card.
Applicants who are considered unsuitable are refused registration and provided
with an opportunity to appeal against the decision to the Door Registration
Independent Appeals Panel. The Panel when considering the matter hears from
the Police and the applicant and then decide whether or not to grant the
application."
It goes without saying that it is the Police who have exclusive possession of
any record of criminal convictions.
Mr. de Bono submitted that the decision of whether a person is a fit and
proper person to be registered as a doorkeeper is thus delegated in the first
instance to the Police. Whilst it may happen that the input of the Police
proves to be an insuperable obstacle to registration, that does not mean that
the decision whether or not to register has been delegated to the Police. It
seems to me that the involvement of Police operates as a protection both for
applicants and for the public. Moreover, anyone who is dissatisfied with an
initial refusal of registration may appeal to the Panel. It is there that the
final decision would be made. I shall turn in a moment to Mr. de Bono's
criticism of the constitution of the Panel. However, in the context of the
delegation issue, I conclude that it is a further reason for my holding that
the applicant does not have arguable case on this point.
Is the appeal system procedurally unfair?
The Panel is one of seven members, six of whom are from the Council's
Licensing Committee and the seventh is a Merseyside police officer of
superintendent rank or above who has not been involved in an earlier stage of
any application that is subject to appeal. Appeal hearings are held in private
and an appellant may be represented by a solicitor or another person of his
choice. Another police officer presents to the Panel the reasons for the
recommendation that the applicant be refused registration. Mr. de Bono
submitted that this procedure is unfair and in breach of the rules of natural
justice because one of the members of the Panel (the senior police officer) is
part of the same organisation which made the decision appealed against and
which presents the evidence to the Panel. To this extent, he submitted that
the Police act as both as prosecutor and judge.
Against this Mr. Fraser submitted that there is clear evidence that the Panel
exercises independent judgment. In the twelve months ending April 1999, of
thirty two appeals considered, eighteen were allowed and fourteen dismissed.
Presentation of material by a police officer is justifiable and sensible
because it is the Police and the Police alone who have access to the raw
material. The presence of a senior police officer on the panel is in
circumstances where he is only one of seven members. It is not arguable that
his presence gives a reasonable appearance of bias. Indeed, in one sense his
presence suitably broadens the membership because otherwise the appeal process
would be entirely limited to the Council.
In the circumstances of this case I do not consider that either the
constitution or the procedure of the Appeals Panel has been shown to be
arguably unfair. I record that Mr. de Bono conceded that he was short of
evidence of unfairness when he indicated that, if permission were to be
granted, this is another area in which he would seek to augment the evidence or
at least enhance his information by resort to Part Eighteen. He also conceded
that there had been no request hitherto for the kind of information to which he
was referring which, in the present context, included information as to the
role of the Police in the presentation of material to the Panel.
Conclusion on grounds of challenge
It follows from what I have said that, whereas I consider the ground based on
the £50 fee to be arguable, I find all the other grounds to be unarguable.
Moreover, I consider it appropriate to apply the more demanding Mass
Energy test to the one arguable ground and, when I do so it fails that
test. Accordingly, I do not consider this to be a case for granting permission
for judicial review. In any event, the applicant faces discretionary
difficulties to which I shall now turn.
Delay
After an elephantine period of gestation the scheme in its present form was
implemented as and when each public entertainment licence came up for renewal
after March 1998. Long before that it had received extensive publicity in
trade literature and in the local press. I find it hard to accept that the
Applicant knew nothing of it before receiving notification via the Beluga Bar
in September 1998. The Form 86A seeks to challenge the decision to impose a
general condition on public entertainment licences and the decision "on about
15 September 1998 to start registering attendants and door staff under the said
condition".
By Order 53 rule 4(1) an application for permission to apply for judicial
review:
"shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when
grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there
is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be
made."
The present application was lodged on 5 May 1999. Was it made "promptly"? In
my judgment, it was not. Almost two months elapsed from when the Applicant
received the information from the Beluga Bar until he first consulted
solicitors. The initial application for legal aid was not made until 7
December 1998. It was rejected on 9 December 1998 but notice of appeal of that
decision was not given until 21 December 1998. Eventually, limited legal aid
was granted on 22 March 1999 and full legal aid on 19 April 1999. More that
two weeks then elapsed before the present application was lodged. I do not
consider that it can possibly be said that it was lodged "promptly". Nor was
it lodged within three months. The question therefore arises as to whether
"there is good reason for extending the period". In this context I also have
regard to section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Where (as here) there
has been undue delay in making an application for permission, the court may
refuse to grant a permission if it considers that
"the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial
hardship to or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be
detrimental to good administration."
The evidence in the present case shows that the Council in common with other
local authorities, was initially less than certain about the lawfulness of the
scheme. However, with the encouragement of the Home Office, the Police and
licensees, the Council adopted a scheme, albeit some time after numerous other
local authorities in the area and much further afield. This scheme and others
like it have been running successfully for a considerable time. No other
challenge has reached the courts although one in the south of England was
intimated some time ago before fizzling out. No other applicant in Liverpool
has challenged the scheme. Staff have been taken on, equipment has been
purchased and licensees have co-operated. Registration fees have been paid. I
have referred earlier in this judgment to the number of applications in the
first year and what became of them. Mr. Culkin's affidavit also gives details
of the operation of similar schemes in various other local authority areas in
different parts of the country.
Against this background would it be appropriate to extend time in view of the
lack of promptness and the undue delay? In my judgment, even if the grounds of
challenge had had merit, it is unlikely that a court would seriously
contemplate certiorari at this stage. To do so would be at the
very least "detrimental to good administration". See Regina v. Dairy
Produce Quota Tribunal, ex parte Caswell [1989] 3 All ER 205;
Regina v. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parte Association of
Metropolitan Authorities [1986] 1 All ER 164; Regina v. Secretary
of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour - Smith [1995] ICR 889. That
is no doubt why Mr. de Bono sought leave in the course of the hearing to amend
his Form 86A so as to seek in the alternative declaratory relief. Whilst there
is always a public interest in ascertaining whether or not a public authority
has acted lawfully, in all the circumstances of this case as I have described
them I would have been reluctant to extend time to permit the Applicant to seek
relief of such a limited kind. In this regard it is also pertinent to note
that the Applicant is not a licensee or an applicant for a public entertainment
licence, nor for that matter has he applied for registration as a doorkeeper.
Moreover, neither he nor his solicitors wrote any letter before action in this
matter until 31 March 1999. I do not regard his application as deserving of
discretion.
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