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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> B, R (on the application of) v Southwark [2003] EWHC 1678 (Admin) (04 July 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/1678.html Cite as: [2004] HLR 3, [2003] EWHC 1678 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		4th July 2003

Friday, 4th July 2003

1. MR JUSTICE OWEN: The claimant seeks judicially to review a decision made by the defendant on 20th June 2003, refusing to provide him with accommodation as a homeless person, under section 183 of the Housing Act 1996.
2. On 23rd June McCombe J adjourned the permission application to an oral hearing and ordered that in the meantime the defendant do forthwith secure, and thereafter continue, suitable accommodation for the claimant. He also gave the defendant liberty to apply to discharge or to vary that order.
3. On 25th June the matter came before Goldring J who gave permission to apply for judicial review. He also ordered that the injunction granted on 23rd June be discharged, but that the defendant use its best endeavours to identify suitable accommodation for the claimant.
4. The claimant is 17 years of age. On 19th March 2003 he was sentenced to a term of 8 months' imprisonment in a Young Offender Institution, and is currently detained at Her Majesty's Prison, Young Offender Institution, Huntercombe.
5. By section 102(2) of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 the period of detention and training, under a Detention and Training Order, shall be one half of the term of the order. The claimant is therefore due to be released on 19th July, but section 102(4) provides that the Secretary of State may release an offender and I quote:

"(a) in the case of an order for a term of 8 months or more but less than 18 months, one month before the half-way point of the term of the order."

6. On 19th May 2003 Her Majesty's prison service wrote to Mrs Mina Mawson, of the Youth Education Support Services, a charitable organisation based in Camberwell, who has been involved in assisting the claimant since September 2001, informing her that the claimant had been successful in gaining early release under the Home Curfew Detention Scheme, the tagging scheme, as it is known:

"... subject to securing appropriate accommodation prior to discharge date."

7. The letter continued:

"I would like to remind you that this is subject to securing appropriate accommodation prior to discharge date, in order to process the documentation, I would need an address and signed authorisation forms by June 10th. I emphasise the appropriate nature of accommodation as not only must it meet his basic requirements, but it must also fulfil any regulations placed on [it] by the YOT, and be suitable for tagging."

8. In consequence, on 20th May, the claimant himself wrote a letter to the defendant saying:

"I am due to be released on the Home Detention Scheme 'Tagging' on 19th June 2003. Unfortunately I am homeless and will have nowhere to go when I leave prison. Unless I have suitable accommodation I cannot be released on 19.06.03 and will have to remain in Prison for the full term."

9. He therefore asked if he could be provided with suitable accommodation. The letter was forwarded to the defendant by Messrs Collisons, solicitors acting on his behalf, under cover of a letter dated 22nd May, together with a copy of the letter of 19th May from the Prison Service, to which I have already made reference, and two letters from the defendant's Youth Offending Team, to whom I shall refer as the YOT, dated 20th May and 21st May respectively.
10. The letter of 20th May set out the history of the claimant's case in some detail and concluded:

"[Mr B] is due for release on 19th June 2003 and without any suitable address, his application for housing must be deemed urgent. If this Youth Offending Team is to succeed in its objective of reducing the likelihood of further offending, I am of the opinion that it will need the cooperation of the Housing Department to help provide some stability in this young man's life upon his release from detention."

11. The second letter, dated the following day, said this:

"Following a telephone call I received on 20th May 2003, from Miss Remi, of the Immigration's Criminal Case Work Team, I am writing to update you on [Mr B's] situation. Miss Remi informed me that [Mr B] was granted British Nationality in July 2002. This was due to his father being naturalised in 1995, therefore 'there is no problem with his status in this country.'"

12. The defendant replied on 23rd May, saying that the council would:

"... process [Mr B's] application for homeless assistance to avoid litigation at this stage."

13. But adding:

"This is not of course to be construed as any commitment to house [Mr B] upon his release from custody."

14. In response, by letter dated 26th May, Messrs Collisons asserted:

"[Mr B] is now 'Threatened with Homelessness' in as much as it would not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy his prison cell after 19.06.03 at which time he is free to leave subject to his having obtained suitable accommodation.

In the circumstances we would ask you please to allocate a specific property for [Mr B] for his occupation as on 19.06.03. The prison requires this address and signed authorisation forms by 10.06.03, failing which [Mr B] will have to remain in prison. The timetable is therefore quite tight in that you would need to propose a property before 10.06.03 in order for the YOT team to check its suitability. I believe the key requirement is the possibility of installing a dedicated telephone line."

15. There was no reply. On 29th May Collisons' wrote again pressing for a response. Again there was no reply. On 20th June Collisons' wrote a letter before claim, saying inter alia:

"... further to our correspondence since that date in which we have made it abundantly clear that [Mr B] becomes homeless on 19.06.03 we note that you have failed to offer our client any accommodation. He therefore remains in prison today.

We therefore write this letter before claim. Our client's position is that he needs to be granted suitable (temporary) accommodation today. If you provide our client, through his litigation friend with that accommodation today, we believe that it will still be possible for the property to be assessed as to suitability for the Youth Offending Team and that [Mr B] will be allowed to leave prison for his Home Detention."

16. They then set out the basis of the claim in considerable detail. There was no response. On 23rd June these proceedings were initiated with the application to McCombe J for injunctive relief, to which I have already made reference. The claimant remains in prison.
17. Finally, and importantly, by a letter dated 2nd July, ie the day before this hearing, the defendants wrote to the claimant's solicitors in the following terms:

"I am writing to tell you that I have made a decision on your application for homeless assistance.

I am not satisfied that you are homeless. This is because you are currently detained in a Young Offender Institution. I have considered whether it is reasonable for you to remain there, and I have decided that as your detention is lawful (since there is no evidence or contention to the contrary), it is reasonable for you to continue to occupy your current accommodation.

Since you are not homeless, the Council has no duty to secure accommodation for you at this time. As we are aware that you are to be released on 19th July 2003 (the midway point of your sentence) we will continue to make enquiries with regard to your circumstances, anticipating that you will approach us on release."

18. The effect of that decision was to remove the foundation upon which the application for judicial review was based, in that the relief sought by the claimant was a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant local authority to provide suitable accommodation to the claimant until 48 hours after his application for housing assistance had been determined and communicated to the claimant through his solicitors.
19. Mr Pettit, who appeared for the claimant, therefore sought leave to amend the claim to include a claim for a declaration that the claimant is homeless for the purpose of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996; in other words, that the determination of 2nd July was made on an erroneous basis. In view of the urgency of the situation I gave leave to amend his claim to seek such a declaration.
20. Accordingly, the issue before me is simply whether the claimant is homeless, within the meaning of Part VII of the Housing Act, notwithstanding that he is serving a sentence of detention in a Young Offender Institution. If he is not then he is caught in what has been described as a classic Catch 22, a reference to the well-known novel bearing that title. He cannot be released under the tagging scheme unless suitable accommodation is available for him, but accommodation will not be made available for him until he is released.
21. The issue turns on the proper construction and application of section 175 of the Housing Act of 1996. It provides:

"175(1) A person is homeless if he has no accommodation available for his occupation, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, which he -

(a) is entitled to occupy by virtue of an interest in it or by virtue of an order of a court,

(b) has an express or implied licence to occupy, or

(c) occupies as a residence by virtue of any enactment or rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation or restricting the right of another person to recover possession.

(3) A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy."

22. The claimant submits, by reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Stewart v London Borough of Lambeth 2003 EWCA Civ 753, that his detention in prison does not amount to accommodation within the meaning of section 175; secondly, that, in the alternative, if he has accommodation available for his occupation it is not accommodation to which section 175(1) a, b or c applies and, thirdly, under section 175(3) that his prison cell is not accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy.
23. As to the first, in Stewart, the Court of Appeal addressed the question of whether a local authority was entitled to conclude that a prisoner, who had been sentenced to a term of 5 years' imprisonment and had sought to avail himself on release of the provisions of the Housing Act 1996 relating to homelessness, became intentionally homeless. The court held that the local authority was entitled to conclude, on the material before it, that the appellant's homelessness was a direct result of his deliberate act in knowingly committing a criminal offence, and that the chain of causation, linking the offence and his homelessness on release from prison, was not broken by his prison sentence.
24. That issue does not arise in this case, but in the course of giving the principal judgment of the court, Longmore LJ said in paragraph 21:

"Mr Luba is correct to submit that the local authority did not consider whether Mr Stewart's term in prison constituted settled accommodation, so as to break the chain of causation between (1) eviction from his flat as a result of his deliberate act and (2) his release from custody and looking for accommodation anew. The question is whether, if they had considered the matter, there would have been any prospect of a different conclusion. In my view there would not. Prison is, to my mind, the opposite of settled accommodation. The prisoner hopes that it will be as temporary as possible. Any such hope on the part of Mr Stewart was triumphantly justified in this case since, although he was sentenced as a long-term prisoner, he appears to have been released only two days after he would have been released if he had been a short-term prisoner. The learned judge, Judge Cox, gave this argument short shrift. He said:

'The position of Mr Stewart upon his incarceration was that first of all I suspect, although I do not know, that, in common with many other prisoners, he would have taken every legitimate means that he considered available to him to curtail the period of his incarceration. I know not whether he appealed or appealed against sentence, but it is to be expected that he might have done. He would have taken steps likewise to obtain release as quickly as he possibly could. He was in fact released after two and a half years of a five year sentence, albeit on licence. During the period that he was incarcerated he was perforce moved from one prison to another. He did not have in any sense a settled home in any one prison, and I have to say that my mind recoils from the idea that a cell in any one prison, for example Brixton, could be regarded as one's home and, has been pointed out to me by Mr Redpath-Stevens in the skeleton which has [been] placed before me, the concept of accommodation as it is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary involved at least the consideration of having one's habitual residence, house or home. It seems to me that incarceration in one of Her Majesty's prisons is the antithesis of having a home. It is just that. It is incarceration. It is detention against one's will and it seems to me that in those circumstances it cannot be said that that amounts to any sort of accommodation within the expressions used in the Act.'

I need only say that I entirely agree."

25. Mr Pettit submits that the decision affords clear authority for the proposition that prison cannot amount to accommodation within the meaning of section 7 of the Act.
26. Miss Bretherton sought, in response, to rely upon the decision of the House of Lords in Puhlhofer v Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] AC 484.
27. She relied in particular on the following passage from the speech of Lord Brightman:

"In this situation, Parliament plainly, and wisely, placed no qualifying adjective before the word 'accommodation' in section 1 or section 4 of the Act, and none is to be implied. The word 'appropriate' or 'reasonable' is not to be imported. Nor is accommodation not accommodation because it might in certain circumstances be unfit for habitation for the purposes of Part II of the Housing Act 1957 or might involve overcrowding within the meaning of Part IV. Those particular statutory criteria are not to be imported into the Homeless Persons Act for any purpose. What is properly to be regarded as accommodation is a question of fact to be decided by the local authority. There are no rules. Clearly some places in which a person might choose or be constrained to live could not properly be regarded as accommodation at all; it would be a misuse of language to describe Diogenes as having occupied accommodation within the meaning of the Act. What the local authority have to consider, in reaching a decision whether a person is homeless for the purposes of the Act, is whether he has what can properly be described as accommodation within the ordinary meaning of that word in the English language."

28. But it has to be borne in mind that the House of Lords was addressing an earlier and different statutory provision and was not considering the specific question of whether imprisonment can amount to accommodation, whereas the Court of Appeal in Stewart was addressing that question within the context of Part VII of the Housing Act of 1996.
29. Although a prisoner is obviously accommodated in prison, using the word in its ordinary sense, I am satisfied that Stewart's case is authority for the proposition that prison is not accommodation in the sense in which the term is used in Part VII of the Act.
30. Secondly, and in my judgment more importantly, section 175(1) provides that a person is homeless unless he has accommodation to which subsections a, b or c applies; ie accommodation that he has a right to occupy which is enforceable or defensible at law. A prisoner cannot be said to have a right to occupy his prison cell. Imprisonment involves the removal or restriction of rights. His detention is the antithesis of a right to occupy. In my judgment, prison accommodation cannot fall within subsections a, b or c of section 175(1).
31. Thirdly, Mr Pettit submits that even if prison amounts to accommodation to which section 175(1) applies, then he should not be treated as having accommodation as it would not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy it.
32. He submits that the test is subjective, relying on the judgment of Tucker J in the R v London Borough of Brent, ex parte McManus [1993] 25 H.L.R. 643, which concerned section 60(1)subsection of Part III of the Housing Act of 1985. Tucker J held that:

"(1) The test as to whether the applicant is intentionally homeless within the meaning section 60 of the Housing Act 1985 is a subjective one; the authority should approach the matter by examining how the situation which their inquiries showed to exist affected this particular applicant and her daughter; the local inquiry should have focused on the particular area of Belfast in which the applicant lived, which the evidence suggested was specifically prone to the worst excesses of sectarian violence."

33. Miss Bretherton has sought to argue that the early release provisions are a bonus, and it is therefore reasonable for the claimant to continue to occupy his prison cell, in accordance with the sentence passed upon him, until his release on 19th July.
34. In my judgment, that argument is unrealistic. How can it sensibly be said that, viewed from the subjective standpoint, it is reasonable to remain in prison when eligible for release subject only to accommodation being available. The lawfulness of the original sentence is immaterial. Thus, if it were necessary for me to do so, I should also have resolved this issue in favour of the claimant.
35. Finally, Miss Bretherton submitted that if it is right that as a matter of law a serving prisoner may be homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Act, that will have serious budgetary implications for local authorities, who will be obliged to undertake enquiries under section 184 of the Act in response to any application for housing by a serving prisoner.
36. As to that, there are a number of points to be made. I recognise that housing authorities operate under severe budgetary constraints that inevitably impose difficulties in discharging their obligations to the homeless, particularly in the major inner cities. But I should not be deflected from ruling as to the proper construction and application of section 175 of the 1996 Act by the fact that the ruling may have financial implications for housing authorities. In any event, I am not persuaded that my ruling would have major financial implications.
37. The issue arises on the narrow facts of this case, namely a claimant who continues to be detained in prison, because, although eligible for the Home Detention Scheme, he cannot be released as he has no accommodation to go to. There would be no reason for prisoners who are not in this particular situation to seek "assistance in case of homelessness" until they come to the end of their sentence, or rather that part of their sentence that they are required to serve.
38. Secondly, and in the case of those qualifying for early release, the problem will only arise where the individual does not have accommodation to return to. Thirdly, and in the case of young offenders in the position of the claimant, the Young Offender Teams will, in any event, have to address the problem of accommodation on release from custody, as is acknowledged by the defendants in this case.
39. In conclusion, the claimant is in my judgment entitled to a declaration that he is homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the 1996 Act. It follows that the decision letter of 2nd July is based upon an error of law.
40. It does not, however, inevitably follow that the defendant is under an obligation to provide accommodation for the claimant. Given that he is under 18, he is in priority need, but according to the defendants there remains a question as to his eligibility, based on a question mark as to his immigration status.
41. That is not an issue that I am in a position to resolve. But I am bound to say that on the face of it I find it surprising that the defendants take the view that his status remains in issue, in the light of the letter from its own YOT dated 21st May 2003, to which I have already made reference.
42. It is fervently to be hoped that the claimant's situation can now be resolved as a matter of the greatest urgency, given that over two weeks have already elapsed from the date upon which he could have been released on home detention.
43. I need only add that I was told in categorical terms that the accommodation identified by Mr Clark, as a result of the order made at the earlier stage in these proceedings, has been approved as suitable for the claimant by the defendant's YOT teams.
44. Yes, Miss Bretherton?
45. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, a number of matters arising; the first perhaps is the easiest, the matter of costs. I have discussed this matter with Mr Pettit, and certainly there is no opposition to the usual order that costs should follow the event.
46. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
47. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, that is the first matter. The second matter is, I have just been handed a letter during the course of your Lordship's judgment, which I feel it is only proper, given your Lordship's final comments, to draw to the court's attention: those instructing me wrote to the Treasury Solicitor last night threatening to join them to these proceedings, or to apply to join them, if a proper response was not received.
48. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
49. MISS BRETHERTON: A letter has been received which is dated 4th July and faxed through this morning.
50. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
51. MISS BRETHERTON: This states:

"Following your request I asked my client to check the IND database, with results as follows..."

52. 1, with regard to the reference number that the YOT have given:

"... search revealed someone of a name you confirm is not known to be connected in any way. Date of birth did not match that given by you."

53. 2, with regard to the name of this particular defendant:

"... search revealed no similar name and closest match was for different date of birth/HO ref.

3. 15.8.85/Nigerian - search revealed someone of totally different name which you confirmed was unrelated to your matters."

54. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
55. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, the reason why I draw it to the court's attention is that, given your Lordship's comments, it seemed to me only proper to say at this stage that my clients may have to consider this matter as a matter of urgency and reach a decision on eligibility.
56. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, I have seen a copy of that letter.
57. MISS BRETHERTON: You have, my Lord?
58. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
59. MISS BRETHERTON: I am grateful. My Lord, secondly, there is an application for permission to appeal. My Lord, I propose to make that application brief, because, of course, the judicial review is on the point of law, and what I say is that with regard to the third points, the three points decided by the court, firstly, that accommodation ought to be decided in the light of Puhlhofer.
60. Secondly, for the reasons that I gave yesterday, I say that the claimant could have fallen within all three categories. The only types of occupation known to English law are either a tenancy, a licence, or a trespass. He patently is not a trespasser. It is a matter of agreement, I am sure, that he is not a tenant, he can only be a licensee in respect of the prison premises.
61. Finally, I say, in accordance with the submissions I made yesterday, that occupation of a prison, in accordance with a sentence, must be reasonable to occupy. I do not take the --
62. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, your final submission is that it is entirely reasonable to remain in prison at a time when otherwise you could be released.
63. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, what I say is that the early provisions apply only to those who already have the accommodation, ie in certain circumstances --
64. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
65. MISS BRETHERTON: -- and therefore, is a strict definition of the statute. I will not press the point, your Lordship has decided against me, but what I must say is that not only do I make the application on the basis that there are reasonable prospects of success, I do say that, as your Lordship was informed yesterday, there is no authority on this point.
66. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
67. MISS BRETHERTON: I also would ask that the court does grant permission, on the basis that it is important that perhaps the Court of Appeal do have the opportunity to say, in terms, that what they intended by the judgment in Stewart was that this applied throughout the Act, and that it is not a matter that is dealt with obiter, albeit in a persuasive manner.
68. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
69. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, the matter is of huge significance to my clients because of applications, because every young offender is entitled to make the application for early release. So, notwithstanding the strength of your Lordship's judgment with regard to your findings against the defendant, I would say that this is a matter of significance. It is important that the matter is dealt with by the Court of Appeal in order that my clients can adopt a consistent approach, and that if it is the case they ought to be immediately considering the applications for those people who are eligible for early release, that there are not the sort of delays that have occurred while these proceedings occurred, in other proceedings. So, my Lord, I would ask that the court does give permission.
70. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, thank you, Miss Bretherton. Mr Pettit, first as to costs, you are obviously entitled to your costs.
71. MR PETTIT: My Lord, I am grateful. The only other -- for completeness, we are publicly funded so we ask for an order of detailed assessment of our public funded costs in any event.
72. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, you will have your costs, and you may have an order for detailed assessment of your publicly funded costs.
73. MR PETTIT: My Lord, as far as the appeal is concerned --
74. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
75. MR PETTIT: -- obviously, if the result of today's judgment is that in the very near future, as we hope, my client will be released into one of these premises that has been identified, then the practical effect of that would be that there would be nothing for the Court of Appeal, no list ongoing for the Court of Appeal to deal with.
76. So, the only way in which the Court of Appeal would want to deal with this matter is if there is an ongoing disagreement, and that would mean that my client was still in custody. Obviously anything that jeopardises his chance of release is nothing that I can possibly agree to or to endorse.
77. It would seem that the only way -- if you were to grant permission to appeal, my learned friend would obviously have to ask you for a stay on your judgment, pending the appeal, in order to ensure that there is an ongoing disagreement between the parties. It may be that the Court of Appeal in a case like this might consider dealing with it as an academic issue, but they are very reluctant to do so.
78. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
79. MR PETTIT: In any event, looking at the merits of the case, there are three limbs, and your Lordship has found for us on all three limbs. So, in order to successfully appeal this decision, the defendants would have to successfully appeal all three of those elements.
80. In my submission, my Lord, the chances of successfully appealing any one of them are slim, and the chances of successfully appealing all of them would be negligible. In the circumstances, my submission would be that such an appeal would have no reasonable prospects of success, and although this is obviously an issue that the defendants feel is important to them, it is not one, as you have found, that has quite the wide significance that perhaps they would believe.
81. The reality is that the Court of Appeal did deal with this issue in Stewart and it does not have to do so again, in my submission.
82. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, thank you Mr Pettit.
83. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, very briefly, may I respond?
84. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, of course.
85. MISS BRETHERTON: I did discuss the possibility of my needing to make an application, before attending for your Lordship's judgment this morning, with my learned friend, and it may be that part of his concerns arise out of perhaps my error in my discussions with him.
86. My Lord, having thought through your Lordship's judgment it seems to me that it would not be a matter for me to need to apply for a stay, because your Lordship has not made an order for release, for example, or indeed that my clients accommodate, recognising the situation with regard to eligibility. Now, of course, my clients will take on board the court's comments with regard to wanting the matter speedily dealt with --
87. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Well, his concern is that if leave to appeal were granted that the defendant would not feel under any obligation to act in response to my declaration that their decision was wrong in law.
88. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, yes, but the position is this: that given the letter from the Treasury Solicitor this morning, as was canvassed during the course of submissions yesterday, my clients will only be under an obligation to provide accommodation in the event that --
89. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Well, Miss Bretherton, I hope that all reasonable efforts will be made to resolve this problem, not to create further problems.
90. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, I do appreciate --
91. MR JUSTICE OWEN: I hope that is well understood.
92. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, it is well understood, and certainly there is no attempt to be obstructive. The position is, however, that the letter from the Treasury Solicitor does raise very, very real concerns with regard to the status of this young man, and the position is therefore that --
93. MR JUSTICE OWEN: I am bound to say, Miss Bretherton, I find that difficult to understand. This young man, in any view, came to this country as a young child with his parents, both of whom are now naturalised.
94. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, the difficulty there is that your Lordship bases that assertion upon what we now understand to be the incorrect information that resulted from the discussions between YOT and the Immigration Authorities, that is the pertinence of that letter.
95. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes. Well, as I have indicated, that is not an issue that I am in a position to resolve, but there it is.
96. I am not going to accede to your application to give you leave to appeal, you will have to make your application to the Court of Appeal.
97. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, yes. My Lord, if I might raise one matter arising?
98. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
99. MISS BRETHERTON: It is highly likely I will be instructed to draft and make an urgent application to the Court of Appeal.
100. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes.
101. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, given the amount of time it takes for transcripts to be drawn up, is it possible I could prepare a note and submit it to your Lordship for approval as a matter --
102. MR JUSTICE OWEN: You may be unduly pessimistic as to the time it takes for a transcript of the judgment to be prepared. My experience of this court is that transcripts of judgments are produced remarkably quickly.
103. Miss Bretherton, I do not think you will do better than Monday or Tuesday.
104. MISS BRETHERTON: My Lord, I am very grateful for that indication. My Lord, they are the matters I wished to raise.
105. MR JUSTICE OWEN: Yes, thank you both very much indeed.