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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> HM Attorney General v Doswell [2005] EWHC 1283 (Admin) (15 February 2005) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2005/1283.html Cite as: [2005] EWHC 1283 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		15th February 2005

1. MR JUSTICE MOSES: This is an application for a civil proceedings order to be granted against Mr Doswell pursuant to section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The background facts demonstrate that that which triggered a spate of proceedings and applications is the grievance that Mr Doswell feels as a result of the actions of Nottingham City Council. That grievance was manifested again today when, rather than advancing grounds to resist the making of an order pursuant to section 42, he again was at pains to tell us about the background history.
2. That which triggered his complaints appears to have been two applications for injunctive relief made by Nottingham City Council preventing him from entering two schools where his daughters were pupils. It is to be noticed that in between those two injunctive proceedings of 26th June 1998 and 24th May 2000, he was convicted of an offence of affray at the Nottingham Crown Court on 4th October 1999, in respect of which he was sentenced to 5 months' imprisonment. It is apparent from the proceedings that he subsequently launched that they were triggered by feelings that the police were wrong to prosecute him, that their procedures were wrong, and that the local authority was motivated by improper motives in seeking the injunctions and seeking to enforce them when they alleged that they were breached.
3. The consequences of those feelings of grievance are that 13 actions or applications were launched, seven against the local authority and three against the police. When they failed two sets of proceedings were launched against the Home Office and one against the county court in relation to the handling of the injunction. An analysis of those 13 actions, brought between 15th November 2000 and 2nd October 2003, reveals that the fount of the complaints brought in different ways were the injunction proceedings and the criminal proceedings to which I have referred. None of the actions or applications were successful. They bore in almost every case the hallmarks of an aggrieved litigant in person, who was not prepared to take no for an answer but, on his claim being struck out or rejected, sought to appeal or make further applications.
4. The action against the Home Office, item No 13, provides a good example of the measures taken by Mr Doswell when he felt aggrieved. The application that he brought on 2nd October was dismissed by Master Bragge with permission for an oral hearing. Mr Doswell applied for an oral hearing which was set down for hearing in March 2004. Mr Doswell then, in a retaliatory application, contended that the defendants failed deliberately to comply with civil procedure rules. He asked for the hearing to be adjourned because he had made a claim for judicial review. The claim was dismissed on the basis that the Home Office was the wrong defendant and permission to appeal was refused. Two applications were made for permission to appeal. Mr Doswell then applied for judgment to be entered in default of a defence, to which the response was that the claim had been struck out.
5. The matter then appeared before David Richards J on two occasions when he struck out the applications, and there was then a further application for permission to appeal, alleging misfeasance in public office by members of the staff at the Royal Courts of Justice. The matter then culminated in consideration by Longmore LJ. In all, four or five judges were involved in those proceedings.
6. When separate applications for judicial review on 3rd February 2004 and 11th February 2004 failed because permission was refused, appeals were made to the Court of Appeal and were heard by Potter LJ. At the end of his judgment Potter LJ said that the defendant:

"appears to have a history of reluctance to accept judicial rulings against him, and, whether or not through a lack of appreciation of the requirements of the rules or the substantive law, he is inclined to issue repeated proceedings which are either misconceived or constitute an abuse of process. In those circumstances he may well be approaching the stage where he is a candidate for a civil restraint (or extended civil restraint) order."

He gave the references for the procedures in respect of such orders. He concluded:

"The applicant would be well advised to acquaint himself with the terms of that decision."

That appeal was dismissed and those words were uttered by Potter LJ on 13th September 2004. It is right to point out that since then no fresh proceedings have been launched, and we have to consider whether there is a danger that they will be.

7. Mr Doswell has appeared before us today. To my mind he has amply demonstrated the risks that would be attendant upon the absence of any such order under section 42. He has before us produced further voluminous volumes in addition to the volume that he produced in resisting these proceedings. They form three parts. They relate to the original grievances to which I have referred. Although it is right that he has launched no fresh proceedings I, for my part, am satisfied that, absent an order under 42, there is a real danger that he will continue to seek to air his grievances in the form of fresh and repetitious proceedings. All those proceedings are properly called vexatious. They cause inconvenience, harassment and expense to those against whom they are addressed, and to the court staff who from time to time themselves form the subject matter of actions. They disclose no basis in law for bringing proceedings whatever.
8. Mr Doswell has asked us to look at the whole history of the matter relying upon the dicta of Parker CJ in R v Velatza(?) [1959] 1 WLR 622,624. He asks us to look at those words in a sense wholly different from that intended by Lord Parker CJ. We are required to look at the whole history of the many repetitious and baseless proceedings which he has brought in order to air his sense of grievance. I for my part have done so. I am quite satisfied that both that history and the submissions that he has advanced today confirm the need to protect the court and the public from repeated attempts by this defendant to air his grievances in unmeritorious actions and applications. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the basis for making an order under section 42 has been made out. There is much evidence, not only of the launching of proceedings that have no foundation whatever in law, but in the repetitious way in which they have been launched and as to the deleterious effect those have upon those against whom they are targeted. In those circumstances I would make the order.
9. MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON: I agree. The Attorney General's evidence demonstrates that the conditions for making an order under section 42 are amply fulfilled. The inference to be drawn from the repetitious proceedings, to which my Lord has referred, combined with the submissions that we heard from Dr. Doswell today, demonstrate amply the need to make that order.
10. MR BOURNE: Save for the order itself there is no application.
11. MR DOSWELL: About the drawing up of the order, do you do that?
12. MR JUSTICE MOSES: The order issues from the court.
13. MR BOURNE: I ask the court to note whether the order should have a penal notice attached as it is not clear whether the order is self policing.
14. MR JUSTICE MOSES: I thought that we were talking about a section 42 order. That has the effect that this defendant will not be allowed, without leave of the court, to institute proceedings or make any applications. If you then need to police a breach of that, that is a separate consideration.
15. MR BOURNE: That must be right.
16. MR DOSWELL: Is there any way that I can challenge the decision?
17. MR JUSTICE MOSES: You seek leave to appeal. If you need leave it is refused. You would have to go to the Court of Appeal.
18. MR DOSWELL: How long do I have to file it?
19. MR JUSTICE MOSES: I am not prepared to give advice myself. You will have to seek advice on that.