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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Glica v Government of Poland [2008] EWHC 1111 (Admin) (28 April 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/1111.html Cite as: [2008] EWHC 1111 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		28 April 2008

1. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: This is a statutory appeal under the Extradition Act 2003 from an order made by District Judge Nicholas Evans extraditing the appellant to Poland pursuant to a European arrest warrant dated 11 July 2007 issued by the judge at the Regional Court of Bydgoszcz, Poland which is recognised as a judicial authority for the purposes of Part I of the Act. The warrant has been certified by the appropriate judicial authorities in this country and was executed on the appellant, who had come to this country in 2005, on 14 January 2008. Thereafter the proceedings took place which culminated in the extradition order.
2. The appeal is based on two grounds. There is no dispute but that the warrant relates to extradition offences. There are no bars asserted before us to extradition. No human rights argument has been put before us which could preclude extradition. What is said however is that the arrest warrant upon which the proceedings were based was not valid in that it failed to comply with the provisions of Section 2 of the Act and, secondly, that the English translation which was before the court was not a true copy of the Polish original.
3. As far as the first of those grounds is concerned, it is submitted that there are two bases upon which, pursuant to Section 2 and the Framework Decision, an extradition can be ordered under Part I of the Act, namely for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.
4. It is said in the present case that the warrant does not sufficiently identify upon which of those two bases the warrant is laid. Counsel for the appellant has said that is a necessary requirement - and that the courts of this country have made it plain - that if it is not possible to spell out of a warrant clearly upon which basis the warrant is issued then that warrant must fall. The argument is based by analogy, it is submitted, on the argument which succeeded in front of Mr Justice Crane in R on Application of Bleta v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 3194 when the requirement was that the person whose extradition was sought should be unlawfully at large. Unless that could be spelt out of the warrant, it was not a warrant on which the court could act. It is submitted therefore, by analogy, that since the requirement now is the two-fold one I have indicated, one or the other of those two bases must be able to be spelt out by clear inference from the document.
5. The document itself in its preamble does not identify which of those two bases is the one upon which the warrant was issued. Paragraph A simply identifies the appellant. However the appellant's difficulties start in paragraph B which identifies the type of decision and then has the heading "Effective Judgment". It goes on to identify two judgments of the relevant provincial court, one on 22 December 2004 reference 247/04, and the second on 16 October 2004 reference 204/04. It continues by identifying the documents' reference numbers. In paragraph C 2, under "Length of the custodial sentence or any other detention order imposed", as far as the first of those cases is concerned, it is identified as "1 year and eight months of custodial sentence" and as far as the second is concerned, "ten months of custodial sentence". At C 3 under "Remaining sentence to be served", the first case is "1 year and eight months of custodial sentence" and in the second case "ten months of custodial sentence".
6. There is nothing in the remaining parts of the warrant - which essentially go on to deal with the identification of the criminal activity upon which those sentences were based - to undermine what appears to me to be an absolutely unequivocal statement that the warrant is based upon two convictions or, to be more exact, convictions on two separate occasions of this appellant in respect of which he has been ordered to serve significant terms of custody.
7. Accordingly I have no difficulty in concluding that as far as the basis of the warrant is concerned it clearly sets out that this is a warrant based upon the requirement for executing a custodial sentence. There is no ambiguity which could, in my view, in any way invalidate the warrant on that ground.
8. The second basis of the appeal is that the English translation of the warrant is not a true copy or true translation of the Polish original. That arises out of the fact that in paragraph C 3, as I have already stated, the remaining sentence to be served in relation to the first sentence was stated to be 1 year and eight months of custodial sentence. Turning to the Polish original, it can be seen that there are additional words that have not been translated into English. That was identified as a mistake by those advising Mr O'Donoghue, on behalf of the appellant, and brought to the attention of the district judge. Those words in essence mean that the court has determined that of that 1 year and eight months, seven months shall be deemed to have been served already. It is unclear from the documents whether or not that is because of a period spent in custody on remand; but that could well be the reason. Be that as it may, to that extent, and it should be said to that extent only, a difference has been identified between the Polish original and the English translation.
9. On behalf of the appellant Mr O'Donoghue seeks to argue that as a consequence the prosecution cannot rely upon the English translation to base an order for extradition because the prosecution has failed to prove the accuracy of the warrant which it is seeking the court to enforce.
10. The problem, in my judgment, with that argument is that essentially the documents by virtue of Section 202 of the Act prove themselves, subject only to any evidence that may be called which might undermine the accuracy of any translation. The effect of any inaccuracy will obviously depend upon the nature of that inaccuracy. In the present case the inaccuracies are of no significance. The importance of the lengths of sentence identified in the warrant go to the question whether or not the offences were extradition offences. It could arguably, in some circumstances, I suppose, go to the extent to which it is argued a sentence has been served but that clearly cannot be argued in this case.
11. So far as that aspect of the case is concerned, there is no doubt that the fact he has served seven months of one of those sentences has no effect on the categorisation of the offences as extradition offences at all. It follows that it is a mistake of no materiality. In those circumstances the district judge was entitled to disregard the error as being a matter that could in any way preclude extradition.
12. I would accordingly dismiss this appeal.
13. MR JUSTICE UNDERHILL: I agree.
14. MR BRANDON: There is one matter that arises. We have not copied the relevant passage. Where an appeal in these circumstances is refused - I am looking at Section 36 (2):

"The person must be extradited to the category 1 territory before the end of the required period."

The required period is 10 days starting with the day on which the decision of the relevant court on appeal becomes final; in other words, today. Your Lordship may or may not know that there are now regular flights to Poland carrying people back to that jurisdiction after unsuccessful extradition appeals or their extradition has been ordered by a court of first instance. The next flight is on 29 May.

15. In those circumstances there is provision in the Act for agreeing an extended period within which the order takes effect. I am reading Section 36 (3) (b):

"(b) if the relevant court and the authority which issued the Part I warrant agree a later date, 10 days starting with the later date."

The next flight is on 29 May. May we ask that the 10-day period start on, for the sake of argument, 20 May or, in case a flight was late, 21 May?

16. MR O'DONOGHUE: Clearly there cannot be any objection. There is one other thing. Mr Glica is subject to bail. One of the bail conditions is curfew. It is not possible for him to go back to Coventry this evening by 9.00 pm.
17. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Why not?
18. MR O'DONOGHUE: So he tells me.
19. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: It is about an hour and thirty minutes to Coventry; that is by train. (Pause)
20. MR O'DONOGHUE: He finds that he no longer has that difficulty.
21. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: Mr Brandon, could you put before the associate the appropriate form of order extending the 10-day period?
22. MR BRANDON: Yes.