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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Murphy, R (on the application of) v Salford Primary Care Trust [2008] EWHC 1908 (Admin) (04 July 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/1908.html Cite as: [2008] EWHC 1908 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF JEAN MARIE MURPHY | Claimant | |
v | ||
SALFORD PRIMARY CARE TRUST | Defendant |
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Ms F Morris (instructed by Hill Dickinson) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
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"32. It is submitted that the following principles may be derived from the relevant case law (R v Cambridge Health Authority ex p B [1995] 1 WLR 898, R (Rogers) v Swindon NHS PCT [2006] EWCA Civ 392 and R (Otley) v Barking and Dagenham NHS PCT [2007] EWHC 1927 (Admin):
a. When an NHS body makes a decision about whether to fund a treatment in an individual patient's case it is entitled to take into account the financial restraints on its budget as well as the patient's circumstances (paragraph 58 Rogers).
b. Decisions about how to allocate scarce resources between patients are ones with which the Courts will not usually intervene absent irrationality on the part of the decision-maker (page 991 B). There are severe limits on the ability of the Court to intervene (paragraph 25 Otley).
c. The Court's role is not to express opinions as to the effectiveness of medical treatment or the merits of medical judgment (page 905 B).
d. It is lawful for an NHS body to decide to decline to fund treatment save in exceptional circumstances, provided that it is possible to envisage such circumstances (paragraphs 59, 62 and 65 Rogers)."
Additionally, this is an area in which the courts submit the decision-making process to rigorous scrutiny (paragraph 56 of Rogers).
"3.1 The following principles are offered as guidance and not intended to be binding in every case. Where appropriate, treatment, procedures or therapies may be authorised that are not included within these principles or that would appear to be excluded by them. The possibility will be especially relevant in, but will not be confined to, the 'exceptional circumstances', referred to in paragraph 4 below."
Paragraph 4 is entitled "Exceptional Circumstances". Paragraph 4.1 provides:
"4.1 Treatments or procedures that would otherwise appear to be excluded by this policy may nevertheless be authorised for a particular patient, where the failure to provide them would be likely to cause significant damage to his/her psychological health or social circumstances."
And paragraph 4.3 enjoins those considering this document as follows:
"4.3 When deciding whether circumstances are 'exceptional', account may be taken of previous decisions made under similar circumstances."
So that was the policy that the decision-makers in this case were following.
1. Mrs Murphy suffered from metastatic renal cancer.
2. She was unable to take part in clinical trials of Sunitinib for the reason I have already identified.
3. The fact that she had breast cancer.
4. The fact that Mrs Murphy has suffered from some mental health problems, quite independently of those that overtook her when she was on Interferon.
5. A number of complaints raised in correspondence from Mrs Murphy's son.
6. That whilst being treated with Interferon Mrs Murphy had not been able to take the maximum dose. That is because Professor Hawkins considered it necessary to reduce the dose to try to ameliorate the side effects.
7. The fact that Mrs Murphy, despite suffering serious illness herself, remains the principal carer for her husband, who himself suffers from a number of difficult medical conditions. Those include Crohns disease, in respect of which there has in the past been surgical intervention and a stoma; secondly, psoriasis, which makes the treatment, and dealing with that problem, more difficult; and, thirdly, diabetes and other health problems.
"NED2 stated her view had been that the main issue was whether the 7 issues should have been looked at as a whole rather than each separately. NED1 said he felt the argument made by GP2 was sound — if none was exceptional on its own, collectively they could not be exceptional. GP1 said he felt NED2's question would have been reasonable if there had been a number of 'maybes' with regards exceptional circumstances, however given that so many of the individual issues were 'black or white' it had not been necessary to have gone through the process of considering them together."
It is apparent that within the Process Review Panel there were two views: one, that it simply was not necessary to look at the seven issues in the round if each, individually, was of no real weight; and the other that on the facts of this case there was no need to do so because they were in truth of negligible weight.
"NED1 said, in summary the PRP believed the CP took into account all the relevant considerations and gave sufficient weight to those considerations. He asked whether the PRP therefore upheld the decision of the CP."
They did so. The reasoning of the Process Review Panel is elaborated a little in the statement of Mr Bertenshaw, its chairman, in paragraph 19 of his statement:
"The PRP also considered the argument advanced by the Claimant's solicitors that even if individually the circumstances referred to in relation to the Claimant were not 'exceptional' their concurrence in one individual's case constituted an exceptional circumstance in itself. The PRP rejected this view as a number of the circumstances highlighted would be common to those with the Claimant's condition and if none of the individual circumstances which remained were exceptional then the totality of those circumstances did not in fact constitute exceptional circumstances in this case."