[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Rhodes-Presley, R (on the application of) v South Worcestershire Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 2700 (Admin) (09 October 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/2700.html Cite as: [2008] EWHC 2700 (Admin)

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		9 October 2008

1. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: The claimant in these proceedings is a gentleman in his late 50s with no previous convictions who was charged with an offence of criminal damage of a minor nature to his neighbour's car during the course of a dispute between neighbours which, I am told, has long since evaporated.
2. The matter came before the South Worcestershire Magistrates' Court in September 2006. They heard evidence and purported to convict the claimant who had pleaded not guilty. They said, in announcing their verdict, that they found the defendant guilty on the balance of probabilities. He was subsequently sentenced by them to a conditional discharge. The language used by the magistrates in announcing their decision caused understandable consternation. It is undeniable that that language shows that the conviction cannot stand.
3. The claimant asked for a case to be stated. A draft case was produced in which the magistrates said that they had simply used the wrong language in announcing their decision and had been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. This was never signed up to by the magistrates and never became a case stated. The concern on behalf of the claimant was that the decision of the justices might in fact have included implicitly a decision that he was not guilty on the criminal standard and their satisfaction of his guilt had only been on the incorrect civil standard.
4. What then happened was that the district judge at the Magistrates' Court sought to list the matter for a hearing as to whether - pursuant to the powers in Section 142 (2) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 - the decision of the magistrates should be set aside and the claimant re-tried. This was in December 2006. That issue was not heard in front of the district judge but was dealt with by the lay justices, the majority of whom had participated in the earlier hearing. Although the proposed course of action of re-opening the hearing following setting aside of the conviction was opposed by the defendant and certainly cautioned against strongly by the Crown, the magistrates exercised their power under Section 142 to set aside the conviction and ordered a re-trial to take place before a different bench of magistrates. They then refused to state a case. The concern that the claimant had in dealing with the matter in that way was that if there had been a case stated the Divisional Court might have found, on whatever facts were placed before them, that the conviction was in fact intended to be - or could only be - seen as an acquittal because the magistrates had intended to convey that they could not be satisfied beyond the civil standard or alternatively that the Divisional Court might decide to order that there be no re-trial.
5. Accordingly judicial review proceedings were begun. Permission was granted as long ago as 29 June 2007. The matter finally comes before me for hearing. The relief sought is an order quashing the decision of the Magistrates' Court to re-open the case under Section 142, an order requiring them to state a case for the Administrative Court and/or a quashing of the conviction and an instruction that a not guilty verdict be entered.
6. Mr Walters for the Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS") has provided a helpful skeleton argument in which he recognises that there was an error in the conviction, that there were difficulties in sustaining the decision to re-open the case because of delay and the request to state a case, that he could not contend that the magistrates should not have stated a case, but also making it clear that the prosecution would not seek a re-trial as it would not be in the public interest, as indeed it would not.
7. The application undoubtedly raises some interesting issues as to the interaction between Section 142 and the power to state a case. It may be that the power in Section 142 could well have been properly exercised if exercised promptly, and it may be that if Section 142 is operated properly even an extant request to state a case may become frivolous because the defendant would have achieved all he could properly achieve. But I am not asked, and I do not intend to make rulings in relation to that matter. I was also concerned that the granting of relief to the claimant - firstly, quashing the re-opening of the decision - would mean that the conviction would revive, that there would then be an order to the magistrates to state a case which would come before this court at some point in the future and that it might be inappropriate for the court, in its discretion, to decide that the magistrates should enter a not guilty verdict because there is some doubt about what they intended to convey by the unfortunate words which they used.
8. This trivial alleged incident arising out of a long-gone neighbour dispute should, in my view, receive its quiescence today if at all possible. Mr Walters' helpful interventions have enabled that to happen. It is perfectly clear, as I have said, that if the conviction had not been set aside by the magistrates it would have had to be quashed. The magistrates' decision under Section 142 in terms of setting aside the conviction is effective unless quashed. So the position at present is that there is no conviction against Mr Rhodes-Presley. He is a man of good character.
9. The concern Mr Evans then had was whether there would be a re-trial. Mr Walters not merely made it clear in his skeleton argument that there would be no re-trial because it would be not in the public interest, but he confirmed orally to me that he had taken that stance having consulted the relevant officers of the CPS and that could be taken as the authoritative position of the prosecuting body. Therefore this court can take it - and does take it - that there will be no re-trial. The Magistrates' Court obviously has no power to engage in a re-trial of its own motion. The order made under Section 142 cannot require the Crown to pursue a prosecution.
10. There was concern about the precise mechanics whereby the stance of the CPS which I referred to would be conveyed to the magistrates. Mr Walters has made it clear that whether or not the defendant needs to be there they will make clear to the Magistrates' Court - and for these purposes it may be necessary to list the matter - that they will offer no evidence and the magistrates will then have no option but to dismiss the case with a verdict of not guilty. It may not be necessary for Mr Rhodes-Presley to attend but that is the position that the CPS will adopt. On that basis there seems to me no purpose in any further order in relation to these proceedings, still less for those that would require that this matter come back before the Administrative Court for decisions to be quashed. I have to say that insofar as it were necessary for this court to order that there be no new trial, it is perfectly obvious that the conclusion of the CPS that a re-trial would not be in the public interest is the only sensible one it could reach in the light of the minor nature of the alleged offence, the lapse of time and the character of the claimant as well as the context in which the matter arose.
11. Lest however there be any slip between the firm intentions of the CPS and this court and giving effect to them by the magistrates, I will give liberty to the claimant to restore the proceedings whilst otherwise it seems to me making no order on the application before me which, save for that liberty to restore, means that this case should be regarded as at an end.
12. It may be Mr Evans that the appropriate order is to dismiss the claim subject to liberty to restore in the event that it is necessary for the working out of the court's intention. That may be the neater way of doing it.
13. MR EVANS: Yes.
14. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: Would you be content with an order in those terms?
15. MR EVANS: I am.
16. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: I will make an order that the applications be dismissed with a liberty to the claimant to restore the matter for the purposes of working out the manifest intentions of the court.
17. MR EVANS: I considered the question of costs given that the claimant is legally aided. It seems to me that if Mr Rhodes-Presley wants to pursue any personal costs that he incurred, because the proceedings are still effectively live before the magistrates he is better off doing that there rather than here.
18. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: Yes. I am not sure what my power would be to make any order for costs. It is not appropriate to make one against the CPS.
19. MR EVANS: No.
20. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: The magistrates made the error but have not sought to be obstructive.
21. MR EVANS: No. It would only have been an application for costs from central funds for his travel expenses and the like for the proceedings. It seems to me he can pursue that with the magistrates.
22. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: I will make no order as to costs save for detailed assessment of the legal aid costs. You will have to apply for a transcript if you want a copy of the transcript.