[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> South Staffordshire District Council, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Anor [2008] EWHC 3362 (Admin) (08 December 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/3362.html Cite as: [2008] EWHC 3362 (Admin)

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		8 December 2008

1. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: This is an application brought by the claimant, South Staffordshire District Council, pursuant to Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash, as erroneous in law a decision of an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government that was reached on 22 November 2007.
2. In 2002 the second defendant in these proceedings, Mr Dunne, occupied an open site in the Green Belt within the area of the claimant district council and moved a caravan on to it to occupy it as a home for his family. Planning permission was initially refused in enforcement proceedings but he remained on the land. In 2006 he made a fresh application for retrospective planning permission for himself and his family.
3. By the time the case came before the inspector in October 2007 the family consisted of a wife and eight children between the ages of 10 and 1. Five of the children at the time of the inquiry attended the local Roman Catholic primary school in Bushfield, some 1.8 kilometres away; four of them were registered as having special needs and received additional support from that school; one child was classified as statemented; one of the children, the second defendant and his wife had on-going health questions that were addressed locally. It seems they were addressed in the same place - Bushfield - where there was a general practitioner as well as other services and schools.
4. The issues before the inspector were primarily whether there had been a change of circumstances since the previous application; secondly, and critically, whether the second defendant had made out a case for departing from the normal consideration that inappropriate development within the Green Belt should not be permitted, having regard to the degree of impact upon the Green Belt, the conservation area and the highway, on the one hand, and on the other the need for gypsy site provision generally, the availability of alternative sites, the personal circumstances of the second defendant and his family and what is defined as sustainability, meaning the environmental impact of modes of travel to and the continuing need for his services provided locally from the site.
5. The inspector was required to make an overall assessment of those matters. In the event, the inspector upheld the second defendant's appeal on the most important issue, namely whether a combination of relevant considerations justified the grant of planning permission at all on the site, notwithstanding that it was found to be inappropriate development, harmful to the Green Belt with the consequence that normally it would not be granted.
6. It was the claimant's case at the inquiry that that was not the appropriate conclusion to reach.
7. There was then an alternative case apparently advanced by the claimant at the inquiry that even if there was to be some permitted development it should only be temporary. In the event, the inspector imposed conditions on the development but those were conditions related to personal occupation by the second defendant and his family: a limit to the number of caravans requiring some adjustment to the site, and that the occupation was limited to occupation by the second defendant and his wife and their resident dependants. In the event that they ceased to occupy the site that permission would go. There were other conditions which are immaterial for present circumstances.
8. The claimant in this application submits that the inspector misdirected herself in consideration of the issue as to whether there should have been a time limit condition on the grant of this planning permission in the light of the relevant guidance to which she is bound to have regard. All parties who have made submissions to the court recognise the guidance to which regard must be had is the Planning for Gypsy and Traveller Caravan Sites Guidance issued by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister on 2 February 2006.
9. The contents of that guidance appear to have been stimulated by the lack of sufficient progress on the highly contentious issue of caravan sites for gypsies and travellers pursuant to the previous circular - Circular 1/1994 Gypsy Sites and Planning. The lack of progress has to be seen in the context of the increasing awareness that the planning process, with respect to gypsy families who were in occupation of land, was required to take into account the possibility or the fact that there was a private or family life engaged in that process that required respect under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Most noticeably, before the date of the relevant circular, Chapman v United Kingdom (judgment, February 2001) set out the issues that needed to be considered before planning decisions were made adverse to such claimants, in particular whether there was alternative, available, affordable, separate or suitable land to which they could move.
10. With that brief background, it is appropriate to look at the section of the circular headed "Transitional Arrangements". There, the authors of the circular contemplated at paragraph 41 that the circular would promote fresh duties for assessments at a regional level of the need for pitch numbers. And that process would eventually result in local planning authorities preparing local development documents that would make provision for such need as the total process within the regional framework identified as being necessary. The planning circular identified the need for information gathering by planning authorities and authorities at the strategic regional level.
11. [Circular 1/2006] identified sources of information that could be made available. It concluded at paragraph 44:

"44 ..... Local planning authorities will be expected to demonstrate that they have considered this information, where relevant, before any decision to refuse a planning application for a gypsy and traveller site, and to provide it as part of any appeal documentation."

The guidance then continues in paragraph 45 in these terms:

"45 Advice on the use of temporary permissions is contained in paragraphs 108-113 of Circular 11/95 ..... Paragraph 110 advises that a temporary permission may be justified where it is expected that the planning circumstances will change in a particular way at the end of the period of the temporary permission. Where there is unmet need but no available alternative gypsy and traveller site provision in an area but there is a reasonable expectation that new sites are likely to become available at the end of that period in the area which will meet that need, local planning authorities should give consideration to granting a temporary permission."

Mr Rumney for the claimant says the inspector must give consideration to such a temporary permission if the threshold is met, namely reasonable expectation that these sites are likely to become available at the end of that period.

12. There is other relevant guidance in paragraph 46 to which I need not turn.
13. I turn to the appeal decision itself. The inspector went through a process acknowledging the impact upon the decision that it fell for her to take of Circular 1/2006. Paragraph 10 of her decision states:

"[It] aims, amongst other things, to create and support sustainable, respectful and inclusive communities where gypsies and travellers have fair access to suitable accommodation, education, health and welfare provision; to increase significantly the number of gypsies and travellers' sites in appropriate locations with planning permission; to underline the importance of assessing needs at regional and sub-regional levels; and to ensure that identified need is dealt fairly and effectively ..... "

14. When the inspector came to consider the factors relating to need for further gypsy site provision, at paragraph 39 of her decision she noted that -

"A Gypsy and Traveller Accommodation Assessment (GTAA) has been commissioned by the council in conjunction with other nearby authorities. The results of the sub-regional assessment will inform the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) and Local Development Framework. It is due to be completed by the end of this year. In my view, the best and most-up-to date assessment of need available at this time is the Interim Regional Statement (IRS). This assesses a sub-regional need for 102 pitches over the next 5 years (of which 44 relate to unauthorised developments). If the same formula used to calculate sub-regional need is applied to the district, then 28 pitches would be required in South Staffordshire."

15. The claimant is the local planning authority, South Staffordshire District Council. That district council forms part of a sub-region called the Central Housing Market Area which involves seven district councils or planning authorities: Cannock Chase, Lichfield, South Staffordshire, Tamworth, North Yorkshire, Nuneaton and Rugby. That sub-region is itself part of the West Midlands Region.
16. The Interim Regional Statement to which the inspector referred was an Interim Regional Statement policy promoted by the West Midlands Region. That was in response to the 2006 planning circular. The statement concluded:

"Because of the urgency and priority of the issue ..... the Interim Regional Statement ..... has been produced to cover the period until the completion of the RSS Revision for this policy area, to assist Local Planning Authorities in developing local plans for Gypsy and Traveller site provision."

Paragraph 9 of that Interim Regional Statement states:

"The direct aim is to increase the number of authorised Gypsy and Traveller sites in appropriate locations in order to address under provision over the next 3-5 years from 2006."

There were plans as to how that process would proceed from the interim statement through to the RSS Revision which would consider the allocation of pitch requirements from local planning authorities in line with assessed needs and a strategic plan of how they can best be met.

17. I return to the inspector's decision. At paragraph 40 she concluded:

"The estimated figure of 102 across the sub-region relates to provision over the next five years. Bearing in mind the likely time it will take to identify sites in relevant development plan documents and for planning permission to be secured and implemented, it seems to me that action is required promptly to address this overall need."

18. The inspector noted that the claimant council had not carried out any positive assessment of need for many years. She noted that the council's submission to her was that they did not think they would be called upon to make further provisions within the sub-region because they had already made some provision and there was limited evidence of unlawful occupation in their district. At paragraphs 44 and 45 of her decision she pointed out that no available alternative sites were drawn to her attention and there were no publicly provided gypsy sites in the district. Although there were publicly owned sites outside the district, there was no suggestion that there were pitches currently available and no evidence before the inquiry suggested that there were vacancies on either public or privately rented pitches or that they would be available to the second defendant and his family. She records some evidence from the defendant's family as to inquiries they had made and their understanding of the position.
19. I have already explained that she noted education and health needs of the family and concluded at paragraph 49 in the following terms:

"I give the benefits that would arise from a settled base in respect of the continued education of the children and access to healthcare for [one of the children] considerable weight."

20. With those elements of factual findings in the equation, she then turned at paragraphs 53 to 62 to what she called the overall balancing exercise where she comes strongly in favour of granting planning permission and then two paragraphs on conditions. Summarising her conclusions in those paragraphs as best I can, I make the following sub-points: (1) the council had failed to carry out proper assessment of needs for many years and permission for the use of land available for gypsy sites had only been forthcoming on the appeal; (2) given the linear shape of the district, sites in this area would be divorced from Wolverhampton which I heard is a central location for some of the gypsy community and an area to which this particular family has links; (3) the lack of any suitable, available and affordable sites therefore adds considerably to the weight she gave those considerations.
21. Paragraph 59 I must read in full since it is submitted by Mr Rumney, on behalf of the claimant, that this is the location of a misdirection. The inspector said:

"I accept that there is no realistic likelihood that suitable, affordable and acceptable alternative sites" -

(she adds a footnote which referred to a decision of Mr George Bartlett QC in a case to which I will return in due course, namely R (On Application of Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council) v First Secretary of State and Angela Smith, 19 February 2007, hereafter "the Doncaster case") -

"will be identified in the area before October 2010 (3 years) having regard to the LDS timetable. It will be, at the very least, a further 4 years before any alternative sites are available. That is if there is no slippage of the timetable and subject to sites being provided in South Staffordshire. At this point in time, the council has not made any progress towards finding suitable sites. Indeed, the council does not accept that it may be necessary for South Staffordshire to contribute to the sub-regional need. This casts considerable doubt on whether there is a reasonable expectation that new sites are likely to become available at the end of a reasonable period which will meet the identified need for further sites generally or for this family.

60 I conclude that the considerations that weigh in favour of the appellant would cumulatively clearly outweigh the harm by reason of inappropriateness and the other minimal harm I have identified to the visual amenity of the Green Belt, thereby amounting to very special circumstances."

22. Under the heading "Conditions" at paragraph 61, she said:

"I find there is an unmet need but no available alternative gypsy and traveller site provision in the area. For the reasons set out in paragraph 59, there is no degree of certainty that new sites are likely to become available which will meet that need within a reasonable timescale or where they will be provided. I consider, having regard to paragraph 45 of Circular 01/2006, that it is not necessary for me to give consideration to granting a temporary permission in this case."

23. With that rather considerable degree of quotation from the inspector's decision, I hope I can summarise the four challenges that are said to be misdirection and misapplication of the circular and in particular paragraph 45 of the circular read earlier in this judgment.
24. Briefly the points are: (1) that the inspector only considered the district council as the geographical area in which need might be available over the next four to five years, pursuant to the Interim Regional Strategy, when she should have been looking at the provision of alternative suitable sites in the sub-region at least; (2) that she misapplied the circular by asking a too high test as to the likelihood of sites becoming available by referring to "no degree of certainty" rather than limiting her consideration to reasonable expectation of likelihood; (3) that she does not make plain what is the reasonable period that she had in mind in the decision and so the decision maker, indeed the council, is unclear as to whether she is saying that four years is too long to wait for the second defendant and his family, who have been there since 2002, or whether she is saying that she does not think there will be a suitable alternative provision for some four years; (4) overall the inspector's reasons are sufficiently confusing and unclear to prevent the claimant (who is a participant to the planning inquiry) knowing precisely how she has applied paragraph 45 of the guidance which was at least one of two important issues at the planning hearing.
25. In that context, both the claimant and Mr Phillpot, who appeared for the first defendant the Secretary of State, have referred to South Bucks District Council v Porter No 2 [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953. The judgment of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood at paragraph 36 states:

"The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principal important controversial issues', disclosing ho wany issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. the reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."

26. Mr Phillpot also drew my attention to the proceeding reason in the speech of Lord Brown which referred to the steady body of learning upon the topic of sufficiency of reasons and in particular indicated that if the inspector has dealt with the substantial issues, she is not required to deal with every consideration however insignificant. That would impose an unjustified burden. Lord Brown quoted from the speech of Lord Lloyd of Berwick [in Bolton]:

"Since there is no obligation to refer to every material consideration, but only the main issues in dispute, the scope for drawing any inference - the inference being that the decision-maker had not fully understood the materiality of the matter to the decision - will necessarily be limited to the main issues, and then only ..... when all other known facts and circumstances which appear to point overwhelmingly to a different decision."

27. There is other familiar guidance to the effect that inspectors' decisions are not to be subjected to minute forensic scrutiny. They are required to take into account and not to misunderstand important planning guidance, but guidance is guidance rather than some statutory provision, a misunderstanding of which may have fundamental differences.
28. With the assistance of the approach to be derived from those authorities, it is then said by Mr Phillpot in response - in which he is supported by Mr Masters who appears for the second defendant - that each of the four heads of challenge which the court has identified as being argued by this claimant are, in truth, without substance. First, they largely turn on the fact that there was no evidence produced by the claimant council that other district councils within the sub-region would be able to meet, within four or five years, the reasonable needs of this family that would make planning permission on this site appropriate for a temporary period or at least require the inspector to give much more detailed consideration to temporary planning permission in the light of the evidence. Secondly, it is submitted by the defendants that one has to be conscious of what the inspector understood to be suitable, affordable and acceptable alternative sites.
29. It is at this moment that it is appropriate to look in a little detail at the decision of Mr George Bartlett QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court judge) because the inspector made express reference to the decision. That decision, too, was concerned with planning permission for gypsies and travellers. It, too, was concerned with a sub-issue of whether temporary permission would have been sufficient. At paragraph 25 of his judgment, the Deputy High Court judge, having referred to the case of Chapman v United Kingdom, said:

"It is, in my judgment, clear in the light of this that the inspector did not misrepresent the policy in what she said in paragraph 45.

On the contrary, what she said appears to be entirely in accord with the policy as a whole and with Chapman. Nor do I think the inspector reached a conclusion on the option of temporary permission that she was not entitled to reach. The new Circular enjoined her to give consideration to granting a temporary permission where there was a reasonable expectation that new sites were likely to become available at the end of the period. It did not require that there should be time-limited permission if there is no such reasonable expectation. That would be a matter for the judgment of the decision-maker in the light of all the circumstances."

30. It might be noted that in that particular case the inspector had concluded at the end of her decision that she did not think there was a realistic likelihood that suitable, affordable and acceptable alternative accommodation would become available. She had explained earlier in her decision as part of that conclusion where she said:

" ..... But as the search process has not yet started, and there is no certainty of a suitable, available, affordable and acceptable site (or sites) being found outside the Green Belt to meet the needs of of the site occupants within any firm timescale, this cannot be relied upon to meet their short or even medium term needs."

31. Mr Bartlett QC at paragraph 27 of his judgment accepted the submission advanced by the Secretary of State that those two paragraphs read together met the test in paragraph 45:

"It is, I think, implicit in what the inspector said in paragraph 45 in relation to ties that would be built up and the enrolment of children at local schools, that she considered that the longer the occupants remained on the site, the less suitable and acceptable any alternative would become. That was a view that was, in my judgment, reasonably open to her. I do not think that she misunderstood or misapplied the guidance in the circular ..... "

It is significant that that case was referred to by the inspector in the present case. She made the cross-reference to it in the way that she has done in the middle of paragraph 59.

32. In my judgment once it is recognised that for the criteria in paragraph 45 of the planning circular to be met there must be a reasonable expectation that new sites are likely to become available which will meet the need of the individual claimant as defined in the Doncaster case, then this was a case in which there was no evidence before the inspector of sites becoming available anywhere within the sub-region within a timescale that might be said to be capable of meeting those needs and thus engaging a duty to consider more carefully whether the overall balance in planning control could be met merely by giving a time-limited permission.
33. The starting point was that there were no sites at all within the sub-region at present. Secondly, there was no evidence put forward by the claimant as to what actual measures - in pursuit of regional planning strategy objectives - either it or its neighbouring district planning councils were actually doing to deliver sites. The only evidence which the claimant could and indeed did record was the Interim Regional Statement of the West Midlands region. But that statement of aim was, in my judgment, not evidence that was capable, without more, of satisfying the test set out in paragraph 45 of the circular since one could know nothing about where these sites were to be made available and whether they would be able to accommodate the health and education needs of the family that had been identified that the inspector regarded as a matter of considerable weight in the grant of planning permission and the promotion of the purposes of the circular as a whole.
34. If the evidence that is relied upon by a party to a planning inquiry is speculative, uncertain and does not condescend to particularities of detail that enable an inspector to assess it and test it for necessary qualities to meet an alternative to the grant of a planning permission personal to the second defendant and his family but without limit of time, then it cannot be the subject of subsequent criticism on a challenge under Section 288 that aspects of the reasoning or of detail were as perfect as the claimant would prefer.
35. Some assistance in focussing on the importance of the evidence establishing the proposition that requires further engagement can be obtained from two cases that Mr Masters drew to my attention. The first is a decision of Mr Justice Richards in R (On Application of Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council) v First Secretary of State (unreported, 19 March 2003) where the importance of evidence is stressed at paragraphs 36 and 45. The second is a decision of the Court of Appeal in Wychavon District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA 692 (23 June 2008) where Lord Justice Carnwath stressed the need for evidence at paragraphs 24, 36 and 41. I read from paragraph 24:

" ..... This judgement must necessarily be one to be made by the planning inspector, on the basis of the evidence before him and his view of the site."

36. In my judgment the absence of evidence of particular sites at particular locations or particular parts of the sub-region and the absence of any clear indication as to when those sites would be available for occupation by this family is an answer to all four of the points of complaint made by the claimant. If there was no evidence of sites being made available by other district councils in the sub-region then the distinction between the focus on failures of this district council in paragraph 59 of the judgment and the focus on unmet need in the area at paragraph 61 is without significance because the inspector is only required to look at that which has been put before her. Nothing having been put before her, therefore there was nothing that she could examine.
37. Secondly, in my judgment, she was entitled to conclude that the reliance by the claimant council on the period of four to five years for a site becoming available was wholly imprecise as to timescale as well as to location and actual delivery. Clearly in that respect she was entitled to add weight to the fact that the particular council resisting this planning application and temporary permission had not made any progress itself towards finding suitable sites and never even accepted the need for such.
38. Elsewhere in the Interim Regional Statement document there is reason for cautious pessimism since the authors of the document at a regional level note that none of the participating planning authorities had made assessments of pitch requirements and there is no comprehensive information from local authorities or other sources. Such indications as there were - and I accept there were not many - were that other district councils had not proceeded to pass down the line of delivery of accommodation. Delivery of accommodation with planning permission at the end of the process is what is required for the expectation referred to in paragraph 45 of the planning circular to be engaged. It is not sufficient that at some point down the line - three years or so - sites are identified in the sub-region of the district council.
39. That is only part one of a complicated process which then requires those sites to go forward into the planning permission process with consultation and public hearing. The inspector would certainly be entitled to draw on her own experience that frequently in the past that process could make the sites fall by the wayside. I interpolate, in my judgment it is well known to anybody reading the history of the planning development for caravan sites since 1968 that even when there were statutory duties on local authorities to find sites that frequently did not result in need being met. Unmet need increased when those statutory duties were repealed. That was the whole basis for the more vigorous tones of the 2006 Circular. The inspector was entitled to look at evidence of delivery, the date of intended delivery and the place.
40. Thirdly, in my judgment, there is nothing in the complaint that she had set too high a threshold on the likelihood of delivery. It is plain that - read as a whole, against the background of the findings that she has made - she had considerable doubt as to whether the council would be able to deliver on their part of the process of delivery of sites within the four years which they had identified as a potential alternative. That is because at least three years would be spent identifying sites and one year at the very least before any site could become available. Given the process which the planning circulars spell out that has to be gone through to transfer identified sites into actual sites, in my judgment, that one year addition, if anything, is extremely over-optimistic as experience and the terms of the circular itself identified.
41. It is no doubt for that reason she referred to slippage in the timetable. Once there is slippage there is real uncertainty as to when such sites can be obtained. There is no magic in any particular formula of words. If it were the case that the inspector was saying nothing less than complete certainty is required there may be room for an arguable misdirection. She has quoted at paragraph 55 of her decision the crucial words of the planning guidance circular - "reasonable expectation that these sites are likely to be available". She referred expressly to paragraph 45 of the circular at paragraph 61 when she dealt with conditions. Her reference to "no degree of certainty", in my judgment, must in those circumstances be her own paraphrase of whether the test of reasonable expectation that new sites are likely to become available has been met. Expectation imports something higher than mere hope. It imports something in the nature of a belief of delivery which is reasonable. What needs to be delivered has already been the subject of comments in this judgment.
42. Having dealt with the time period, the area in which the time period could be delivered and the degree of probability that suitable sites could be delivered within the confines of time and area, in my judgment, there is nothing in the general reasons challenge that is the subject of the fourth head of complaint. The participants to this inquiry would know what their submissions were and what the issues were. The claimant district council can, in my judgment, have been under no illusion that their case - though alternative case - if it was a case of planning permission at all, was only a case for planning permission for four or five years because after that time someone else within the region is likely to have provided sites that would provide the claimant and his family with an alternative place to live. It was rejected primarily, as I said at the outset of this judgment, because there is no evidence from which only that conclusion could reasonably have been drawn. And there is no evidence that would enable the inspector to examine such sites.
43. For the reasons given by the inspector, in my judgment, read as a whole against the factual context of the issues before her, she makes perfectly plain what her decision is and makes perfectly plain she has applied rather than misapplied paragraph 45 and she has not misunderstood its terms, its purpose, its language or its object. I therefore dismiss this application.
44. MR PHILLPOT: I am grateful. There is an application for an order that the claimant pay my client's costs. I have a statement of costs for summary assessment. That has been given to the other side.
45. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Have you had a chance to look at this?
46. MR RUMNEY: Yes.
47. MR PHILLPOT: In terms of principle, I do not think there can be a reasonable argument that I should not get costs.
48. MR RUMNEY: No.
49. MR PHILLPOT: It is simply on quantum. The total that you will see is £9,121. As I understand it, there is a single statement of costs which produces a total sum of £9,121. If I can assist on any individual point I will be happy to do so.
50. MR RUMNEY: I cannot resist costs in principle of course for the Secretary of State. I am sorry to appear cavilling, but

there is a question on the details of the statement of costs. I do take the view that - on the second page - "work done on documents" seems a high amount considering that there are substantially no documents produced on behalf of the Secretary of State, no witness statement, no pleading. There is a skeleton argument but that would be prepared by counsel and included in counsel's costs. It is a lot of hours and it is many more hours than the claimant, who has prepared a bundle and has had documents to prepare, has incurred on documents.

51. MR PHILLPOT: I can assist on that. Work done on documents includes as a standard item, when the Treasury are looking at a matter of this sort, the work that is undertaken by the Treasury Solicitors going through the challenge and providing a written note of advice - a minute of advice it is called - to the planning inspectorate, examining the matter in detail in the same way as one might have counsel's written opinion, but the work is done in-house. In addition, there is also - - - - -
52. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Which would save some of the time you would otherwise use.
53. MR PHILLPOT: Indeed. That narrows down the issues that are required - - - - -
54. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: I think at this stage in the evening I am going to make a very modest reduction (Inaudible) otherwise it seems a reasonable matter. Does VAT come into this?
55. MR PHILLPOT: No.
56. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: You do not charge.
57. MR PHILLPOT: No. The Treasury does not charge VAT.
58. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: £8,500.
59. MR RUMNEY: I am grateful.
60. MR MASTERS: In relation to my costs, there is - - - - -
61. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: I do not think the claimant pays twice.
62. MR MASTERS: It is a matter within your discretion. May I make two points? One is that costs should always follow the event. One is only paying twice if the same issues arose. What I would say is my friend represents the inspector and her decision. Here, I represent my client's Article 8 rights.
63. MR JUSTICE BLAKE: I appreciate that but, you having done your job at the inquiry and put that case forward, it was the Secretary of State defending the inspector's decision; and although I am always grateful for the supplementary submission, I do not think so.
64. MR MASTERS: I understand.