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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Chaudhari, R (on the application of) v Walthamstow Coroners Court [2008] EWHC 3393 (Admin) (09 December 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/3393.html Cite as: [2008] EWHC 3393 (Admin), [2008] Inquest LR 124

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		9th December 2008

1. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. The claim form was filed on 7th October 2008. It is a very sad case, because the claimant seeks to challenge the conduct of an inquest that took place as long ago as 11th September 2001.
2. The inquest was into the death of a child, Baby Sunaina. When the baby was born, on 25th May 2000, she was, sadly, a very ill baby and she died on 26th October 2000, when she was only 5 months old. The verdict of the coroner was that the cause of death was multiple congenital abnormalities, including Edwards' Syndrome. She had been diagnosed with that syndrome before birth. However, although she had undergone surgery, which had been successful for that particular condition, she deteriorated as a result of other congenital abnormalities and eventually died.
3. The claimant, who is the baby's aunt and is a qualified pharmacist, is dissatisfied with that verdict of death by natural causes and would seek a verdict of neglect. While I quite understand the very strong feelings on the claimant's part, I hope that she will understand that there is a very considerable public interest in the finality of litigation, in particular in respect of such sensitive matters as the verdicts of juries following an inquest.
4. It would have to be a truly exceptional case to justify granting permission to apply for judicial review in October 2008 in respect of a verdict that had been given more than 7 years previously, on 11th September 2001. So the question is: are there such exceptional circumstances in this case? There would have to be, for example, some piece of wholly new and highly significant evidence which had not been available at the time of the inquest.
5. On behalf of the claimant, Mr Hussain pointed me to a report of Professor Weindling, who is Professor of Perinatal Medicine at the University of Liverpool. He prepared a report on 15th August 2004 at the request of Detective Inspector Tipping of the Specialist Crime Directorate. Inspector Tipping was investigating the matter pursuant to complaints that had been made by the claimant. Professor Weindling's report acknowledges that a mistake was made, in that the baby was given an excessive dosage of a particular drug, ranitidine. It is said that that piece of new information, when the professor had earlier said that her care had been satisfactory, justifies re-opening the matter.
6. There are, it seems to me, two insuperable obstacles to that. The first is that the report is dated 15th August 2004. So the claim that is now made, even if one takes that report as the starting date, is some 4 years late. But what is of more importance is that the claimant has simply identified one particular comment in this report, and has not taken the report in its whole context. While the professor acknowledged that an error had been made, he was clearly of the view (a) that that was simply an error, rather than any form of conspiracy, and (b), and most importantly for present purposes, that it is unlikely that these mistakes resulted in serious injury or permanent damage.
7. His conclusions were as follows. In respect of the question "Was there genuine negligence in the care of Sunaina?", he said, "I cannot find evidence to support this allegation". In respect of the effect of the excessive drug dosage, he said in terms, "I do not think that Sunaina was harmed by the drug error in this case". A little later he says, "I do not think that Sunaina's death was caused by the administration of ranitidine or of potassium chloride. I do not think either of these agents caused her any harm". It is a fair paraphrase of his report to say that he was of the opinion that sadly Sunaina had a genetic disorder, which occurred by chance and could not have been prevented, and it is effectively that which caused her early death.
8. If one looks at that report as a whole, it could not conceivably provide any basis, even if a challenge had been made in time, for re-opening the coroner's verdict. I quite appreciate that the claimant disagrees with the professor's conclusions, but the fact of the matter is that there is no independent medical evidence which dissents from the professor's findings. Thus, for those reasons it is plain that this renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review cannot possibly succeed. It is very, very much out of time and there is simply nothing to support the assertion that there was any error in the verdict way back in September 2001. Indeed, the professor's report reinforces the verdict that was reached in 2001.
9. For the sake of completeness, I should mention the fact that the defendant's acknowledgment of service also makes the point that this is not the first claim for judicial review in respect of this matter. As I understand it, there have been two earlier claims, which have been refused. There simply has to be an end to litigation. While I appreciate the claimant's very strong feelings in the matter, it really does not serve any useful purpose to keep on coming back to court to try to obtain a different answer.
10. I refuse this renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review and I also certify that the claim is wholly without merit. I do give the politest of warnings that if any further claims are made in this court then the court will have to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to make a civil restraint order against this claimant. There really has to be finality in litigation. The claimant must appreciate this. So permission is refused.
11. Thank you very much, Mr Hussain. You have said everything that could possibly have been said.
12. MR HUSSAIN: I am grateful.
13. MR McGUIRE: Thank you very much. I hesitate to do this, but there is the occasional case where one does have to consider asking for costs. A schedule has been, I hope, handed up. Essentially, it can be divided into two parts. The first is the costs of the preparation of the acknowledgment of service, which in this case had to be quite a substantial document in order to try and bring these proceedings to an end one spent longer doing it than normally would be the case. The item under my name for a fee for documents that we can see from behind, that is the summary of grounds.
14. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: So what is that? In principle, at least, the normal order might be for the costs of the acknowledgment of service, although it is unusual for coroners. Where does that get us to? How much is that?
15. MR McGUIRE: That is £1,350. I am told by my instructing solicitor that most of the costs she incurred were in preparing instructions, getting the papers together, putting the medical evidence into order so that I can look at it and so on. So if your Lordship were minded to make an order for costs limited to that figure, the question is something of the order of £2,000. That is £1,350 plus £650 of the £705. The other large item your Lordship will see is the brief fee. The question then is, on the same principle as (inaudible) whether enough is enough and the claim is plainly seen to be hopeless. This is not about recovering all the money; it is about the court drawing a line in the sand and saying, "This application ought not to have been made". So I do not press hard on the amount, but ask for the £1,350 and some of the solicitor's costs as well.
16. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: What do you want to say about that, Mr Hussain? The normal position would be that Mr McGuire would not be entitled to his costs of today, but in principle would be entitled to his costs of an acknowledgment of service, although that is not always sought on behalf of coroners, but there may be cases where it is appropriate.
17. MR HUSSAIN: I would just say that of course I oppose the application. It is an unusual case. It is not one of those cases that one normally comes across where frivolous applications are made. I have not been involved in any previous applications. I am told that there have been in the past. This is perhaps the only occasion where there has been some representation. The full impact and view of the court will be made clear.
18. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Yes, the claim itself is the claimant in person.
19. MR HUSSAIN: That is right. So it was not on legal advice itself. I am sure, on this occasion, that the claimant and the family have heard very clearly the view of the court. It should not be used as a further punishment, which is how it will be seen, on the issue of costs.
20. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: You will be able to explain, Mr Hussain, the implications of what I said about a civil restraint order.
21. MR HUSSAIN: I intend to.
22. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: In old language, it is a vexatious litigant order. It would be very unfortunate if the court had to make that, but after three tries of judicial review it has to be said that is enough and the court will take steps to stop further litigation if people persist in making unwarranted claims. They do not think they are unwarranted, but in legal terms they are unwarranted.
23. MR HUSSAIN: I am sure they will be made fully aware of the higher test that will be necessary for any future claim, if it is deemed that there is some merit in it. On this occasion I would ask that there be no order as to costs.
24. MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN: Yes, thank you.
25. While, normally, a defendant who successfully resists an application for permission to apply for judicial review is entitled to the costs of an acknowledgment of service, perhaps the more normal position in coroner's cases is for the coroner to maintain a position of standing back. I quite understand why, in the circumstances of this case, the defendant felt that it would indeed be helpful, and it was, to have an acknowledgment of service, but I think that, in the interests of trying to draw a line under this litigation and not engendering more unhappiness and discontent, the sensible thing to do is to make no order as to costs in this case, but to make it perfectly clear to the claimants that if they come back to the court again and try to re-litigate this matter, either by way of judicial review or in some other guise, then the court will feel that they have had a clear warning and they should expect then to face significant costs if they lose yet again.
26. I think in the interests of drawing a line under this unhappy case, the sensible order is to not make any order for costs. That is not to indicate to the claimants there is any merit in their claim at all; it is simply that I do not want there to be a source of further potential aggravation between themselves and the defendant. I think the better thing to do is to draw a line under this now.
27. Thank you very much.