CO/9543/2011 
Neutral Citation Number: [2012] EWHC 2461 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 

Wednesday, 25 July 2012

B e f o r e: 

MR JUSTICE BEAN 
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Between: 
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF KUZNECOVAS
Claimant

v 

PROSECUTOR GENERAL OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
Defendant 
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Computer‑Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of  
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MISS HOLLY SCOTT MASON (instructed by Whitelock and Storr) appeared on behalf of the Claimant

MR BRIAN GIBBINS (instructed by the CPS Special Crime & Disorder Division) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
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Judgment
1.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  This is an appeal by Jurijus Kuznecovas challenging the decision of District Judge Tubbs, on 30 September 2011, to send him to Lithuania under a European arrest warrant to face two charges of public order offences. 
2.	The appellant was originally represented by solicitors and counsel and the counsel lodged a skeleton argument on 11 December.  The case had by then already been adjourned once.  It was listed for hearing on 14 December, and it was that hearing to which the skeleton argument was addressed.  It raised a number of points, one of which was then a live issue: the suggestion that the prosecutor on whose application the District Judge had ordered extradition, the office Of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania, was not a judicial authority within the meaning of the Extradition Act.  That point has since been definitively settled by the decision of the Supreme Court on the appeal of Mr Assange, and therefore cannot be a ground for reversing the decision of the District Judge.
3.	There were two other points raised.  The first was that the appellant is not an accused person within the meaning of the statute, specifically section 2(3), but a mere suspect.  This is an argument commonly raised when the application for extradition comes from a requesting state which has a procedure under which people are interviewed prior to trial proceedings to ensure that there is a proper basis for the accusation to proceed to trial.
4.	It was held in the case of Asztalos v Szekszard City Court, Hungary [2010] EWHC 237 that the issue is whether the person whose extradition is requested is on that side of the line, namely that the proposed interview is in the nature of a pre‑trial interview, or whether the accused is simply someone that the local police, or local prosecutors, would like to speak to in the course of an investigation. Here the terms of the European arrest warrant make it clear that Mr Kuznecovas is in the first category, not the second category, so there is nothing in this point either. 
5.	The third argument raised was one concerning the rule against double jeopardy contained in section 12 of the Act.  That was a matter raised by the appellant's solicitor before the District Judge.  But the double jeopardy bar does not apply in a case where a police investigation was at some stage suspended, and then properly revived.  That was the decision of the European Court of Justice in the case of Turansky [2008] ECR 1‑11039. 
6.	The double jeopardy point cannot therefore avail this appellant.  Any procedural irregularity in the earlier investigation, if that has any significance under Lithuanian criminal procedure, is a matter for the Lithuanian courts, not for this court.  It follows that in my view there is nothing in this appeal and it should be dismissed.
7.	Prior to this hearing the appellant's solicitors were left without up‑to‑date instructions and have requested to come off the record.  Since that has not been the subject of any order of the court, Miss Holly Scott Mason of counsel has very properly attended before me this morning.  However, she is without substantive instructions and accordingly was not, as a professional matter, able to add anything to the arguments, with which I have dealt, contained in the skeleton argument settled by Mr Brownhill in December.
8.	I grant the application of the appellant's solicitors and counsel to come off the record, but as I say I dismiss the substantive appeal. 
9.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  Mr Gibbins? 
10.	MR GIBBINS:  There was one other matter which I should have drawn to my Lord's attention.  That is the question of extension of time for the appeal.  My Lord, will know that ‑‑ 
11.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  You are quite right.  What, if anything, was lodged within seven days?  There was an issue about whether the appeal was entered in time: is that right? 
12.	MR GIBBINS:  No, my Lord, I do not believe that was the point.  The point that I was concerned with was that Collins J, when he disposed of the matter by way of adjourning it on 14 December, extended time for the hearing of the appeal up until 4 April of this year.  I do not believe there has been a further extension.  I should have picked up on that earlier, but I wrote to the court office on 15 June asking for the matter to be further extended. 
13.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  The office note says that the next day Ouseley J, the lead judge, extended time until today. 
14.	MR GIBBINS:  I was unaware of that.  Then I apologise for troubling you. 
15.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  Thank you for drawing it to my attention.  I think we can take it that the formalities have been observed.  I do not know whether there was a period in which there was not an extant court order, but I am proceeding on the basis that Ouseley J's extension enabled me to hear the case today. 
16.	MR GIBBINS:  It does.  I think one of the earlier decisions in the Moulai (?) case makes it clear that the court can extend the deadline not only prospectively, but also retrospectively. 
17.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  Thank you very much.  That is a relief.  It seems to me that if there was any gap in continuity it would effectively have been the fault of the court rather than the appellant.  Anyway you tell me the point has been decided:  Ouseley J made his order, so all is well. 
18.	MR GIBBINS:  As far as the question of costs is concerned, I am mindful that the court has a busy day and also of the caution, and indeed reluctance, that the court brings to bear in relation to such applications.  If I am not pushing at an open door, then I will not trouble my Lord. 
19.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  You would not be pushing at an open door, Mr Gibbins.  Of course I will hear you if you want to make the application, but I dare say you have been on the other side sometimes as well, and it is not easy.  Solicitors and counsel in the cases of clients who disappear during litigation are put in a position of difficulty.  Shall we leave it there then? 
20.	MR GIBBINS:  Indeed, my Lord.  
21.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  I am very grateful to you both.  
22.	MISS SCOTT MASON:  On that note can I just ask for a detailed assessment of costs? 
23.	MR JUSTICE BEAN:  Yes.