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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Bartkowiak v Judicial Authority of Poland [2012] EWHC 333 (Admin) (10 February 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2012/333.html Cite as: [2012] EWHC 333 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		10 February 2012

1. LORD JUSTICE GROSS: The first judgment will be given by Irwin J.
2. MR JUSTICE IRWIN: This is an appeal from the decision of Senior District Judge Riddle in the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court, ordering the extradition of the appellant to Poland. The short point is as follows: where the European Arrest Warrant in a given case recites multiple offences, and multiple sentences for those offences, but does not explicitly recite the total sentence to be served, is the European Arrest Warrant defective because it fails to give the particulars required by section 2(6)(e) of the Extradition Act 2003?
3. The facts are as follows: the appellant is a Polish national, who acquired various convictions and sentences in Poland. The relevant European Arrest Warrant relates to seven offences derived from five separate judgments from the District Court in Torun. It is not necessary to give all of the details, sufficient it is to say that in 2004 he was found to be in possession of 12 bags of cannabis, and received an 8-month prison sentence, the entirety of which falls to be served. Secondly, in November 2005 he was found to be in possession of 11.5 grams of cannabis, and a sentence of 5-months' imprisonment was served, with 12 days remaining to be served. The third judgment relates to 4 February 2005, in the course of which he purchased, no doubt by what we would describe as deceit, a bathroom cabinet knowing that the purchase was "a forbidden act". In respect of that he received 6 months' imprisonment, the entirety of which falls to be served. The fourth judgment deals with three offences. In the first and second, it is said, there was a supply of cannabis by the appellant, and the third relates to the theft of an identity card. The aggregated sentence for those three offences was 2 years' imprisonment and the appellant has one year and 10 months remaining to be serving. The fifth judgment relates to possession of cannabis and amphetamines. The appellant was sentenced to 1 year and 4~months' imprisonment, the entirety of which remains to be served.
4. Subsequent to these judgments he came to the United Kingdom. He is sought as a convicted person. The first European Arrest Warrant in respect of this appellant -- because there has been a second -- was issued by the District Court of Torun on 27 February 2008, was certified by the Serious and Organised Crime Agency on 18 June 2010 and, as I have indicated, is the subject of the judgment by the Senior District Judge which is now the subject of appeal.
5. The respondent says in his written submissions that, where an aggregate sentence is not specified, then separate offences from Poland are to be served consecutively. The appellant says that is wrong, or that the court is ignorant of whether that is correct. Further the appellant says that is not in any event specified in this warrant, and that is the premise of the argument for the appeal.
6. The substantive hearing took place on 29 June. This argument was raised and rejected by the Senior District Judge.
7. A European Arrest Warrant, it is said by the appellant, must satisfy certain criteria. Section 2(6)(e) of the Act in its relevant terms reads that the information required to be placed in the warrant is:

"Particulars of the sentence which has been imposed under the law of the category 1 territory in respect of the offence, if the person has been sentenced for the offence".

8. The obvious purpose of that, in my judgment, is to ensure that the offence or offences are serious enough in terms of their sentence to warrant extradition and specifically satisfy the requirement of a minimum 4-month sentence being imposed pursuant to section 65(3) and 65(4) of the Act.
9. The appellant also relies on the Extradition Act 2003 (Multiple Offences) Order 2003, which in its relevant wording from paragraph 1(1) to the Schedule to those regulations reads as follows:

"Unless the context otherwise requires, any reference in the Act to an offence (including a reference to an extradition offence) is to be construed as a reference to offences (or extradition offences)."

10. The appellant submits that that means when one returns to the wording of the Act itself, section 2(6)(e), that "particulars of the sentence which have been imposed under the law of the category 1 territory in respect of the offence, if the person has been sentenced for the offence" should be read to mean in respect of the offences, if the person has been sentenced for the offences; so by necessary implication, a requirement to specify a single sentence for multiple offences. The appellant goes on to say that if the warrant is defective in this regard then it cannot be made good by extraneous information, relying on the well-known dicta of Lord Hope in Dabas v High Court of Justice, Madrid [2007] UKHL 6.
11. In oral submissions, Mr Jones, for the appellant, supplemented his written submissions as follows: he suggests that there are advantages to the interpretation he advances. Firstly, that the requested person has a clear idea of the total sentence he faces. Secondly, that at any initial hearing where the question of bail arises, the length of sentence will be of help to the court considering bail. Thirdly, that it will always provide the answer to the 4-month test; it will always tell the court in England as to whether that is passed by the sentences or sentence aggregated or fully calculated. Fourthly, that it is of assistance when considering other statutory bars to extradition.
12. Mr Jones accepts that none of those points arise in this case since each of the sentences specified in the Warrant -- one of them aggregated and the others individual -- pass the 4-month barrier. Mr Jones goes on to say that the interpretation advanced by the respondent -- which is that the requirement of a total sentence in respect of multiple offences is not necessary -- brings none of those identified advantages.
13. Mr Jones goes on to seek to distinguish dicta in Milan Trepac v Presiding Judge County Court in Trencin, Slovak Republic [2006] EWHC 3346 (Admin) and specifically paragraph 16 of the judgment of Keene LJ in that case, and further on dicta from the speech of Lord Hope in the case of Pilecki v Circuit Court of Legnica, Poland [2008] UKHL 7 and in particular the approach of Lord Hope set out in paragraph 28 of that speech.
14. The respondent, in written submissions, replies that there is no requirement for the total sentence to be derived from individual sentences; the effect of paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the 2003 Order is explicitly dependant on context. The meaning here is that particulars of the sentence for an offence, or sentences for offences, can perfectly well be flexible depending on the number of offences and on the facts of the case in question, and that as long as the expression of the sentence, or sentences, to be served in the Warrant enables the English court to be satisfied that the 4-month test is passed, then the Warrant is not defective, even if it fails to bring the contingent advantages which the appellant states would be brought if fuller detail was given in every case. In other words, that the content of the Warrant, even if it is of lesser utility and confers no such additional advantages, does not render it defective.
15. I agree. It appears to me that the purpose of the provision is to stipulate that such information is given so as to see whether the warrant satisfies the minimum legal test. Once the information does so, that is sufficient and extradition can proceed. There is no obligation, in my judgment, to inform a potential extraditee of the overall effect. In practical terms, the statement of the sentences passed by a court may often not do so in many jurisdictions, including our own, and so a requirement which would mean that a warrant was invalidated, unless it did achieve that effect would be excessive and otiose.
16. For those reasons, I would dismiss this appeal and sustain the order to extradite.
17. LORD JUSTICE GROSS: I agree.
18. MR JONES: My Lords, thank you. Can I, without disrespect, invite my Lord to correct one aspect of that judgment. It is a matter of fact. You indicated that I relied on the case of Trepac, in fact those specific paragraphs which my Lord recited were relied on by the respondent and I merely sought to distinguish those in the light of --
19. MR JUSTICE IRWIN: Forgive me, I will correct that when the judgment is available.
20. MR JONES: My Lord, can I also have an order for cost to assessed in the usual way.
21. MR JUSTICE IRWIN: Yes, indeed.