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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Pacia v Judicial Authority of Poland [2013] EWHC 1520 (Admin) (08 May 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2013/1520.html Cite as: [2013] EWHC 1520 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		8 May 2013

1. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: This is an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the decision of District Judge Riddle, given on 26 February 2013, whereby he directed that the appellant should be returned to Poland in order to serve sentences, which had been imposed for offences committed admittedly some time ago. On the other hand, the sentences were suspended and their suspension was set aside, but not eventually until, in respect of all of them, June 2007.
2. The matter was raised before the District Judge and he has given a lengthy judgment. The basis of the contention that there was a bar to extradition was based on section 14 of the Act, it being said that the passage of time made it unjust to return him. The District Judge had, in the circumstances, to consider whether the appellant was a fugitive from justice. He saw and heard him give evidence and was satisfied, on the appellant's own account, that he was aware of the obligation to remain in contact with the probation officer, and he failed to do that. It was clear from the warrant that some of the sentences of imprisonment were imposed before he came to this country. He came here in February 2006. He said, and it seems the District Judge accepted, that his probation officer was aware that he had come to this country, but he should have kept in touch and he did not. He was aware, it seems, that he was obliged to keep in touch.
3. As a result the District Judge properly took the view that he could not rely on section 14. In fact nothing else was argued on his behalf before the District Judge. It is clear, when one looks at the evidence, that, as is inevitable, his return to Poland in order to serve sentences would be harsh for his girlfriend, with whom he has been in a relationship since March 2006. It seems his partner owns the house in which they live, but he contributes to the expenses and he has a stepchild who is some nine years old. As I say, it is inevitable that there is harshness for those with whom an individual is living if he has to go and serve a sentence of imprisonment, which has been properly imposed.
4. I am told today that applications have been made to the court in Poland to suspend, certainly to ensure that the sentences are not required to be served. Mr Cranfield tells me that he has information that there is a hearing on the 15th of this month (that is a week today) in which this matter will be considered. That in itself is not a good reason for adjourning matters. It is to be noted incidentally that there is what is described as a "skeleton argument", which appears to have been submitted on the appellant's behalf. This is no doubt in order to comply with the order of the Master, which required such a skeleton, but that does not assert that the District Judge was wrong to decide that he was a fugitive from justice. Indeed the evidence was clear that he failed to keep in touch and he knew that he was obliged to keep in touch.
5. It was suggested, notwithstanding that, that it would be unfair to extradite him. Unfairness is not the test; unjust or oppressive is the test which is not in the least met in all the circumstances.
6. Accordingly this appeal must be dismissed. The only question is whether, having regard to the information that there is a hearing in Poland on the 15th, I should defer the issuing of the order of dismissal for a few days to see what the result of that hearing is. If of course it goes against the appellant, then the extradition will go ahead. If, on the other hand, it is favourable, no doubt the warrant will be withdrawn and extradition will not be carried out.
7. There is a period of fourteen days before any steps can be taken to remove the appellant, because time must be allowed to enable any appeal, or application for leave to appeal, to be made in relation to a further appeal to the Supreme Court. That is a period which is automatically allowed, even though, as in this case, there is no conceivable chance that any such application can properly be made.
8. In those circumstances there is time for the decision to be reached. Accordingly, I do not think any deferment is needed. This appeal is dismissed.