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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Cahyono, R (on the application of) v Entry Clearance Officer [2013] EWHC 365 (Admin) (07 February 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2013/365.html Cite as: [2013] EWHC 365 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		7 February 2013

1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: This is a claim by Mr Cahyono challenging a decision by an entry clearance officer in Indonesia refusing him entry clearance to visit the United Kingdom for a period of three months and one day. The decision was made on 23 November 2010. Following the grant of permission to apply for judicial review, the entry clearance officer re-examined the refusal and issued a fresh decision, again refusing entry clearance. Permission to challenge that refusal has been granted on one ground only, namely that the decision is said to be irrational.
2. I deal first with the facts. Mr Cahyono was convicted in Indonesia in 2004 of possession of ten tablets of ecstasy. He was 24 years old at the time and he was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment. He wished to visit friends in United Kingdom, namely Mr Amir and his civil partner, Professor Wintemute. Professor Wintemute wrote a long and detailed letter, dated 26 October 2010, to the British Embassy and Consulate General in Jakarta explaining the purpose of Mr Cahyono's proposed visit, and the reasons why in Professor Wintemute's view, Mr Cahyono should be granted entry clearance to enable him to visit the United Kingdom, notwithstanding his criminal conviction.
3. Entry clearance was refused however on 23 November 2010 on the basis of Immigration Rule 320(18). The entry clearance officer noted that Mr Cahyono had committed a criminal offence, what would in the United Kingdom be possession of a Class A controlled drug, and that offence would have been punishable by imprisonment for 12 months or more if it had been committed in the United Kingdom. Thus the entry clearance officer concluded that the case fell within Immigration Rule 320(18). He referred to the sponsor's letter of October 2010 and the supporting documents included with it but he concluded that he was unaware of any sufficiently strong compassionate circumstances to justify the claimant's admission to the United Kingdom.
4. Following the grant of permission to apply for judicial review of that decision, the entry clearance officer in Jakarta re-examined the claimant's case. He took a fresh decision, again, refusing entry clearance on 26 September 2012. For present purposes that in my judgment is the decision to focus upon as it is that decision which sets out the present reasons for refusing Mr Cahyono entry clearance to the United Kingdom.
5. The letter so far as material reads as follows. It starts by noting that Mr Cahyono has applied for entry clearance. It notes that he has been asked to re-examine the refusal of the earlier application for entry clearance and it notes that the claimant meets the requirements of paragraph 41 of the Immigration Rules. The letter then goes on to say as follows:

"However, on your application form you stated that, in 2003, in Bali, Indonesia, you were arrested and convicted of the possession of 10 tablets of Ecstasy. On 9 January 2004, you were sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4 years. You served 3 years, 4 months and 3 days of this term before your release. That criminal conviction means that I must consider your application for entry clearance in accordance with paragraph 320 of the Immigration Rules, which gives details of general grounds on which an application for entry clearance must or may be refused."

The letter then sets out in terms Rule 320(18) and I will return to that shortly. The letter continues as follows:

"The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 classifies Ecstasy as a Class A controlled drug. Class A drugs are considered to be the most harmful and are therefore treated as the most dangerous under the Act. A person will be charged with possession under the Misuse of Drugs Act if he has the controlled substance in his physical possession, in his pocket for example, or if he has control over it without permission. In order to prove possession, the amount of the controlled substance held is not considered. All that needs to be proved is that the individual had the controlled substance in his possession and that he was aware of having it in his possession. The sentence available for possession of a Class A drug on indictment is up to seven years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine or, in some cases, both.

In view of the foregoing, I conclude that you have been convicted of on offence which, had it occurred in the United Kingdom, would have been punishable with a sentence of more than 12 months' imprisonment. That being the case, entry clearance should normally be refused.

However, under paragraph 320(18) I have the discretion to grant an application for entry clearance where I am satisfied that 'admission would be justified for strong compassionate reasons'. I have therefore considered whether strong compassionate reasons exist in your case.

I have taken into account the following facts: that the offence for which you were convicted took place some seven years prior to your application for entry clearance, that you were released from prison some four years before you made your application, that it is said that you have not reoffended, and that it is said that you are a close friend of your sponsor's partner. Your sponsor has said that you have served the punishment administered to you by the Indonesian courts and that, other than your conviction, there is no reason to refuse your application. All of these points were made in the letter dated 26 October 2010 written by your sponsor and I have given them due weight in my assessment of the facts.

Your sponsor says that the compassionate circumstances outlined in your application and in his letter represents factors to be considered in mitigation. To set them out, they are: your age at the time of the commission of the offence (24 years), and your age now (32 years); the length of time since your conviction (8 years) and release in December 2006 (5 years); the lack of any further conviction; your full-time employment; the time that has elapsed from the time of your previous application and making this application (2 years); the opinion of your sponsor that a court in the UK would have reached a different sentencing conclusion on the facts and that it is inconceivable that you should be excluded from the UK based on this evidence.

I have considered these arguments and my conclusions are as follows: you are convicted of a very serious offence and this fact weighs heavily against you, not only because of the length of the sentence which you received but also because of the seriousness which UK law accords to such an offence in general and the class of drug to which the offence relates. Had you received a sentence of 4 years' imprisonment in the United Kingdom, the sentence would not be considered as 'spent' under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Custodial sentences of more than 2 and a half years can never become spent under the terms of that Act.

It is not appropriate for me to speculate as to the likely sentence that the offence may have attracted in the United Kingdom. My function is to determine application for entry clearance in accordance with the facts and evidence available to me and not to debate the hypothetical outcome in sentencing in a criminal matter (there is no claim that you are innocent of the offence). In the United Kingdom, Ecstasy is categorised as a Class A under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and that means that it is considered to be amongst the most harmful and dangerous of drugs.

I do not consider that your age at the time of the commission of the offence and your conviction is a factor that should be afforded any weight in your favour. You were 24 years old when the offence was committed; you are not a minor and you were capable of fully understanding the risks involved and the potential consequences of your actions.

Set against that are these factors: you are said not to have reoffended; you are said to be employed; you are said to have a stable life; you are said to have known your sponsor and his partner for several years. I have given you full credit for these matters but I do not consider that they constitute strong compassionate reasons which would lead me to exercise discretion in your favour and grant your application for entry clearance. Your sponsor has said in his letter dated 26 October 2010 that his partner regards you as a brother. I have not seen any evidence that you and your sponsor's partner are actually related and you have made no such claim. That being so, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not engaged and refusing your application does not constitute a breach of your human rights.

You wish to make a social visit only to friends in the UK. There are no special or compassionate reasons for the visit. It is arguable that you have stronger reasons for coming to the United Kingdom in 2008 when you made your first application for entry clearance because, at that time, you were invited to attend the civil partnership ceremony of your sponsors, yet you did not contest the refusal of that application. The visit proposed now does not have to take place in the UK. Your sponsors can visit you in Bali or elsewhere if they wish."

The letter continues by referring to guidance that has been issued and concludes by saying this:

"...I am satisfied that it is reasonable and proportionate to refuse your application in accordance with paragraph 320(18) of the Immigration Rules because, for the reasons given, I do not consider that you and your sponsor have advanced strong compassionate reasons which would lead me to exercise discretion in your favour.

I therefore refuse your application in accordance with paragraph 320(18) of the Immigration Rules."

6. I turn next to the legal framework against which that decision was made. Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 provides that a person who is not a British citizen requires leave to enter the United Kingdom. Section 3(2) provides for the Secretary of State to make Immigration Rules. The relevant rule in the present case is Rule 320(18). Paragraph 18 is one of a group of grounds which appear under the heading "grounds on which entry clearance or leave to enter the United Kingdom should normally be refused". Paragraph 18 itself reads as follows:

"Save where the Immigration Officer is satisfied that admission would be justified for strong compassionate reasons, conviction in any country, including the United Kingdom of an offence which, if committed in the United Kingdom is punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months' or any greater punishment or, if committed outside the United Kingdom, would be so punishable if the conduct constituting the offence had occurred in the United Kingdom."

7. The operation of Immigration Rule 320(18) is described in the decision of Sullivan J, as he then was, in the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Bindel where he refused permission to apply for judicial review for the grant of entry clearance. In summary, in my judgment, Immigration Rule 320(18) operates as follows.
8. First, an entry clearance would normally be refused if a person has a conviction for an offence which is punishable with 12 months' imprisonment or more if that offence had been committed in the United Kingdom.
9. Secondly, if an entry clearance officer is satisfied that there are strong compassionate circumstances justifying the grant of an entry clearance then entry clearance would not be refused on the basis of Immigration Rule 320(18). There may be other applicable rules, such as for example Rule 320(19) which may justify refusal. But, in my judgment, if the entry clearance officer is satisfied that there are special compassionate circumstances justifying entry, then refusal on the basis of Rule 320(18) would not be appropriate.
10. Thirdly, even if there are no special compassionate circumstances justifying the grant of entry clearance there is, in any event, still a discretion and the entry clearance officer is not obliged to refuse entry simply because the person has a conviction for a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for 12 months' or more. That appears from the fact that the Rules provide that, if an applicant falls within the Rule, normally an entrance clearance should be refused. As Sullivan J noted in Bindel, that leaves a discretion, exceptionally, for an immigration officer to grant entry clearance even if a person otherwise falls within Rule 320(18).
11. Against that background, Mr Cahyono challenges the rationality of the entry clearance officer's decision, refusing him entry clearance. He puts the rationality challenge in four ways in his skeleton argument. First, it is said that the entry clearance officer attached manifestly excessive weight to the claimant's conviction and sentence in Indonesia and attached manifestly inadequate weight to the likely sentence in United Kingdom. In particular, the claimant contends that it could be concluded with almost complete certainty that he would in fact have been sentenced to less than 12 months' imprisonment and would indeed have been extremely unlikely to have been sentenced to imprisonment at all if he had committed the offence in United Kingdom.
12. Mr Malik, who appears for the claimant, accepts that the weight to be attached to a consideration is a matter for the decision-maker, not the court. However, Mr Malik relies on a dictum of Silber J at first instance in the case of R(on the application of BT3G Ltd) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] EU Law Reports page 325. Mr Malik draws my attention to the dictum at paragraph 187, where Silber J said this:

"The balancing and weighing of relevant considerations is primarily a matter for the public authority and not the Courts. Courts, have, however, been willing to strike down as unreasonable decisions where manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate weight has been accorded to a relevant consideration in determining whether a consideration is relevant."

13. The point was not raised when the matter went on appeal to the Court of Appeal. I doubt whether a decision can be challenged simply on the grounds that manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate weight was attached to a particular consideration unless it can also be shown that the decision itself was irrational. But for present purposes, and without deciding the point, I assume that that could give rise to a claim for judicial review.
14. I turn therefore to the substance of the entry clearance officer's decision. In my judgment, the approach and the decision of the entry clearance officer is not irrational or unlawful on this first ground of challenge. Immigration Rule 320(18) applies where a person has a conviction for an offence and that offence is one that is punishable by 12 months' or more imprisonment. That is, it is an offence which falls within a category which is treated as serious, ie it is an offence capable of being punished by a sentence of 12 months' or more. If a person falls within that Rule because he has a conviction for such an offence, he will normally be refused entry clearance unless the entry clearance officer is satisfied that there are strong compassionate circumstances justifying grant of an entry clearance. Here, the entry clearance officer correctly concluded the claimant did fall within this Rule. He had been convicted of an offence and if that offence had been committed in the UK, it would be punishable by 12 months' or more imprisonment.
15. The entry clearance officer then went on to consider whether there were strong compassionate circumstances justifying the grant of entry clearance. He considered the arguments of the sponsor, including the argument that a United Kingdom court would have been likely to have imposed a different sentence from the Indonesian court and the sponsor's argument that the claimant should not therefore be excluded from the United Kingdom on the basis of his Indonesian conviction. The entry clearance officer considered that the offence was a very serious offence, not only because of the sentence actually imposed in Indonesia, but also because of the seriousness with which United Kingdom law treats such offences generally, and the fact that this was a Class A drug. That is, it was among the most harmful and dangerous of drugs. In my judgment, the entry clearance officer was entitled to take that view of the offence and of the circumstances. In approaching that matter in that way the entry clearance officer was not attaching manifestly excessive weight to the sentence imposed in Indonesia, nor was he manifestly attaching inadequate weight to the sentence the claimant says he would have got if he committed offence in the United Kingdom.
16. The entry clearance officer, as the claimant accepts, is not obliged to speculate about what sentence a person might have received in the United Kingdom. Nor, in my judgment, is he obliged to accept that, if there is material that indicates the person might have received a sentence of less than 12 months in the UK that should automatically be treated as a strong compassionate circumstance justifying the grant of entry clearance. Rather, in my judgment, the entry clearance officer is looking at the Rules which say that normally, a person would be refused entry clearance if he has committed an offence which is capable of being punished with 12 months' imprisonment or more.
17. In the circumstances, such an offence is one that the United Kingdom law views seriously. This particular offence also involves Class A drugs and they are among the most dangerous and harmful drugs and the fact of the matter is that the claimant was prepared to commit such a serious criminal offence. Furthermore, he committed that offence in Indonesia and he was prepared to break the law knowing that he would face a lengthy term of imprisonment if he did so. In my judgment, an entry clearance officer is perfectly entitled to take the view that he did of the offence and he is perfectly entitled to conclude that the fact that the claimant might or even would have been given a different sentence in the UK did not of itself amount to compassionate circumstances justifying the grant of entry clearance. That is not an irrational decision viewed in the context of Immigration Rule 230(18).
18. Secondly, the claimant says there is error of logic and reasoning in the entry clearance officer's decision. It is said that the entry clearance officer's reasoning means that the maximum punishment that could be imposed becomes the minimum sentence used for the purpose of Rule 320(18). That argument in my judgment proceeds on a false premise. Paragraph 320(18) is triggered where the conviction is for an offence that is capable of being punished by imprisonment for 12 months or more. That is, the Rule operates on the basis that if the offence is of a particular level of seriousness, then the person should not normally be granted entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom, subject to compassionate circumstances and other exceptional circumstances. Here, the entry clearance officer's decision is perfectly logical and is clearly reasoned. This is a serious offence. It is one that carries the possibility of 12 months' or more imprisonment. Against that background, the entry clearance officer considered the arguments about compassionate circumstances, including the argument about the sentence that the claimant says he would have received if he committed the offence in the United Kingdom, but the entry clearance officer considered that offences carrying sentences of 12 months or more were, generally speaking, serious and, on the facts of this case, an offence involving a Class A drug, which is one of the most harmful and dangerous drugs, was a serious offence. Taking the view that the Rule applied and that these matters did not in his view amount to compassionate circumstances, is a logical and rationally reasoned decision, so the second way of putting the rationality challenge in my view fails.
19. Thirdly, the claimant says that there was a misdirection of law by the entry clearance officer. At paragraph 11 of the skeleton the claimant says the entry clearance officer formed the view that he has the discretion to grant an application for entry clearance where he is satisfied that admission would be justified for strong compassionate reasons. The claimant says this is a misdirection as, if the entry clearance officer finds there are strong compassionate circumstances, he must grant leave, and has no discretion. In my judgment, it is correct to say that if the entry clearance officer was satisfied that there were strong compassionate circumstances he could not refuse leave on the basis of Rule 320(18). But in my judgment this ground mischaracterises what the entry clearance officer said and what he actually did.
20. If one goes back to the decision letter of the entry clearance officer, what he says is, in view of the foregoing - the fact that the claimant had been convicted of a Class A drug offence which is subject to up to 7 years' imprisonment - the entry clearance officer had concluded that the Rule applied and that, as the Rule applied, entry clearance should normally be refused. However, said the entry clearance officer, under paragraph 320(18) he had the discretion to grant an application for entry clearance where he was satisfied that admission would be justified for strong compassionate reasons and he therefore considered whether such strong compassionate reasons existed and he came to the view that they did not.
21. In my judgment, all the entry clearance officer is saying in this case is that, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a conviction for an offence which has a sentence of 12 months' or more imprisonment available, he can still grant entry clearance if there are strong compassionate circumstances. But, in the end, he found that there were not strong compassionate circumstances. He is not misdirecting himself in law, he is simply saying that, even though there is a relevant conviction, he I can still grant entry clearance if there are strong compassionate circumstances. But the problem for the claimant is that the entry clearance officer did not find any such strong compassionate circumstances. There is in my judgment no misdirection in law in substance here.
22. This morning the claimant's case was put slightly differently. As I have explained, even if Rule 320(18) applies because there is a conviction for a relevant offence and there are no strong compassionate circumstances, there is still a residual discretion to grant entry clearance. In the case of Bindel for example, Sullivan J gave some possible examples of what might constitute exceptional circumstances. He referred to the public interest in granting a person leave to enter the United Kingdom because of economic considerations or because the individual provides some particular learning or skill which justifies allowing him in, notwithstanding the conviction and the absence of strong compassionate circumstances. It is said that in this case the entry clearance officer did not consider exercising his residual discretion. In my judgment, this argument fails for the following reasons.
23. First, it was never suggested to the entry clearance officer that there were any other exceptional circumstances justifying the exercise of a residual discretion to grant entry clearance.
24. Secondly, and more fundamentally, Professor Wintemute's careful letter sets out all the circumstances which he considered justified granting entry clearance. He groups those circumstances under the heading "strong compassionate circumstances". The entry clearance officer considered all those circumstances but he came to the conclusion that those circumstances did not amount to strong compassionate circumstances justifying entry clearance. All the relevant factors that were identified were considered by the entry clearance officer.
25. Thirdly, no other exceptional circumstances are advanced in the letter of 26 October 2010 which would justify the entry clearance officer exercising a residual discretion in circumstances where the claimant has a conviction for a serious offence and where the entry clearance officer does not consider that the facts give rise to strong compassionate circumstances justifying entry. There was a suggestion this morning that Professor Wintemute's view, which expresses in his letter that he would not sponsor someone if he thought that they might cause problems in the United Kingdom, was itself an exceptional circumstance. That, however, is the view of the sponsor as to what he thought about Mr Cahyono's likely behaviour in the UK. The question is not what Professor Wintemute thought about Mr Cahyono's likely behaviour but the question of what decision the entry clearance officer was to make on the actual facts in this case. Furthermore, it is right to note that Professor Wintemute was not in his letter putting forward his view as being an exceptional circumstance justifying why the claimant should be granted an entry clearance even if Rule 320(18) would otherwise apply. He was not suggesting that his view was itself an exceptional circumstance. As no exceptional circumstances were ever identified or put forward as justifying exceptionally the grant of entry clearance, there was, in my judgment, no error of law on the part of the entry clearance officer in dealing with the cases he did by asking, was there a relevant conviction and, if so, in asking whether all the circumstances identified amounted to strong compassionate circumstances. There is, in my judgment, no misdirection or error of law in the present case.
26. Finally, the claimant says that, given the purpose of the Immigration Rule is to exclude serious offenders from the United Kingdom to protect law and order, and, given that the sponsor has said that he would not sponsor anyone who might cause problems whilst in the UK, the entry clearance officer's decision is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted morals, that no sensible person could have arrived at that decision.
27. In my judgment, the decision that the entry clearance officer reached was one that he was perfectly entitled to come to. He was entitled to take the view that he did of a conviction for an offence of possession of a Class A drug. He was entitled to take the view that the circumstances relied upon, such as age, the nature of the visit to the UK and so on, did not amount to strong compassionate circumstances justifying the grant of an entry clearance. The decision was not in my judgment an irrational decision.
28. Finally, I should say that paragraph 28 of the claim form set out a number of factors that were said to be ones that were relevant considerations. The entry clearance officer's decision of 26 September 2012 considered all of those matters. His conclusion that those matters did not amount to strong compassionate circumstances is, in my judgment, a lawful, rational conclusion. For all those reasons, in my judgment, the decision of the entry clearance officer in this case is a rational decision and is one that he is lawfully entitled to reach on the basis of Immigration Rule 320(18).
29. I appreciate that this judgment were come as a disappointment to the claimant and to his friend and sponsor. Ultimately, however, the claimant's case does fall within Immigration Rule 320(18) because he has a conviction for a relevant offence. The decision on whether or not the circumstances relied upon amount to strong compassionate circumstances is a matter, primarily, for the judgment of the entry clearance officer, so long as his judgment is a rational one, reached in accordance with usual public law principles. In my judgment, the entry clearance officer in this case did reach a decision which is rational and which is lawful. In those circumstances this claim will be dismissed.
30. Are there any other applications?
31. MR RAWAT: My Lord, there is an application for costs.
32. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Do you have a schedule?
33. MR RAWAT: We do not have no schedule.
34. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: It is a case of less than one day. What are you asking for?
35. MR RAWAT: Costs subject to detailed assessment, if not agreed.
36. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Mr Malik, what do you say about costs?
37. MR MALIK: My Lord, first of all, I am very grateful for this very detailed judgment. As far as the costs are concerned, in my submission, there should be no order as to costs. I say this because the original decision that was made by the entry clearance officer was replaced by a subsequent decision only after the grant of permission and that decision was served on the claimant with the detailed grounds of defence. It was only in the subsequent decision, the points taken in the judicial review claim form, as my Lord has indicated, were identified by the entry clearance officer. In these circumstances, in my respectful submission, there would be no order as to costs.
38. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: What do you say to that, Mr Rawat?
39. MR RAWAT: It is right that there was a subsequent decision and that was served, well, it is dated 26 September 2012. The point is that, subsequent to that fresh decision, the claimant still decided to continue with his case and with his challenge. It would have been open to him in light of the contents of the fresh decision to review his stance and to decide whether he wished to continue with his challenge he reached the view that he did.
40. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Anything you wish to add, Mr Malik?
41. MR MALIK: I simply say, that is the reason I say there should be no order as to costs, rather than asking for the claimant's costs to be made by the entry clearance officer up until the time when the new decision was taken.
42. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: But in reality, three of the four grounds that you made were refused even at the permission stage and you maintained the fourth ground even after the fresh decision and therefore all the costs would have to have been incurred in any event.
43. MR MALIK: I leave this in my Lord's hands.
44. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: I am grateful.
RULING ON COSTS
45. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: I have dismissed this claim for judicial review and the defendant now asks for costs. The usual order is that costs follow the event and that the successful defendant is entitled to the costs of the claim from the claimant.
46. Mr Malik for the claimant says that in this case the situation is slightly different because there was a decision in 2010. Following the grant of permission a fresh decision was taken and it is that decision that has been the subject of the challenge today.
47. In my judgment this is a case where the normal rule applies and where costs should be ordered for the simple reason that, firstly, four grounds of challenge were put forward, three were dismissed at the permission stage and, secondly, and more importantly, the only ground that was the subject of permission was maintained even after the fresh decision. In my judgment, this is a case where the claimant should be ordered to pay the defendant's costs. Those costs to be assessed if not agreed. I will summarise shortly the order for the purposes of the associate. Are there any other applications?
48. MR MALIK: My Lord, can I just reserve the position. I have an application for permission to appeal. As my Lord knows, the Court of Appeal has not yet had the opportunity to consider this particular Rule and that, in my submission, given the particular facts of this case, is a compelling reason for granting permission.
49. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Except, ultimately, I find in your favour on the interpretation of the Rules. The problem is not the Rules from your point of view, the problem is the decision letter of the entry clearance officer.
50. MR MALIK: My Lord, I will leave it here.
51. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: I do not grant permission to appeal as there is no realistic prospect of success. This case turns ultimately on the facts and on the decision letter of the entry clearance officer which is clear and there is no compelling reason for permission to appeal to be granted.
52. MR MALIK: I am grateful, my Lord.
53. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Are there any further applications?
54. MR RAWAT: No, my Lord.
55. MR MALIK: No, my Lord.
56. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: To summarise, the order that I make is:

1. The claim for judicial review is dismissed;

2. The claimant is to pay the defendant's costs, those costs to be the subject of detailed assessment if agreement on the costs cannot be reached; and

3. Permission to appeal is refused.

57. Thank you both very much indeed for your assistance. You have been very helpful indeed.