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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Veizi, R (On the Application Of) v The General Dental Council [2013] EWHC 832 (Admin) (12 March 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2013/832.html Cite as: [2013] EWHC 832 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		12 March 2013

1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: This is an appeal by the appellant, Spyro Veizi, against the determination by the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Dental Council at the conclusion of a hearing which lasted between 18 July and 3 August 2011. In the result the Committee directed that the appellant's name be erased from the Dental Register and made an immediate order of suspension. At that hearing the appellant was represented by counsel and solicitors. His appeal has been conducted in person. His initial appellant's notice is unclear and may be read as being only an appeal against the immediate order of suspension pending the erasure, which would be itself dependent upon any appeal. However the skeleton argument, which he put in on his own account and is very detailed, makes it clear that he seeks to challenge the direction that his name be erased from the Dental Register.
2. During the course of preparation of the appeal it has been very difficult for those instructed on behalf of the respondent to make contact with the appellant or to obtain any documents or information from him. However, as each hearing date has approached the appellant has made sufficient contact to make it clear that he knows what is coming.
3. The initial date fixed for this hearing was 9 October 2012 and shortly before that the appellant made an application for an adjournment on the basis that he had no financial means to obtain proper representation. That was agreed by the respondents on the condition that the case should be re-listed in January 2013. In fact, it has been re-listed for today and the usual notification would have gone to the appellant telling him of that date. It is quite clear that he is aware of the date because as recently as 6 March, only six days ago, he contacted the respondent's solicitors saying:

"I am looking to discontinue my appeal. I shall try to contact the court myself in the next couple of days if my personal circumstances allow me to."

He has not made contact with the court. He has not appeared at the hearing today, which was listed not before 2.00 pm and the time is now 2.23 pm, and there is no sign of him at court. I conclude that he had proper notice of this hearing.

4. He received an email, or at least was sent an email, by the respondent's solicitors asking whether he wanted to apply for a further adjournment or to withdraw his appeal and supplying him with a draft consent order for withdrawal of the appeal. He has not responded to that invitation.
5. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the appropriate course is for me to hear the appeal in the appellant's absence and determine it. That is a ourse adopted in similar circumstances by Wyn Williams J in the case of Al-Daraji v The General Medical Council [2012] EWHC 1835 Admin.
6. I have had the benefit of bundles of documents prepared by the respondent, together with a detailed skeleton argument from Miss Plaschkes, Queens Counsel, for the respondent, who appeared at the hearing before the Professional Conduct Committee.
7. It is not necessary for me to go into the details exhaustively but it is sufficient, it seems to me, to note that the allegations against the appellant were not simply of failings in relation to his clinical practice -- which might be capable of improvement with sufficient further training and would, if they stood alone, no doubt have required the Committee to look closely at the professional development which the appellant had undertaken since the time of the complaints -- but the fundamental allegations which led to erasure were allegations of dishonesty. The underlying facts were largely admitted, relating not only to advice given to two patients but also in relation to claims for units of dental activity which were, in fact, excessive, but the further conclusion or allegation that the conduct was dishonest was a matter of dispute which in general the Committee found proved.
8. It is not surprising in those circumstances that the Committee concluded not only that there was substantial evidence of misconduct, but also that it amounted to an impairment of the appellant's fitness to practise. In particular the Committee clearly relied upon their findings of dishonesty, noting:

"That dishonesty is a type of behaviour which brings the profession into disrepute, affects the public confidence in the profession and although in the past could make your fitness to practise currently impaired."

The Committee moved from that concentration on dishonesty and that approach to consider alternatives to erasure and came to the conclusion that the reputation of the profession would be damaged by the appellant's returning to practise.

9. Given the nature, extent and duration of the dishonest practices alleged and that they involved deliberately misleading patients as well as making false claims for public funds, it is, in my judgment, not at all surprising that the Committee concluded that the least possible sanction was that the appellant's name should be erased from the Dentists' Register. Further, that given the wide range in failings and the seriousness and prolonged dishonesty, an immediate order was necessary for suspension until the erasure came into effect. Indeed, it is difficult to see, on the material that I have read, how a Committee could properly have come to another conclusion.
10. Accordingly, I am firmly of the view that this appeal is entirely without merit and should be dismissed and I accordingly do dismiss it.
11. MS PLASCHKES: My Lord, I am grateful for my Lord's judgment.
12. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Yes. That leaves the question of costs. I have been provided with a costs schedule.
13. MS PLASCHKES: My Lord, may I ensure that my Lord has the most up-to-date copy? May I pass up the most up-to-date copy.
14. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Certainly. The one I have is dated 11 March, faxed 11 March, which was yesterday.
15. MS PLASCHKES: I believe there is a more recent one.
16. (Handed).
17. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Thank you. It is dated 12 March. It is not quite the same. I will substitute one for the other.
18. I can see the difficulties where there is an appellant who makes broad allegations and does not produce the documents which should be produced for an appeal, the query in my mind, you may be able to help, is whether it was really necessary to copy everything given that, in effect, if I can use language from a different context, this is an appeal against sentence rather than conviction, is it not, although there is an element in his appeal which suggests he was challenging the dishonesty, that part of it, and that may be your answer to my question.
19. MS PLASCHKES: Yes, my Lord, and one of his grounds was that there wasn't an adjournment and a particular witness was read instead of him having the opportunity to call the witness. So there is that aspect. So there was, in a sense, a challenge to the facts and, of course, with an appellant in person what is in the skeleton argument may not necessarily be the entirety of that which is advanced to the court and, therefore, it is necessary to be able to deal with and to rebut and to assist the court with any documentation that would help with any points that are raised or may be raised by the appellant in those circumstances.
20. My Lord, I am happy to take the court through each section and explain what work was undertaken at each stage.
21. May I say that the funding for the respondent comes from the registrants, the dentists and dental care professionals, who fund the General Dental Council and so it is a question of who should bear the costs in relation to this.
22. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Yes. I think, in a sense, I have answered my own query because I noted the issue about the adjournment. That may be simple to answer, looking at it from my point of view, in that the witness who was not available to be called could not deal with the financial issues which were the key points that led to the erasure, but it did seem to me, in reading the claimant's skeleton argument, that he was, at least indirectly, challenging the finding of dishonesty because he was, in effect, saying that he had very limited experience, he was told what to do by the person who ran the practice and as soon as he found out that was wrong he paid back everything to the NHS. All those must be relevant and one would assume were put in in order to challenge the finding of dishonesty, in which case I can understand it might well have been necessary to go through the way in which the claims, at least in sample claims, were put forward and why the Committee was perfectly entitled to conclude as they did.
23. So I will make an order as asked that the appellant should pay the costs of the respondent assessed as claimed at £22,070.18.
24. MS PLASCHKES: Thank you, my Lord.
25. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Thank you for your assistance.