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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Jelensky v Circuit Court in Katowice, Poland [2014] EWHC 4157 (Admin) (10 November 2014)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2014/4157.html
Cite as: [2014] EWHC 4157 (Admin)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2014] EWHC 4157 (Admin)
CO/3433/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
10 November 2014

B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE COLLINS
____________________

Between:
SLAWOMIR JELENSKY Appellant
v
CIRCUIT COURT IN KATOWICE, POLAND Respondent

____________________

Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
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____________________

The Appellant did not attend and was not represented
Mr Daniel Jones (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) appeared on behalf of the Respondent

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

  1. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: This is an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the decision of District Judge Ikram given on 18 July 2014 ordering his extradition to Poland on a warrant issued by the Circuit Court of Katowice on 23 September 2013. It is an accusation warrant in relation to an offence of fraud allegedly committed in November 2010.
  2. The appellant put in grounds of appeal, which really told very little save that he wished to rely on Article 8. He has provided with his appeal notice a statement which sets out, so far as one can understand, the basis upon which he seeks or will seek to argue that he should not be returned. Part of the matter or matters that he raised were that the Polish authorities had details of his UK address, his phone number, et cetera, and he had not, as it were, disappeared and was contactable by the Polish authorities. He says that he did try to contact the prosecution and other relevant authorities to find out why he was wanted and why he had been issued with the warrant, but he had received no reply.
  3. His case is that he and his wife have lived in the United Kingdom, himself since 2004 and his wife since 2008. They have no family in Poland. His wife has depression and depends upon him and he has his own health problems.
  4. The matter came before the court on 27 August and was then adjourned with an order being made by Sir Stephen Silber that the appellant should provide written details of his address and other contact details given in Poland and when or where that was. The result of that was that the CPS should receive instructions from the Polish authorities.
  5. It seems that he did not comply directly with the order of Sir Stephen Silber, but he gave sufficient information to be obtained from the Polish authorities and there is now a letter dated 25 September 2014. That does indicate that some addresses were given, in particular an address in Manchester which is not the address at which he appeared to be living, having regard to the Notice of Appeal. The deputy public prosecutor who has given the response indicates that attempts were made to contact him but they all failed, and he gave, apparently, a place where he was supposed to be working but an attempt to contact him there was unsuccessful. Thus it seems to me that it is impossible to say in this case that any blame could be attached to the Polish authorities having regard to any delay that may have occurred in the pursuit of this particular warrant.
  6. The offence in question is a fraud which is said to have caused the victim to lose something over 26,000 zlotys. It seems that he apparently gave false information that he had been responsible for selling a number of cameras and other articles. So it is, on the face of it, a not insubstantial fraud and the loss is considerable.
  7. Mr Atlee has very helpfully indicated to me this morning that, albeit he is no longer representing the appellant, he did at an earlier stage, and indeed he attended at the hearing before Sir Stephen Silber when the appellant was appearing in person. The court, it seems, was not given any address; it certainly has no address, but on 28 August, the day after the hearing before Sir Stephen, today's date was fixed. Notice was sent to Mr Atlee's firm of that date. Indeed, he confirms that today's hearing was in his diary, albeit he does not have access to the file and was unable to tell me how that arose. It seems that must have arisen because, as I say, the court notified his firm.
  8. In the circumstances, it would in my view be inconceivable that the appellant was not notified of today's date. He has not attended today in order to pursue his appeal. Mr Atlee expressed some surprise at that, in the sense that his dealings with the claimant were such as made clear that the appellant did want to pursue an appeal in person.
  9. The hurdle that has to be surmounted in these cases to establish that return would be disproportionate is a high one. The information that is available does not look promising so far as this appellant is concerned. However, it may be that there is more to it than is simply set out in the information the court has so far. There is clearly nothing, as I say, in the suggestion that there is any blame in any way to be attached to the Polish authorities in pursuing this arrest warrant.
  10. In the circumstances, since I am satisfied on the material before me that it is overwhelmingly probable that the appellant was served, I propose formally to dismiss the appeal, since obviously there is no basis which could persuade me that it should be allowed. However, I recognise that it could possibly be the case that the appellant was not notified; alternatively, since he has to come down from Merseyside there may be a good reason why he has not turned up today. There was nothing to stop him notifying the court that he was delayed in any way.
  11. However, in order that there should be no unfairness, what I propose to do is to direct that this order shall not come into force for 14 days. If within that period the appellant puts in writing the reasons why he did not attend today, coupled with a full indication of all that he seeks to rely on in support of a potential appeal, including any statements from witnesses (particularly, perhaps, his partner) which might support that, then this order will not come into effect.
  12. If he does put in writing that information, it will be considered on paper. If, but only if, the judge is satisfied that it raises a case which ought to be further considered that the appellant did have a good excuse for not attending today, then a further hearing will take place. Otherwise the order will come into effect if the judge rejects what is put in writing. Of course, if nothing is put in writing by the appellant within 14 days, this order will then immediately come into effect.
  13. Can you, between you, translate that into an appropriate order?
  14. MR JONES: My Lord, yes.
  15. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: Thank you again very much, Mr Atlee. I am afraid I cannot give you any costs for that.
  16. MR ATLEE: I am pleased to assist the court.


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2014/4157.html