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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> BCT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 4265 (Admin) (18 December 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2014/4265.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 4265 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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BCT |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Secretary of State for the Home Department |
Defendant |
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John Paul Waite (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 11/12/14
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Crown Copyright ©
Neil Garnham QC :
Introduction
The History
The Law
"Where notice has been given in accordance with regulations under section 105 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (notice of decision) of a decision to make a deportation order against him, and he is not detained in pursuance of the sentence or order of a court, he may be detained under the authority of the Secretary of State pending the making of the deportation order."
"(i) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose;
(ii) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances;
(iii) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention;
(iv) The Secretary of State should act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal."
"not possible or desirable to produce an exhaustive list of all the circumstances that are or may be relevant to the question of how long it is reasonable for the Secretary of State to detain a person pending deportation pursuant to paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 . But in my view they include at least: the length of the period of detention; the nature of the obstacles which stand in the path of the Secretary of State preventing a deportation; the diligence, speed and effectiveness of the steps taken by the Secretary of State to surmount such obstacles; the conditions in which the detained person is being kept; the effect of detention on him and his family; the risk that if he is released from detention he will abscond; and the danger that, if released, he will commit criminal offences."
"… where there is a risk of absconding and a refusal to accept voluntary repatriation, those are bound to be very important factors, and likely often to be decisive factors, in determining the reasonableness of a person's detention, provided that deportation is the genuine purpose of the detention. The risk of absconding is important because it threatens to defeat the purpose for which the deportation order was made."
"A risk of offending if the person is not detained is an additional relevant factor, the strength of which would depend on the magnitude of the risk, by which I include both the likelihood of it occurring and the potential gravity of the consequences. Mr Drabble submitted that the purpose of the power of detention was not for the protection of public safety. In my view that is over-simplistic. The purpose of the power of deportation is to remove a person who is not entitled to be in the United Kingdom and whose continued presence would not be conducive to the public good. If the reason why his presence would not be conducive to the public good is because of a propensity to commit serious offences, protection of the public from that risk is the purpose of the deportation order and must be a relevant consideration when determining the reasonableness of detaining him pending his removal or departure."
"The risk of absconding and reoffending are always of paramount importance, since if a person absconds, he will frustrate the deportation for which purpose he was detained in the first place."
The competing arguments
"1 These proceedings raise the question of whether persons returned to the Democratic Republic of Congo ("the DRC") against their will are at real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights simply by reason of their status as either (a) failed asylum seekers or (b) criminal deportees…
7. P is also a national of the DRC, born in 1987. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 2001 to join his parents and was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2003. Between July 2003 and May 2004 he was convicted of offences of street robbery, affray and assault on a police officer. In June 2006 he was convicted at Blackfriars Crown Court of robbery, sentenced to detention for public protection with a minimum term of 2 years 6 months and placed in a young offender institution. On 14 March 2011 a deportation order was made against P. His appeals against that order and against the refusal of his claim for asylum were unsuccessful. On 14 May 2012 an emergency Travel Document was agreed with the DRC authorities. P was detained on 28 June 2012 and deportation arrangements were set for 5 July 2012.
8 On 3 July 2012 Mary Glindon MP sent an e-mail to Halliday Reeves Solicitors, who were acting for a DRC national who was about to be returned to that country on the same flight as R and P. The e-mail included the following passage:
Last week I attended a meeting organised by the All Party Parliamentary Group, which was addressed by the [DRC] Ambassador, Barnabe Kikaya Bin Karubi. I raised the issue of the failed asylum seekers plight.He type-cast all of these people saying that they have come to this country as members of the former oppressive regime in the DCR, are here because we have a good benefit system and having committed terrible crimes in this country have to be suitably punished when they return to the Congo. As Ambassador, he signs the deportation papers!"…
12 On 16 August 2012 the DRC Ambassador wrote to Mary Glindon MP, copied to the UKBA among others, stating that he had been misquoted as to what he had said to the All Party Parliamentary Group. The Ambassador stated that:
"… at your question regarding the return of asylum seekers to the [DRC] who, allegedly are arrested, tortured and humiliated, I responded by saying that it was not the case. Congolese citizens who failed to acquire asylum in the United Kingdom are reunited with their families upon arrival…
Nevertheless, people who are being deported for having committed crimes in the UK are held in custody for a period of time to allow the congolese justice system to clarify their situation"."
"13 In the meantime, between 18 and 28 June 2012, the Country of Origin Information Service of the UKBA had undertaken a Fact Finding Mission ("the FFM") to Kinshasa, DRC, to acquire information about the procedure for and treatment of Congolese nationals returning to the DRC from the United Kingdom and western Europe. The results of the FFM were published in November 2012 in a report running to 107 pages, setting out information obtained from a large number of interlocutors…
14 In the light of the FFM report, the UKBA issued a Country Policy Bulletin ("the Bulletin") dated November 2012 to confirm its policy in relation to returns to the DRC. The Bulletin also considered the Unsafe Return report, but noted (paragraph 5.2.6) that the UKBA had not been provided with details of the individuals making the allegations, despite the fact that they were stated to have been in the asylum process and therefore known to the UKBA. The Bulletin further noted that the United Nations (which had facilitated 206,541 voluntary returns to the DRC in 2004 to 2010), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the 11 states participating in the Intergovernmental Consultation on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (which had undertaken over 419 enforced returns to the DRC in the period 2009–2012) had all reported that they were not aware of any mistreatment of returnees. Three European Embassies in Kinshasa (Belgium, Switzerland and France) also reported no awareness of the mistreatment or detention of returnees, save that the French Embassy reported that the DRC authorities would detain a known foreign national offender…
16 As for the risk of detention of returnees, the Bulletin stated as follows (paragraph 11.1):
"In [the FFM report] the weight of evidence is that detention occurs only under certain circumstances; for example the French Embassy stated 'DGM [Direction Generale de Migration] do not detain people for immigration matters. This happens if you have committed crimes here or for example a returnee has committed a crime [the example given was murder] in the country the person has been returned from. In which case, the DGM will be looking out for their arrival. Therefore people are not detained for being returned but for their crimes. DGM does not have detention facilities at the airport. They detain people in town at their headquarters'".
and concluded that (paragraph 11.7 and 11.8):
"The consensus within the FFM is that returnees per se do not face a risk of detention, unless they committed a known offence, or have a recognised profile of opposition to the DRC government. … Whilst in general prison conditions in the DRC are severe and likely to reach the Article 3 threshold … consideration needs to be given to the individual facts, in particular (a) the reasons for any possible detention, (b) the likely length and type of detention and the individual's gender, age and state of health"…
44 It is clear, and Mr Blundell did not dispute, that the position with regard to criminal deportees is significantly different from that of failed asylum seekers. In the first place, the starting point is different because the position of criminal deportees was not considered in BK (although certain of the evidence may have related to "deportees"). Further, the following two propositions are not seriously in dispute:
i)First, that criminal deportees to the DRC, if identified as such, will be detained on arrival for an indeterminate period. The DRC Ambassador's official statement makes the unequivocal statement that "people who are being deported for having committed crimes in the UK are held in custody for a period of time to allow the Congolese justice system to clarify their situation" . Further, there is ample evidence in the FFM report, most convincingly in the response from the French Embassy (see paragraph 16 above), that the DRC Ambassador's statement reflects what occurs in practice. Another interlocutor reported that returnees with a criminal record "are taken straight to prison" . It is clear that the 'detention' referred to in this content is not merely a short period of administrative detention at the airport for immigration purposes (several interlocutors confirming that there are no detention facilities at the airport), but incarceration in a prison or detention facility in or around Kinshasa.
ii) Second, such detention is likely to be in conditions which contravene Article 3 of the ECHR . The Bulletin acknowledges (paragraph 11.8) that prison conditions in the DRC are severe and likely to reach the Article 3 threshold. This was more than confirmed by a US State Department Report dated 19 April 2013 which records that conditions in most prisons remained severe and life threatening: "Serious threats to life and health were widespread and included violence, particularly rape; food shortages; and inadequate food, potable water, space, sanitation, ventilation, temperature control, lighting and medical care. Death from starvation or disease was not uncommon" . Mr Blundell advanced an argument that such concerns do not extend to DGM detention facilities in which deportees are likely to be held. However, the same Report goes on to state: "Even harsher conditions prevailed in small detention centres, which were extremely overcrowded; had no toilets, mattresses, or medical care; and provided detainees with insufficient amounts of light, fresh air and water"
45 Given the above, it is not surprising that the Defendant appeared to accept in the decision letter in R's case (see paragraph 21 above) that those who had been convicted of a criminal offence in the UK "may be at risk" on return to the DRC.
46 The Defendant's reasoning for entirely discounting that acknowledged risk in the case of P (and criminal deportees more generally) is that the UKBA's re-documentation process does not identify a returnee as a criminal deportee, so there is no real risk to them unless the criminal offences in question had generated publicity identifying the offender as a DRC national. This reasoning was advanced in the Bulletin, in P's decision letter and in Mr Blundell's skeleton argument for these proceedings, in which Mr Blundell argued that P was not therefore in the position of having to lie to avoid his status being revealed.
47 However, it was recognised in BK that returnees from the UK "will be questioned with a view to determining what type of expellee they are; and in particular whether they are either a failed asylum seeker or a deportee" (paragraph 188) and almost all of the interlocutors cited in the FFM report confirmed that returnees are questioned on arrival by the DGM. Because of such questioning, the UKBA, in paragraph 9.11 of the Bulletin, advised that case owners should review each case to determine whether the applicant falls into the risk categories identified in Country Guidance, whilst taking into consideration appropriate evidence which post dates BK .
48 Acknowledging that the above material demonstrated that it was highly likely (if not inevitable) that P would be questioned about his status, Mr Blundell's fall-back position was that a realistic view should be taken as to how P would answer such questions. Given that he has been held to have lied in immigration proceedings in this country, it could safely be assumed, Mr Blundell argued, that he would lie to hide the fact of his convictions rather than face the potentially serious consequences of admitting them."
"52 In the case of criminal deportees to DRC, it is clear that they will be interrogated on arrival, no doubt by professional, skilled and experienced immigration officials. According to the French embassy, those officials are specifically looking out for criminal deportees and no doubt able to probe for information and look for signs which would demonstrate that a returnee has been imprisoned in the United Kingdom. There would seem to be an obvious and serious risk that a criminal deportee such as P would not be able to hide the fact of his convictions in the face of interrogation designed to elicit that very fact.
53 Further, it must be assumed that immigration officials in the DRC are able to conduct internet searches in relation to a person they are interrogating. There must be a real and substantial risk that an offence which attracted a custodial sentence of 12 months or more (so as to give rise to automatic deportation) will have been reported in some form, even if the case did not generate substantial publicity. It would not seem to matter whether DRC nationality was mentioned in any report if the person was named. It is also relevant to note in this context that the FFM report recorded evidence from the police in Kinshasa that the DGM sends a team to the United Kingdom to identify Congolese who are to be returned to the DRC and that "the same team who had identified them abroad (including the UK) welcome them here" .
54 In the light of the above discussion, and with considerable regret given the nature and extent of P's criminal record in this country, I am satisfied that P's application to revoke the Deportation Order made against him cannot be considered to be clearly unfounded. As the Defendant's decision to the contrary was based on the same undisputed evidence of the attitude of the DRC authorities which I have considered, it necessarily follows that I find that decision to be irrational. Indeed, in my judgment there is a real and substantial risk that P, in common with other criminal deportees (who have served the sentences imposed on them for their crimes in this country), would be subjected to further imprisonment and ill-treatment if returned to the DRC."
"It is claimed that the UK is currently operating a policy of non-removal of people with criminal records to DRC. In the light of the High Court judgment in the case of P& R (DRC) the Home Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office are urgently liaising with officials in the Democratic Republic of Congo to address the concerns raised in the judgment in respect of foreign national offenders. It is noted that the Secretary of State for the Home Department has permission to appeal against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. Whilst removal may not be currently happening once all appeal rights are exhausted on both sides, which will happen within a reasonable timescale removal will be addressed."
Discussion
"But the risk of reoffending is a relevant factor even if the appellants are right in saying that it is relevant only when there is also a risk of absconding. As Lord Rodger of Earlsferry JSC pointed out in argument, if a person re-offends there is a risk that he will abscond so as to evade arrest or if he is arrested that he will be prosecuted and receive a custodial sentence. Either way, his reoffending will impede his deportation."
"there is no evidence of any difference in the management of the returns process by the DRC authorities of FAS [former asylum seekers] and FNO returnees. The DRC authorities have no interest in criminal proceedings outside of the DRC, only in outstanding criminal offences committed within the DRC"
"at the time of receipt of the rule 39 indication there was a realistic prospect that the ECtHR proceedings concerning removal to Somalia would be resolved within a reasonable period: it was not apparent that they would drag on as in practice they did. Nor was it apparent that the ECtHR's final decision would be such as to prevent the appellant's removal. I stress "apparent", because that is the word used in the approved formulation of Hardial Singh and in my view it is important not to water it down so as to cover situations where the prospect of removal within a reasonable period is merely uncertain."