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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Otobo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2118 (Admin) (20 July 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/2118.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 2118 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Michael Otobo |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Secretary of State for the Home Department |
Defendant |
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Lisa Busch (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 14th July 2015
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Nicol :
'The judge did not find that the appellant's brother is a qualified person; he was simply not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant's brother is not a qualified person and that the respondent was thereby entitled to revoke the residence card.'
'The application for a permanent residence card shall be submitted before the residence card expires. Failure to comply with the requirement to apply for a permanent residence card may render the person concerned liable to proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions.'
There does not seem to be any transposition of the requirement that the application for a permanent residence card has to be made before the expiry of the residence card into the EEA regulations. In any event, the SSHD has not suggested in correspondence that this second application by George for a permanent residence card was in some way invalid because it was made after the expiration of the residence card.
'Although, having regard to the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, there would have been no defence to this claim, the residence card in question has now expired and a new application must be made. The decisions of the First-tier Tribunal are sufficient satisfaction for the complaints made by the Claimant about inaccurate information held by the Defendant and the claim is now academic.'
'If an issue arises in the future in which it is relevant for the Claimant to show that he accrued residence in the UK as the EEA family member of a qualified person during the period 20 September 2007 (the date of its issue) to 20 September 2012 (the date of its expiry), he will be able to rely upon that residence card and the determinations of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal to show that he had indeed accrued in such a capacity for such a period. That is his alternative remedy to the extent that this is his concern. A residence card does not confer a permit to reside under the EEA regulations; it merely confirms a right that exists because the conditions were satisfied.'
'The claim is not well formulated for the real point to emerge, and it is not surprising that the AoS does not address it. It is this. In the case of George Otobo, the revocation of the residence card, expired though it became, was based on the allegation that his brother Michael was not a qualified person, that is an EEA national, importantly exercising his treaty rights here. The appeal was allowed, the SSHD having failed to attend to maintain by evidence her assertion that Michael was not a qualified person.
As I understand the essence of this claim, it is not a repeat of George's claim or his wife's. It is a claim that the decision in George's claim means that the basis upon which the SSHD had concluded that George was not entitled to a residence card, that Michael was not a qualified person, must be expunged from government record, and that the SSHD must now acknowledge Michael to be a qualified person, for whatever significance that may have in reality or to Michael for other purposes. The nature of the solicitor's firm for whom he was said to be working, or of his relationship with them, may be relevant. However, much may turn on the significance of the way in which the decision by the UT was reached in George's case, and on whether it was more than a decision on the burden of proof rather than a finding as to the status of Michael. It may be that two different decisions can lawfully be reached. But that may be arguable. The remedies sought all depend on that point. That is the only substantive point upon which I grant permission to proceed, though I think that is the point which the Claimant wishes to raise, though relief if he is successful is also a matter for debate.'
Conclusion