CO/1492/2015 
Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWHC 2572 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand
London WC2A 2LL 
 
Wednesday 22 July 2015 
 
B e f o r e: 

MR JUSTICE DOVE

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Between: 
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY 
Appellant 
v 

IMRAN 
Respondent 
 
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Mr Geoffrey Williams QC (instructed by Legal Department, Solicitors Regulation Authority) appeared on behalf of the Appellant

Mr Gregory Treverton‑Jones QC (instructed by Farleys) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
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J U D G M E N T
1.	MR JUSTICE DOVE:   
2.	Introduction 
3.	This is an appeal under Section 49 (1) (b) against a decision which was reached by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal following two days of hearing on 28 January 2015.  The facts of the matter are set out below.  The effect of the order which was made was that the respondent in this case should be suspended from practice as a solicitor for a period of two years.  The appeal is brought by the Solicitors Regulation Authority on the basis that that sentence or sanction was excessively lenient and that this court should substitute an order striking off the respondent.  
4.	The Facts 
5.	On 20 February 2010 the respondent was driving in Stockport when he was travelling at a speed that activated a speed camera, causing him to be issued with a notice of intention to prosecute.  The notice which was sent was dated 26 February 2010.  When he was in conversation with a third party that third party indicated to him that there may be a person who would be able, in effect, to make the ticket go away by providing details which would lead to it being in some way avoided.  Some time later but before the period of time by which he had to return the notice, and having discovered from this person the location of the person who would be able to assist him in getting rid of the ticket, on 22 March 2010, whilst in Oldham, he visited a garage and there completed the Section 172 notice with details which he was given by a person in the garage.  Those details were undoubtedly false.  
6.	On the notice there were warnings.  The warnings indicated that it would be an offence under Section 5 of the Perjury Act to knowingly or willingly provide a false statement in the course of completing the notice.  A warning also appeared just above the provision of the details of the person who it was to be suggested by the respondent was driving the vehicle at the material time to the effect that the statement as to who the driver had been was made knowing that he would be liable to prosecution if he willingly stated in it anything which he knew to be false or did not believe to be true.  
7.	The statement as to fact that he was not driving the vehicle and also as to the identity of the person who was driving the vehicle were completely false.  As a consequence of that, a police investigation commenced.  It appears that he was contacted by the police in relation to their investigations as to how the false details had been provided on the notice.  
8.	On 14 September 2011, after he had been notified by the police, he wrote to them indicating his acceptance that he had completed the details incorrectly and apologising for what he had done.  He also indicated his willingness to assist with the police investigation.  On 30 October 2011 the respondent was arrested and interviewed under caution.  At the start of that interview he accepted what he had done and stated that he had done it because he was concerned to protect the clean driving licence which he had and also avoid the imposition of an increase in relation to his car insurance.  He set out in the interview what he had done in order to contact the person in Oldham who had facilitated his false completion of the notice.  
9.	On 27 February 2012, as a result of what he had done, he was charged under Section 5A of the Perjury Act 1911.  On 2 March 2012 he reported the matter to the appellant in accordance with his professional duties.  Whilst he had been a trainee at the time when the offence was committed, by the time he was charged with it he had been enrolled as a solicitor.  On 5 May he appeared for the first time in the Magistrates' Court and sentence, it appears, was adjourned until 20 July 2012.  In the intervening period a letter was obtained by his solicitors from the Crown Prosecution Service reflecting both his co‑operation with the investigation and his candour with the police over the matter.  As a result of his appearance at the Magistrates' Court, he was sentenced to two months' imprisonment.  The reason for the imposition of that sentence was as follows: "offence so serious because deliberate attempt to circumvent traffic legislation by a man trained in law".  
10.	The appellant appealed against that sentence.  The appeal was brought on before His Honour Judge Thomas, sitting in the Crown Court at Manchester, Crown Square with lay magistrates.  Having considered his appeal, His Honour Judge Thomas, they dismissed it.  In the course of delivering a short judgment explaining the reasons why the appeal was unsuccessful, the judge observed:
i.	"Mohammed Imran is a 28‑year old man.  He has recently in fact professionally qualified as a solicitor.  There are those who speak very well of him and we had a number of references about him.  And although in a way that is something that cuts in his favour, I am afraid there is something as well that perhaps cuts against him because what he has done here, as far as this case is concerned, he has been very dishonest in relation to a speeding ticket, as I will call it.  His car was caught in a speed camera as long ago now as February 2010, and his response over the ensuing months was a very dishonest one.  What he should have done of course is responded honestly and straightforwardly to the notice of intended prosecution that was sent to him.  He surely should have known that in the ordinary way but particularly because of his legal qualification.  Those notices that are sent in this sort of situation have a bold print on them, the warning about prosecution if they are not responded to honestly.  In the event, he did not.  His motivation seems to have been to avoid penalty points; possibly to avoid penalty points just because penalty points are inconvenient on a licence for ultimate disqualification.  But, more imminently, he seems to have been concerned about the impact that the penalty points might have had on his insurance premium."
11.	Following the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant was returned to prison where he served one month of the two‑month sentence which had been imposed upon him.  
12.	On 20 May 2014 he was charged by the Solicitors Regulation Authority in relation to the proceedings which are before the court.  The charges were recorded in the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal's decision as follows:
i.	"1.1 He placed false details on a Section 172 Notice ‑ Request for Information ‑ and thereby failed to:

1.1.1	Uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice in breach of Rule 1.01 of the Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 ..... ; 

1.1.2	Act with integrity in breach of Rule 1.02 of the 2007 Code."
13.	It appears that although in the light of what I have set out above there was no defence offered in principle to the matters with which he had been charged, there was an issue before the tribunal as to the length of time which was engaged in the acts of dishonesty in this case.  On behalf of the appellant it appears to have been submitted to the tribunal that the period of relevant dishonesty for the purposes of the charge and therefore the sanction exercise was one which spanned the length of time between the provision to him of the notice on 26 February 2010 and the completion on 22 March 2010 of the form by him.  That was disputed by the respondent who contended that in fact the dishonesty involved was solely over the course of a day or so.  As a result of that issue being before the tribunal, the respondent gave evidence on oath before them and was cross‑examined as to what he had said to the police and tested as to the length of time which was truly engaged in the dishonesty in this matter.  The tribunal had to form a conclusion about that issue and did so in paragraph 20.30 of their decision as follows:
i.	"20.30 The Tribunal had considered the evidence and the submissions for the applicant and the respondent.  The tribunal had carefully considered the drafting of the Rule 5 statement.  Allegation 1.1 stated that the respondent 'placed false details on a Section 172 Notice ‑ Request for Information'.  Mr Giles had allowed the applicant some latitude but the allegation 1.1 was very narrowly worded and did not permit the applicant to stray into the course of conduct leading up to the completion of the form.  The tribunal did not consider that the allegations as drafted extended to the period from the date of receipt of the NIP until it was signed but related solely to the conduct of the respondent on the day in question.  It had also been established during the proceedings that the prosecution was not seeking to rely on the respondent's conduct after he signed the form and the Rule 5 allegations did not relate to such conduct.  The tribunal had found the respondent to be a credible witness.  The applicant had not succeeded in its efforts to prove that there had been a careful planning of dishonest conduct for a period of a month.  The tribunal had taken very careful heed of the guidance in Sharma about the scope and extent of dishonesty.  The tribunal found the allegation of dishonesty in respect of allegation 1.1 proved against the respondent to the required standard but within the limitations set out above."
14.	Having noted that there were no previous disciplinary matters in the respondent's case and set out mitigation which was advanced on his behalf, the tribunal turned to their consideration of sanction and provided the following reasons for their conclusions:
i.	"23 The tribunal had regard to its Guidance Notes on sanction, to the submissions of the parties, the mitigation which had been offered, the respondent's testimonials and the remorse which was apparent from the respondent's misconduct.  The tribunal had first to consider the seriousness of the respondent's misconduct.  The tribunal considered the respondent's culpability.  As to motivation, the respondent clearly sought a benefit for himself in that he wished to avoid penalty points and the possibility of increased insurance premiums and also avoid the disappointment that would be caused to his family who held him in very high esteem.  The respondent appeared to have got the speeding notice completely out of proportion.  The respondent was clearly culpable for the misconduct but the tribunal found that his actions were not planned but were spontaneous.  The tribunal accepted the evidence of the respondent that while someone else had given him the information about how he might avoid penalty points without seeking it, he did not embark on a planned course of behaviour to take advantage of that information but rather on a day when he had to be in Oldham on business and when the period for submitting the NIP form was about to expire he made a rash and spur of the moment decision to obtain the false details and immediately completed them on the form.  The tribunal also had regard in terms of culpability to the fact that the respondent was a trainee rather than a qualified solicitor at the time of the offence.  The tribunal had jurisdiction over someone in that position (Re a Solicitor (Ofosuhene) 21 February 1997 unreported) but lack of experience was a factor to be taken into consideration.  In assessing the harm that the respondent's misconduct had caused, the tribunal considered that potentially even for a trainee solicitor to be convicted of a criminal offence and imprisoned if only for a month would have a serious impact upon the reputation of the legal profession.  Mr Giles had made submissions that such impact would be reduced because of the particular circumstances of the case and the tribunal, after careful consideration, agreed with that view.  The tribunal considered that the public would be inclined to empathise with a young man who had clearly worked very hard to be the first in his family to go to university and achieve a professional qualification and then made a spur of the moment and totally misguided and foolish decision to avoid the consequences of a speeding offence.  If he had thought about it, the respondent would have known the extent of the harm caused to the reputation of the profession by his actions.  There was also some harm to the public in that legislation designed for public safety had been circumvented.  In terms of aggravating factors, dishonesty had been admitted and a criminal offence had been committed [admitted].  In terms of general mitigating, rather than personal mitigating factors, the respondent had voluntarily notified the applicant just a few days after he was charged with the offence (albeit not after he was arrested) and he made immediate, open and frank admissions to the police at the earliest opportunity once he was apprehended.  The misconduct was a single episode of very brief duration in a previously unblemished career.  The respondent had shown insight into his misconduct and remorse.  Overall, the tribunal found the misconduct to have been very serious such that striking off had to be considered.  It was said in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 that any solicitor who was shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the tribunal.  The Guidance Notes on sanction indicated that the most serious misconduct involved dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties.  The tribunal was also mindful as set out in the case of Bolton that the most fundamental purpose of sanction was to maintain the reputation of the solicitor's profession and it was also mindful of its duty to protect the public.  A finding that an allegation of dishonesty had been proved would almost invariably lead to striking off, save in exceptional circumstances.  The respondent had been convicted of a criminal offence and had admitted dishonesty and dishonesty had been found proved against him albeit in narrower terms than the applicant had sought to prove.  The tribunal therefore had to consider whether the circumstances of his case were truly exceptional such that striking off the respondent would not be the appropriate sanction.  The tribunal had regard to the respondent's personal mitigation which was that he was a trainee solicitor at the time, the family's sole breadwinner and the severe consequences which he had already experienced in terms of imprisonment.  It also had regard to the very strong support which he had inspired in his employer and his family and the quality of his testimonials.  The tribunal paid close attention to the guidance in Sharma about what constituted an exceptional case.  The tribunal had looked at the previous cases including Salsbury, Bultitude and Burrowes.  It had also been referred to the tribunal case of Taylor referred to in Afolabi.  The tribunal concluded that the respondent's dishonesty had been of very short duration in that it occurred in a matter of hours on one day when a combination of circumstances put him in the way of temptation.  He had derived some benefit from his actions in that they had thwarted the administration of justice in respect of speeding offences as time had already run out for the authorities to pursue him when his offence was discovered.  He had suffered a severe detriment in terms of imprisonment which made any punitive element in the sanction less relevant.  The key question of maintaining the reputation of the profession remained.  The tribunal considered that a severe sanction in terms of a suspension for a considerable period of time would, in what it considered to be the very particular and exceptional circumstances of this case, mark the seriousness of the misconduct taking into account the respondent's lack of maturity at the material time and would be sufficient to maintain the reputation of the profession.  The tribunal determined that a fixed term suspension of two years should be imposed."

15.	The Law 
16.	Section 49 (1 (b) of the Solicitors Act 1974 provides as follows:
i.	"(1) An appeal from the Tribunal shall lie ‑

(b)	in the case of an order on an application under section 43 (3) or 47 (1) (d), (e) or (f) or the refusal of any such application to the Master of the Rolls;

(c)	in any other case, to the High Court."

17.	The appropriate principles which are to be applied in cases of this kind have been previously explored in a number of cases, some of which were referred to by the tribunal in reaching their conclusions which I have set out.  The starting point must be the decision in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, where, in the leading judgment, Sir Thomas Bingham MR observed the following as to the principles to be applied when exercising this jurisdiction:
i.	"14 Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.  Lapses from the required high standard may, of course, take different forms and be of varying degrees.  The most serious involves proven dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties.  In such cases the Tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors.  Only infrequently, particularly in recent years, has it been willing to order the restoration to the Roll of a solicitor against whom serious dishonesty had been established, even after a passage of years, and even where the solicitor had made every effort to re‑establish himself and redeem his reputation.  If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust.  A striking‑off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, but it may well.  The decision whether to strike off or to suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment, to be made by the Tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case.  Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the Tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension.

ii.	15 It is important that there should be full understanding of the reasons why the Tribunal makes orders which might otherwise seem harsh.  There is, in some of these orders, a punitive element: a penalty may be visited on a solicitor who has fallen below the standards required of his profession in order to punish him for what he has done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way.  Those are traditional objects of punishment.  But often the order is not punitive in intention.  Particularly is this so where a criminal penalty has been imposed and satisfied.  The solicitor has paid his debt to society.  There is no need, and it would be unjust, to punish him again.  In most cases the order of the Tribunal will be primarily directed to one or other or both of two other purposes.  One is to be sure that the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence.  This purpose is achieved for a limited period by an order of suspension; plainly it is hoped that experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standards.  The purpose is achieved for a longer period, and quite possibly indefinitely, by an order of striking off.  The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth.  To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied re‑admission.  If a member of the public sells his house, very often his largest asset, and entrusts the proceeds to his solicitor, pending re‑investment in another house, he is ordinarily entitled to expect that the solicitor will be a person whose trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in question.  Otherwise, the whole profession, and the public as a whole, is injured.  A profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.

iii.	16 Because orders made by the Tribunal are not primarily punitive, it follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases.  It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the Tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren.  He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic.  Often he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not offend again.  On applying for restoration after striking off, all these points may be made, and the former solicitor may also be able to point to real efforts made to re‑establish himself and redeem bis reputation.  All these matters are relevant and should be considered.  But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well‑founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness.  Thus it can never be an objection to an order of suspension in an appropriate case that the solicitor may be unable to re‑establish his practice when the period of suspension is past.  If that proves, or appears likely to be, so the consequence for the individual and his family may be deeply unfortunate and unintended.  But it does not make suspension the wrong order if it is otherwise right.  The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member.  Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price."
18.	The particular circumstances in relation to which applications of this kind ‑ appealing against decisions of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ‑ are to be approached was further considered by the Court of Appeal in Salsbury v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 1285.  In the leading judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Jackson observed:
i.	"30 From this review of authority I conclude that the statements of principle set out by the Master of the Rolls in Bolton remain good law, subject to this qualification.  In applying the Bolton principles the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal must also take into account the rights of the solicitor under articles 6 and 8 of the Convention.  It is now an overstatement to say that 'a very strong case' is required before the court will interfere with the sentence imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.  The correct analysis is that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal comprises an expert and informed tribunal, which is particularly well placed in any case to assess what measures are required to deal with defaulting solicitors and to protect the public interest.  Absent any error of law, the High Court must pay considerable respect to the sentencing decisions of the tribunal.  Nevertheless if the High Court, despite paying such respect, is satisfied that the sentencing decision was clearly inappropriate, then the court will interfere.  It should also be noted that an appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal to the High Court normally proceeds by way of review; see CPR rule 52.11(1).

ii.	.....

iii.	37 In my view, the Divisional Court fell into error in holding that there were exceptional facts which brought this case to the very bottom of the scale of dishonesty.  The Court also erred in concluding that this case fell into the very small residual category where striking off was not appropriate.  On the contrary, this was a case of serious dishonesty by the solicitor, where the normal consequences should follow.  The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal quite properly took into account the particular circumstances of this case, but nevertheless concluded that striking off was both appropriate and proportionate.

iv.	38 In my view the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal's decision was correct, both in law and on the facts.  However, even if the case were regarded as being on the borderline, the Divisional Court was not entitled to interfere with the sentence imposed.  The Court ought to have paid proper respect to the decision of the Tribunal, which was an expert and informed body, particularly well‑placed to assess what measures were required to deal with Mr Salsbury and to protect the public interest.  The Divisional Court could not be satisfied that the sentencing decision reached by the Tribunal was clearly inappropriate."
19.	The Divisional Court in Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharma gave consideration to the approach espoused in these authorities in cases where the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had to deal with accusations of dishonesty and sanctions in cases where dishonesty was involved.  Summarising the jurisprudence, Mr Justice Coulson, giving the leading judgment of the Divisional Court, observed as follows:
i.	"13 It seems to me, therefore, that looking at the authorities in the round, that the following impartial points of principle can be identified: (a) Save in exceptional circumstances, a finding of dishonesty will lead to the solicitor being struck off the Roll, see Bolton and Salsbury.  That is the normal and necessary penalty in cases of dishonesty, see Bultitude. (b) There will be a small residual category where striking off will [be] a disproportionate sentence in all the circumstances, see Salsbury. (c) In deciding whether or not a particular case falls into that category, relevant factors will include the nature, scope and extent of the dishonesty itself; whether it was momentary, such as Burrowes, or [over] a lengthy period of time, such as Bultitude; whether it was a benefit to the solicitor (Burrowes), and whether it had an adverse effect on others."

20.	There was some discussion during the course of the argument as to the approach which should be taken to the finding of exceptional circumstances.  At one point during the course of his submissions Mr Williams developed an argument that the question of exceptional circumstances should in truth be approached on the basis that they were circumstances which were unique to the particular case of dishonesty which was being considered.  It seems to me however ‑ in particular having regard to paragraph 13 of what was said Sharma ‑ that the question of exceptional circumstances is in truth the other side of the coin of there being a small residual category of those cases which involve a finding of dishonesty but where striking off is not the appropriate remedy.  In other words, that small residual category will be those where there are exceptional circumstances.  Beyond that, it is probably not sensible to stray bearing in mind the fact‑sensitive nature of the investigation which will be undertaken by the tribunal in considering the appropriate sanction in cases of dishonesty.  
21.	It is also in my view important to observe, adopting the approach provided by the Court of Appeal that interference is only justified where a decision made was clearly inappropriate, that when dealing with an expert and experienced tribunal ‑ who deal with a large volume of cases unfortunately involving dishonest solicitors ‑ they will be in the best position to judge where a case falls within that small residuary category where striking‑off is not the appropriate sanction.  Thus, the exceptional‑circumstances case needs to be understood in the context of the expertise and experience of the tribunal which is being considered, alongside the test derived from Salsbury that it is only where the tribunal has reached a decision which is clearly inappropriate that this court should in cases of sanction intervene.  
22.	Conclusions 
23.	The submissions made on behalf of the appellant by Mr Williams focused in principle upon two areas.  The first was his submission that there was no justification for the conclusion reached by the tribunal in paragraph 23 on several occasions that the dishonesty which was engaged in this case (which was undoubtedly serious) was not planned but was spontaneous and occurred on the spur of the moment.  He submitted that against the background of the length of time between notice having been sent to the respondent and his completion of it dishonestly with the false information ‑ and taking account of the conversations he had with other parties which led to the commission of the offence ‑ that it was simply unsustainable for the tribunal to have proceeded when assessing the seriousness of dishonesty on the basis that this was a "rash and spur of the moment decision".  
24.	Clearly, at the heart of any assessment of exceptional circumstances, and the factor which is bound to carry the most significant weight in that assessment, is an understanding of the degree of culpability and the extent of the dishonesty which occurred.  That is not only because it is of interest in and of itself in relation to sanction but also because it will have a very important bearing upon the assessment of the impact on the reputation of the profession which Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in Bolton identified as being the bedrock of the tribunal's jurisdiction.  I therefore accept Mr Williams's submission as to the importance of the tribunal investigating and finding the degree of culpability or dishonesty in each individual case.  
25.	I am however unable to accept his submission that the tribunal were unable to find that the dishonesty in this case was, in truth, operative over a very short period of time and that this was, as the tribunal concluded, "of very short duration in that it occurred in a matter of hours on one day when a combination of circumstances put him in the way of temptation".  The reason for that is that the tribunal had heard not simply submissions but also evidence on the point and had reached a finding which is not the subject of any challenge in this appeal at paragraph 20.30 which I have set out above.  That finding is carefully reasoned and explained.  It involves a finding that the respondent was a credible witness in relation to his contention that this was not a piece of carefully planned dishonesty but was rather something which occurred on the spur of the moment and within a very short period of time.  
26.	Mr Williams developed that submission further to criticise the tribunal for not having properly understood the gravity of the offending with which they were concerned.  He submitted that it was important to appreciate that the nature of the offence under Section 5A of the Perjury Act 2011 involved making a false declaration and lying in respect of a statement of truth.  He reminded me that, of course, making such declarations is part of the day‑to‑day practice of many solicitors and therefore has an important bearing both in relation to upholding the reputation of the profession and also undermining the public's confidence in solicitors.  
27.	Having considered these submissions I am unpersuaded that the tribunal were unaware or failed to attach weight to the nature of the offence with which they were concerned.  As will be evident from their conclusions at paragraph 23 of their determination, they made particular reference to the fact that the actions of the respondent in this case had "thwarted the administration of justice".  I am therefore not satisfied that there was any error of the kind which Mr Williams contended for in respect of the tribunal's weighting of the factors associated with what was undoubtedly serious dishonesty in this case.  What was particular about it was the spur of the moment nature of the dishonesty and the fact that it arose spontaneously and not in a planned manner.  
28.	The second main thrust of Mr Williams's submissions were that many of the factors which were relied upon by the tribunal as part of their reasoning to make this an exceptional case were matters which are routinely encountered in cases of dishonest solicitors brought before the tribunal.  The respondent had made a full and frank admission of the matter, straightaway going to the police, to the courts and to the tribunal.  That, submitted Mr Williams, was not an exceptional matter.  Nor was the fact that he had shown insight and remorse into his offending or that he was a relatively young person at the time when the offences occurred.  It was routine, he submitted, for a person in the respondent's position to be able to produce personal mitigation in the form of references from employers and contacts within the community and not unusual at all for punishment to have been meted out in the form of a prison sentence to a solicitor who has been guilty of serious dishonest conduct.  
29.	There is some force in Mr Williams's submissions.  But in my view it is not possible when assessing exceptional circumstances simply to pick off the individual features of the case.  It is necessary, as the tribunal did, to record and stand back from all of those many factors, putting first and foremost in the assessment of whether or not there are exceptional circumstances the particular conclusions that had been reached about the act of dishonesty itself.  The fact that many solicitors may be able to produce testimonials and may immediately confess the dishonest behaviour is certainly relevant to the determination of whether or not it is an exceptional case, but is not a factor that is likely to attract very substantial weight.  Of far greater weight would be the extent of the dishonesty and the impact of that dishonesty both on the character of the particular solicitor concerned but, most importantly, on the wider reputation of the profession and how it impinges on the public's perception of the profession as a whole.  
30.	I am satisfied that in this case the tribunal, having understood the nature of the dishonesty, certainly placed that at the heart of their decision both as to the culpability of the respondent but also as to the effect of that dishonesty on the reputation of the profession.  The assessment of the tribunal within paragraph 23 of their decision includes an assessment of the impact on the public and their view that the public "would be inclined to empathise with a young man who had clearly worked very hard to be the first in his family to go to university and achieve a professional qualification and then made a spur of the moment and totally misguided and foolish decision to avoid the consequences of a speeding offence".  Thus, it is clear, both in that extract and elsewhere, that the conclusions which the tribunal reached embedded within them both the assessments of the dishonesty and the impact which that had on the important interest of maintaining the reputation of the solicitors' profession.  They certainly, Mr Williams is right to point out, had regard to all of the other factors as well.  It was on the basis ‑ in my view correctly ‑ of the totality of those factors that they concluded that this was an exceptional case.  
31.	In doing so, as Mr Treverton‑Jones QC, who appears on behalf of the respondent, points out, they will have no doubt have brought to bear their wide experience of having had before them a large number of cases involving dishonest solicitors so as to be able themselves to be satisfied that this respondent did fall within that very tiny quota of people for whom striking off is not the inevitable outcome.  
32.	I am not satisfied, in short, that in this case there is evidence in the decision that the outcome that the tribunal reached was "clearly inappropriate".  They had regard to all the material considerations, and the approach which they took had regard to the relevant legal principles.  They had clearly in mind the guidance in relation to sanction which flows from the authorities which I have quoted above and which is provided to them to assist them in determining the correct sanction.  For the reasons which I have set out above, I am unprepared to reach the conclusion that this decision was clearly inappropriate and that therefore I should interfere with it.  As a result this appeal must be dismissed.
33.	MR TREVERTON-JONES:  I would therefore ask for an order that the appeal is dismissed.  I would ask for an order that the SRA pay Mr Imran's costs.  To my embarrassment, there is no costs schedule produced by those instructing me so I would ask for a detailed assessment.  
34.	MR JUSTICE DOVE:  Lord Justice Jackson would probably suggest that I assess them at zero.
35.	MR TREVERTON-JONES:  I do not know what he would suggest, but they will not be particularly large.  They will certainly be a lot lower than the SRA.  I would ask for a detailed assessment.  I have nothing in writing to give you.
36.	MR JUSTICE DOVE:  Is there anything you want to say, Mr Williams?
37.	MR WILLIAMS:  Yes.  First of all, the practical point that the rules are clear and well known.  There has been no schedule served upon us, and consequently no notice other than by implication that an application would be made.  Secondly, the appeal in my submission was properly brought in the public interest.  The SRA is a public interest regulator.  The profession supports it financially.  These cases are important and this case falls into that category.  In my submission it would be inhibitive that the SRA ‑ ‑ if they were discouraged from pursuing such appeals as this for the benefit of the public and the profession.  There is that aspect to it.  And, secondly (sic), the fact that these matters should be dealt with on the day by summary assessment, not putting the parties to the further costs of detailed assessment.  That is the whole basis of the regime.  
38.	So I would ask my Lord to consider that the right order in this case is that each party should pay their own costs.
39.	MR JUSTICE DOVE:  Mr Treverton‑Jones?
40.	MR TREVERTON-JONES:  I have nothing in response.  Ordinarily, had there been a schedule of costs, I would submit that the ordinary rules should apply and that the costs should follow the event in this court which is well known on these appeals.  Therefore, I invite you to order that the SRA pay Mr Imran's costs, those costs to be the subject of detailed assessment. 
41.	Ruling 
42.	MR JUSTICE DOVE:  I am not willing to order detailed assessment in this case because it seems to me that is simply going to add further to the costs of the parties.  I also take the view there is some force in what Mr Williams says about public interest in these appeals being heard.  However it does seem to me that the respondent having been successful, I should assess costs.  And I am going to do so in a notional figure of £5,000.  That is the best I can do.  Adding to the costs of the proceedings by ordering detailed assessment seems to me to be quite disproportionate.