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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Wolszlegier v District Court in Gdansk, Poland [2015] EWHC 703 (Admin) (09 February 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/703.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 703 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		9 February 2015

1. MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE: The appellant challenges the decision of Senior District Judge Riddle made on 1 December 2014 to order his extradition to Poland pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant. The warrant was issued by the District Court in Gdansk on 9 June 2014 and certified by the NCA on 5 August 2014. The warrant relates to a conviction for six offences of fraud committed in 2008. 1 year, 11 months and 27 days' imprisonment remain to be served.
2. Two issues are raised on this appeal: first, passage of time under section 14 of the Act. The appellant contends that it would be oppressive because of the passage of time of 6 years since the offences occurred to extradite him. Second, whether extradition is proportionate in the light of the appellant and his family's Article 8 rights.
3. As for the first, Ms Draycott, for the appellant, submits that he is not a fugitive. He was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment on 23 December 2008 which was suspended for 5 years. There was a condition that he repay all of the money (approximately £6,000 at today's exchange rates) which he has since done, certainly to a substantial extent. Ms Draycott contends that the district judge accepted that he was not a fugitive. The appellant has also been living openly in this country since 2010.
4. Ms Brown, for the respondent, accepts that the district judge did not make a finding that the appellant is a fugitive. However, she refers me to the comments that the judge made at page 6 of his judgment where he said:

"The point is not the label that attaches to absence. In this case there was clearly no prohibition on the defendant leaving Poland. However when he left he knew he had committed another offence. He failed to tell me about that at the original hearing, and I am satisfied that he was deliberately trying to hide this material fact from me. Moreover I do not accept that he thought the sentence had been suspended for that new offence."

The judge continued:

"It is clear to me that when this defendant left Poland he knew he had committed another offence, and that at the very least the suspended sentence was likely to be imposed. He fled to avoid that happening and failed to leave a forwarding address. It is his fault, not the fault of the Polish court, he was not traced earlier. Whether or not you describe him as a classic fugitive, it is not open to him to complain about the delay which is entirely of his own making."

5. Ms Draycott submitted that the appellant's surrender would be oppressive. Over six years have elapsed since the underlying offence. At the time of the offences the appellant was 27 years of age; he is now 33 years old, with two children, a partner of seven years and a full-time job. He is the main breadwinner for the family. The family would have no alternative emotional or financial support in his absence. He has led a blameless life in this jurisdiction, and, she submits, took his obligation to the Polish court very seriously by paying off the fine, or most of it, within the required time frame.
6. These matters are relevant not just to the issue of oppression but also to the Article 8 claim. Ms Draycott submits that the interference with the Article 8 rights of both the appellant and his family is not strictly necessary and proportionate to the aims of honouring extradition arrangements. In conducting the balancing exercise the court is required to undertake, Ms Draycott submits that there are two additional factors that should be taken into account: first, the fact that the offences are unlikely to have attracted a custodial sentence in the UK; second, that the period for which the appellant's extradition is sought is particularly lengthy given the fact that the sentence was originally suspended and he has paid the fine, at least to a very great extent.
7. I accept Ms Brown's submission that the offences cannot be described as trivial and certainly may attract sentences of immediate custody in this jurisdiction, in particular in circumstances where the appellant committed a further offence during the period of the suspended sentence. The overall delay in this case is not unusual in the context of extradition cases. Ms Brown accepts that the appellant's Article 8 rights are engaged. However, she refers me to the detailed judgment of the senior district judge in this regard.
8. In my judgment, the senior district judge made findings of fact in relation to Article 8 rights that were available to him on the evidence before him, and I can discern no error of law in his decision. Some fresh evidence has been provided in the form of the appellant's updated proof of evidence, but I accept Ms Brown's submission that this evidence does not take the case much further. In my view, it does not add materially to the evidence on which the district judge made his findings.
9. In my judgment, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that his surrender would be oppressive, and there is no basis for departing from the decision of the senior district judge on the appellant and his family's Article 8 rights. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.