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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Horgle, R (on the application of) v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] EWHC 856 (Admin) (27 February 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/856.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 856 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		27 February 2015

1. MR JUSTICE IRWIN: This is an appeal by way of case stated from the Romford Magistrates. It derives from an incident on 20 July 2013 in the car park of the United Reformed Church in Romford.
2. The conviction of the appellant, Mr Horgle, was pursuant to section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986. The case stated was amended by order of this court on 21 February last year.
3. The amended case statement needs a little care in its interpretation. First of all, the information, at least as recited in the case statement, is missing a key word. I will interpolate that word. The information was that the appellant:

"Used towards Rachel Hilton threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence would be used against her ..."

Then I leave out some words which are not relevant and no one says they are:

"... or where that person was likely to believe that such violence would be used."

That is contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act.

4. The magistrates recited the reasons for their conclusion in open court.
5. Before we get to that, the general nature of the evidence was that Mr Horgle, who was the estranged partner of Ms Hilton and the father of their two children, was abusive and, as the prosecution said, threatening to her because, at the conclusion of contact which was arranged with the children in the church buildings, he saw that another man was in her car. That appears, on the evidence, to have precipitated the row.
6. His account was that Mr Akwafo had been insulting to him. The account of Ms Hilton and of Mr Akwafo was that he was simply provoked by Mr Akwafo's presence in the car and then became abusive and threatening.
7. The submissions at the closing of the evidence were recited by the magistrates in the following terms:

"Summary of closing submissions from the appellant: there was no evidence given by an independent witness who saw or heard any threats made by Mr Horgle. Ms Hilton's evidence and Mr Akwafo's evidence of the alleged threats were inconsistent.

Summary of the closing submissions from the respondent: there was ample evidence to enable the magistrates to conclude that the appellant had committed the offence."

8. The Justices were reminded of the words allegedly used by Mr Horgle: "I will spark you up" and "I will fuck you up". RH gave evidence that she believed these words to mean "I will beat you up" and that she was in fear.
9. Following those submissions, the reasons given in open court at the time were stated as follows:

"Agreed facts: there was an incident in the car park of the United Reformed Church on 20 July 2013.

Disputed facts: whether Mr Horgle used threatening, abusive or insulting words against Rachel Hilton and Albert Akwafo with intent to cause them fear.

Evidence: Rachel Hilton was a credible witness. She gave a clear account of what happened. She tried to diffuse the situation for the sake of her children by encouraging Albert Akwafo to come away and get back in the car so that they could leave.

Her evidence of what EH [that is the appellant] said to her was corroborated by Mrs Cotterall. EH used abusive language which Rachel found threatening and it also frightened the children. Mrs Cotterall said she heard EH say 'fucking bitch' to Rachel several times. She also said that Rachel was distressed, was shaking, was almost crying and looked in shock.

We did not find EH credible. He said he used the word 'bitch' once, whilst all three other witnesses disputed this.

Albert Akwafo: we found him to be mostly credible but we are concerned he said he did not know the defendant when there were so few people around. However, his description of the incident does tally with that of R and Mrs C.

We accept that A was called a 'fucking bastard 'by EH and this would have caused some distress. However, there is some discrepancy in his evidence, eg when he said that staff pulled EH away from him and this was not corroborated by Mrs C.

The alleged spitting and use of the key as a weapon has not been proved, because it is one word against another.

Finding: we find EH guilty of the section 4 Public Order Act against RH. We do not find EH guilty of the section 4 Public Order Act against Albert Akwafo."

10. Following the initial lodging of a request to state a case, the matter came before Mr Justice Mitting in February of last year. He ordered that a full statement of the evidence from the magistrates should be recited in the stated case. He also ordered an alternative question for the opinion of this court.
11. That alternative or amended question was placed within the case stated, following submissions from counsel for both sides and by agreement. The question reads:

"Were the Justices entitled to conclude that the defendant was guilty of an offence under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 where there was no finding of fact that he had the intent to cause fear of immediate unlawful violence?"

12. In addressing the court today, Mr Badger, who has put the case with great clarity, began by saying the basis of the conviction must have been the first limb under the section, namely that the magistrates were considering a case with intent to cause fear of violence, if I can paraphrase the first phrase in the section.
13. As the arguments developed today, it is clear that Ms Wilkinson for the Crown submits that, in fact, despite the use of the phrase in their reasons, "with intent to cause them fear", the magistrates must have in fact concluded that the conviction was to be based on the effect of the behaviour and the threatening or abusive words. That is to say that the behaviour and words were likely to induce the belief in Rachel Hilton that violence would be used.
14. It is by reason of that analysis of the findings of the magistrates that, no doubt, Ms Wilkinson conceded or agreed to the altered question for the opinion of the court.
15. Mr Badger concedes, in my view quite rightly, that there was evidence here which could have led to a conviction on the first limb under the section. He says that the magistrates could properly have said, "we can infer from the threats recited in evidence by Rachel Hilton that we accept such threats and that it would have been a proper inference from those threats to conclude that the appellant held the relevant intent to satisfy the section". That is a correct concession. It might be, looking at the reasons, that the magistrates reached such a conclusion but, in my judgment, Mr Badger is right to say they did not express it.
16. I move to the alternative basis therefore, which is consistent with the agreed redrafted question for this court. The answer to the question must be "yes". The Justices were entitled on this evidence to conclude that the defendant was guilty of an offence under section 4 in the absence of such a finding. There was evidence before them, on any view, which would entitle them to conclude that the language, threatening, abusive and insulting as it clearly was, combined with the behaviour was such as to induce a belief that violence would be used. Therefore, the simple answer to the question is "yes, they were so entitled on the evidence in this case".
17. The underlying question developed by Mr Badger is: were the magistrates clear enough in the reasons they gave for their conviction so as to enable the appellant to know the basis upon which he was convicted?
18. Having listened to the argument, it seems to me that the only confusion in the reasons stated at the time, or as amplified once the whole of the evidence has been set out in the case stated following the order of the court, the only basis for confusion is the use of the phrase, appearing on the second page of the stated case, "with intent to cause them fear". That having been used by the magistrates at the time, it clearly pointed the appellant and his representatives towards the first rather than the third limb of the section.
19. Both counsel have referred the court briefly to authority. I take them in order of time.
20. In R v City of Westminster (1996) 28 HLR 819 the Court of Appeal stressed the obligation to give reasons for a decision in court. The passage Mr Badger took me to appears on page 8 of the report. It reads as follows:

"It is well established that an obligation, whether statutory or otherwise, to give reasons for a decision is imposed so that the persons affected by the decision may know why they have won or lost and, in particular, may be able to judge whether the decision is valid and therefore unchallengeable or invalid and therefore open to challenge."

21. There are numerous authoritative statements to this effect, see for example Thornton V Kirklees Borough Council [1979] 1QB 626 at 638H in the judgment of Megaw LJ, R v London borough of Croydon ex parte Graham [1993] 26 HLR 286 a case to which further reference has been made, where Sir Thomas Bingham MR said:

"I readily accept that these difficult decisions are decisions for the Housing Authority and certainly a pedantic exegesis of letters of this kind would be inappropriate. There is, nonetheless, an obligation under the Act to give reasons and that must impose on the council a duty to give reasons which are intelligible and which convey to the applicant the reasons why the application has been rejected in such a way that, if they disclose an error of reasons the applicant may take such steps as may be indicated."

22. The other authority is that of R (McGowan) v Brent Justices [2001] EWHC Admin 814, a decision of Tuckey LJ and Silber J.
23. In the course of considering the obligations of justices exercising a criminal jurisdiction, the court, at paragraph 13, dealt with the question of justices giving reasons:

"This court in McKerry v Teesdale and Wear Valley Justices (2000) 164 JP 355, had something to say about justices giving reasons in the pre-1998 Act days, but no doubt with the provisions of Article 6 well in mind. In that case a youth court had agreed to the partial lifting of reporting restrictions in relation to a juvenile offender who appealed against the decision by way of case stated, complaining of inadequate reasons. At page 362, Lord Bingham CJ said:

'... the justices did announce that they were acceding to the request to dispense to the extent to which they did because they considered that the appellant constituted a serious danger to the public and had shown a complete disregard for the law. That was, in my judgment, enough to indicate the basis of the decision ...

It is, however, as I think, the law that justices are not obliged to state reasons in the form of a judgment or to give reasons in any elaborate form ...

In my judgment, the reasoning which is called for depends both on the matter to be decided and the court by which the matter is to be decided. It is not usual for magistrates to give detailed reasons; nor is it usual for juries, who make very important decisions affecting human rights, to give any reasons at all. If an aggrieved party wishes to obtain more detailed reasons from a magistrates' court, then a request can be made to state a case, as was done here, and the justices have given their reasons at somewhat greater length.'"

24. The important principle to be extracted from that paragraph is this: justices are not obliged to state reasons in the form of a judgment or to give reasons in any elaborate form. The basis of the decision should be clear. As long as it is clear in some language then that suffices to satisfy the obligations of justices. It would be quite unrealistic to expect a more legalistic approach.
25. Thus, the question comes down to this: was the conviction properly based? Was there evidence before the court upon which they could properly convict in the absence of a finding of fact of the relevant intent for the first limb? Answer: yes.
26. Were the reasons insufficiently stated so that the appellant knew the basis of his conviction? It seems to me they were not.
27. I accept that the use of the phrase, "with intent to cause them fear", is unhelpful but it seems to me that the recital of the reasons for the conviction made it perfectly clear to this appellant that the justices had accepted the account of Rachel Hilton as to what the appellant had done. That included such threats as to cause her very real fear and very real distress. They recited that distress and that fear, her shock and the fact that she was crying. They recited, as had been addressed to them in closing submissions by the prosecution, the nature of the threats. The language, "I will spark you", was specific language which was used. That was the prosecution case. And it was understood by her, as she explained to the court, to be a direct threat of violence. Having made that finding, they were entitled to conclude that the appellant was guilty and there was a sufficient explanation of their reasons.
28. It might have been preferable if they had said in a sentence or two, "we accept that the threats were used, we accept they caused an immediate fear of violence in the mind of the principal witness", but that was so clearly implicit in what they did say that it seems to me there were sufficient reasons to satisfy Article 6 or any obligation on the part of justices in such a situation.

For those reasons, this appeal is dismissed.