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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> The Interim Executive Board of X, R (on the application of) v Ofsted [2016] EWHC 2004 (Admin) (01 August 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2016/2004.html Cite as: [2016] ELR 519, [2016] EWHC 2004 (Admin), [2017] EMLR 5 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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THE QUEEN (on the application of THE INTERIM EXECUTIVE BOARD OF X) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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OFSTED |
Defendant |
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Ms Helen Mountfield QC and Ms Sarah Hannett (instructed by Ofsted Legal Services) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 27 July 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Stuart-Smith :
Anonymity Order
Introduction
i) Alleged irrationality and inconsistency with previous inspection reports;ii) Alleged irrationality because of an absence of evidential basis for the findings in the report;
iii) The report is alleged not to be the product of an independent, merits-based evaluation, and bias;
iv) The treatment of the School is alleged to be inconsistent with treatment of other schools and therefore irrational; and
v) The powers of inspection are alleged not to have been used for statutory purposes and are therefore alleged to be ultra vires.
The Factual Background
i) No report commented adversely on the segregation policy adopted by the School. While there was reference in the December 2014 Report to the School's policy not meeting current regulations, it was also recognised that it did not match current practice, which was to ensure equality of opportunity for all pupils;ii) The leadership of the School was endorsed consistently, while recognising the substantial challenges it faced;
iii) Safeguarding of children was not criticised and was expressly considered to be highly effective in creating a safe culture in the School;
iv) Educational and teaching standards were consistently improving.
"This is an inadequate school
- Leaders have failed to keep pupils safe from extreme views that undermine fundamental British values.
- Leaders have failed to have due regard to the need to achieve equality of opportunity.
- Books in the school library contained derogatory views about, and incited violence towards, women. Pupils had easy access to these books. Leaders told inspectors that they did not know the books were there.
- Boys and girls are segregated in all lessons and at social times from Year 5 onwards. They are taught on separate corridors, have separate breaktimes and are not allowed to mix during the shared lunch hour. When they go on some trips to the same venues they go on different days.
- Leaders' decision to segregate pupils by gender limits the opportunities for pupils' social development. The arrangements in this school do not provide sufficient opportunities to foster good relations between boys and girls.
- Some older pupils told inspectors they are worried that being segregated by gender will mean that they are not prepared well for life beyond school.
- …
- Provision in early years is inadequate because of safeguarding weaknesses. …
- The interim executive board has failed to ensure that safeguarding arrangements for pupils or to ensure that pupils are provided with sufficient opportunities for good social development.
- The interim executive board has not ensured that all steps have been taken to comply with its duty under the Equality Act 2010 to have due regard to the need to achieve equality of opportunity for pupils."
- Improve leadership and management, including governance, by ensuring that:
- All necessary steps are taken to keep pupils safe and improve their welfare
- All books and any other materials in the school support equality of opportunity and promote fundamental British values of tolerance and respect, particularly in relation to the role of women in modern Britain
…"
The Principles to be Applied
25 There is a clear and identifiable line of authority in relation to the grant of injunctions to restrain public bodies from publishing decisions or reports, which makes it clear that there are separate public law questions which fall to be considered alongside the ordinary principles of private law injunctions. So far as private law injunctions are concerned, the ordinary test, by reference to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 , is whether there is an arguable case for the claimant, and if so, where the balance of convenience lies. In defamation cases, injunctions will rarely be given because of the obligations of freedom of speech, but certainly so where the defendant asserts that he or she intends to justify the truth of what it asserts. However, in the public law field there are additional considerations, as is clear from the authorities which have been put before me. The central authorities are, first of all R (Matthias Rath BV) v Advertising Standards Authority Limited [2001] HRLR 22, a decision of Turner J which chose to follow the earlier decision of Laws J in R v Advertising Standards Authority ex parte Vernons Organisation Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1289, rather than an earlier decision of Popplewell J in R v Advertising Standards Authority ex parte Direct Line Financial Services Ltd (1997). Turner J pointed out that Popplewell J had approached the matter as if the dispute between the parties existed in private law, whereas Laws J, experienced as he is in public law, had considered the matter properly in the area of public law.
26 …
27 Different words are used by the judges in differentiating the more difficult hurdles which must be achieved by a claimant in a public law injunction case such as I have described from the ordinary, run of the mill, private law injunction case to which I have referred. There were pointed out by the various judges distinctions, some of which apply to this case: one in particular, namely that in a public law situation, such as here, it is usually the case that individuals are not seeking to salvage their reputation or avoid personal loss, and therefore there is, in addition, the impact of Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others [1993] AC 534 in the House of Lords to be filtered in. Secondly, and almost duplicatively, the courts will, for that reason among others, have less readiness to grant an injunction in favour of one public body against another.
28 The real issue is one in respect of which, once again, this case is a fortiori because of the statutory duty to publish, and is the interest of the public in there being publication by the body which is required to prepare the report. In Rath Turner J said that the defendant should only be prevented from publishing its opinions in a manner and time that was appropriate on 'pressing grounds'. In London Borough of Ealing, Stanley Burnton J said that the public has a right to receive the information contained in the Audit Commission report, 'unless there are exceptionally strong grounds for preventing them from doing so'. In the Debt Free Direct Ltd decision, Sullivan J said that he, like Turner J, unhesitatingly preferred the approach of Laws J to that of Popplewell J, and stated (in para [21]) 'if restraint of the expression of private opinions is justified only in exceptional circumstances, then the grounds for restraining the publication of an adjudication by a public body exercising a quasi-judicial function must be all the more compelling if they are to succeed'. He said, in para [24], that there would have, in his judgment, to be 'the most compelling reasons to prohibit a public body which is embarked on a quasi-judicial task … from publishing its decision'.
29 It is not simply, therefore, that there are all these additional words: 'exceptional circumstances', 'most compelling reasons', 'pressing grounds', 'exceptionally strong grounds', which require to be satisfied, but such that it will not be in every circumstance – far from it, that a good arguable case is entitled to be protected by an injunction.
30 Sullivan J gave examples of where there might be extreme circumstances – as he put it, in para [24], 'most compelling reasons to prohibit a the public body': if for example the public body had engaged in a vendetta against the person the subject of the adjudication or if the adjudication was prompted by a deliberate desire to inflict damage on the reputation of the person criticised. One can think of other examples involving fraud or corruption, or perhaps involving the intention to proceed with a report which is, and can be shown to be, as on a justification injunction, manifestly untrue or riddled with error. It is never helpful to come up with examples, except suffice it to say that the test of the judge's thermometer, in terms of response to an injunction, will be set and calibrated several degrees higher, so far as looking at the arguability of a case, than it is in this case.
Is there here a set of circumstances which disengages the general principle that the courts will not prevent the publication of opinion or the dissemination of information save on pressing grounds? … If a private individual will not be restrained from expressing his opinion save on pressing grounds I see no reason why a public body having a duty, other things being equal, to express its opinion should be subject to any less rigid rules. It seems to me that the case is, if anything, analogous to one where an administrative body has an adjudicative function and in the course of its duties publishes a ruling criticising some affected person and the ruling is later disturbed or reversed by an appropriate appellate process. There are many such instances and many of them involve the criticism of members of the public, corporate or natural.
I do not know of an instance in which a public body of that kind would fall to be restrained from carrying out what is no more nor less than its ordinary, but important, everyday duties simply upon the grounds that the intended publication contains material which is subject to legal challenge as being vitiated by some error of law. If the application for judicial review here is successful I cannot think but that there are ample means at the applicant's disposal to correct any adverse impression which what, ex hypothesi, would be an unlawful report may have given to the public. Indeed, though it has not been canvassed in argument, I know of no reason why the fact that they have obtained leave should not itself be disseminated if they wish to take any steps in that direction since this is an attempt to prevent the public and indeed, in fairness to the applicant, its fellow advertisers and others in the trade to which it belongs from seeing that the authority has reached these conclusions. I do not consider that the effects of that publication are damaging to the applicant in a manner which would be so irreparable, so past recall as to amount to a pressing ground, in the language of Strasbourg, a pressing social need, to restrain this public body from carrying out its function in the ordinary way.
Application of Principles to the Facts of the Present Case