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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Budheo, R (On the Application Of) v Revenue & Customs [2016] EWHC 3260 (Admin) (06 December 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2016/3260.html Cite as: [2016] EWHC 3260 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		6 December 2016

1. MR JUSTICE TURNER: This application for permission is refused. The first ground upon which it is refused is that this court takes the view that there is no legitimate basis for allowing an extension of time. I am entirely satisfied that time began to run when the Code of Practice 9 ("Cop 9") procedure was first instigated on 6 December 2013. This is not a case in which the claimant is entitled to rely upon a continuing state of affairs. The decision effectively being challenged was made then and he was under an obligation to respond promptly. It is now precisely three years since the procedure initiated and on no basis could that be described as prompt.
2. The chronology is usefully set out in the decision of the single judge on paper. Having instigated the Cop 9 procedure on 6 December 2013, the claimant responded within six days in terms which, even then, included the threat of judicial review and sent two letters subsequently, both in February 2014, ventilating his complaints and, again, threatening judicial review. Indeed, the letters were headed, "Pre-action notice of judicial review".
3. The defendant's reasons for suspicion were given on 6 June 2014. The claimant's decision to pursue his remedies through the Tax Tribunal, I agree with the single judge here, provides no justification for the delay in making this application. In any event, the claim form was served out of time.
4. It is important, very important, that challenges to public decisions are brought timeously and, in this case, the public have an interest in ensuring that such challenges are dealt with promptly. As a result of the delay, we are now three years down the line from a procedure which ought to have been challenged from the outset, if it was going to be. It is not in the interests of justice or the public for these matters to be spun out indefinitely. So, even on the basis of the question of extension of time, permission is refused.
5. I do not make any ruling or judgment as to whether or not the Cop 9 letter comprised a charge so as to engage Article 6. It is not necessary for me to do that. However, I would observe that in the particular circumstances in this case, bearing in mind the reasons put forward by the defendant, I would have taken the view that the claimant had no reasonable prospect of success in establishing that any Article 6 rights had been breached. It is not possible for me to conclude that it is arguable that the decision to initiate the Cop 9 was irrationally challenged in the public arena.
6. In those circumstances, the application is refused. Thank you both very much.