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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> DS, R (on the application of) v Wolverhampton City Council [2017] EWHC 1660 (Admin) (30 June 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2017/1660.html Cite as: [2017] ACD 99, [2017] ELR 630, [2017] EWHC 1660 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Birmingham Civil Justice Centre Priory Courts B4 6DS
		30/06/2017

Mr Justice Garnham:

Introduction

1. The claimant is a thirteen year old boy who lives with his parents in Wolverhampton. An anonymity order is in place to protect the claimant and I will refer to him as DS throughout this judgment. He brings these proceedings through his mother and litigation friend, SS.
2. DS suffers from autism and severe learning difficulties. Until 12 October 2016, he attended Tettenhall Wood School in Wolverhampton. DS arrived home from school on that day wearing nothing beneath the waist except a towel. As a result of that incident, DS's parents stopped DS attending the school. Despite various investigations and reviews that have taken place since, DS has never returned to Tettenhall Wood School.
3. By these proceedings against the City of Wolverhampton Council the claimant challenges what those acting for him describe as "the Defendant's ongoing failure or refusal to provide suitable education at school or otherwise than at school in breach of its duty under section 19(1) of the Education Act 1996". That application is brought with permission of Singh J, who refused permission to apply for judicial review on a second ground relating to an alleged failure to provide information requested by the claimant's parents.

The History

4. The claimant was born on 9 July 2003. He has a diagnosis of severe learning difficulties, pervasive developmental disorder and autism, severely delayed speech and communication skills including social communication. He is described as "non-verbal"; he has difficulty in making known his needs and wishes. As acknowledged in the skeleton argument filed on his behalf, his behaviour can sometimes be challenging due to frustration. He has limited independence and limited self care skills. He has delayed fine motor skills and significant sensory needs.
5. DS is the subject of an education, health and care plan ("EHC plan") maintained by the defendant Council. Since about 2010, DS has attended Tettenhall Wood School, a maintained special school in Wolverhampton. Because of his special educational needs, DS was transported to and from school on a school bus. He would be met by his mother on his arrival home and she would escort him from the bus into the family home.
6. On Wednesday 12 October 2016, SS left her home in the usual way to meet DS from the bus. She describes what happened in her witness statement:

"I went to help (DS) off the school bus in the usual fashion however, was horrified to find (DS) sitting in the front passenger seat of the bus restrained by harness, naked from the waist down. It was confirmed to me, by staff on the bus, that he had been naked from the waist down throughout his journey home from school. It was explained to me by the school bus driver that (DS) has left the school building in a pad, pull-up nappy and PT shorts however whilst the bus was still in the school grounds under the presence of school and transport staff, he had taken them off as soon as he entered the bus. This took place in view of three members of staff. I am aware that a towel was given to (DS) however I'm not sure who gave him this or whether it was placed over him….

I understand that when (DS) is on the school bus he is secured on the bus with a mechanism known as a Houdini strap; this is a seat belt which goes from under (DS)'s bus seat through his legs and up to and over his shoulder and therefore he would have likely been naked when strapped into his seat. He would certainly not have been able to remove any clothing whilst in the harness demonstrating that he must have been strapped in naked".

7. The Head Teacher of Tettenhall Wood School is Ms Sarah Llewellyn. She says that at approximately 15.00 hours on 12 October 2016, DS

"was taken by two members of staff to the awaiting bus on the school car park ready to be transported home. There were two female pupils on the bus – one wheelchair user, the other ambulant. There was the driver and the escort. (DS) left school wearing elasticised PE shorts, incontinence pad, a top but no shoes or socks. It was reported that there was an incident on the bus which involved (DS) pulling the hair of members of staff, struggling and failing to comply with the direction of members of staff. Whilst on the bus (DS) removed his shorts, underwear and pad. The two other female pupils were immediately moved to a different part of the bus.

There were repeated attempts to get (DS) to put on his shorts. In order to protect (DS)'s dignity whilst in a state of undress and fearing that (DS) would soil the seat on the bus, a towel was used to cover (DS)'s lower half. School staff reported that they left the vehicle to give (DS) some space and time to calm. The doors were closed. The minibus hazard lights were illuminated therefore it is reported that staff believed (DS) was ready to travel as this was the signal used by the drivers to the members of staff on duty that they were ready to leave the premise. It was reported that (DS) arrived at his home address on school transport and was naked from the waist down with a towel, strapped to his seat in a standard "Houdini harness". Members of staff confirmed that notwithstanding the difficulty of (DS) on this occasion, (DS) was restrained in the Houdini harness prior to the bus setting off. When the bus arrived at (DS)'s home, (DS) alighted the bus in a state of partial undress, naked from the waist down. (Mrs S) who was waiting for (DS) received an explanation from staff on the bus as to what happened."

8. Mrs S explains in her statement that after she had collected DS she wrote to the family social worker, Jigna O'Callaghan, to explain what had happened and to request that the incident be investigated. That email was sent at 17.28 on 12 October 2016. Mrs S wrote:

"At approximately 15.50 this afternoon (DS) arrived home on school transport naked from the waist down. The bus staff reported that the school staff allowed him to leave the premises like that and bus staff phoned the transport department to alert them. Naturally they have been advised that they shouldn't bring (DS) home if it happens again as they can't have a naked child on the bus. It horrifies me that the school staff thought it was appropriate for him to leave the school premise on transport naked from the waist down. I have spoken to the bus staff about how the situation occurred, and it appears that he had a pad/pull-up nappy and his PE shorts on…when he got on the bus but took them off straight away in view of three staff. The bus staff then had to move children around on the bus so that 'naked (DS)' couldn't be seen. It also appears school staff gave him a towel? I am furious and want you to investigate this please."

9. Later that same evening Mrs S emailed Ms O' Callaghan again saying:

"We want to arrange a meeting with you asap. With all the things that have happened in the last year with (DS) at Tettenhall Wood and now this, we want to move (DS) to a new school."

10. She says that the following day she and her husband raised their concerns with Mr Paul Cooper, the Council's Designated Officer. They wrote:

"Paul, you asked me to drop you an email describing my concern on how (DS) has been treated so that you can use it in the meeting next week. My wife and I are disgusted with how (DS) could be treated in this manner. We do not want to hear excuses about he was covered with a towel, or however children were moved to a different seat. Excuses are ignoring the fact that (DS) has been treated without any respect or dignity. If a child without complex needs was put on a school bus without trousers or pants it would seem outrageous (bearing in mind our son isn't fully continent and requires a pad.) why would it not be the same for (DS)?....the upshot of today is that we believe (DS) is not being treated as a human being or with any respect. The school left him unclothed from the waist down, the transport team were more concerned that (DS) had soiled the seat, and the school suggested having a towel on him on a bus, all of these are unacceptable. (DS) has severe learning difficulties and is extremely vulnerable and we feel that he has been treated like an animal and we need the school and the LA to fully listen to and deal with these concerns…."

11. Mrs S says that she also:

"made it known to the defendant that I wanted (DS) to be placed in a new school as I had concerns with (DS)'s safety and wellbeing should he return to Tettenhall Wood School. Our confidence in the school was entirely dashed and I believe it demonstrated a fundamental lack of ability to meet my son's needs."

12. On 13 October 2016 Mrs S also wrote to the head teacher of Tettenhall Wood School. Her email read:

"We need to arrange a meeting asap for review of (DS)'s needs and to arrange a new school place."

13. In response to the email of 13 October Mr Cooper informed the claimant's parents that a Position of Trust meeting had been arranged for 18 October and that they would be updated following the meeting. In fact the parents were told only that the meeting had been held and that an investigation would take place.
14. Mr and Mrs S wrote to the Interim Head of Special Education Needs at the defendant council on 27 October 2016. That email read as follows:

"Dear Mr Senior, we are sure that by now you will have been informed of the terrible incident on Wednesday 12 October 2016 when our thirteen year autistic son…was returned home on the minibus from Tettenhall Wood Special School naked from the waist down. We have since removed him from school and are currently looking for somewhere that properly meet his needs….we have absolutely no confidence in Tettenhall Wood Special School's ability to meet (DS)'s special education needs after this incident which clearly demonstrates a total lack of care, concern or respect for him."

15. On 3 November 2016 solicitors instructed by Mr and Mrs S also wrote to the Interim Head of Special Education Needs at the defendant council. That letter concluded with the following:

"In the circumstances we call upon the authority to not only provide the information we have requested but to amend (DS)'s EHCP and to agree with the family that this child should be considered for transfer to the Rugeley School which we understand has a place available for him and have expressed that they believe they can meet his needs."

16. On 4 November an interim review of the EHC plan was held. The claimant's parents attended that meeting with their solicitor. By email dated 9 November 2016 the claimant's mother requested home tuition for the claimant pending the amended EHC plan.
17. By letter dated 16 November 2016, the claimant intimated a claim for judicial review. The defendant responded by letter dated 30 November 2016. By that letter the Council indicated that Tettenhall Wood School remained responsible for meeting the claimant's educational needs and that arrangements were being made for DS to receive a maximum of 10 hours home tuition pending conclusion of the investigation and the issue of the amended plan.
18. By letter dated 20 December 2016, the defendant indicated that the police had decided to take no further action in respect of the events of 12 October, that the outcome of the defendant's investigation was that "a case to answer" had been found in respect of two current members of staff and one former member of staff; that no case to answer was found in respect of the transport company and that no further information would be divulged pending the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. It was said that the defendant would undertake a "lessons learned" review because "a degree of fault" had been found. The letter indicated that the claimant continued to have a full time place at the school but that the defendant had also commissioned up to 10 hours education for the claimant from the defendant's pupil referral unit.
19. By letter dated 22 December 2016 the claimant's solicitors asserted that the defendant had failed to find, or propose, a new school placement and threatened proceedings.
20. At the permission hearing on 24 March 2017 the defendant told the Court that the claimant had been offered both home tuition and four afternoons at a pupil referral unit and that an EHC plan would be issued on 27 March 2017.
21. A new EHC plan was issued on 30 March 2017. That plan named a different school, Wightwick Hall School, as the proposed school for DS. The claimant's parents were told subsequently that that school would not be able to accommodate the claimant until mid-July 2017 and in the interim the claimant should return to Tettenhall Wood School.
22. Educational provision was commissioned by the defendant for the claimant from an organisation called the Nightingale Centre. It was suggested that that centre would provide a maximum of four sessions, of one hour each, per week. In fact, the logs kept by the Nightingale Centre demonstrate that the claimant did not receive four hours tuition in any week.
23. Following an event at the claimant's home on 29 March 2017, the Nightingale Centre withdrew from providing educational provision for the claimant. Subsequently care was provided for the claimant by an organisation called Progress Care. That organisation, however, is not an educational provider and is not registered as such with Ofsted.
24. The claimant has attended no school in the period from 12 October 2016 to date.

The Appeal to the FTT

25. Mr and Mrs S have initiated an appeal to the First Tier Tribunal against the choice of school. They argue that the appropriate school for the claimant is Rugeley School.
26. I was told that the appeal was listed for hearing in mid-October 2016. It was common ground before me that the choice of school in the new plan was a matter for the Tribunal in that appeal, not for me in this judicial review.

The Statute

27. Section 7 of the Education Act 1996 sets out the duty of parents to secure education of children of compulsory school age.

"The parent of every child of compulsory school age shall cause him to receive efficient full-time education suitable—

(a) to his age, ability and aptitude, and

(b) to any special educational needs he may have,

either by regular attendance at school or otherwise."

28. This case turns on the proper construction and application of section 19 of the Education Act 1996. That provision provides as is material:

"19 (1) Each local authority shall make arrangements for the provision of suitable education at school or otherwise than at school for those children of compulsory school age who, by reason of illness, exclusion from school or otherwise, may not for any period receive suitable education unless such arrangements are made for them….

(4A) In determining what arrangements to make under subsection (1) …in the case of any child or young person a local authority shall have regard to any guidance given from time to time by the Secretary of State.

(6) In this section…"suitable education", in relation to a child or young person, means efficient education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude and to any special educational needs he may have (and "suitable full-time education" is to be read accordingly."

The Argument

29. I had the benefit of detailed skeleton arguments from Ms Charlotte Hadfield on behalf of the claimant and Ms Aimee Fox for the defendant. I heard oral submissions from both counsel. I am grateful for their assistance.
30. Ms Hadfield argues that the combination of the circumstances of the incident on the 12 October 2016, the lack of information provided by the defendant to the claimant's parents, especially regarding the avoidance of similar events in the future, and what she calls a "lack of reaching out to the parents" produced a situation where it was not reasonably practical for DS to continue attending Tettenhall Wood School. She argues, further, that it was not reasonable in those circumstances to expect DS to attend school. In those circumstances, she says, there was a breach of section 19.
31. In response, Ms Fox argued that it was important to see the events of 12 October 2016 in their proper context. She says that the evidence shows that DS had a propensity to remove clothing and to "self-stimulate". She said that that behaviour had happened at school previously and had happened at the claimant's home. She said that this was the first time it had happened on the bus travelling from school to home. She argued that the use of a towel when events like this occurred was part of a policy recommended by the local authority's education psychologist. She said that the school was seeking to address the issue of such behaviour and the majority of the time those attempts were successful.
32. Ms Fox argued that from the moment this incident occurred, the claimant's parents made it clear that under no circumstances would they contemplate DS returning to Tettenhall Wood School. She argued that it was right that the matter was investigated by the local authority. She said that investigation had revealed there was a case to answer and that that case lay in the failure of all staff to check with staff on the bus that all was well with DS, and that he was fully dressed, before the bus departed.
33. Ms Fox argued that the defendant authority had been able to satisfy itself that it was reasonably practicable for DS to return to the school. She pointed out that he had attended the school for six years, that there was no suggestion that it was institutionally incapable of educating and caring for DS; that there was no evidence of physical or emotional harm. She said that the parents had refused even to contemplate DS's return to the school. She said that it was reasonable to expect DS to attend the school.
34. Further arguments were advanced on the adequacy of the alternative provision which was offered and I return to that below.

Discussion

35. There are two elements to this application. To succeed, the claimant needs to make out his case on both. First, he needs to show that the defendant was obliged by section 19 to make alternative arrangements for his education. Second, he must establish that they have failed to do so.

Section 19

36. The expression "or otherwise" is used twice in section 19. Its meaning on the first occasion is plain – a local authority must make arrangements for the provision of suitable education either at a school or elsewhere. Its meaning on the second occasion it is used is less obvious. It is clearly intended to widen the class of children for whom alternative arrangements for the provision of education must be made. The two identified groups of such children are those who by reason of illness or exclusion will not receive education. "Or otherwise" is plainly intended to encompass other causes of non-attendance at school or non-receipt of education. There can be little doubt that "or otherwise" is not intended to include simple parental preference; such an interpretation would be flatly inconsistent with the section 7 duty on parents to cause their children to receive "efficient full time education".
37. The courts have considered the meaning of "or otherwise" in section 19 on a number of occasions. I was shown three authorities.
38. In R (G) v Westminster City Council [2004] EWCA Civ 45, a child applied for judicial review of the local authority's refusal to make provision for his education other than at the school at which he was registered. He had been voluntarily removed from the school by his father following a number of incidents of alleged bullying and his temporary exclusion following a fight. His father had indicated that he would not be returning the claimant to the school and had asked the local authority to discharge its duty to arrange for the provision of suitable education for him under s.19 by providing home tuition for him. Although the local authority did make efforts to provide alternative education, it argued that by keeping the child on the register at the school and keeping a place available for him there, it was discharging its duty under section 19. It was argued on the child's behalf that because of depression and stress brought on by having been bullied at the school, he was a person who, by reason of ill health or otherwise, would not receive suitable education unless arrangements were made for this at a school other than that at which he was registered. Judicial review was refused at first instance and the child appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
39. At paragraph 42 and following, Lord Phillips MR said:

42. In the absence of any case precedent, or any extrinsic aid to construction, we shall seek to give section 19 a meaning that accords with the natural meaning of the language used and makes sense, having regard to the overall scheme of the legislation. Section 19 covers the situation where there exists at least one suitable school which, for one reason or another, a child is unable to attend. 'Illness', which is one of the specified reasons, is likely, if it prevents a child from attending a particular school, to prevent that child from attending any school. In such a situation, section 19 requires the local education authority to arrange for the provision of suitable education 'otherwise than at school'. 'Exclusion' prevents a child from attending a particular school. In that situation, section 19 requires the authority to make provision for suitable alternative education, 'at school or otherwise than at school'. In the case of both 'illness' and 'exclusion' the authority has to arrange for the provision of suitable education where it is impossible for the child to attend an existing school. It seems to us that 'otherwise', where used for the second time in section 19, is intended to cover any other situation in which it is not reasonably possible for a child to take advantage of any existing suitable schooling. This conclusion is supported by the 'eiusdem generis' canon of construction, which is no more than an approach which gives a word the natural meaning that it bears having regard to its context.

43. This meaning of 'otherwise' is one that makes sense. If the local education authority has arranged for the provision of education which is suitable for a child and which it is reasonably practicable for the child to enjoy, it would not seem logical that the authority should be under a duty to provide alternative suitable education, simply because, for one reason or another, the child is not taking advantage of the existing facility.

44. This meaning of 'otherwise' also accords well with the overall scheme of the legislation. … The primary duty of seeing that a child goes to school lies on that child's parents — see section 7 of the Act. If the parents fail to perform this duty, the local education authority has power to take coercive action…

46. In any case where a child is not receiving suitable education it is necessary to consider the whole picture in order to decide in what respect, if any, this is attributable to a breach of duty by the local education authority...

47. The fact that parents have misconceived objections to their child attending a particular school does not make the situation one in which it is not reasonably practicable for the child to receive education so as to give rise to an obligation on the part of the authority to provide alternative arrangements: in assessing what is reasonably practicable, the parents' unreasonable objections must be disregarded.

48. It is possible to envisage exceptional situations where, although a school satisfies the criteria in section 19(6) and there is no physical impediment to the child attending that school, it is none the less not reasonable to expect the child to attend that school. Imagine, for instance, a situation in which three other children in the school were facing criminal charges, which they denied, of sexually assaulting that child. In such circumstances it might not be reasonably practicable for the child to continue to attend the school. The local education authority would then come under a duty under section 19 to make alternative arrangements" (emphasis added).

40. That decision was considered by another constitution of the Court of Appeal in C v London Borough of Brent [2006] EWCA Civ 728. There the claimant applied for judicial review of the defendant local authority's decision to provide her with education at a pupil referral unit ("PRU") following her exclusion from school. The claimant, who had made several allegations of bullying, had been excluded from school following an assault on a classmate. The local authority decided she should attend a PRU that provided education for children excluded from school. The claimant argued that the PRU was unsuitable and that her personal circumstances were not being taken into account. The Court of Appeal directed that the full court hear the application for judicial review.
41. Smith LJ referred to paragraphs 46-48 of the judgment of Lord Phillips in G v Westminster and said this:

40 Having read that passage, it does not appear to me to support the proposition that where an excluded pupil is for some reason not attending the educational facility offered by the LEA, the LEA must satisfy itself that the refusal is unreasonable before it can avoid a finding that it is in breach of its section 19 duty to provide suitable education. The focus of paragraph 48 is not upon the question of whether the parents' view according to their understanding of the facts is reasonable. The focus is rather on whether it is objectively unreasonable to expect the child to attend the school in question (emphasis added).

42. In R (R) v Kent County Council [2007] EWHC 2135 a 14-year-old child applied for judicial review of a decision of the defendant local education authority that a particular local secondary school was the appropriate school for him. He had been enrolled at a local secondary school, where he alleged he was bullied and called names relating to his racial appearance. Subsequently he attended a private school, but after a year was withdrawn because of bullying. Thereafter, he was educated at home. The local authority then considered what education should be provided for the child, and in a decision letter it set out its view that his withdrawal from the local secondary school was not reasonable and that the education offered at that school was suitable and available to the child. An educational psychologist, who noted the child's reluctance to return to the school, concluded that it would be psychologically detrimental to him to return there, and that it was crucial to re-integrate him into another school that could meet his needs and had a bullying policy in place.
43. Nicolas Blake QC (as he then was), sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the application. He referred to paragraph 42 and 46 of the decision in G v Westminster and said this at paragraph 20-21;

"So there the Court of Appeal indicate that the "or otherwise" limb of reasons why it is not possible for a child to receive public education should be construed in broadly the like manner as the tests for illness and exclusion, where impossibility is the test, but otherwise is modified by the adjective "reasonably possible". Elsewhere the test is expressed as "reasonably practicable". But the ejusdem generis rule gives an indication of the high test that has to be met. It is apparent from G itself that the question is not whether the parents or S himself have reasonable objections to attending the school, the focus of the court's attention is not upon the parental objections or the child's objections, but upon the objective consideration of whether the education offered is reasonably possible or reasonably practicable to be accessed by the child in question…

In my judgment, those passages indicate that the focus of the section 19 duty is concerned with whether educational provision offered by the local authority is available, is possible and is accessible to the child, although the test is one of reasonable practicable as opposed to absolute impossibility. Nevertheless that is an objective and strict test" (emphasis added).

44. Mr Blake then turned to the question as to who is to decide whether the provisions offered are practicable or reasonable. He said at paragraph 22

"In my judgment, it is clear that questions as to what is suitable education are primarily for the local education authority, though subject to supervision by the court. Equally, one would imagine that what is reasonably practicable should in the first instance at least be grappled with by the education authority, again subject to the supervision by the court. In the case of G, the Court appeared to decide the issue of 'reasonable practicability' for itself. It may well be, however, that there is not much difference in this particular branch 'between the local authority or the court's assessment' of what is practicable because something is either available, objectively speaking, or it is not."

45. I draw from those authorities the following propositions:

(i) Section 19 is intended to cover circumstances in which it is not reasonably possible for a child to take advantage of existing suitable schooling.

(ii) The fact that parents have misconceived objections to their child attending a particular school does not mean the authority is obliged to make alternative arrangements.

(iii) There may be exceptional circumstances where there is no physical impediment to the child attending the school, but it is nonetheless not reasonable to expect the child to attend that school.

(iv) Where that latter question arises, it is to be answered objectively, not by reference to the parents' view of the facts.

(v) The acid test is whether educational provision offered by the local authority is available and accessible to the child.

46. I apply those principles to the facts of the present case.
47. I am entirely satisfied that Tettenhall Wood School is capable of providing efficient education suitable to the age, ability, aptitude and needs of a child like DS. The school has been assessed by OFSTED to be "a good school" on the occasion of each of the last two inspections, the local authority regard it as suitable and there is no evidence of widespread complaint about the education it provides. DS has attended the school for 6 years and, although there have been complaints from his parents on occasions in the past, there was no evidence before me as to events prior to 12 October 2016 fundamentally to call its suitability for him into question.
48. It cannot sensibly be suggested that there is any physical impediment to DS attending the school and the mere fact that Mr and Mrs S would prefer DS to be educated elsewhere is not determinative. The question I must ask myself, therefore, is whether the events on 12 October 2016 mean it is not reasonably possible for DS to take advantage of what would otherwise be the satisfactory schooling offered at Tettenhall Wood School
49. It is argued by the claimant that those events, and the reaction to them of the school and the parents, amount to exceptional circumstances of a character which mean it is not reasonable to expect DS to attend that school.
50. I accept without hesitation that the parents were upset, and justifiably upset, by the way in which DS was transported from school on 12 October. To permit a vulnerable child to travel home in a bus when, apart from the provision of a towel, he was naked from the waist down was a serious error by the school authorities. DS could not have removed his clothing once he was in his harness; that must mean that he was fitted into his harness whilst naked below the waist. As the defendants acknowledged before me, it was wrong of the school staff to accept the bus driver's apparent indication that the bus was ready to move off without first ensuring that the problem created when DS removed the clothing form his lower half was properly addressed.
51. The position was made worse by the fact that DS is not always continent and by the fact that other children were being conveyed in the same vehicle. The complaint of Mr and Mrs S that these events demonstrate that the school was failing properly to respect the dignity of DS is, in my judgment, made out.
52. I accept, moreover, that the schools response to these events was inadequate. I appreciate that the need to ensure that the matter was properly and independently investigated meant that neither the school nor the local authority could discuss the details with the parents immediately. I appreciate too that the conduct of disciplinary proceedings may have inhibited discussion on some aspects of the history. But nonetheless I have no doubt that more could have been done by the school and the authority to communicate with the parents, to listen to their concerns and to offer reassurance. It ought to have been possible to explain the outcome of the independent investigation without revealing material which would prejudice any subsequent disciplinary hearing.
53. However, the evidence makes clear that DS had developed a tendency, on occasions, to remove his clothing at school. His condition meant that, on occasions, he was disinhibited and would self-stimulate in public places. It was the school's job to manage that problem when DS was at, or travelling from, school. The fact that DS exhibited such behaviour in the past does not excuse the school's failures on 12 October. But it does, in my judgment, provide relevant context; dealing with the consequences of the claimant undressing at inappropriate times was a feature of their work with him and it was not a unique event in DS's life.
54. In my judgment, the reaction of Mr and Mrs S to the events of 12 October was not entirely reasonable or proportionate. Within four hours they were demanding that DS be moved to a new school. That, rather more than an explanation for what had happened or consideration of how the problem could be avoided in the future, was their primary response. Whilst I accept, as Ms Hadfield argued, that a less than temperate response was understandable in the hours immediately after the event, the parents have continued ever since to have as their focus the provision of a different school for DS.
55. Moreover, they have made it crystal clear that they want the authority to provide DS with a place at one particular school, namely Rugeley School. It was with a request that a transfer to Rugeley be considered that the claimant's solicitors ended their letter of 3 November 2016. Rugeley is an independent school, the fees for which are particularly expensive. I am left with the clear impression that the events of 12 October were seen by the parents as providing valuable ammunition in their fight to get their son the school they wanted for him. Whilst that is a perfectly proper ambition for the parents to have for their son, it did in my view colour their dealings with the school and the authority from 12 October onwards.
56. In my view, Ms Fox is right to assert that the failures of the school on 12 October constituted a one-off event; there had been no similar failing by the school previously and there was no suggestion of a systemic failure by the school which would undermine its ability to care for DS in the future. No criminal conduct had been suggested or revealed. The school was willing to investigate what had happened and to learn from such mistakes as the investigation revealed. In my judgment, this one event notwithstanding, the school remained suitable for DS.
57. Furthermore, the defendants argued, and it was not disputed, that after this event the school's policies on child protection and safeguarding were reviewed, and revised polices ratified by the Governing Body. All staff at the school had undertaken, or were required to undertake, refresher training in relation to pupil safety, safeguarding and managing school transport. That suggests a willingness on the part of the school to adapt, so as to improve its systems and management and, as a result, to improve the care they would be able to offer DS.
58. In my judgment, against that background, the events of 12 October and the school's response to them do not mean that it was "not reasonably practicable" for DS to attend Tettenhall Wood School. The lack of information provided by the defendant to the claimant's parents, and the limited contact initiated by the school, was regrettable but it does not, in my view, bring this case into the sort of exceptional category described in G v Westminster by making it objectively unreasonable to expect DS to attend the school. On the contrary, with a proper degree of open-mindedness on the part of the parents, the deficiencies in the school's arrangements which the events of 12 October 2016 revealed could have been put right and DS could have returned to the school in safety, and with proper respect for him ensured. Instead, in my judgment, the parents made clear that they were not willing even to contemplate the claimant's return to Tettenhall Wood School.
59. I make it clear that I do not blame the parents of DS alone for what has occurred. On the contrary, they have my sympathy for the difficulties they face and my admiration for their efforts to do the best for their son. Furthermore, as I have made clear above, the school and the authority bear a share of the blame for the difficulties that have arisen. But my task is not to decide who bears what blame, but to decide whether section 19 (1) is engaged. It is my firm conclusion that it is not.
60. In those circumstances, the claimant fails to make out his case that the defendants were obliged to make alternative provision for him.

Suitable alternative provision

61. In the light of that conclusion, it is not necessary for me to address the second element of the claim. For the sake of completeness, however, I set out, in summary form, my views on this issue.
62. Ms Fox argued that the defendant was offering to provide adequate education via the school's outreach programme or at home. She says the claimant's parents refused, or never took up, the offer of outreach support. She says that the Nightingale Centre were commissioned to provide tuition for 10 hours each week, but their attempts to do so failed because of the claimant's behaviour and the response of Mrs S. She says a company called Progress Care were commissioned to provide "sensory work" with the claimant and Regis Group were instructed to provide four hours educational provision each week. But the claimant's parents have again not taken up the offer. She argues that, in effect, all attempts to provide education had been rebuffed by the claimant's parents. Nonetheless, she says, the authority remained willing to make proper provision available for the claimant.
63. Had it remained an issue in the case, I would have rejected the defendant's submissions in this regard. In my view, what was offered to the claimant fell a long way short of adequate educational provision.
64. Ms Hadfield referred to statutory guidance produced in accordance with the 1996 Act. The guidance provides at paragraph 10.39 that:

"Local Authorities must make arrangements where, for any reason, a child of compulsory school age would not otherwise receive suitable education. Suitable education means efficient education suitable to a child or young person's age ability or aptitude and to any SEN he or she may have. This education must be full time, unless the local authority determines that for reasons relating to the physical or mental health of the child, a reduced level of education would be in the child's best interest" (emphasis added).

65. She points out that under paragraph 10.40, where education is arranged elsewhere than at school, it "should be on a par with mainstream schools". Further, the guidance provides that where "alternative provision is specified in a child or young person's EHC plan the local authority must arrange its provision".
66. There was no evidence before me that the defendant had carried out any formal assessment to the effect that a reduced level of education would be in DS' best interest. I accept Ms Hadfield's submission that, in those circumstances, where educational provision is required under section 19, it must be full time, on a par with mainstream schooling and in line with the EHC plan.
67. Both the new and the original EHC plan provided that DS should be educated at a school; DS was not being so educated. The provision of a maximum of 10 hours educational assistance a week does not, in my judgment, constitute full time education, even when taken with the offer to provide "outreach" from Tettenhall Wood School. The log produced by the Nightingale Centre demonstrates that the EHC plan was not being fully addressed. I note, in particular, that DS was not receiving educational provision sufficient to meet the requirements for cognition and learning set out in section E3-E4 of the EHC plan.
68. It follows that, had I found that the defendant authority was under a duty to make alternative provision for DS's education, I would have found that they had failed in their attempts to do so. However, for the reasons set out above, I have concluded that they were not under such a duty because Tettenhall Wood School remained suitable and available for him.

Conclusion

69. In those circumstances, this application for judicial review must fail.
70. I note that the new plan provides for DS to attend Wightwick Hall School and that he can be accommodated there from 10 July 2017.