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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Diop, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWHC 1934 (Admin) (26 July 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2018/1934.html Cite as: [2018] EWHC 1934 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
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THE QUEEN on the application of AMETH DIOP |
Claimant |
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- and – |
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT |
Defendant |
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Mr Eric Metcalfe (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 13 June 2018
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Crown Copyright ©
DAVID PITTAWAY QC :
"Bail accommodation is provided in the form of Initial Accommodation with shared facilities (followed by a move to dispersal accommodation within a couple of weeks), Standard Dispersal Accommodation which is self-contained to a greater or lesser degree, or Complex (bespoke) Bail Accommodation. Section 4 (1)(c) support can be refused by the Home Office where the cost of sourcing bespoke accommodation in any one case is considered too high, and such a refusal attracts a right of appeal to the Asylum Support Tribunal.
If a detained applicant for Section 4 bail accommodation has been convicted of a criminal offence, at an early stage in the application process Home Office staff are required to determine the nature of the offence, make enquiries of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and IRC centre management, and then identify and allocate the appropriate type of Section 4 accommodation to be sourced. Health and access issues may also be considered by the Home Office at this stage"
"A.1.1 The Authority expects that the substantial majority of dispersals shall take place within 9 Working Days of the Provider receiving the relevant Accommodation Request. However, the Authority may give notice of less than 9 Working Days (see 2.8.1)
...
A.1.4 The Provider must submit Accommodation Proposals to the Authority by the time required in the relevant Accommodation Request" (Home Office, 2012: 72) Since 2012, the Home Office has procured Section 4 accommodation, including Section 4 (1)(c ) bail accommodation, from three firms (G4S, Serco, and Clearel) under COMPASS35 contracts36."
"14 Chapter 5 of the UKVI s.4 Policy contains instructions to the Section 4 Bail Team for dealing with applications for bail accommodation. An application form is required. These applicants may be asylum seekers (who could also apply under s.95), failed asylum seekers (who could also apply under s.4(2) and (3) ) or people who have never had an asylum application but are otherwise in detention under any provision of the Immigration Acts. There are three types of accommodation provided by the SSHD (acting through UKVI) under the UKVI s.4 Policy, and in this respect as in others the content of the Home Office s.4 Policy is very similar (often identical). The three types of accommodation are:-
i) Initial Accommodation (IA), or Level 1 accommodation. This is usually hostel type accommodation which is short term. People stay in such accommodation while more suitable long term accommodation is found. This can be used for bail applicants, but is not suitable for offenders who present a high risk, as shown by a conviction for a violent, sexual or serious drug offence or a MAPPA category 1, 2 or 3, level 2 & 3 3 . This means that such people are handled outside the mainstream of the system. An early decision must be made that they are not suitable for Level 1 and whether Level 2 or 3 is appropriate. I will call this the "threshold decision."
ii) Standard Dispersal Accommodation, or Level 2 accommodation. This is longer term accommodation which is provided by third party contractors to the SSHD. It may be shared accommodation and may be unsuitable for people who present a particular level of risk.
iii) Level 3 or Complex Bail Dispersal Accommodation. The UKVI s.4 Policy says that "in the rare event the applicant is assessed as being unsuitable for Standard Dispersal Accommodation Home Office case workers should assess whether Complex Bail Dispersal Accommodation is suitable". The UKVI s.4 Policy says that this will usually only be the case when the Offender Manager 4 has identified specific licence conditions which could not be met in Standard Dispersal Accommodation. This implies that Level 3 applicants will "usually" be subject to licence after release while still serving a prison sentence. In such cases, an arrangement will usually already be in place to regulate the offender once released from immigration detention, and that will include a restriction on where s/he can live. The accommodation provided under s.4 at Level 3 will usually be a single occupancy flat which means that the occupant does not present a risk to those with whom s/he shares premises. Its location must be suitable also, and properties near schools and parks will not be judged suitable for some offenders."
"62. It seems right to start with a firm expression of the importance of the right to liberty, and to a speedy determination of the propriety of administrative detention by an impartial court. Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights identifies key principles of the common law in this regard. The common law history is outlined in A v. SSHD [2005] 2 AC 68 [36]. Lord Bingham there sets out the submission made by counsel for the claimants in that case but does so in a way which makes it clear that he accepts the common law origin of the fundamental importance of the right to personal freedom. This approach to Article 5 and Article 5.4 in particular is mandated by R (Osborn) v. Parole Board [2014] AC 1115 [57]-[63]. I start from the proposition that the claimants' right to liberty is a fundamental one which the courts will protect to ensure that any restrictions are lawful, proportionate and subject to judicial oversight.
63. This starting point affects a number of aspects of the case. The importance of the right requires proper protection by fair procedures and judicial oversight. Where detention has no defined duration its impact may be particularly damaging to the detainee. I was supplied with the Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons CM 9186 January 2016 by Stephen Shaw to illustrate this observation. In the case of immigration detention, the length of the detention is constrained always by Hardial Singh[8] principles which do not require a certain release date to be known at the start of the detention. The lawfulness of detention is determined when challenged on that basis by the High Court in judicial review proceedings, and in damages actions. There is, therefore, judicial oversight of detention. The present claims concern bail prior to the Hardial Singh end point which is an important safeguard against unnecessary detention"
"69. I do nevertheless conclude that the statutory power in s.4(1)(c) is a power coupled with a duty. It is unnecessary to decide whether the duty extends to the existence of a policy of the kind I have been describing because there is one. The policy itself is not challenged as being unlawful. In my judgment, as Mr. Tam was inclined to accept, there is a duty to operate that policy fairly and rationally. That involves a duty to determine applications fairly and rationally and to apply the relevant policy. Unusually for an application for assistance, the task of assembling all relevant material falls not on the applicant but on UKVI under the UKVI s.4 Policy. If there is a duty to deal with applications fairly and rationally, this must extend to all the parts of the process for which the SSHD is responsible. The duty to deal fairly and rationally with an application in these circumstances is not merely confined to adjudicating on material supplied by the applicant. This is not, in practice, a materially different duty from a duty to make reasonable efforts to provide accommodation. I prefer the formulation of the duty as a duty to act fairly and rationally and in accordance with the policy when confronted with an application because it seems to me to arise from very clear public law principles which regulate the exercise of powers. The argument which Nicol J summarises in Razai at paragraph 25 by analogy with s.117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was not advanced before me and is not entirely convincing because s.117 in terms creates a duty whereas s.4(1)(c) in terms confers a power. The route I prefer leads to a very similar result."
"76. Delay in processing an application whose outcome will affect the liberty of the applicant may require the intervention of the court. R v. Home Secretary ex.p Phansopkar [1976] 1 QB 606, 626B-G per Scarman LJ is authority for this, if any were needed. This is a principle of the common law. That was a case where the right to family life under Article 8 was engaged rather than the right to liberty, but the common law has always protected the right to liberty. Habeas corpus and bail are creations of domestic law in England and Wales. In R (Noorkoiv) v. SSHD and another [2002] EWCA Civ 770 the Court of Appeal held that the obligation to avoid delay in determining a person's right to be released is a more intense obligation than the duty to try criminal cases within a reasonable time. Lack of resources and administrative necessity do not justify such delays. This was a decision framed in terms of Article 5. It is authority for the need for public authorities to have effective systems for taking steps which are designed to affect the release from detention of any person."
"81 Mr. Tam submits that the cause of the delays in the three cases before me, and in many others no doubt, is not unlawfulness but, at worst, maladministration. He also submits that the systemic delay question is not justiciable. The remedy for maladministration is by accountability to Parliament and the Ombudsman. This is really because a complex multi-agency system such as the present involves many decisions and many components. I reject the submission that the court has no ability to determine the lawfulness of the operation of a system which is relevant to the length of administrative detention. It appears to me that this is one of the more important functions a court may have to fulfil. The authorities which I have cited above are all to the like effect. I have quoted Stanley Burnton J above as an example of a case where the court did just that, but exercised appropriate restraint in deciding what remedy was appropriate. The Master of the Rolls in the Detention Action case cited above when dealing with the Fast Track Rules (FTR) for asylum appeals said:
"For the reasons that I have given the FTR are systemically unfair and unjust. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. The object of the SSHD in placing appeals in the fast track is the entirely laudable one of dealing with them quickly……….But the consequences for an asylum seeker of mistakes in the process are potentially disastrous. That is why section 22(4) of the 2007 Act recognises that justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency….It is too heavily weighted in favour of [speed and efficiency] and needs to be adjusted. Precisely how that is done is a matter for the Tribunal Procedure Committee and Parliament."
82 The Fast Track Rules were rules for speedy determination of appeals and the court is very well placed to assess their fairness. That was a different kind of exercise from that which is involved in this case. The fairness of procedural rules is obviously justiciable, but the SSHD made a somewhat similar submission at [28] which was rejected. The court should respect the rule making process, but that must not be taken too far. The court guards its jurisdiction in cases involving liberty jealously. Where the lawfulness of a system is under consideration, the court will not seek to design a better system or to impose any targets on the executive. If the system is unlawful, the court will say so and leave it to the executive and Parliament to remedy the position: see as an example, the approach of Elias J in R (Mersin) v. SSHD [2000] INLR 511 at pages 3 and 4 when the judge rejected out of hand a submission that the court ought to supervise the remedial process.
83 On that basis the operation of a system of this kind is justiciable.
84 In relation to maladministration Mr. Tam relies on R (S) v. SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 546 [39]-[41] per Carnwath LJ as he then was, and Moussaoui v. SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 50 [21]-[26] per the Master of the Rolls. The court is concerned with illegality and not maladministration.
85 The s.4 bail system does not work for high risk offenders. The timescales set for herself by the SSHD (and included in the policies and COMPASS contracts) are routinely not met, and missed by substantial margins. Each of these delays builds on others to amount to lengthy inactivity. In itself that does not amount to illegality. It may simply be that the timescales are hopelessly optimistic for these difficult cases. A failure to meet these deadlines is not evidence of unlawfulness. I agree with Thirlwall J that ground 2 was not arguable. That ground sought to say that each time a deadline, or target, was not met this was unlawful delay"
"91 It is not appropriate to seek to analyse the facts of each case to identify individual decisions which caused delay because that would involve the court in an impossible task and would not result in any finding of illegality in any event over and above the one I have already made. The reason why it would not result in any finding of unlawfulness is that this exercise would be an enquiry into maladministration of the kind identified and precluded in the authorities at paragraph 83 above. It does appear that there was maladministration in each case in that the chronologies show a lack of vigour in pursuing COMPASS providers and NOMS and the police and, perhaps, a too ready acceptance of objections to addresses by the latter two agencies. In the case of Ali there was a significant period when his case was simply overlooked and nothing was done. That maladministration was not of itself illegal, but there came a time in each case where it put the SSHD in breach of her legal duty which I have identified. The process simply took so long in each case that it was not being conducted fairly or rationally.
92. I hold that in each case the time taken to resolve the application amounted to a breach by the SSHD of her duty to deal with the applications fairly and rationally. I cannot allocate that unlawfulness to particular decisions or to particular periods of delay for the reason I have explained. In effect, my finding is similar to that of Stanley Burnton J in Salih. It is therefore essential that the system is overhauled and entirely appropriate that there is to be a pilot by NOMS of a system designed to reduce delays for which it is responsible. When arrangements come to be made under the Immigration Act 2016 the failures of the existing system must be addressed."
"95. There is also no easy way to determine in each case the point at which the processing of the s.4 application had gone on so long that it became unlawful. That is a fact specific decision of the kind required when considering whether any particular period of detention was unlawful under the Hardial Singh principles. The Court of Appeal in Fardous v. SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 931 explained the nature of that kind of decision and made it clear that there are no rules of thumb by which an answer can be produced."