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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council, R (On the Application Of) v Highways England [2018] EWHC 3059 (Admin) (16 November 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2018/3059.html Cite as: [2018] EWHC 3059 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
PLANNING COURT
1 Bridge Street West Manchester M60 9DJ Judgment handed down at: Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
THE QUEEN on the application of SEFTON METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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HIGHWAYS ENGLAND |
Defendant |
____________________
Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council) for the Claimant
Tim Buley (instructed by General Counsel's Office of Highways England) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 23rd October 2018
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ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
STRAND, LONDON WC2A 2LL
DATE: 16/11/2018
BEFORE :
MR JUSTICE KERR
HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mr Justice Kerr:
Introduction:
Statutory Provisions, Directions and Guidance:
"what we expect Highways England to achieve and how they must behave in discharging their duties and in delivering our vision and plans for the network, set out in the [RIS]".
"is about more than just complying with the letter of the law. We expect the company to go the extra mile in the way it engages with road users and collaborates with other organisations to develop shared solutions."
Facts:
"[t]owards the end of this year … to be in a position to present our outline plans and proposals to members of the public, at what is known as 'preferred route consultation'. This will be your opportunity to discuss with us the options we are proposing, as well as those that we have dismissed. Ultimately, the decision on what will be chosen as our preferred route will be made by the Secretary of State for Transport after considering the public's view and our recommendations".
Issues, Reasoning and Conclusions:
(1) Highways England had misunderstood its functions by behaving as if it were an ordinary private sector developer. Its functions are public and it is not, unlike a private developer, free to advance only its own commercial interest. It was obliged to act in the public interest; an ordinary developer is not. The fairness of the consultation exercise had to be viewed in that light.
(2) Highways England was bound under section 5 of the 2015 Act to co-operate with the council in exercising its functions, and by section 6(1) and (3) to act in accordance with the terms of the Licence. These required it to co-operate with others in order to take account of local needs, priorities and plans in planning (paragraphs 4.2(f) and 5.17(c)).
(3) Specifically, Highways England was required to "co-operate with, consult with and take reasonable account of the views of", among others, the council and local communities (paragraph 5.18), in a way that is demonstrably open and transparent, positive and responsive and collaborative (paragraph 5.19(a)-(c)).
(4) The consultation had to be "consultation or engagement proportionate to the circumstances in accordance with government guidance on consultation principles" (paragraph 2.2). These provisions in the Licence, together with the statutory underpinning of sections 5 and 6 of the 2015 Act, amounted to a statutory duty to consult on more than just the two options.
(5) By failing to consider seriously and consult upon the option of building a tunnel and rejecting the council's formal request to include the tunnel option in the consultation process, Highways England acted in breach of these duties and the consultation was consequently unfair and unlawful.
(6) Mr Cosgrove accepted that Highways England was not bound to include in the process every discounted option, however remote or fanciful it might be. For example, he accepted that Highways England had not been obliged to include in the consultation the option of building a flyover or overpass to link the two motorways with the port.
(7) The tunnel was different because it was a serious prospect supported by the council whose area includes the Rimrose Valley Park and the A5036. The cost was not necessarily prohibitive. The economic benefits expected to flow from development of the port will be substantial. The environmental damage from both the online and offline route options would be severe.
(8) Although the case was not put on the basis of a legitimate expectation, Highways England had promised in the third newsletter that it would consult not just on the two options to which consideration was eventually restricted. It promised to consult on those options "as well as those that we have dismissed". That promise had to be kept if the consultation was to be fair and lawful in accordance with the Licence.
(9) The promise was broken in the Minister of State's letter of 22 August 2016 refusing to include the tunnel option in the consultation process and thereby rendering that process unfair, unlawful and in breach of the Licence provisions. The promise was not "publicly withdrawn" (see R (Save Britain's Heritage v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 2137, per Coulson LJ at [51]).
(10) The exclusion of the tunnel option from the consultation was a "show stopper" requiring the intervention of the court at this stage, to borrow the phrase of Carnwath LJ (as he then was); see R (Hillingdon LBC) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWHC 626 (Admin) at [69]. It was no answer that the decision to build the new highway has yet to be formally taken. The tunnel option has been ousted and it will be impossible to resurrect it later unless the court intervenes.
(11) The issue was one of procedural fairness for the court and is not governed by the Wednesbury standard. The unfairness lies in loss of the opportunity to advocate the excluded option at a time when the proposals are still at a formative stage: see R (Medway Council) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2002] EWHC 2516 (Admin) per Maurice Kay J at [27]-[32], where the exclusion from an airport runway consultation of a possible new runway at Gatwick Airport meant the consultation was unfair.
(12) The tunnel option was presented to members of the public at consultation events in early 2017. That was done recognising the obligation to consult about discounted options as well as the two considered viable. Highways England had accepted in its letter of 13 March 2017 that it was obliged to do so.
(13) The letter of 13 March 2017 wrongly asserted that the steering group had endorsed the findings in the feasibility study, including its rejection of the tunnel option as not practical. Highways England had undertaken in July 2017 to do more work on the tunnel option, which would be pointless if it had been discounted entirely. But that further work was not done.
(14) The DCO process is not an adequate alternative and is not capable of curing the unfairness. The pre-application consultation is on only one option, the construction of the offline route. Advocating a tunnel option as a viable alternative and therefore a basis for objecting to the DCO, is no substitute for consulting on that option while the proposals are still at a formative stage. The objection will be met with the response that the tunnel option has already been discounted.
(1) The position of Highways England was closely analogous to that of a private developer. It was entrusted with the task of building the network in accordance with the RIS. It did not have any free standing statutory duty to consult. The primary duty imposed by the Licence was one of co-operation, not consultation.
(2) Indeed, there was no specific duty to consult at all, in advance of selecting the preferred option that would become the subject of a DCO application. In so far as the Licence required it to do so, the obligation was flexible not rigid and did not prescribe the limits of the consultation exercise.
(3) It was for Highways England to set the parameters of the consultation. The authorities had consistently recognised the entitlement of consulting bodies, both statutory and non-statutory, to delineate the scope of a consultation exercise, including the ability to consult by reference to a preferred option or a range of possible preferred options.
(4) It would make no sense for Highways England to consider a tunnel option in detail, as that option had been identified early in the process, when the feasibility study was done, as not feasible because it was seen as representing poor value for money. Detailed examination of a non-starter would waste time and money and would be a sham because it could not realistically be undertaken with an open mind.
(5) The third newsletter of June 2016 had not contained any promise worth the name; it meant only that there would be an opportunity to comment on options that were regarded as impractical, as well as the two options that were serious contenders to be subjected to detailed examination.
(6) Even if the wording were interpreted as a promise to consult on a tunnel option, the promise was unequivocally withdrawn by the Minister in his letter of 22 August 2016. It did not matter that the withdrawal was not set out in a public document; this was not a legitimate expectation case and it was not unfair to withdraw an option the Secretary of State would not pay for.
(7) This was a case in which the consultation process was fair overall; nothing had gone clearly and radically wrong in the course of it. The advocates of a tunnel had their opportunity to advocate one, albeit with no realistic prospect of success given the financial constraints on the project. There was no "show stopper" requiring the intervention of the court.
(8) The DCO process was highly relevant to the fairness of the consultation. Although the pre-application consultation would only relate to the plan to build the new offline route, objectors would be able to object by advocating the tunnel as a less environmentally damaging, albeit more expensive, alternative.
(9) The Examining Authority and the Secretary of State would be obliged to consider conscientiously those arguments and the content of the environmental impact assessment before, respectively, recommending and then deciding whether to grant development consent for the project.
(10) Even if the grounds of complaint were well-founded, relief must be refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981: it is highly likely the outcome would have been substantially the same if the matters complained of had not occurred. It would make no sense to grant relief now when no decision with direct and immediate legal consequences has yet been taken.
"is to let those who have potential interest in the subject-matter know in clear terms what the proposal is and exactly why it is under positive consideration, telling them enough (which may be a good deal) to enable them to make an intelligent response. The obligation, although it may be quite onerous, goes no further than this."