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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Tabuncic & Anor v Government of Moldova [2021] EWHC 1269 (Admin) (14 May 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2021/1269.html Cite as: [2021] EWHC 1269 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
IN AN APPEAL UNDER SECTION 103
OF THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
and
MR JUSTICE HOLGATE
____________________
(1) ADRIANE TABUNCIC (2) IGOR IGOR COEV (aka IGOR KOEV) |
Appellants |
|
- and - |
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GOVERNMENT OF MOLDOVA |
Respondent |
____________________
the First Appellant
David Josse QC and Louisa Collins (instructed by Saunders Solicitors) for
the Second Appellant
Helen Malcolm QC and Hannah Hinton (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) for
the Respondent
Hearing date: 20 April 2021
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Stuart-Smith LJ:
The factual background
Extradition Request in respect of Mr Tabuncic
Extradition request in respect of Mr Coev
The extradition proceedings
"If the Citizen Adrian Tabuncic is exposed to inter-prisoner violence, requiring protection under the Enforcement Code, and where the perpetrator(s) shares his cell or has access to areas shared by Adrian Tabuncic, the perpetrator(s) will be moved out of the cell/vicinity while Adrian Tabuncic will remain housed in the cell(s) included in this assurance. He will be moved only to one of the other mentioned cells referred to in the assurance.
In exceptional, unforeseen, circumstances where he requires protection under the Enforcement Code or for disciplinary reasons he will not be placed in solitary confinement for any period longer than strictly necessary and only in the renovated solitary confinement cells at Balti No 11."
"7. The State guarantees reasonable protection against violence and the personal security of Igor Coev under Article 206 of the Enforcement Code, which in case the detainee feels in danger, he may request from the prison administration to keep him in safe custody as set out in the code:
(1) The state ensures the personal security of the convicts.
(2) When the danger to the personal security of the convicted person appears, he is entitled to address a request to any of the staff management of prison, regarding the assurance of personal security. In this case, the person in charge (staff management of prison) is obliged to take immediate measures to ensure the personal security of the convicted person, and depends of the case to ensure also the state protection measures.
(3) The prison administration shall undertake the measures to remove the danger of the personal security of the convicted person. The respective measures will be maintained for as long as the purpose requires."
"In order to ensure the personal security of the inmate, the administration of [the] penitentiary is obliged to isolate him from the other inmates, using for these purposes various rooms, which corresponds to the requirements for detention of this persons. In exceptional cases, the cells of the disciplinary isolators can be used, and the restrictions on the conditions of detention in the disciplinary isolator, the basis and the mode of disciplinary isolation, in this case, do not extend to the inmate transferred for the reasons of personal security."
"73. … Specific cells have been nominated by the Government. It is unclear whether they would be transferred to another one of the nominated cells in the same or another prison or whether it is intended that they would be transferred into another cell/room outside the assurance. If they are to remain within the same prison, what will happen to those who have threatened them and how will the defendants be practically protected from reprisals?"
"8. If the citizen Igor Coev is exposed to inter-prisoner violence, requiring protection under the Enforcement Code, and where the perpetrator(s) shares his cell or has access to areas shared by Igor Coev, the perpetrator(s) will be moved out of the cell/vicinity while Igor Coev will remain housed in the cell(s) included in this assurance. 9. In exceptional, unforeseen, circumstances where he requires protection under the Enforcement Code or for disciplinary reasons he will not be placed in solitary confinement for any period longer than strictly necessary and only in the renovated solitary confinement cells at Balti No.11. 10. Citizen Igor Coev will at all times be subject to a regime which will allow for at least one house of exercise in the open air every day as part of a broader programme of out-of-cell activities."
"11. The assurances are clear. If the defendants are exposed to inter-prisoner violence any perpetrator who shares the same cell or who has access to common areas will be moved out of the cell or vicinity. Mr Coev will remain accommodated in his same cell, Mr Tabuncic will remain in the same cell or in another cell identified in his assurance.
12. In exceptional, unforeseen circumstances where Mr Coev or Mr [Tabuncic][1] require protection or where for disciplinary reasons it is necessary for him to be placed in solitary confinement, they will be detained in a renovated solitary confinement cell at Balti 11 (cells which Mr Tugushi has previously conceded are Article 3 compliant) for no longer than strictly necessary.
13. I am satisfied that these plans are clear and on the face of it are workable."
"16. It is impossible to eradicate all risks of inter prisoner violence in any prison. I have previously found that there is evidence of a powerful prison sub-culture that is tolerated by the prison authorities. However, I am satisfied that the assurances provided in this case provides the defendants with reasonable protection against violence by non-state agents. I am satisfied that if the terms of the assurances are fulfilled there is no real risk of the defendants being subjected to violence that would violate Article 3.
17. I am satisfied that it is compatible with the defendants Article 3 rights to send the case to the Secretary of State but only on the basis of the assurances of 6 April 2020."
The appeals
The CPT Report and the Respondent's response
"48. The problem of inter-prisoner violence and intimidation in Moldovan prisons has long been a source of serious concern for the CPT. In the report on its 2018 ad hoc visit, the Committee called upon the Moldovan authorities to take determined action to address this problem, in particular by taking effective measures to tackle the related phenomenon of an informal prison hierarchy.
The findings of the CPT's delegation during the 2020 visit showed that the problem of inter- prisoner intimidation and violence among the adult male inmate population remained as acute as ever and was, as in the past, largely linked to the well-established informal hierarchies in the country's prison system.
49. According to medical files examined by the delegation at Cahul, Chis?ina?u and Taraclia prisons, inmates were regularly found with injuries indicative of inter-prisoner violence, such as haematomas around the eyes and, albeit to a lesser extent, with more serious injuries (e.g. a broken arm). As had been the case in the past, practically all the cases of inter-prisoner violence remained unreported, due to the climate of fear and intimidation created within the establishments by inmates who were at the top of the informal prison hierarchy, as well as a general lack of trust in the staff's ability to guarantee prisoner safety. Unsurprisingly, many of the prisoners met by the delegation were very reluctant to speak about the circumstances in which they had sustained their injuries, and some were visibly scared. On a few occasions, the delegation was followed by prisoners who tried to put pressure on other inmates in order to prevent them from talking freely with the delegation. Nevertheless, a number of inmates in each of the prisons visited did provide accounts of beatings, threats of violence and extortion by other inmates, as well as sexual assault. At Chis?ina?u Prison, the delegation heard an allegation that a sex offender had been deliberately placed in a cell with prisoners known for violence toward sex offenders (so called "press-khata"). The prisoner concerned claimed that he had been severely beaten and raped by his cellmates, apparently as a punishment for his sex offender profile. However, the prisoner did not submit a complaint due to fear of retaliation.
50. Despite the vehement denials of the Moldovan authorities in their responses to the CPT's previous visit reports, it was again clear that there was tacit collaboration between the management of the prisons visited and the informal prisoner hierarchies as regards maintaining order among inmates and ensuring the "smooth operation" of the establishments. Most strikingly, the informal hierarchy had a say in the initial "classification" and placement in cells of newly admitted prisoners, as well as in a decision as to which prisoners were to be permitted to work. This helped the informal leaders to constantly enrol "unexperienced" prisoners into the informal community of inmates, offering protection and other support in exchange for their money and loyalty. This arrangement also meant that informal leaders were free to use intimidation and a "reasonable" level of violence against those who refused to contribute to an illegal collective fund ("obshchak") managed by the informal hierarchy's leader."
" 57. In the CPT's view, the continuing failure of Moldovan authorities to ensure a safe and secure environment for prisoners is directly linked to a number of factors, notably the chronic shortage of custodial staff, reliance on informal prisoner leaders to keep control over the inmate population and the existence of large-capacity dormitories. At the same time, there is no proper risk and needs assessment of prisoners upon admission, nor a classification of inmates to identify in which prison, block or cell prisoners should be placed. The increased vulnerability of some prisoners (such as sex offenders, persons with mental health issues or drug dependencies) clearly calls for the need to identify potential risks and vulnerabilities in order to prevent these prisoners from being subject to violence and exploitation by other inmates."
The Simionescu breach letter
i) On 10 February 2021 Mr Coev's team had provided the CPS with a purportedly authentic Moldovan Court document indicating that Mr Coev now faced only a suspended sentence. It was said that instructions "are being taken to check the authenticity and whether the request for his extradition will be withdrawn" and that enquiries had been made with the Moldovan MOJ, though it was not said when;
ii) The letter relating to breach of Mr Simionescu's assurances was being investigated. It was said that meeting had taken place between the CPS and the NPA on and since 25 March 2021 and that "the CPS has not been provided with the reply to the issue of the alleged breach in an admissible and disclosable format." It was said that a state emergency in Moldova meant that "the personnel involved are working at 30% capacity." Hence the Respondent could not finalise its skeleton argument as directed;
iii) The Appellants' skeleton had been served late, being served 7 business days before the hearing rather than 10.
The present hearing
Discussion and Conclusions
Note 1 The judgment below refers to Mr Tugushi both here and 3 lines later. Here it is plain that the reference should be to Mr Tabuncic; the later reference is not quite so clear. [Back]