 |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> W & Ors v Crown Court at Croydon [2024] EWHC 3373 (Admin) (13 December 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2024/3373.html Cite as: [2024] EWHC 3373 (Admin) |
||
[New search] [Printable PDF version] [Help]
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand London WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
____________________
| (1) W (2) X (3) Y (4) Z |
Claimants |
|
| - and - |
||
| CROWN COURT AT CROYDON |
Defendant |
|
| - and - |
||
| LONDON SOUTH CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE |
Interested Party |
____________________
Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE
Web: www.epiqglobal.com/en-gb/ Email: [email protected]
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
THE DEFENDANT did not appear and was not represented.
MS SCHUTZER-WEISSMANN appeared on behalf of the Interested Party.
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
"5.1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
…
5.4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful".
"Well dealing with the bail applications which have been submitted by four defendants: W, X, Z and Y. I make clear that I have read the carefully prepared submissions which were provided on behalf of all of the four defendants. I have also considered carefully the applications made in respect of each of them and I have considered carefully the conditions that have been proposed on behalf of each of the four of them.
I, of course, have the advantage of knowing about this case having been the trial judge and having sat on the Section 28 and listened to the opening, I am very familiar with the evidence.
I recognise full well that these defendants are of good character. I am also conscious of the fact that the four defendants face very serious charges of an honour-based kidnap. But the facts of this case, the evidence in this case, the circumstances of the case, leave me with substantial grounds for believing that each of the defendants will fail to surrender, interfere with witnesses and commit further offences. And so those - I do not believe that there are conditions that are provided or can be offered by the defendants which are sufficient to allay those concerns. So I am refusing bail on all three of those grounds. Thank you very much".
31. Section 29(3) is in clear and unambiguous terms. The relevant words are "the High Court has no jurisdiction over a Crown Court" in matters relating to trial on indictment. It is noteworthy that Parliament did not employ the words "relating to the indictment", but has deliberately adopted the much broader phrase embracing "matters relating to the trial on indictment" (emphasis mine). That is a broad definition and it is plainly designed to prohibit this court trespassing upon the trial process itself. Collateral issues that have nothing to do with the trial are not covered by the prohibition.
32. The one theme that stems from Lord Browne-Wilkinson's speech in the Manchester Crown Court case and Maurice Kay LJ in the Isleworth Crown Court case is the trial process, (the trial itself) is forbidden territory.
33. Decisions made within the trial itself are plainly matters relating to trial on indictment. Decisions made in advance of the trial relating to bail and decisions made after the trial (before a retrial or before sentence) are amenable to judicial review challenge. I have to say I have certain misgivings about post trial/pre-sentence bail decisions as a trial is an indivisible process; but that issue is not for debate in this case. Accordingly, I will say no more on that.
34. Of course, pre-trial rulings on the admissibility of evidence and such like are intrinsic to the trial and may not be challenged in judicial review proceedings. The purpose of bail is to secure the attendance of a defendant at his or her trial. Prior to the trial that is collateral to the trial process. However, once the trial has started, bail, and indeed other decisions (see TH) are "matters relating to trial on indictment"(emphasis added). Once the trial has started there is no demand for the issue to be intrinsic to the indictment, it simply has to be a decision or matter relating to the trial. Bail is plainly a matter that relates to the trial process once the trial has started. For my part, I am convinced this interpretation is compliant with European Convention jurisprudence, striking as it does a proportionate response by way of achieving the right balance between judicial decision and the need to focus on the trial, set against no High Court review.
"A detailed hearing took place, with counsel for both sides appearing before the Judge. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Judge gave a ruling in which she refused bail, a transcript of which is available. The Judge set out the nature of the charge facing the Claimant and a summary of the prosecution evidence updated, as it had been, for the Judge and as presented to her. She stated that the case against the Claimant was "extremely strong" and "extremely serious". His account was "implausible". Were the Claimant to be convicted, he would receive a very substantial sentence. She stated in terms that she took into account the fact that the Claimant was of good character with family in Liverpool, and went on:
'… [The Claimant] is a man who... quite inexplicably in many ways, has been released under investigation for many months before he was re-interviewed, where he gave no comment and was subsequently charged. It's right to say that he has attended... the voluntary interview and... he appears at the magistrate's court But I am quite satisfied, as was the District Judge, that there was a very real and substantial risk of this man failing to surrender if I were to grant him bail, and that risk is not met by any of the proposed conditions, even if I add to it not applying for any travel documentation. So this application for bail is refused'."
"20. The Judge, it is then submitted:
i. failed to acknowledge the right to bail;
ii. failed to explain why she rejected the evidence that – notwithstanding the Claimant's knowledge of the seriousness and strength of the case against him – he had attended on the police and at court when requested, in favour of the findings that there was a very real and substantial risk of the Claimant failing to surrender if granted bail;
iii. appeared to question the police decision to release the Claimant under investigation in 2017 and thereafter.
21. It is the second of these complaints that lies at the heart of the Claimant's case. What is said is that the Judge weighed his attendance and compliance in the balance, but simply dismissed it without giving any proper reasons for doing so.
22. Reference is made to R (on the application of Rojas) v Snaresbrook Crown Court [2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin) ('Rojas') (at [21]), where the statutory duty to give reasons for removing bail which had previously been granted was emphasised Whilst it is accepted that this is not a case where bail was being removed, it is suggested that the same principles apply, by analogy, to a situation where someone has previously been released under investigation.
23. In R (on the application of Fergus) v Southampton Crown Court [2008] EWHC 3273 ('Fergus') Silber J (at [20] and [21) referred to the critical test that for custody to be imposed, custody had to be necessary. He confirmed that any reason justifying the decision to withdraw bail had to be stated by the decision maker, and that such reason must relate to the facts:
'…The underlying facts have to be put forward.'
24. The Claimant submits further that the duty to give reasons when withdrawing bail, and by analogy here, encompasses a duty to explain why a change from previous status is necessary. The integrity of the system, it is said, is compromised if judges overturn previous decisions without good reason. Anecdotally, Ms Lumsdon informed the Court that defence solicitors advise their clients as a matter of course that, absent a material change of circumstances and provided that the client has complied with attendance requirements on the police and the courts the courts will effectively honour the previous police decision".
"29. Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, materially, as follows:
'Right to liberty and security: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:... (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person affected... when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so...'
30. In my judgment, Article 5 does not add anything to the consideration of this particular question. Very shortly after Allwin, in April 2005, Collins J restated the position expressly in the context of Article 5 in R (on the application of Wiggins)v Harrow v Crown Court [2005] EWHC 882 (Admin) ('Wiggins'). At [35] to [37] he rejected the proposition that there should be a more intensive review in bail cases engaging fundamental rights:
'35... The Crown Court judge constitutes, for the purposes of Article 5... the independent court which has to decide the issue. The Convention does not require any right of appeal from that independent court. This is not a strict appeal. It is a judicial review, so there is, in my judgment, no reason why the approach of this court should be other than a strict review approach....
37. [A more intensive review] would undoubtedly be the right approach if this were a decision of a review court dealing with an administrative decision against which there was no appeal. However we are not dealing with an administrative decision, but we are dealing with the decision of a judge.'
31.The approach in Wiggins was expressly adopted in R (on the application of N) v Leeds Crown Court [2005] EWHC 3352 (Admin) in December of the same year, where there is a useful summary of the relevant principles to be found, in particular at [13] to [17].
32. In October 2005, in R (on the application of Thompson) v Central Criminal Court [2005] EWHC 2345 (Admin), Collins J dealt with Wednesbury reasonableness and proportionality in the context of Article 5:
'3. Mr Bowen has submitted that since we are concerned here with rights under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the test ought to be one of proportionality rather than the usual Wednesbury test. But, as seems to me, in this context what this court has to decide, this being a review and not an independent appeal, is whether the decision made by the judge below proportionate. It will be proportionate if it lay within the bounds of what was reasonable in deciding what was proportionate. Hence, the test is, appropriately, the Wednesbury test when it comes to this court'.
33. As to the overall approach, Collins J described it thus:
'10. The approach under the Bail Act is entirely consistent with the approach that the European Court has regarded as proper under Article 5, namely that there must be a grant of bail unless there are good reasons to refuse. The approach, therefore, really is not should bail be granted, but should custody be imposed, that is: is it necessary for the defendant to be in custody? That is the approach the court should take. Only if persuaded that it is necessary, should a remand in custody take place. It will be necessary if the court decides that whatever conditions can reasonably be imposed in relation to bail, there are nonetheless substantial grounds for believing that the defendant would either fail to surrender to custody, commit an offence, interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct justice.'
The test of necessity was repeated by Silber J in Fergus at [20]".
...
36. All that aside, in practice, it seems to me that there is unlikely to be any material distinction in outcome, whichever approach is adopted. In Gibson, the Court will only interfere if the judge wrongly exercised his discretion; and in Thompson, the Court will only interfere if the decision was not within the bounds of what is reasonable. What is required is the robust application of Wednesbury principles. Insofar as there is any material difference in cases relating to the granting or the withholding of bail, the well-established line of reasoning in the later authorities – commencing with the Divisional Court decision in M in 2005 – is to be preferred."
"38. The essence of the claim is that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that there were substantial grounds for believing that the Claimant would fail surrender to custody in circumstances where the Claimant had at all times previously cooperated and attended court at all times as required, including after charge. For the Claimant, it is said that the Judge ought to have, but failed, to explain why there should be a change in his custody status; alternatively, that the Judge should not simply have disregarded his previous cooperation in such circumstances without explanation.
39. I am not persuaded that the Judge's decision was irrational in any way, or that she failed to give adequate reasons for the purpose of s.5(3) of the Bail Act 1978. The decision itself was well within the bounds of reasonableness and cannot be said to have involved the wrong exercise of discretion. As for reasons, the Judge's analysis was tailor-made, clear, and reasoned – far from the situation in Rojas for example, where the Judge had simply stated that a custodial sentence was inevitable and the defendant would be remanded in custody.
40. This is not a case where the Judge had to proceed on the basis that she was considering whether or not a change of custody status was justified – rather her task was to consider, by reference to the relevant legislative framework, whether or not it was necessary to impose custody at that stage. It is difficult to see what more she could have said. She stated, in terms, that she had well-in-mind the fact that the Claimant had complied, including after charge, with requirements to attend. She expressly did not disregard that factor".