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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Social Work England v Brown [2025] EWHC 1087 (Admin) (06 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1087.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1087 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LEEDS

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		06/05/2025

Note: This judgment was produced by the Judge, after using voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment in a remote hearing. ............................. MRS JUSTICE HILL

Mrs Justice Hill DBE:

1. The Claimant to this application is Social Work England, which is the regulator responsible for the regulation of social workers in England. The Defendant is a social worker registered with the Claimant.
2. By this application the Claimant seeks to extend an interim order under paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 of the Social Worker Regulations 2018.
3. Under paragraph 8(5) of Schedule 2, the Claimant's Adjudicators have the power to impose an interim order on a social worker's registration on the grounds that it is necessary for the protection of the public or is in the best interests of the social worker for a period of up to 18 months. An interim order may suspend a social worker from practising or impose conditions on the social worker's registration.
4. Paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 provides that the Claimant as the regulator may apply to the High Court to extend or further extend the period for which an interim order has effect. Under paragraph 14(3), on an application under sub-paragraph (2) the High Court may substitute a different period for which the interim order has effect or may confirm the order. 
5. Mr Harris of counsel represented the Claimant at the hearing before me.
6. Mr Brown, the Defendant, did not attend. However, I am satisfied that the Defendant has been served with the proceedings because he has filed an Acknowledgement of Service which is signed and dated by him 22 April 2025. Further, I have seen an email from the Defendant sent to the Claimant specifically indicating that he had posted the Acknowledgement of Service and that he was "not attending" the hearing. His views were before the court in various documents to which I will refer. In those circumstances it was appropriate to proceed in the Defendant's absence.
7. The order suspending the Defendant from practice was made on 11 August 2021 for a period of 18 months. It has been extended by the High Court on three occasions most recently on 7 March 2025, when it was extended for a period of only two months which was shorter than the period been applied for by the Claimant. The order is therefore due to expire on 8 May 2025. The Claimant seeks to extend it by a further 11 months to 7 April 2026. The order has been reviewed on nine occasions and on each occasion it has been considered necessary for it to continue.
8. In considering whether to extend the interim order I have taken into account the extensive main bundle provided by the Claimant and the supplementary bundle. In particular I have had regard to (i) the witness statement from Eleanor Poole, Head of Hearing Operations and Case Review for the Claimant dated 14 April 2025; (ii) the documents relating to the most recent High Court extension on 7 March 2025; (iii) the documents relating to the most recent interim order review dated 21 January 2025; (iv) the skeleton argument provided by the Claimant dated 28 April 2025 and (v) the statement from Rachel McAssey, Assistant Director – Regulation (Registration, Advice and Regulation) dated 2 May 2025. I have also taken into account the helpful oral submissions made by Mr Harris at the hearing.
9. I have considered the Defendant's recent communications with the Claimant and the court. In his email to the Claimant dated 23 April 2025 and in section B of the Acknowledgement of Service form he referred back to the submissions he made for the last hearing before the High Court on 7 March 2025, indicating that his position remained the same as it was then. I have read those submissions, at page 117 of the main bundle provided by the Claimant, together with the submissions the Defendant made for the interim order review hearing on 21 January 2025, at page 299 of the bundle.
10. The Defendant relies on the fact that only a two-month extension was granted at the last hearing. He argues that "there has been no change to warrant an extension at all – let alone until March 2026". Accordingly, he does not consent to the further extension of the order sought by this application.
11. In considering whether to extend the interim order, I have applied the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369 at paragraphs 28 and 31-33. These make clear that the criteria to be applied by the court when considering an application to extend an interim order are therefore the same as those for the making of an interim order by the regulatory body. Relevant factors in considering whether to grant an extension include the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients or service users, the reasons why the case has not been concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner if an interim order is continued.
12. Further, the onus of satisfying the court that the criteria are met is on the regulatory body.  It is not the function of the court to make findings of primary fact about the events that have led to the suspension or to consider the merits of the case. The court is required to ascertain whether the allegations (rather than their truth or falsity) justify the prolongation of the interim order. In general, it need not look beyond the allegations.
13. As to the gravity of the allegations and the seriousness of the risk of harm to service users I agree with the views expressed at paragraphs 33-36 of the last interim order decision. There, the panel concluded that the allegations against the Defendant were serious, on the basis that the concerns related to "alleged failure to record visits; failure to complete actions on child cases; failures to comply with court directions' failure to maintain appropriate written and verbal communications; and failure to carry out statutory visits".
14. Further, as the panel observed, the concerns if proven, had the potential to place service users at the risk of harm, given that the alleged failures were "wide-ranging, related to basic areas of social work practice and were alleged to have occurred over a significant period and in connection with a number of service users". Taken at face value, the information available to the panel revealed "risks from which the public require protection" such that an interim order was necessary. The panel had received a range of documentation including an agreed statement of facts with Social Care Wales, referrals to the Health and Care Professions Council and from Shropshire Council and information from the Claimant's investigation. The panel noted that the Defendant denied some of the concerns and set out the context in which he was working at the time which he said was without adequate supervision and impacted by Covid.
15. I consider that the allegations made against the Defendant are grave and that there is a serious risk of harm to service users if he is permitted to practice without restriction.
16. The primary focus of the submissions at the hearing was the issue of why the case has not been concluded to date. Notably at the last High Court hearing, the judge was not willing to grant the extension to sought by the Claimant. He granted only a two-month extension for a series of specific purposes: (i) so that the Claimant could return to court with clear information as to its budget for the 2025/2026 financial year and what that meant in terms of the capacity to hear the case; (ii) confirmation of which of the four local authorities were supplying witness evidence in support of the case; and (iii) confirmation that the Family Court had been made aware that the matter was going to be back before the High Court within two months in the hope that that would assist in the outcome of applications made to the Family Court.
17. The Claimant has provided a comprehensive timeline of steps that it has taken since the last High Court hearing, at pages 184 to 186 of the bundle. This shows very regular steps being taken by the Claimant to try to progress this matter, including communication with bodies such as Social Care Wales and the various local authorities as well as the Family Court from whom information is being sought. Ms McAssey's statement brought matters up to date to as recently as 2 May 2025. In summary I am satisfied that the Claimant is taking steps to progress matters as expeditiously as possible, including to finalise witness evidence.
18. The Claimant's witness statements and skeleton argument addressed each of the matters identified by the judge at the last High Court hearing.
19. As to (i), although exact clarity around the budget for the Claimant is not yet possible because the necessary grant-in-aid letter has not yet been received from central government, it has been possible for the Claimant to commit to the fact that this case will be listed for hearing within the financial year ending on 31 March 2026. To that end a provisional listing window of 12 January to 31 March 2026 has been identified and a timetable has been set working towards a "back stop" date of disclosure of the case to the Defendant on 7 November 2025. That should allow time for the Defendant to have sufficient notice of the relevant documentation and for the case to progress to hearing within the listing window.
20. As to (ii), the latest position is that Shropshire County Council, Merthyr Tydfil Council and Cardiff City Council are the local authorities supplying witness evidence.
21. As to (iii), the Family Court has been made aware of the position in respect of these proceedings. The various applications relating to permission to access and rely on Family Court documents were referred to a judge in early April. As Ms McAssey's statement confirmed the Claimant's external legal provider has been in regular contact with the Family Court since then.
22. As to the prejudice to the Defendant, this is a case where the Defendant is not working and has indicated that he does not intend to return to work. That in itself does not necessarily remove the risk or remove the utility of an interim suspension order: see Social Work England v Spence [2024] EWHC 827 (Admin) at [13]. However, it does mean that the specific prejudice that somebody who would otherwise want to work suffers by being prevented from working is not present in this case. That said, I accept that there are some other forms of prejudice being suffered by the Defendant, such as the impact on his well-being of having to engage in these proceedings at a time when he feels "removed" from his time as a social worker. However, that is the inevitable consequence of the regulatory proceedings, whether or not the interim order is extended. Overall, I am satisfied that any prejudice that the Defendant is suffering by the continuation of these proceedings is outweighed by the need to protect the public from the risk of harm that would arise if his practice was unrestricted.
23. Balancing all of the relevant considerations, albeit with some reluctance, I am content to extend the order by 11 months to 7 April 2026. I do so on the basis that the extension sought is said to be a realistic estimate to bring this case to conclusion within this financial year. The hearing should therefore take place before the end of March 2026. On any view this case has already had a very lengthy history and it may well be that any further application is not so favourably received. However, I grant the extension sought by this application.