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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Social Work England v Larman [2025] EWHC 1089 (Admin) (09 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1089.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1089 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LEEDS

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		09/05/2025

Note: This judgment was produced by the Judge, after using voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment in a remote hearing. ............................. MRS JUSTICE HILL

Mrs Justice Hill:

1. The Claimant to this application is Social Work England, which is the regulator responsible for the regulation of social workers in England. The Defendant is a social worker registered with the Claimant.
2. By this application the Claimant seeks to extend an interim order under paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 of the Social Worker Regulations 2018.
3. Under paragraph 8(5) of Schedule 2, the Claimant's Adjudicators have the power to impose an interim order on a social worker's registration on the grounds that it is necessary for the protection of the public or is in the best interests of the social worker for a period of up to 18 months. An interim order may suspend a social worker from practising or impose conditions on the social worker's registration.
4. Paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 provides that the Claimant as the regulator may apply to the High Court to extend or further extend the period for which an interim order has effect. Under paragraph 14(3), on an application under sub-paragraph (2) the High Court may substitute a different period for which the interim order has effect or may confirm the order. 
5. Mr Harris of counsel represented the Claimant at the hearing before me.
6. The Defendant attended and represented herself. There had been some difficulties in her accessing all the material for the hearing. The case was put back by around 45 minutes to allow her to consider the key documents. Having done so she was content for the hearing to continue.
7. The order in respect of the Defendant was made on 20 December 2021, for a period of 12 months. It is an interim conditions of practice order, meaning that there are conditions on the Defendant's practice but she is not suspended from practising entirely. The order has been extended by the High Court on three occasions most recently by a sealed order dated 11 November 2024 by 6 months. The order is therefore due to expire on 16 May 2025. The claimant seeks an extension to the order by a further 9 months to 15 February 2026. The order has been reviewed on a series of occasions and on each occasion has been considered necessary for the order to continue.
8. I deal first with the Claimant's application in relation to CPR 5.4C. The Claimant seeks a direction that any application made by a non-party under CPR 5.4C for documents other than the claim form, judgment or order be made on 14 days' notice to the parties. As far as I understood the Defendant's submissions she welcomes the order because part of the intention of it is to ensure that certain aspect of the paperwork which deal with her health remain private; such that the opportunity would be given to her and the Claimant to address any application that is made for copies of the documentation on the court file before any disclosure is made.
9. Protecting the Defendant's right to privacy around her health in this way is one reason for making the order sought. The other is that some of the documentation on the court file refers to a protected child and Family Court proceedings. I have taken into account what is said about the CPR 5.4C application at paragraphs 66 to 68 of Ms Poole's witness statement and paragraphs 15 to 22 of the Claimant's skeleton argument. In light of those arguments I am satisfied it is appropriate to make the order sought. The order amount to an intrusion into the important principle of open justice, but it is a relatively limited one intrusion, and it is justified by the matters I have referred to.
10. In deciding whether to extend the order I have considered the Claimant's core bundle and supplementary bundle, primarily the documentation relating to the most recent High Court review dated 11 November 2024, the most recent extension before the interim order review panel dated 24 March 2025, the witness statement from Eleanor Poole, Head of Hearing Operations and Case Review for the Claimant dated 31 March 2025 and the witness statement from Rachel McAssey, Assistant Director – Regulation (Registration, Advice and Regulation) dated 2 May 2025. I have also taken into account the oral submissions made by Mr Harris and the Defendant at the hearing.
11. I have applied the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369 at paragraphs 28 and 31-33. These make clear that the criteria to be applied by the Court when considering an application to extend an interim order are therefore the same as those for the making of an interim order by the regulatory body. Relevant factors in considering whether to grant an extension include the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients or service users, the reasons why the case has not been concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner if an interim order is continued.
12. Further, the onus of satisfying the court that the criteria are met is on the regulatory body.  It is not the function of the court to make findings of primary fact about the events that have led to the suspension or consider the merits of the case. The court is required to ascertain whether the allegations (rather than their truth or falsity) justify the prolongation of the interim order. In general, it need not look beyond the allegations.
13. Considering first the issues of gravity and risk, the allegations against the Defendant are serious and involve allegations in relation to a vulnerable child who had already suffered harm. It is said that the Defendant's actions put the child at risk of further harm and that her actions amounted to a failure to undertake basic safeguarding for a vulnerable service user by not addressing the requirements of the court order.
14. The Defendant had accepted at the initial interim order application stage that there were gaps in her knowledge relating to court proceedings and that she did not wish to undertake court work until such time as she had undertaken the necessary training in this area. At the last interim order review on 24 March 2025 the panel noted that the Defendant had been unable to provide documentary evidence of having carried out training in safeguarding and other areas of social work.
15. The panel observed that the allegations related to conduct which called into question the Defendant's ability to undertake and/or perform fundamental and core aspects of a social worker's practice including but not limited to safeguarding vulnerable young people, making appropriate records, evidencing her decision-making and following instructions and/or directions.
16. Further, the evidence presented to the panel derived from a credible, independent and reliable source namely a local authority and that there was sufficient information to support the concerns raised and in turn that the concerns gave rise to a real risk of harm to service users in respect of the risk of repetition. The panel observed that the Defendant had not taken steps to mitigate the alleged concerns such that they could not have confidence that they would not be repeated. For that reason the panel concluded that she continues to pose an ongoing and real risk of harm to service users; and that there was nothing further presented to it which mitigated those risks.
17. For these reasons I accept the submissions made in the skeleton argument at paragraphs 36 and 50 to 51 about the concept of gravity and seriousness of risk in this case.
18. The focus of the submissions was the progress made and the reasons why the case has not been concluded.
19. The Claimant has very fairly placed before me a note of the High Court hearing on the last occasion, from which it is clear that the judge considered the progress that had been made by the Claimant since the previous extension was unimpressive. The judge considered that the Claimant had provided scant detail by way of explanation and that there had been unsatisfactory delays. The judge made clear that it was expected that the case would be dealt with promptly by the new expiry date of 16 May 2025 and that any further extension if caused by the Claimant's own delay might well not be granted.
20. It has not been possible for the case to be concluded within the period of the extension. However the progress that has been made since the last hearing has been set out in some detail in the statements from Ms Poole and Ms McAssey. In summary, while there have been delays since the last occasion these are not due to the conduct of the Claimant but are explained by the time taken to obtain permission to rely on Family Court documents. Happily during the hearing Mr Harris was able to confirm that the permission has very recently been granted.
21. Ms McAssey's statement explains that although the budget cannot yet be confirmed until the Claimant receives the grant-in-aid letter from central government consideration has been given to when this case will realistically be listed. Paragraph 42 of the Claimant's skeleton argument explains that witness statements from the four key witnesses are either already finalised or very close to being finalised. It is therefore proposed that allowing for the time taken for counsel to review documentation, for disclosure take place and for further relevant directions to be complied with, this case will be listed during this financial year, notwithstanding the budgetary uncertainty.
22. I have been assured by Mr Harris that the application is made to extend the order until 15 February 2026 on the basis that the hearing would take place and the case concluded by that point. I have placed significant reliance on that fact.
23. Inevitably there is some prejudice to the Defendant by the order being extended, including by the impact on her health. However, this is not an order that prevents her from obtaining work as a social worker, as the previous review hearings have confirmed (although she may well have encountered some difficulties in actually obtaining such work).
24. In any event, I consider that any prejudice caused by the extension of the interim order is outweighed by the need to protect the public from the risk of harm that would arise from the Defendant's unrestricted practice.
25. In conclusion, I am persuaded that it is appropriate to grant the extension sought. However I reiterate that I extend the order to 15 February 2026 in the anticipation that this will allow the hearing to take place by that date. I therefore make the order sought.