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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Social Work England v Gregory [2025] EWHC 1140 (Admin) (13 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1140.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1140 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LEEDS

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		13/05/2025

Note: This judgment was produced by the Judge, after using voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment in a remote hearing. ............................. MRS JUSTICE HILL

Mrs Justice Hill:

Introduction

1. The Claimant to this application is Social Work England, which is the regulator responsible for the regulation of social workers in England. The Defendant is a social worker registered with the Claimant.
2. By this application the Claimant seeks to extend an interim order under paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 of the Social Worker Regulations 2018.
3. Under paragraph 8(5) of Schedule 2, the Claimant's Adjudicators have the power to impose an interim order on a social worker's registration on the grounds that it is necessary for the protection of the public or is in the best interests of the social worker for a period of up to 18 months. An interim order may suspend a social worker from practising or impose conditions on the social worker's registration.
4. Paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 provides that the Claimant as the regulator may apply to the High Court to extend or further extend the period for which an interim order has effect. Under paragraph 14(3), on an application under sub-paragraph (2) the High Court may substitute a different period for which the interim order has effect or may confirm the order. 
5. The order in question is an interim suspension order. It was made on 1 December 2023 for a period of 18 months. It is due to expire on 31 May 2025. The order has been reviewed on three occasions most recently on 7 April 2025. On each occasion the panel has considered it necessary for the order to continue albeit that the basis for the order has changed: the interim order is now considered necessary to protect the public, in the wider public interest to maintain public confidence in the social work profession and to uphold professional standards, but not because it is is also in the Defendant's best interests.
6. The background to the order being imposed is that on 1 September 2023 the Claimant received a referral in relation to the Defendant on behalf of Cotswolds Children's Services within Gloucestershire local authority, the Defendant's former employer. The referral appended the local authority's investigation report which detailed a number of concerns relating to the Defendant's practice. The concerns were found to be substantiated and the Defendant was dismissed from her post without notice as a result. The Defendant had not attended an investigatory interview with the local authority and did not attend the disciplinary hearing.
7. This is the first application made to the High Court to extend the order. The Claimant seeks to extend it by a further 18 months until 30 November 2026.
8. I have been provided with a comprehensive bundle by the Claimant which I have considered, with a particular focus on the following: (i) the witness statement of Eleanor Poole, Head of Hearing Operations and Case Review for the Claimant, dated 9 April 2025; (ii) the original interim order decision in this case dated 1 December 2023; and (iii) the most recent review decision dated 7 April 2024.
9. Ms Sharpe of counsel appeared for the Claimant. The Defendant did not appear at the hearing.

Proceeding in the absence of the Defendant

10. I am satisfied that the Defendant has been made aware of the hearing and chosen not to attend, given the following background.
11. The Claimant originally attempted to serve the Defendant at her registered address. By way of a telephone call with the Defendant it became apparent that she was no longer at that address. She provided the Claimant with an alternative postal address on the telephone and the documents were re-sent to that address by next day special delivery on 22 April 2025. On that basis service was deemed to have occurred under CPR 6.14 on 24 April 2025 and I have seen a Certificate of Service from the Claimant dated 29 April 2025 to that effect. Ms Sharpe informed me that the documents were also sent to the Defendant by email.
12. The Defendant has not engaged with any earlier stage of these proceedings or indeed those before the local authority. There is no evidence that she has any desire to participate. It is therefore fair in my view to proceed in her absence and I have done so.

CPR 5.4C

13. The Claimant seeks an order under CPR 5.4C to restrict access to the court file in a way that is not uncommon in cases of this nature. The proposed order is to the effect that any application for access to documents on the court file other than the claim form or any judgment or order under CPR 5.4C should be made on 14 days' notice to the parties.
14. I have noted various references within the bundle to sensitive personal health information about the Defendant. The nature of the hearings by the regulator is such that this material would be heard in those proceedings in private. Although these proceedings are public, there is no immediately obvious countervailing public interest in access to this information.
15. I have considered the recent case law on this issue, namely the judgment of His Honour Judge Pearce sitting as a Judge of the High Court in General Medical Council v Hughes [2024] EWHC 3176 (Admin).
16. In all the circumstances I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make the order sought. It will enable the parties to have a 14-day period in which to make suggestions to the learned judge considering any application for access on the issue of any redactions to be made to the documentation.
17. The order is to some degree an intrusion onto the principle of open justice but is a relatively limited one and is justified by the matters I have referred to.

The extension application

18. In considering whether to extend the order I have applied the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369 at paragraphs 28 and 31-33. These make clear that the criteria to be applied by the Court when considering an application to extend an interim order are therefore the same as those for the making of an interim order by the regulatory body. Relevant factors in considering whether to grant an extension include the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients or service users, the reasons why the case has not been concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner if an interim order is continued.
19. Further, the onus of satisfying the court that the criteria are met is on the regulatory body.  It is not the function of the court to make findings of primary fact about the events that have led to the suspension or consider the merits of the case. The court is required to ascertain whether the allegations (rather than their truth or falsity) justify the prolongation of the interim order. In general, it need not look beyond the allegations.
20. Turning first of the gravity of the allegations and the seriousness of the risk of harm to service users, I have taken into what was said in the most recent panel review decision at paragraphs 36-41.
21. In summary the panel found that there were "wide-ranging and serious regulatory concerns" in relation to the Defendant's work as a social worker. Those concerns were supported by cogent evidence from a credible source including the local authority's report. They span a period of time. They relate to "fundamental aspects of social work practice" and suggest a lack of compliance with social work professional standards, potentially impacting the safety of the public. If proven they demonstrate a standard of practice far below that expected of a social worker.
22. The panel noted there was nothing new to change the original assessment made when the interim order was imposed; and given the "absolute lack of engagement" by the Defendant there was no evidence of insight or remediation. Accordingly, there remained in the panel's view a significant risk to the public that she may repeat such conduct if permitted to return to work as a social worker unrestricted.
23. I adopt all of that reasoning and also take into account what is said in the skeleton argument from Ms Sharpe. In short, I conclude that the allegations are serious and there would be an unacceptable risk of avoidable harm to children and their families if the social worker is allowed to practice unrestricted.
24. Turning to the third Hiew factor, I have considered the reasons why the case has not been concluded to date. I am satisfied that significant steps have been taken to progress the case as set out in the chronology at page 60 of the bundle and as explained in further detail by Ms Poole.
25. Efforts have been made to obtain evidence. The case investigation report and evidence bundle have been disclosed to the social worker. The case examiners have reviewed the case and it has now been referred for a substantive hearing. It will be necessary for external legal providers to be instructed and for the case to be investigated further which is estimated will take between 6 to 8 months. On that basis the investigation should conclude in December 2025.
26. In light of the budgetary position, the priority to be given to other cases and the timescale in this case generally it is not anticipated that the case will be listed until after March 2026. It is nevertheless possible that this case could come to a conclusion between March 2026 and the expiry of any extension order made today until 30 November 2026.
27. In all the circumstances I am satisfied that the Claimant has done what it can to progress the case. I would very much hope that matters can be brought to a conclusion within the currency of any extension I grant today.
28. As to the fourth Hiew factor, the extension of any order will inevitably cause some prejudice to the Defendant but I am satisfied that is outweighed by the need to protect the public from the risk of harm that would arise if she were to practice unrestricted. It is again relevant that she has not engaged in either the local authority or the Claimant's investigation, nor provided any information to dispute the allegations.
29. Balancing all these considerations, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the extension sought. I therefore extend the order to 30 November 2026.