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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Huggitt, R (On the Application Of) v Crown Prosecution Service [2025] EWHC 179 (Admin) (30 January 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/179.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 179 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		30th January 2025

FORDHAM J Note: This judgment was produced and approved by the Judge, after authorising the use by the Court of voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment.

FORDHAM J:

Introduction

1. This is a renewed application for permission for judicial review of a Ruling of HHJ Morris ("the Judge") on 31 March 2023, by which she refused a defence application for costs to be paid by the Crown pursuant to s.19(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 and r.45.8 of the Criminal Procedure Rules. The test involved asking whether costs were incurred by the Claimant as a result of "an unnecessary or improper act or omission" by the prosecution. Mr Montgomery has rightly accepted in his oral submissions today that that is a high threshold. Under the applicable case-law, the conduct of the prosecution must be starkly improper, and with a stark impropriety such that no great investigation into the facts or decision-making process is necessary to establish it. The Judge set out that relevant law. It is, rightly, not said that her 22-paragraph Ruling involved any material misdirection as the law or any error of law. What is said, in essence, is that her decision was unreasonable in the public law sense of being beyond the range of reasonable decisions. Refusing permission for judicial review on the papers on 23 May 2024, Sir Duncan Ouseley considered that to be unarguable. Having considered the position afresh on this renewed application, so do I.

Context

2. The Claimant was charged, together with three other individuals, with criminal offences relating to an illegal entry at Marwell Zoo on 15 February 2021. That incident took place during a period of Covid national lockdown. Perimeter fences to the Zoo were cut. CCTV showed an incursion by four individuals. There was entry into two of the animal enclosures. There was criminal damage. There was social media evidence of the targeting of animals, including a wound to the leg of a giraffe from items being thrown at it. The four individuals were stopped in a car. They were wearing clothes that matched what was seen on the CCTV footage. There were then criminal charges of burglary (entering a building intending to commit criminal damage); criminal damage; and animal welfare offences. As the Judge explained in the Ruling, the Claimant stood accused on the basis both of presence and participation, capable of being evidenced by encouragement as well as active involvement. For his part, he had given a "no comment" interview. Mobile phone footage and all the other evidence had to be analysed by the prosecution on an ongoing basis, as the Judge explained. In the end, some of the Claimant's co-accused were convicted on guilty pleas on some of the charges. The CPS kept the Claimant's legal representatives informed, by letters informing him that the animal welfare charge was not pursued against him (19.10.22), that the burglary offence was not being pursued on the basis of whether it could be shown that the Zoo or any enclosure was a "building" (24.11.22), and that criminal damage was not being pursued on the basis of whether it could be shown that the Claimant's conduct meant he individually had committed that crime (20.12.22).

The Ruling

3. After a clear and careful analysis of the sequence of events in the investigation and criminal proceedings, the Judge concluded in essence as follows: (1) the suggestion that the prosecution had conducted its investigation in a manner which was unnecessary was a gross misstatement of the factual matrix against which the offences had taken place; (2) to suggest that there was impropriety on the part of the prosecution was wholly without foundation; (3) it was an overstatement to elevate any aspects of the prosecution conduct which might be regarded as lacking in clarity or focus in the drafting or redrafting of charges as an unnecessary act or omission or as impropriety; (4) the exercise by the Claimant of his undoubted right to say nothing in interview about his presence had burdened the prosecution by the task of investigating each and every aspect of a joint enterprise activity; (4) even if any drafting of charges in respect of the four accused which ultimately resulted in guilty pleas by some of them could be criticised on a basis referable to competence it still fell a long way from establishing the prosecution had acted either in an unnecessary or in an improper manner; and (5) the Claimant had been a beneficiary of ongoing review by the prosecution at all stages of the process, including after others had pleaded guilty to charges properly reflecting their own culpability.

The Claim

4. Mr Montgomery says today: that there is an "established fact" that there was "never any evidence" to support "any charge"; that the evidence never changed; that the "proof of the pudding" was in the CPS's acknowledgments, expressly referring to sufficiency of evidence; that the position of the co-defendants was "distinctly different"; and that whatever the co-defendants said was not evidence against the Claimant.

Discussion

5. There is, in my judgment, nothing approaching arguable unreasonableness in the Judge's reasoned Ruling, by reference to any of these points. The Ruling provides a thoroughly convincing basis why the Judge was not satisfied applying the relevant legal test. I am quite satisfied having read, and re-read, the grounds put forward and having heard submissions orally that there is no realistic prospect that this Court would at a substantive hearing overturn the Ruling on the ground of public law unreasonableness. Perhaps the nub is that Mr Montgomery says today that the issues raised should have been looked at closely; but I am satisfied that that is precisely what happened. It follows that there is no need or utility for me to get into any questions today about the scope of judicial review of the crown court.

Footnotes

6. There are three footnotes to this judgment. The first is about documents for the hearing. Mr Montgomery says that he never received or saw the Court's directions order (5 September 2024) requiring a renewal bundle and setting down a 7 day deadline for any skeleton argument. He has told my clerk by email that, had he seen those directions, he would not only have prepared the renewal bundle but also a skeleton argument. His email invited me to adjourn so that he could rectify that position. He said the problems related to a move from one set of chambers to another. I make the following observations. Mr Montgomery had himself filed the notice of renewal, following the refusal of permission on the papers. He knew there would be a hearing. He was aware of the hearing date. A listing letter of 29 October 2024 had itself referred to the possibility of a skeleton argument and described clear two working days. Most importantly, the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2024 is published online, and is available to all court users and litigants. It refers (§9.4.6) to the standard renewal directions. Skeleton arguments are also dealt with (§20). Parties are encouraged to prepare skeleton arguments for renewed permission hearings (§20.1.3), to be filed at least two working days before the hearing (§20.4.3). All of this was accessible. There was no renewal bundle. But the Court had the original claim bundle, the CPS's acknowledgement of service and summary grounds, the refusal of permission on the papers and the Claimant's notice of renewal. The request for an adjournment was rightly withdrawn.
7. The second footnote is about a missed hearing slot. This hearing was scheduled for its 30 minute slot at 12 noon. That was in the Court's published cause list. It was also communicated by my clerk to Mr Montgomery by email this morning. Mr Montgomery has told me that he had been misled by his clerks into thinking the case would be at 2pm. That was until he saw the cause list himself, yesterday evening. He told me he was at Isleworth Crown Court this morning but then left by 10:40, making the mistake of not getting a train but travelling by car. I record that the Court received an email at 11:53 to say Mr Montgomery anticipated being 10 minutes late due to "traffic near Piccadilly". Mr Montgomery then in fact arrived at 12:36. I decided, in fairness to the Claimant – who was at Court awaiting his lawyer – to use the whole of the 36 minutes considering the case in light of the case papers. Also, although the time slot had been missed, I did not exclude oral submissions. but allowed Mr Montgomery to use a proportionate period of time (15 minutes) for targeted oral submissions on the reasonableness of the Judge's Ruling. I did not want the case further derailed by his needing to address side-issues. I observe that the case could have been listed at any time from 10:30; that time markings are for the benefit of litigants and lawyers who would otherwise be waiting around at Court for earlier cases to finish; and that the perils of not taking steps to be at Court in very good time are obvious.
8. The third footnote is to record the position as to the nature of the Claimant's legal representation. The claim form of 30 June 2023 (Form N461) gives the name of Akram Mula at the firm Holborn Adams (London EC2) as "the Claimant's legal representative", with Mr Montgomery as "Claimant's Counsel". Holborn Adams are, I am told, the solicitors in the criminal proceedings. Emails from my clerk had included Holborn Adams as a named lawyer in the case, but elicited no response from that firm. Mr Montgomery did not include Holborn Adams in his own response to my clerk. The notice of renewal, following the refusal of permission for judicial review on the papers, is signed by Mr Montgomery. He told me that the judicial review proceedings were always on a Direct Access basis; and that Holborn Adams have played no part since discharge in the crown court. He told me he had put the firm on the Claim Form, inadvertently. He told me that he does not have BSB authorisation regarding Direct Access extending to "conducting litigation", and had become aware of that, but that he does have authorisation for "advocacy" at today's hearing. I am not making any findings. But I do consider it appropriate that I should record the position.

30.1.25