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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Drayton Manor Farms Ltd v Stratford-Upon-Avon District Council [2025] EWHC 775 (Admin) (06 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/775.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 775 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY

		Birmingham Civil Justice Centre Priory Courts, 33 Bull Street Birmingham, B4 6DS
		6 March 2025

MR JUSTICE MOULD:

Introduction

1. This claim concerns development for a 32 mega watt (MW) solar farm and change of use of two dwellings to a solar control building with associated works on land at Drayton Manor Farm, Alcester Road, Stratford-Upon-Avon ["the Development"].

Factual background

2. On 7 November 2023, the local planning authority, Stratford-Upon-Avon District Council, granted planning permission for the Development ["the 2023 planning permission"]. The applicant was Drayton Stratford Limited. Planning permission was granted subject to a number of conditions, including condition 2, which provided that permission should expire no later than 40 years from the date of the first energisation, and condition 3, which required that the Development should be carried out in accordance with a number of specified plans and drawings, including the proposed site plan. That plan showed an arrangement of solar panels on land at Drayton Manor lying to the south of the A46 road.
3. The 2023 planning permission included a series of notes, the first of which is in the following terms:

"Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. This application is a 32 MW extension on an existing 50 MW solar farm. The LPA considers that this may be a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) as the combined threshold is above 50 MW.

Section 15 of the Planning Act 2008 requires that any proposed generating station with a capacity of more than 50 MW in England and Wales would need to seek development consent from the Secretary of State through the nationally significant infrastructure planning regime.

You are advised to seek your own legal advice as to whether the proposals fall within the relevant thresholds set out in the Planning Act 2008.

Further to this, your attention is drawn to the recent decision in Durham County Council & Anor v Secretary of State for Levelling-up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 1394 (Admin).

The Durham case is now authority for the proposition that there is nothing in the TCPA which limits the granting of planning permission only in cases where it is required, i.e. the DCO regime under the Planning Act 2008 does not preclude planning permission being granted under the TCPA for the same scheme, rather it simply states planning permission is not required in addition.

So, applying the Durham reasoning, the LPA could have jurisdiction to determine a planning application for Drayton Manor Solar Farm Phase 2. In doing so, this is not confirmation that a DCO isn't also required, if it is an NSIP. The applicant would be proceeding at its own risk if it did not apply for a DCO and proceeding without a DCO could be unlawful under section 160 of the 2008 Act. The applicant is advised to seek legal advice on this.

This note should not be taken as providing any view on which is the appropriate consenting regime for these proposals, nor should any advice given in this note be taken to prejudice any future decisions that may be made by, or fetter any discretion of, the LPA in relation to these proposals."

4. The existing solar farm to which the local planning authority refer in that note was granted planning permission on 8 June 2015. It was varied by a further planning permission granted on 12 January 2016. The applicant was Anesco Limited. The 2016 planning permission authorised "installation of up to 200,000 solar panels (50 MW) together with associated equipment, including up to 29 inverter cabins, substations, cabling, fencing … CCTV system comprising up to 11 x 3 metre tall pole-mounted cameras, and connection to Wester Power Distribution's 6kV local circuit grid". It went on to refer to amendments to the layout and in relation to certain conditions subject to which the 2015 planning permission had been granted.
5. Condition 13 of the 2016 planning permission required the Development to relate to approved plans, including a site layout, which showed 10 sets of solar panels distributed on land at Drayton Manor Farm essentially to the east, south and west of buildings at the centre of the holding. Condition 11 required the decommissioning and removal of the solar panels and associated equipment no later than 25 years following the first export of electricity to the National Grid or by 1 June 2041, whichever is the earlier date. The solar farm authorised by the 2015 and 2016 planning permissions has been constructed and brought into operation at an overall generating capacity of 45 MW.

The question before the court

6. The legal and practical significance of the observations made by the local planning authority in the note included in the 2023 planning permission is as follows. If the solar farm authorised by that permission is correctly to be considered an extension to the operational solar farm at Drayton Manor Farm, the combined generating capacity of that extended generating station will exceed the threshold of 50 MW as stated in section 15(2)(c) of the Planning Act 2008 ["the 2008 Act"] for an onshore generating station in England. The development authorised by the 2023 planning permission would, on that basis, fall within the definition of a nationally significant infrastructure project ("NSIP") under section 14(1)(a) of the 2008 Act as comprising the construction or extension of a generating station.
7. Section 31 of the 2008 Act states:

"Consent under this Act ("development consent") is required for development to the extent that the development is or forms part of a nationally significant infrastructure project."

Section 160 of the 2008 Act states:

"A person commits an offence if the person carries out, or causes to be carried out, development for which development consent is required at a time when no development consent is in force in respect of the development."

8. The claimant wishes to carry out the Development. However, the note included on the 2023 planning permission creates a measure of uncertainty as to whether to do so would involve the commission of a criminal offence under section 160 of the 2008 Act. Understandably, in the circumstances, the claimant seeks to overcome that uncertainty. It now seeks a declaration from this court that the Development is not an extension of the existing solar farm at Drayton Manor Farm for the purposes of sections 14 and 15 of the 2008 Act and accordingly does not require development consent in accordance with section 31 of the 2008 Act.
9. Perhaps surprisingly, the 2008 Act does not provide a statutory procedure for the purpose of obtaining a conclusive determination either from the Secretary of State or from the court as to whether a given project falls within the definition of NSIP for the purposes of that Act. There is no corresponding procedure to that enacted under section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ["the 1990 Act"] under which a person may apply for a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development from the local planning authority; and on appeal under section 195 of the 1990 Act, from the Secretary of State. I asked Ms Osmund-Smith, whose written in oral submissions on behalf of the claimant have been of very considerable assistance to the court, whether the claimant might, nevertheless, overcome the present uncertainty as to the status of the Development through an application for such a certificate. In the light of her submissions on that question, I do not consider that would be the case. Such a certificate would be conclusive as to the lawfulness of the Development for the purposes of any enforcement action that might later be taken under the powers conferred by the 1990 Act. It would not, however, be conclusive for the purposes of any such action that might later be taken in the exercise of the enforcement powers conferred by Part 8 of the 2008 Act which includes section 160, to which I have referred above.
10. Durham County Council & Hartlepool Borough Council v The Secretary of State for Levelling-up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 1394 (Admin); [2023] PTSR 135 was a case which raised a similar issue as to whether a proposed renewable energy development was correctly to be considered as an extension to a generating station within sections 14 and 15 of the 2008 Act. It was submitted in that case that the remedy available to the developer was to make an application for a development consent order under the 2008 Act and thereby achieve the certainty required. Alternatively, the developer, it was submitted, was in a position to advance the argument that the project was not an extension to a generating station in defence of any prosecution under section 160 of the 2008 Act. At [36] to [38], Chamberlain J rejected that argument:

"36. The alternatives are, in my view, unpalatable. Mr Kohli's suggestion that Lightsource could make an application to the Secretary of State for development consent is impractical and would not achieve the certainty required. It is impractical because applications for development consent are "front loaded" in the sense that they involve a very large amount of preparatory work, including consulting affected parties (see ss.41-48 of the PA 2008). Why would Parliament have intended that a developer should be required to consult in relation to an application which, in its view, does not require development consent at all? How could such a consultation be carried out in circumstances where the developer considers that the project is not an NSIP without confusing or misleading those being consulted? In any event, even if a developer undertook all the necessary preparatory work and submitted an application for development consent, and the Secretary of State rejected the application on the ground that development consent was not required, nothing in the PA 2008 suggests that the Secretary of State's view would bind the court if the local planning authority took a different view and decided to prosecute (though it might, in practice, be persuasive).

37. If the developer chose not to apply for development consent, it would be open to the local planning authority to prosecute under s. 160 once the development had started. Then, as Mr Kohli accepts, the criminal court would have to determine the issue. But why should a developer have to incur the expense of beginning the development when it is clear that there is a dispute between it and the local planning authority about whether development consent is required? And why should a developer have to run the risk of a criminal conviction in order to obtain certainty on a point which both it and the local planning authority wish to have resolved?

38. Finally, even if there are cases where the question whether development consent is required turns on disputed issues of fact, that is not the position here. Even Mr Kohli did not submit that there were any material disputes of fact. He was right to submit that the question whether development consent is required involves a judgment (or, as it is sometimes put, a question of mixed fact and law). But it is not the kind of judgment which requires the court to weigh the "planning merits" (i.e. the advantages and disadvantages in planning terms of a proposed development). The judgment no doubt involves considering more than one factor, but it is the kind of judgment a court has to make whenever it asks whether a given set of facts falls within a statutory concept. I can see no constitutional or institutional reason why it would be wrong for that judgment to be made by me in circumstances where both the local planning authority and the developer invite me to resolve the issue."

I respectfully agree with those observations and shall follow that approach in this case.

11. In short, in my view, the position is this.

1) The note on the 2023 planning permission raises a legal and practical uncertainty as to the lawfulness of the Development, notwithstanding the grant of the 2023 planning permission which is on the record. That uncertainty presents an obvious barrier to investment in the project, notwithstanding the grant of the 2023 planning permission;

2) There is no alternative procedure available to the claimant to resolve that uncertainty in a definitive and legally binding way other than to seek a ruling from this court;

3) The defendant, as local planning authority, do not say otherwise (see their acknowledgement of service). They do not intend to contest the claim -

"The defendant believes it is for the court to determine whether to grant the proposed declaration based on the evidence provided. The defendant would endeavour to assist the court on relevant issues of fact and law by filing such evidence as it anticipates will assist the court in determining the claim without advocating for a particular outcome."

I note that in the event, the defendant did not file either evidence or any submissions in response to the claim.

4) On the direction of Eyre J on 21 October 2024, the claimant served proceedings on the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. On 6 December 2024, the Government Legal Department wrote as follows on behalf of the Secretary of State:

"Absent confirmation by the local planning authority as to whether the Development constitutes an NSIP or a declaration from the court, the claimant perceives a risk of prosecution in the event the Development is implemented. Whilst the Secretary of State has the power to grant development consent, upon receipt of a properly constituted application, it does not have the range of enforcement powers afforded to the local planning authority under Part 8 of the 2008 Act. In any event, her view as to whether development constitutes an NSIP cannot bind the local planning authority (see paragraph 36 of the judgment of Chamberlain J in Durham County Council v The Secretary of State for Levelling-up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 1394 (Admin))."

12. Ms Osmund-Smith drew my attention to some correspondence between the defendant and the Planning Inspectorate prior to the grant of the 2023 planning permission, in which the question whether the Development was a nationally significant infrastructure project requiring development consent was canvassed. I do not think the contents of that correspondence takes matters further. The defendant's purpose at that stage was to satisfy itself that it was acting lawfully and within its jurisdiction under Part 3 of the 1990 Act, in determining the planning application which resulted in the grant of the 2023 planning permission. That question was considered in the Durham case (see [49ff] of the judgment of Chamberlain J). On the basis of Chamberlain J's conclusions at [56(c)] of Durham, the Defendant proceeded to determine the 2023 planning application.
13. Against that background, the substantive question raised by this claim is whether the Development is correctly to be regarded as extending the existing generating station comprising the solar farm in operation at Drayton Manor Farm pursuant to the 2015 and 2016 planning permission; or, as the claimant argues, is a separate generating station, albeit located within the same overall land holding.

The evidence

14. The claimant relies on evidence provided in witness statements by Mr Andrew Murphy and Mr Neil Hutchings. The defendant was served with that evidence. They have not sought to challenge the accuracy or truth of the evidence given by Messrs Murphy and Hutchings.
15. Mr Murphy produces a masterplan which shows that the solar panels authorised by the 2023 planning permission will be situated on lands at Drayton Manor Farm which are adjacent to the lands on which the existing solar farm is located. Both areas are served by a private drive which gives common access to the public highway at Drayton Manor Drive. Mr Murphy provides a helpful summary of the planning history.
16. Mr Hutchings gives his evidence as a qualified electrical engineer and infrastructure consultant who has worked in the electricity industry for over 35 years, including at Scottish and Southern Energy, where he worked for 23 years in various roles, including Managing Director of National Networks. He also worked for Anesco, a renewable energy solutions company (the applicant for planning permission in 2016) for five years where, as Technical Services Director, he was responsible for connecting more than 80 solar farms and energy storage systems to UK distribution networks. He was employed by Anesco, the original developer, during the development, construction and commissioning of the solar farms under the 2016 planning permission.
17. It is necessary to read much of Mr Hutchings' evidence into my judgment, beginning with Section 2, where he deals with the background to the 2016 solar farms:

"The 2016 solar farms were designed, developed, constructed and commissioned by a single entity, Anesco Limited. Whilst planning was secured as part of a single application, the intention of the development was to design and build 10 separate solar farms, each being a size less than 5 megawatts of power in a way which would secure additional ongoing funding through subsidy schemes, such as Feed-in Tariffs and Renewable Obligation Certificates.

Initial planning consent ("the 2015 planning permission") was varied by the 2016 planning permission, which included the separation of the original application into 10 separate solar farms, together with additional ancillary details relating to their connection to the Distribution Network Operators' licensed distribution networks. During the development phase… it was decided only to design, construct and operate nine solar farms. The site known as "The Paddocks" was never constructed."

Mr Hutchings confirms that the nine separate solar farms were designed with a cumulative total generating capacity of around 45 MW. Nine new legal entities were incorporated by Anesco which were to take on ownership and operation of the nine solar farms. He gives details of the names of those companies. He continues -

"Construction and operations and maintenance contracts were entered into between Anesco and each legal entity as part of the development and construction process.

At varying stages during the development and construction process, Anesco sold each legal entity to a number of their customers, who acquired the full rights to own and operate the solar farms."

Mr Hutchings says that at present, five of the solar farms are held in community interest companies (CICs). Each of the nine solar farms took advantage of Government subsidy schemes which were available at the time of commissioning and initial operation. Those subsidy schemes were significant to the financial model of each solar farm at the time. He says that he is not aware of any similar sized solar farm constructed and commissioned at that time without the benefit of any subsidy.

18. Mr Hutchings says that schemes rules have varied over time. At the point at which the 2016 solar farms were ready to apply for subsidy, one of the key requirements for the highest tariff available was that a solar farm should have an installed overall capacity of less than 5 MW as the cumulative total of all the solar panels installed at the site. Lower tariffs were available but were not at a level to support the economic case of building solar farms at the time. To comply with the 5 MW capacity requirement, applicants had to demonstrate that the solar farm was not dependent on any other solar farm or renewable generating station. In the event that two or more solar farms shared land or an electricity connection to the licensed distribution network, they would be considered as single sites and the cumulative total of their installed solar panels compared against the 5 MW cap. Each of the 2016 solar farms separately applied for either a feed-in tariff or a renewable obligations certificate complying with the separation requirements in respect of the subsidy scheme.
19. Mr Hutchings then turns to the proprietary arrangements for the 2016 solar farms. He says that during the development phase of that project, nine separate lease agreements were prepared and entered into, one for each of the 2016 solar farms. Each agreement included a lease plan for a plot of land which has been leased on a continuous basis for the purposes of constructing, commissioning and operating a solar farm. The lease plans show no overlap between any of the nine 2016 solar farms. Each is fenced separately with individual maintenance agreements for both the solar farm and the leased land. He confirms that in order to qualify for feed-in tariffs and renewable obligation certificates each 2016 solar farm complied with relevant legislation and scheme rules, which required each solar farm be separate from the other.
20. Mr Hutchings explains the electricity connection arrangements of the 2016 solar farms.

"Each of the 2016 Solar Farms benefits from its own 11kV dedicated connection to the DNO electricity distribution network, (now operated by National Grid Electricity Distribution ("NGED"), but in 2016 was known as Western Power Distribution ("WPD")). In order to support nine new solar farms, WPD required a new 66kV substation to be constructed, splitting the existing 66kV overhead line between Stratford and Great Alne in two, looping in and out of the new 66kV substation.

Within the 66kV substation, a new 10-way 11kV distribution panel was constructed. Each 2016 Solar Farm connects via an 11kV dedicated cable to one of these ways. A tenth way was required by the DNO for future use, (available for any new DNO customer, not limited to solar farms).

Located within each 2016 Solar Farm is a boundary settlement meter. This meter demarks the boundary between equipment which is owned by the solar farm operator and that which is owned by the DNO."

21. He then says:

"The following is owned and operated by the DNO and forms part of the licensed distribution network.

i) 11kV cables between each meter and the 66kV substation,

ii) the 11kV 10-way panel,

iii) the 66kV to 11kV transformers,

iv) the 66kV cables connecting to the overhead line,

v) and all associated ancillary equipment."

22. Mr Hutchings then turns to the background to the Development. He says: "The proposed 2023 solar farm has been designed but not yet constructed." He then goes on to describe its land arrangements, electricity connection arrangements and any potential impact on the 2016 solar farms. He says: "The 2023 solar farm has been designed to operate as a standalone solar farm with no dependencies or overlap with the 2016 solar farms." He says that there is proposed to be a dedicated lease and electricity connection for use for the operation of the 2023 solar farm. Drayton Manor Farm Limited is the promoter of the Development. The long-term owner and funder of the Development has yet to be ascertained. Due to changes in eligibility rules, the feed-in tariff and other subsidy schemes which were available in relation to the 2016 solar farm are no longer available in relation to the 2023 solar farm. It will therefore trade as a subsidy-free operation and rely on revenues generated from the generation and subsequent sale of electricity to the UK energy market. So far as lease arrangements are concerned, the 2023 solar farm will be located on a separate plot of land owned by Drayton Manor Farm Limited and leased to the solar farm developer and operator. There will be no overlap in terms of land boundary with the 2016 solar farms. The 2023 solar farm boundary is generally separate from the 2016 solar farms, separated by site roads, tracks and hedges. There are, he says, a small number of locations where the boundaries are adjacent but there is no overlap. As is the case with all other tenants of the Drayton Manor Farm Estate, the lease will include rights of access over the estate shared access roads.
23. Finally, Mr Hutchings addresses the electricity connection arrangements for the Development. He says that in November 2021 an application was submitted to Western Power Distribution, the Distribution Network Operator (DNO), for a new connection to their distribution network to supply the proposed 2023 solar farm. The connection offered by the DNO for the 2023 solar farm was received on 1 February 2022. The DNO initially suggested a connection date of no earlier than 2032, but this has since been improved to late 2026. Whilst the final design is still under development, it is likely that National Grid Electricity Distribution's (NGED) existing infrastructure will be expanded, creating an extended 66kV substation to include a new connection point dedicated to the 2023 solar farm. This connection point will include the boundary settlement meter, with all the infrastructure on the near side of it being owned by the 2023 solar farm owner and operator. It is believed, he says, that none of the existing infrastructure, whether owned by NGED or the 2023 solar farm owner, will change or impact existing connection arrangements for the 2016 solar farms. The sole common point between the 2016 solar farms and the Development will be the DNO's licenced network, which all electricity customers in the West Midlands area are connected to.

The claimant's case

24. In paragraph 33 and 34 of the details of claim, the claimant summarises the position in the light of the evidence in the following way:

"33. …the factors which suggest an extension [of the 2016 solar farms] on the facts of this case are as follows:

a) the 2023 solar farm and the 2016 solar farms will be broadly adjacent;

b) the landowner is the same for all of the solar farms;

c) all of the solar farms share the same vehicular access, although that is in common with the development and use of the wider landholding.

34. The features that point against that conclusion are as follows:

d) the two solar farms from inception were developed separately and at different times by different applicants; the 2023 solar farm was not anticipated when the 2016 solar farm obtained permission, and they were not conceived of as one project. Permission for the projects were granted seven years and five months apart;

e) the two projects would have separate distribution and connection agreements and would be separately metered. The 2016 solar farms actually have nine different distribution / connection agreements;

f) the solar farms would be operated by different solar farm operators with different landowner lease agreements;

g) the solar farms would operate independently of each other - both in contractual terms and in terms of physical infrastructure;

h) while there would be a common substation, NGED shall require additional capacity and will expand their existing infrastructure, creating an extended 66kV substation to include a new connection point dedicated to the 2023 solar farm. The separate connection point will include a boundary settlement meter, with all infrastructure to the north side being owned by the 2023 solar farm operator;

i) in any event, the substation is part of the DNO's apparatus for transmitting and distributing electricity, rather than being part of the generating station itself, and is the network to which all electricity customers connect to."

25. It is the claimant's case that for those reasons the 2023 solar farm, i.e. the Development, is not properly to be regarded as an extension to the 2016 solar farms, either individually or cumulatively, but would instead be a separate solar farm. The key factors that point to that conclusion are said to be: the separate inception and development of the 2016 and 20923 solar farms by different applicants; and critically, the 2023 solar farm and the 2016 solar farms being able to operate wholly independently in terms of having separate contractual agreements, separate physical infrastructure and distinctly different lifespans. The 2016 solar farms and the 2023 solar farm are said to be physically, electrically and legally separate.

Conclusions

26. In my judgment, the claimant's analysis is well-founded on the unchallenged evidence, particularly that given by Mr Hutchings.
27. The question of whether the solar farm authorised by the 2023 planning permission is properly to be seen as a separate electricity generating station from the generating stations already in operation is, to some degree, a matter of impression. In my view, the most significant factor is the extent to which, if at all, there will be interdependence between the two facilities in their function of generating electricity from solar power. On that question, I find Mr Hutchings' evidence, as a person of great experience in this field of technology, to be wholly persuasive. There is very little, if any, interdependence of function between the 2016 solar farm and the 2023 solar farm in their core operations as generators of electricity from solar power. The fact that the two facilities are to be located within the same freehold landholding and in part adjacent to each other seems to me to be of much less significance. The 2008 Act threshold for an NSIP is founded upon a functional factor - generating capacity - rather than any spatial criterion or definition. In any event, there is a degree of proprietary distinction in this case. There are and will be separate leasehold owners and operators of the facilities. There is also clear land use planning separation. The facilities will operate over different life cycles and subject to different conditions and controls.
28. For these reasons, I find that the Development is not an extension to an existing generating station, but a separate generating station in its own right. It has a proposed capacity below the threshold stated in section 15 of the 2008 Act. Accordingly, it does not require development consent under section 31 of the 2008 Act. The Development is authorised for planning purposes by virtue of and subject to conditions imposed by the 2023 planning permission.

Relief

29. It is necessary to consider whether I should make a declaration. In order to resolve that question I shall follow the approach laid down by Aikens LJ at [120] in Rolls Royce Plc v Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 387; [2010] 1 WLR 318, starting with the proposition that the power of the court to grant declaratory relief is discretionary.
30. The first question is whether there a real and present dispute as to the existence or extent of a legal right between the parties in this case. It is important to consider that question in the context in which it arises. In this case, the note included on the 2023 planning permission raised a clear point of legal and practical uncertainty as to whether the planning permission granted by that notice was sufficient in law to authorise the lawful implementation of the Development. The 2023 planning permission is a document of public record. There is no other statutory procedure available to resolve the uncertainty which it raises. Neither the defendant as local planning authority nor the Secretary of State suggest otherwise. Even were the local planning authority to change their decision informally, for example, in subsequent correspondence, that would not bind the defendant in relation to any subsequent action under Part 8 of the 2008 Act.
31. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there is a real and genuine dispute before the court as to the extent of the legal rights conferred by the 2023 planning permission which merits resolution by the grant of appropriate declaratory relief.
32. Both the claimant and the defendant as local planning authority are affected by the court's determination. There is an obvious public interest on the issues raised by the note on the 2023 planning permission being decided authoritatively. The defendant as local planning authority were satisfied that the balance of policy and planning advantage weighed in favour of the granting of planning permission for the Development, which was found to be in accordance with the development plan. The Development will contribute to the need for renewable energy generation. The National Planning Policy Framework recognises that even small-scale renewable energy projects will make a valuable contribution to cutting greenhouse gas emissions and maintain security of energy supply. It is in the public interest for the court to resolve the present uncertainty as to whether this renewable energy scheme may lawfully be delivered on the authority of the 2023 planning permission.
33. I am satisfied that all sides of the argument have been fully and effectively put. Both the defendant as local planning authority and the Secretary of State as national planning authority have had the opportunity to consider the details of this claim and the evidence on which it is founded. I am satisfied that they will have considered carefully whether, in representing both the local community and the wider public interest, they should actively participate. The argument in this case is as to whether the Development authorised 2023 planning permission is correctly to be regarded as an extension to the existing electricity generating station comprised in the existing solar farm at Drayton Manor Farm. That argument has been addressed fully and fairly in Ms Osmund-Smith's submissions and in the evidence before the court.
34. Finally, not only is the granting of a declaration in appropriate terms the most effective way of resolving the legal and practical issue raised by the note on the 2023 planning permission; it is also, for the reasons I have given, the only effective way of doing so.
35. In conclusion, I am satisfied that I should exercise the discretion vested in the court in favour of granting declaratory relief in this claim.
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