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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Brown v Competition and Markets Authority (Re NRLB Ltd - Brown and Mason Group Ltd - Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986) [2024] EWHC 206 (Ch) (08 February 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2024/206.html Cite as: [2024] EWHC 206 (Ch) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
INSOLVENCY AND COMPANIES LIST (ChD)
IN THE MATTER OF NRLB LIMITED (CRN.12348377)
AND IN THE MATTER OF BROWN AND MASON GROUP LIMITED (CRN.01892133)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANY DIRECTORS DISQUALIFICATION ACT 1986
Rolls Building Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
NICHOLAS TERRY BROWN |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY |
Defendant |
____________________
Catherine Addy KC and Anna Lintner (instructed by the CMA) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 19 September and 10 October 2023
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Crown Copyright ©
ICC JUDGE PRENTIS:
"the Claimant has interim leave to act as a director of, and take part in the management of, BMG and NRLB, subject to the following conditions:
2.1. the Claimant shall not be or act as a director of any other company;
2.2. the Claimant shall not use the title of "Managing Director" of BMG or NRLB;
2.3. BMG and NRLB shall not act as directors of any company;
2.4. NRLB shall not carry out any trading activities;
2.5. whilst the Claimant may advise BMG in relation to their proposed content, the Claimant shall not approve any tender submission documents or any trade agreements on its behalf or otherwise authorise or cause BMG to submit or enter into the same without the prior written approval of at least two other directors of BMG of such tender submission document or trade agreement;
2.6. the Claimant shall not attend any meeting on behalf of BMG or NRLB with (1) any client or potential client to discuss, submit, approve or enter into any tender submission or trade agreement pre-contract, (2) any competitor of BMG or NRLB, or (3) with any third party that provides financial support to BMG or NRLB, without another director of BMG or NRLB (or alternatively in the case of BMG, Dan Baker) being present;
2.7. no invoices shall be rendered and no payments shall be made on behalf of BMG under the direction of or pursuant to any instructions given by the Claimant;
2.8. subject to condition 2.9 below: (a) Adam Collinson ('Mr Collinson') shall remain a non-executive director of BMG; (b) Ms Morris, Richard Brown ('Mr R Brown'), Lee Brown ('Mr L Brown'), John Payton ('Mr Payton') and Alex Hadden ('Mr Hadden') shall remain directors of BMG; (c) whilst he remains employed by BMG, Charles Buckingham ('Mr Buckingham') shall remain a director of BMG; (d) Ms Morris shall remain a director of NRLB; (e) Mr Hadden shall remain the competition compliance officer for BMG;
2.9. with the permission of the Court or the written permission of the Defendant: (a) Mr Collinson may be replaced as a non-executive director of BMG; (b) Ms Morris, Mr R Brown, Mr L Brown, Mr Payton and Mr Hadden may be replaced as directors of BMG; (c) Ms Morris may be replaced as a director of NRLB; (d) Mr Hadden may be replaced as the competition compliance officer for BMG. Any application for permission from the Court shall be made on notice to the Defendant;
2.10. Mr Collinson, or his replacement, shall: (a) supervise compliance with competition law by BMG and the Claimant; (b) meet with the Claimant no less than four times a year to consider and discuss the Claimant's compliance with competition law, the next meeting being on or around 7 August 2023; and (c) report to the board of directors of BMG every quarter, and the Defendant on reasonable request with no less than 14 days' notice, on compliance with competition law by BMG and the Claimant;
2.11. the Claimant shall procure that face to face (or video, following any relevant government regulations and/or recommendations) competition compliance training is conducted annually for: (a) staff employed by BMG and any consultants engaged by BMG who are identified by Mr Collinson as being at a higher risk of non-compliance; and (b) all directors of BMG and NRLB;
2.12. at the discretion of, and under the supervision of, Mr Collinson or his replacement: (a) no less than twice a year, all email servers within the custody or control of BMG shall be searched for high risk terms relating to potential competition law breaches; and (b) no less than twice a year, samples of the electronic copies of the Claimant's text and call records shall be reviewed and all text exchanges identified as being with a competitor shall be reviewed; and if Mr Collinson, or his replacement, has any concerns following their investigations, such concerns shall be reported to the CMA in writing;
2.13. BMG shall hold minuted board meetings at which its compliance with competition law and any concerns raised by Mr Collinson or his replacement are considered on a quarterly basis. In addition, the appointed competition compliance officer shall provide a report to every board meeting of BMG which shall (a) include details of any competition law compliance training undertaken within BMG since the last board meeting and (b) include details of any matters or reports that such officer has become aware of under the applicable competition compliance policy and/or whistleblowing policy;
2.14. BMG shall maintain a statement on its website underlining its commitment to competition law compliance and acknowledging its involvement in the CMA's investigation, together with a link to its competition law compliance policy;
2.15. Within 2 days of receiving a sealed copy of this Order from the Court, BMG shall publish and maintain a copy of this Order, together with either a copy of or a link to the Disqualification Undertaking on the CMA's website, in a prominent place on its website".
"(i) The court has a discretion under section 17 to allow a person who has been disqualified to be a director of a company or be concerned or take part in the promotion, formation, or management of a company.
(ii) The onus is on an applicant under the section to persuade the court to grant permission. The starting point when approaching the jurisdiction is that the applicant has been held unfit to be a director for the period of the order (or has accepted the equivalent when giving an undertaking). Nonetheless leave may be given in a proper case.
(iii) It is for the court (and not for the Secretary of State) to be satisfied that it is appropriate to give leave for the applicant to be a director etc.
(iv) The discretion under section 17 to give leave is unfettered. It is wrong to seek to add glosses or preconditions. The question for the court is whether in all the circumstances it is appropriate to give leave; and in approaching this question the court balances all the relevant factors.
(v) Though it is usual to establish that the company has a 'need' for the applicant to be a director or to be involved in the management, this is not a precondition. For instance, the appointment may be made to allow the director to obtain a tax advantage.
(vi) The court should, among other things, have regard to the nature and seriousness of the conduct that led to the disqualification order or undertaking and the length of the disqualification. Where that conduct was dishonest a court may be reluctant to give leave.
(vii) The court should, when deciding whether to give leave… to act as a director have regard to the purposes of a disqualification order. These include (i) protecting the public directly by prohibiting the disqualified person from acting and (ii) deterring both the particular director and others from the kind of conduct that has led to the order.
(viii) Leave should not be too freely given as this would tend to undermine the protective and deterrent purposes of a disqualification order. The court would not wish anyone dealing with a director to be misled as to the gravity of a disqualification order.
(ix) On the other hand, the power of the court to grant leave under section 17 is inherent in the disqualification regime and in an appropriate case it may serve the public interest to allow a disqualified person to be a director of a specific company.
(x) Moreover, the fact that the applicant for leave has agreed to the imposition of conditions designed to ensure high standards of corporate conduct may itself be seen as promoting the policy of deterring misconduct."
"The powers to impose disqualification orders exist because of the importance of competition law for the day-to-day business activities of all markets within the UK jurisdiction. Breaches of competition law are serious and the importance of the requirement of fair competition is not to be understated".
"any competition disqualification based on cover bidding or the like necessarily involves deception; it involves dishonest behaviour that is almost certain to result in real financial damage to others. That applies whatever the disqualification period may be. In run of the mill disqualification cases a lower bracket period will almost always be imposed for a minor or 'technical' wrong. That is not the case here. That indeed requires the court to keep public protection in the forefront of its mind.
[45] Public protection must still, however, be balanced against other relevant factors, one of which is need".
"The seriousness of the misconduct is another consideration… That is often expressed by reference to the bracket into which the disqualification period ordered or agreed to by undertaking falls, and in that sense is a convenient shorthand to adopt, but in fact it seems to me that it is the seriousness of the conduct to which attention must be paid rather than the period of disqualification per se."
"The authorities show that the public protection policy underlying disqualification orders has two strands or aspects. One is removing the risk of the disqualified person harming the public through the repetition of the corporate misconduct or abuse which led to the order. It does so by taking him or her off the road for the duration of the order. The second aspect is deterrence. Directors may be expected to maintain higher standards of corporate conduct if they potentially face disqualification for falling below them".
"Deterrence is baked into the disqualification regime. It must be considered in every case. The court must consider the impact on deterrence whenever it is asked for leave. That is why the court should not be too ready to do so… The court must always consider the reasons for the disqualification order".
"…any question of perception should be assessed by postulating a fair minded and informed member of the public, and not one who has been told the bare headlines".
"It might be possible for Mr Rwamba to continue to promote the growth of this part of the business as a consultant, but I think there is force in the submission that, as this aspect of the business expands, and his own involvement in it grows, it will become more difficult for him to ensure that he does not become involved in the management of the companies. That may be a difficult line to draw and it is understandable that leave is sought".
At [52] is this, as to the conditions:
"As well as ensuring that the risk to the public of misconduct is minimised, I consider that these steps should be seen as a positive benefit as they will promote enhanced standards of corporate governance".
"In a case where the applicant concerned has been disqualified because of dishonesty, it is unlikely that his own needs will weigh very heavily, if at all, and it is unlikely that adequate protection to the public can be provided without the full and absolute operation of a disqualification order".
"In my judgement the question I should ask myself is whether it is necessary for Mr Barnett to be a director of a company in order to protect some legitimate interest of Mr Barnett himself, or of any third party, which it is in all the circumstances of the case reasonable that the court should seek to protect. If it is so necessary, then the next question is whether that need can be met without infringing the protection of the public secured by the disqualification order. The extent to which it may be reasonable for the court to seek to protect the interests of the applicant himself in such a case must depend on all the circumstances giving rise to his disqualification. So must the court's ability to continue to protect the public adequately while mitigating the full rigour of a disqualification order".
"It seems to me that the importance of protecting the public from the conduct that led to the disqualification order and the need that the applicant should be able to act as a director of a particular company must be kept in balance with one another. The court in considering whether or not to grant leave should, in particular, pay attention to the nature of the defects in company management that led to the disqualification order and ask itself whether, if leave were granted, a situation might arise in which there would be a recurrence of those defects".
"In a case where no need has been demonstrated on the company's part to have the applicant as its director or, from a business point of view, on the applicant's part to be a director, there would need, I think, to be only a very small risk to the public which the granting of the leave might produce to justify the refusal of the application. Per contra, if a substantial and pressing need on the part of the company, or on the part of the individual in order to be able to earn his living, could be shown in favour of the grant of leave then it might be right to accept some slight risk to the public if the leave sought were granted".
"The emphasis given in a judgment in a particular case on particular circumstances in that case is not necessarily a guide to the weight to be attributed to similar circumstances in a different case".
"unfettered by any statutory condition or criterion. It would… be wrong for the court to create any such fetters or conditions".
"Leave… in my view is not to be too freely given. Legislative policy requires the disqualification of unfit directors to minimise the risk of harm to the public, and the courts must not by granting leave prevent the achievement of this policy objective. Nor would the court wish anyone dealing with the director to be misled as to the gravity with which it views the order that has been made".
"The improprieties which have led to and required the making of a disqualification order must be kept clearly in mind when considering whether a grant of s.17 leave should be made".
"[33] The purpose of a disqualification order or undertaking is not to punish the director for his misconduct. Rather it is to protect the public. Partly it does that by restricting the ability of the person concerned to expose the public to the risk of loss from further misconduct on his part. It is worth adding that the possible further misconduct does not have to be of the same nature as that which has led to the disqualification… Partly a disqualification order or undertaking achieves its purpose of protecting the public by deterring other directors from misconduct which might lead to disqualification proceedings against them. It also seems to me that the existence of the disqualification jurisdiction can have a beneficial effect in the form of maintaining and improving standards of integrity on the part of businessmen who become directors of companies.
[34] Where a leave application is made the court has a balancing process to undertake. In favour of a grant of leave is the 'need' criterion: the need of the disqualified director to earn a living, and (a different matter, and usually more important) the need of some other person, typically another company, to have his services. Against the grant of leave may be the factors which I mentioned in the foregoing paragraph as purposes which the legislation is intended to serve: protecting the public by, to use a familiar metaphor drawn from another kind of disqualification, keeping off the road a person whose past conduct has fallen short of the standards to be expected; deterring other directors from similar misconduct; and maintaining and improving standards of integrity.
[35] In the balancing process the degree of seriousness of the misconduct on the part of the disqualified person who is applying for leave is relevant. The relevance seems to me not to rest on the notion that, if a person's misconduct has been serious enough, a refusal of leave serves him right. Rather the point is in part that, in the case of a person who has misconducted himself seriously in the past, the risk to the public of him misconducting himself again if he is granted leave is greater than would exist in the case of a person whose misconduct was less serious. A different aspect of the same point is that, if a disqualified director whose conduct has been significantly bad is seen by others to have been granted leave by the court to continue as a director of another company, the deterrent effect on other directors will be weakened".
"Until 2003 Mr Kluk had been a director of and a shareholder in a company which dealt in work-related textile goods. In 2003, in connection with that company, he did things on account of which he agreed that he should be disqualified from being a director of a company for the long period of ten years. By the time of the disqualification he was a director of another company which carried on a similar business, the shareholders of which were his wife and trustees for the two of them. What message about the disqualification regime would it convey to directors of similar companies if he was given permission by the court to continue running (with two other directors, recently appointed from long term employees) the same sort of company, carrying on the same sort of business, as he had been running (with two other directors) before? The wrong message, I suggest. It would give the impression that the disqualification regime has no real teeth because, even in cases of serious misconduct, it is not difficult to obtain leave to continue to manage another company".
"6. As found by the CMA in its Decision issued on 23 March 2023 (the 'Decision') and admitted by BMG in settlement of case 50697, Brown and Mason infringed the prohibition imposed by section 2(1) in the Competition Act 1998 (the 'Chapter 1 Prohibition') by participating in the following agreements or concerted practices (together, 'the Admitted Infringements').
6.1 Admitted Infringement 3: Between at least 3 June 2013 and 8 July 2013, Brown and Mason and McGee (as defined in the Decision) infringed the Chapter 1 Prohibition by participating in an agreement or concerted practice in the form of an arrangement for Brown and Mason to provide McGee with a cover bid in return for a compensation payment. This agreement had, as its object, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in relation to the supply of Demolition Services at the Shell Building, Southbank. The contract was awarded to McGee for £18.4 million although, following subsequent additions to the project, it reached the final award value of £21.05 million. The compensation payments received by Brown and Mason amounted to £600,000 excluding VAT.
6.2 Admitted Infringement 6: Between at least 28 July 2014 and 28 August 2014, Scudder (as defined in the Decision) and Brown and Mason infringed the Chapter 1 Prohibition by participating in an agreement or concerted practice, which had as its object, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in relation to the supply of Demolition Services for the Lots Road Power Station. This took the form of a compensation payment arrangement (without cover bidding). The contract was awarded to Scudder for £9.6 million, and Brown and Mason received £100,000 in compensation excluding VAT".
"11. I admit that my conduct as a director of Brown and Mason was such as to make me unfit to be concerned in the management of a company, since my conduct contributed to Brown and Mason's breaches of competition law. As the person with oversight of day-to-day operations of the business, including contract and client relationship management, I accept that Brown and Mason's participation in each of the Admitted Infringements resulted directly from my involvement.
12. In the case of both of the Admitted Infringements, I took a central role in the conduct. As explained below, I met with Brown and Mason's competitors and agreed the cover bidding arrangement in respect of Admitted Infringement 3 and agreed to fix an element of the tender price in respect of Admitted Infringement 6. In both cases, I agreed the amount and terms of the compensation payment and made the arrangements for their payment. My involvement is summarised as follows:
12.1 Admitted Infringement 3: I was directly involved in agreeing to provide the cover bid that is the subject of this infringement… I was contacted by Brian McGee… after the submission of initial tender bids for the Shell Building Project… I met with Mr McGee in person and discussed the tender with him. Mr McGee explained that he wanted the job, provided me with their tender quote and offered to pay Brown and Mason compensation should we agree to submit a quote higher than McGee's… I had received high quotes from subcontractors for the job and, following the re-scope of the project, I did not believe that Brown and Mason would succeed in the tender. I therefore accepted his offer of £600,000 in compensation for placing a cover bid (although, in fact, the bid that Brown and Mason submitted at the second stage of the tender process was slightly lower than McGee's). At the time I made this agreement, I had primary responsibility for decision-making within the business as my father… was absent for medical reasons.
12.2 …in late 2015, I perceived Brown and Mason to be facing financial difficulty. Recalling my original agreement with Mr McGee, and knowing that McGee had in fact secured the Shell Building Project… I called Brian McGee and requested payment of the compensation. I agreed with Mr McGee that the payment of the compensation would be split into three amounts spread across a 12-month period, and that each of the invoices would be made against other projects at Mr McGee's direction, despite the fact that Brown and Mason was not providing services for any of those other projects.
12.3 Following consultation with Mr McGee, I then instructed employees of Brown and Mason to prepare and send three purported invoices to McGee for a total of £600,000 (excluding VAT) [these were dated 17 December 2015, 2 May 2016, and 6 May 2016]. I directed them to enter those invoices against fictional services and goods that were not in fact ever supplied by Brown and Mason…
12.4 Admitted Infringement 6: On 14 July 2014, Denis Deacy (Scudder) sent me a text message requesting a meeting to discuss the upcoming tender for the Lots Road Power Station project… On 28 July 2014, I met Mr Deacy…
12.5 … at that meeting, Mr Deacy informed me that he wanted the contract and that he would 'buy me off the job'. In other words, he requested that I provide a cover price for him in exchange for a compensation payment, rather than actively compete for the tender.
12.6 I refused to participate in a cover bidding process as Brown and Mason wanted to win the contract. However, following further discussion about the client and the tender process, I agreed to a proposal from Mr Deacy that we would respectively increase the prices of our tenders by a set amount, to be paid to the losing party. My recollection was that the value of the increased price and related compensation payment was £80,000, but I note that the Decision also includes reference to documentary evidence… that indicate that the agreed increase to the price and the related compensation payment was in fact £100,000.
12.7 ... Brown and Mason intended to win the contract and priced the job with this intention. Nevertheless, following Scudder's successful tender for the project I contacted Mr Deacy to request the compensation due under our agreement. I called Mr Deacy to request that Scudder make payment of the agreed amount, and in June 2016 I sent two text messages to Mr Deacy each asking if we could 'sort an invoice'. These messages were sent to ensure that payments due under the arrangement were made.
12.8 Having received Mr Deacy's agreement to make the payment, I thereafter corresponded with Scudder employees to agree the terms of the invoice before instructing employees within Brown and Mason to prepare and send four purported invoices to Scudder for a total of £100,000 (excluding VAT) [these were dated 10 November 2015, 22 July 2016, 2 August 2016, and 16 February 2017]. Again, I directed them to enter those invoices against fictional services and goods that were not in fact ever supplied by Brown and Mason…
14. As a result of my actions… I caused Brown and Mason to engage in conduct which created conditions of competition which did not correspond to the normal conditions of the market.
15. I understood at the time that my conduct was wrong. Furthermore, it is clear to me now, and should have been clear to me at the time, given my position as an experienced director, that such interactions between competitors to agree cover bids, fix elements of tender prices and receive compensation payments carried unacceptable risks of infringing competition law.
16. I accept that price fixing (of which cover bidding is one type) is among the most serious forms of competition law breach.
17. I also accept that cover bidding arrangements in conjunction with compensation payments arrangements have been found to be more serious than arrangements where no such inducement is offered.
18. My participation in the Admitted Infringements contributed to Brown and Mason's breaches of competition law and was central to BMG being subject to a penalty of £2,400,000 under section 36(1) of the Competition Act 1998, which BMG has agreed to pay under the settlement agreement with the CMA dated 25 February 2022".
The BMG board, other than Mr Brown
Mr Brown, his roles, and others' perceptions
"We continue to be committed to making the Global Compact and its principles part of the strategy, culture and day-to-day operations of our company, and to engaging in collaborative projects which advance the broader development goals of the United Nations… Brown and Mason Limited will make a clear statement of this commitment to our stakeholders and the general public".
This 2013 version (they were all in similar form) then set out each principle, usually setting out how it was complying with it.