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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Hamblin & Anor v Moorwand Ltd & Anor [2025] EWHC 817 (Ch) (04 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2025/817.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 817 (Ch) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
APPEALS (ChD)
Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
GARETH ANTHONY HAMBLIN MARILYN DELINA HAMBLIN |
Appellants (Claimants below) |
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-and- |
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MOORWAND LTD RND GLOBAL LTD |
Respondents (Defendants below) |
____________________
Alexia Knight (instructed by the Keystone Law) for the First Respondent
Heard on 17 and 18 March 2025
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
This judgment was handed down remotely at 11:00 on 4 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and release to the National Archives
MR JUSTICE MARCUS SMITH:
INTRODUCTION
CLAIMS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANTS
i) First, the Appellants articulated a claim in their own right for repayment of the £160,000 paid by them to RND. The nature and details of this claim do not matter. In an ex tempore judgment rendered after a four-day trial (the Judgment), His Honour Judge Mark Raeside, KC (the Judge) dismissed this claim for reasons given in the Judgment. This part of the Judgment is not appealed by the Appellants and it is (for this reason) unnecessary to say anything more about this claim and the facts underlying it.
ii) Secondly, the Appellants sought permission to bring a "derivative" action on behalf of RND. Derivative actions are cases where a claim vesting in a company is brought by a claimant other than the company whose claim it is, the company being joined as a defendant so as to be bound. The Judge gave the Appellants permission to pursue a "derivative" action against Moorwand on behalf of RND. It will be necessary to articulate in some detail the nature of RND's cause of action against Moorwand (the Derivative Claim). For present purposes, two points are to be noted:
a) First, the Judge's decision to give the Appellants permission to bring the Derivative Claim is not appealed by Moorwand, and requires no further consideration in this judgment.
b) Secondly, the Judge dismissed the Derivative Claim for reasons given in his Judgment. The Appellants seek permission to appeal this decision. Edwin Johnson J ordered that there be a "rolled up" hearing of the application for permission to appeal and the appeal itself, and these matters came before me on 17 and 18 March 2025.
iii) Thirdly, the Appellants contended that the Judge had wrongly held that RND had consented to the withdrawals from the account for the purposes of Regulation 61 of the Payment Services Regulations 2009. This, too, was a claim brought derivatively, but I shall refer to it as the Payment Services Claim.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND THE STRUCTURE OF THIS JUDGMENT
THE APPEAL IN REGARD TO THE DERIVATIVE CLAIM
The manner in which the claim was (said to be) put
The grounds of appeal
A pleading point
i) Paragraph 18 pleads that it was a term of the agreement between RND and Moorwand that "the only person authorised to give instructions for the transfer of monies out of the digital wallet was Mr Stanfield acting on behalf of [RND]. Further or alternatively, Moorwand operated the account as the agent of [RND] and the only person authorised to give instructions in relation to the Account on behalf of RND was Mr Stanfield".
ii) Paragraph 19 pleads an alternative case that "[Moorwand] owed a duty of care, in contract and/or tort and/or agency, to take reasonable skill and care not to execute a payment instruction in circumstances when [Moorwand] was put on inquiry that the payments were not duly authorised by [RND]. The standard applicable in deciding whether [Moorwand] should reasonably have been put on inquiry was that of the reasonable payment service provider".
iii) It is thus clear that the Amended Particulars of Claim assert two distinct causes of action, namely the two alternative ways of putting the Derivative Claim described at paragraph 7 above.
iv) Paragraphs 20 to 26 and 28 to 29 plead the relevant facts and matters that inform the success or otherwise of the two claims pleaded, and I will not set these out. They informed the evidence before the Judge, and the Judge's consideration in his Judgment.
v) Paragraph 31 pleads the transfers out of the Account which according to the Appellants were made without authority or in breach of duty. Paragraph 32 specifically pleads the lack of authority for these payments and asserts that Moorwand should not have made them. That assertion is expanded upon in paragraph 34. Paragraph 35 pleads the contention of breach of duty.
Respect towards a first instance judge's assessment of factual matters
The Judgment
i) At [60], it is recorded that on 21 March 2017, an email was sent from the address [ redacted ] to a Ms Miller of Moorwand (then known as UPayCard). Ms Miller was the business account manager at Moorwand. The email sought to open an account – the Account – at Moorwand. The purpose of the application was this:
I have a marketing consultancy, I would like to be able to receive funds from my clients and also pay suppliers of particular aspects of my business. Monthly predictions in turnover will be around £100,000 per month. Please advise how to proceed once submitted.
ii) Ms Miller responded, asking "[c]ould you please first let me know exactly what you intend to use your business account for?...which countries do you focus on?" No reply was made to this question (at [60]. An application form was completed apparently by Mr "Stanfield", giving RND as the company name, an address as "99 3 Riverlight Quay, London". Mr "Stanfield" gave as his home address "12 Priestley Close, Lincolnshire", giving details of a passport number (462156504) and a utility bill as proof of address. The application form described RND's business at "online marketing and lead generation. Freeland IT/web development". Documents evidencing RND's incorporation were provided, and a utility bill confirming the company's address (at [61]).
iii) There were a number of issues with the documents, which the Judge described in the following terms:
[61] …The application form listed attached documents, including the incorporation document of RND and Memorandum and Articles, proof of the principals, utility bill in the name of the company for the address above. But the utility Bill from Unicom showed someone with an entirely different name on its face, together with the company details of Mr Stanfield at RND. (A subsequent email of 1 February 2018 from Anastasia Rudo to John Mayor refers to the documents that were missing and which would be expected to be supplied).
[62] As a matter of fact the real John Stanfield had a birthday of 29 September 1961, not November 1961 as shown at Companies House, as appears from passport number 462156504. The real John Stanfield's address is 12 Priestley Close, Lincolnshire. According to his Annual Mortgage Statement dated 19 August 2016, he has a mortgage with NatWest Bank at their Birmingham branch, in respect of which there is 12 years 1 month remaining, opening balance £40,322.34, monthly repayments £1124.86, closing balance £37,742.33. It would appear that both the mortgage details and the passport are of the real John Stanfield, but that he had nothing to do with the fraudsters involved with RND. [Moorwand] rightly admit that they failed to identify that the person purporting to be John Stanfield on the Application Form was not the real John Stansfield, but contend that this is part of the regulatory process and is not relevant to any proper common law claim once the account was operated and instructions given and communications made between [Moorwand] and "John" on all the relevant transfers as set out below.
[63] On 9 February 2017, RND supplied ML with a copy of a Unicom invoice said to be addressed to John Stansfield, but close inspection showed a different name on the face of the invoice, Ms Mehegan. On 22 March 2017, "Liliana B" emailed Tatiana Miller in respect of the new merchant, RND and said: "Please do not assign the programs until the documents aren't [sic] approved and all questions regarding the merchants aren't [sic] clarified. Tatiana, please not [sic] my comments; Owner's UB is expired (Aug 16), please ask him to provide a recent one (UB/BS). I'm not sure about the company UB. It looks fake. Can they provide another proof of company address?" So far as the contemporaneous documents are concerned, there was no reply to this serious concern, and [Moorland] did not complete their regulatory checks on RND.
[64] Despite those concerns, the UPay Card account was set up almost immediately on 22 March 2017 which allowed RND to successfully set up a trading account to trade from then onwards. [Moorwand] rightly admits that it called into question the veracity of the Unicom invoice but say that this is part of the regulatory process and not relevant to any duties [Moorwand] owed once the account was operated…
iv) Moorwand set up three different accounts for RND, all commencing operation on 22 March 2017. These three accounts (the account numbers do not matter) were denominated in bitcoin, £ sterling and € Euro: at [97]. The Judge noted (at [97]):
Accordingly, within a day of taking on their new client RND as their customer, it was agreed between them that they were allowed to trade a Bitcoin account and I have no doubt whatsoever of the inference that can be drawn is that the attraction of organisations such as [Moorwand] was that they performed this online trading in Bitcoin. This all took place some five months after the accounts were set up. This is not a case where the Regulatory checks and Bitcoin purchases all factually took place at the same time but were quite separate factual events.
v) The monies fraudulently extracted from the Appellants by the "push" fraud reached RND's account as described in [98] to [100]. The Judge found nothing in this transfer to put Moorwand on inquiry. The Judgment then deals with the payment out of the RND account with Moorwand, noting (at [101]):
Within 10 days or not more than about two weeks, the lion's share of Mr and Mrs Hamblin's £160,000 was paid out by RND from the account number 2241593 which is the Bitcoin account and also the other account in GBP. The details of the transactions are set out below which in terms of the paperwork seems entirely in order. There is no reason why [Moorwand] would be concerned not to carry out the instructions given by RND or be put on enquiry. The Bitcoin account is considered first as it has the most transactions and traded over a short period constantly.
vi) At [102] to [108], the Judge sets out the transactions that resulted in the paying away of the Appellants' £160,000 out of the RND account. The Judge reached relatively few factual conclusions from the granular payments away that he described. However, it can be said that there was a great deal of transacting in Bitcoin (at [111]), with significant payments to "Global Self Drive Ltd" (£40,000) and "Authentic Luxury Watches Trading" (£34,500) (at [111]). The Judge concluded (at [111]) that:
…These three amounts account for £74,650 withdrawn by RND and, therefore, taken with the other Bitcoin purchases, explains the total payment out of £160,000 of Mr and Mrs Hamblin's money. Thus, the greater part of the £160,000 went to the Bitcoin account and a single watch purchase was relatively small at £34,500 and does not stand out when reviewing the three accounts. As far as these three transactions were concerned, they were with RND and therefore they used the line of communication agreed when the GBP account was set up and there was no reason for [Moorwand] to doubt who they were dealing with or that these three transactions were not authorised by RND. To the contrary, [Moorwand] was duty bound to carry out RND's instructions…
vii) The Judge found nothing suspicious (at [113]):
The purchase of the watch was a one-off transaction. It has to be set in the context of all the transactions taking place, including those permitted on the Bitcoin account though I generally accept the comments made by [the single joint expert] that watches, and Bitcoin trading are typically associated with fraudsters. That may be so, but the facts of this case have to be considered with the above transactional background which in my judgment would not give rise to any reasonable concerns by [Moorwand] who provided a quite separate Bitcoin account for the purpose of trading from the outset, and that is where RND generally traded.
viii) The Judge considered the evidence of the single joint expert (who was not cross-examined) later on in his Judgment. As recorded by the Judge (at [128]), the single joint expert concluded:
…With regard to whether a reasonable payment services provider would have had grounds for believing the Transfers were an attempt to misappropriate RND's funds, my view is that, while the transactions themselves were not indicative of an attempt to misappropriate RND's funds, their nature and size were out of the expected character of transaction that RND had previously advised. Therefore, while it was legitimate for [ML] to accept that the instructions were properly given under their terms and conditions, notwithstanding the shortcomings in initial due diligence and there was no reason for them to suspect an attempt at misappropriation of the funds, the nature of transfers should have triggered suspicions of money laundering and been subject to a Suspicious Activity Report, which may have prevented their completion.
ix) The Judge did not consider this material to the Derivative Claim, for reasons given at [128]:
There is no complaint made of ML in accordance with Phillip (supra), only regulatory concerns that "may" have had an impact and this is a counterfactual question not based on any probability for a civil trial and must be put in the context of the very few days in which all the funds were dissipated as set out above and the quite long period of time since the account was set up. So I put this last comment made by Mr Burns to one side as it is of no assistance.
x) The Judge stated his reading of the single joint expert's report as follows (at [129]):
The conclusion in the report maybe leaves something to be desired in terms of understanding, but my reading of it is as follows: (1) The opening of the account by RND was suspicious and therefore greater scrutiny was required with the transactions; however, he could be wrong as a matter of law in accordance with Philipp, (2) Despite these initial shortcomings, there was no reason to suspect any attempt of misappropriation of funds, but (3) the transfers "may" have given rise to a Suspicious Activity Report due to the suspicion of money laundering, which "could" have prevented the transactions from being completed, but that takes this civil case no further.
xi) The Judge concluded (at [130]) that the report only supported "regulatory failings, but this is not of any relevance to a common law and contract case".
Philipp v. Barclays Bank plc
i) The relationship between a bank and the customer of a bank holding a current account with that bank is that of debtor/creditor: Philipp at [29]. For the remainder of this paragraph, all references are to Philipp. I use the term "bank" to embrace payment service providers like Moorwand. As stated, this was a convenient shorthand used both before the Judge and in this appeal, and in no way implies a lack of appreciation of the differences between payment service providers like Moorwand and banks.
ii) Absent contrary agreement, the bank must comply strictly with its mandate. Where the bank acts outside the mandate by making a payment which the customer has not authorised, it cannot debit the customer's account. Conversely, where the bank receives an instruction to make a payment given in accordance with the mandate, the ordinary duty of the bank is to carry out the instruction: at [30].
iii) However, the bank cannot be obliged to act unlawfully when carrying out its customer's authorised payment instructions: at [31]. A genuine, reasonable and (above all) valid concern on the part of the bank that it might incur a legal liability by carrying out the instruction entitles the bank not to act: at [32]. There are many reasons why such a justification for not acting may arise, two of which are (i) incurring liability for dishonestly assisting in a breach of trust and (ii) money laundering: at [32] and [33].
iv) Further, in providing its services, the bank must carry out its services with reasonable skill and care: at [34]. This duty only arises where the bank has some latitude in acting. Where the bank has no choice in terms of its duty, questions of reasonable skill and care do not arise: at [35]. Questions of reasonable skill and care tend to involve judgement, and the exercise of judgement implies choice.
v) Difficult questions arise where a payment instruction is given to the bank by an agent who was an authorised signatory of the customer's account but was acting in fraud of the customer. This – deriving from the Quincecare case – is often referred to as the "Quincecare duty": at [53]. In this case, the Quincecare duty involved consideration of payment instructions given by a Mr "Stanfield" (I will explain why I put the name in quotes in due course) on behalf of RND to Moorwand. In such a case:
a) The bank's duty to exercise reasonable skill and care arises only where there is range of options available to the bank. If the bank has only one course open to it, it must follow that course: at [35] and [63].
b) A bank will be obliged to exercise reasonable skill and care when interpreting, ascertaining and acting in accordance with the instructions of the customer. Where the instruction is clear, leaving no room for interpretation or choice, the bank has no option but to execute the order: at [63] and [64].
c) An agent has no actual (ostensible authority raises different questions) authority to act fraudulently in their own interests and not bona fide in the interests of their principal: at [71], [72] and [78]. Ostensible authority – where a third party relies on the apparent authority of an agent who has no actual authority – exists to protect a third party who relies on the appearance of authority with which an agent is cloaked: at [72]-[85]. Apparent authority confers no protection on a third party with notice that the agent is acting without actual authority: at [86].
d) Where – in a case potentially giving rise to the Quincecare duty – an agent is acting in fraud of their principal, there will (self-evidently) be no actual authority in the agent (at [90]). The bank receiving a payment instruction from such an agent will, nevertheless, be protected by that agent's ostensible authority (at [90]).
e) If there are circumstances suggestive of dishonesty apparent to the bank which would cause a reasonable banker before executing an instruction to make inquiries to verify the agent's authority, the bank's duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in and about executing the customer's instructions requires the bank to make inquiries to ascertain whether the instruction given is one actually authorised by the customer. If the bank executes the payment instruction without making such inquiries, the bank will be acting in breach of duty. Furthermore, the instruction will not bind the customer, as the dishonest agent will lack apparent as well as actual authority to give it on behalf of the customer: at [90]. The duty of care requires the bank, if put on inquiry, not to act without checking that the order is a valid order of the customer to transfer money promptly. The duty of care requires the bank, if put on inquiry, not to act without checking that the order is indeed a valid order of the customer to transfer money. If the bank, without taking steps to clarify the customer's intention, executes the order, the bank will be acting in breach of its duty of care and will also be acting outside the scope of its mandate: at [91].
f) Such cases actually involve interaction between two agents of the principal (here: RND): the agent authorised to give payment instructions (here: Mr Stanfield) and the agent authorised to execute those payment instructions (here: Moorwand). The consequence of the Quincecare duty is that the bank may not follow the instructions of the principal's (other) agent where that agent has neither actual or apparent authority to give those instructions: at [93].
Analysis
i) The Judge incorrectly equated RND's agent (Mr "Stanfield") with RND itself, such that he regarded the knowledge of the agent as that of the company RND: see [69], [109] and [187] of the Judgment. Instead of seeing the issues from the perspective of an innocent principal (RND) that was the victim of a fraud of its agent (Mr "Stanfeld"), the Judge treated the fraudster's knowledge as that of RND.
ii) This was an error of law. It has been clear, since the decision in Re Hampshire Land Co, [1896] 2 Ch 743 that the knowledge of a director acting in fraud of their corporate principal is not to be attributed to the company. For more recent authority – cited both to the Judge and to me – reference may be had to Bilta (UK) Ltd v. Nazir, [2015] UKSC 23 and Singularis Holdings Ltd v. Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd, [2019] UKSC 50.
iii) Although Ms Knight sought to suggest that this was a principle that ought to be attenuated or not applied in the present case, I disagree. Not only am I bound by high authority, but also the rule is a highly principled one. A sound claim brought by a company against a third party should not be destroyed or fatally undermined by attributing to the company the dishonest conduct of the company's agent.
iv) By equating Mr "Stanfield" with RND, the Judge failed to appreciate the significance of a number of factors:
a) RND's business was stated to be that of a marketing consultancy: see paragraph 15(i) above. It was also described as doing on-line marketing and lead generation: see paragraph 15(ii) above. There was thus an obvious tension between the description of RND's business, and the actual conduct of that business by Mr "Stanfield" which the Judge failed to take into consideration: see, in particular, the passages in the Judgment set out at paragraphs 15(vi) to (xi) above. The fact is that the actions of RND's agent were inconsistent with the stated business of RND. That inconsistency could only be disposed of by aligning the agent's state of mind with that of RND which (as I have stated) was an error of law.
b) This elision between agent and principal also meant that the Judge failed to take account of the fact that the person acting as soi disant agent of RND was no such thing. The person authorised to act for RND was a Mr Stanfield, a real person who was himself the victim of identity fraud: see paragraphs 15(i) to (iii) above. There was a good deal of material to suggest that the person in fact purporting to act for RND was not Mr Stanfield, hence my use of quotation marks around "Stanfield". The Judge failed to attach weight to these factors by treating the agent acting or purporting to act for RND as indivisible from RND. Thus, the Judge treated all acts by the (unknown) fraudster masquerading as Mr Stanfield as those of RND. Again, for the reasons I have given, this was an error of law.
v) As a result, the Judge wrongly discounted a number of factors which went to the question of whether Moorwand had been put on inquiry. The issues (i) of whether RND's trading was consistent with that described on the opening of the account and (ii) whether an authorised agent was acting for RND at all were central to the essential Quincecare question of whether Moorwand had been put on inquiry.
vi) The Judge also erred in drawing a line between facts that went to "regulatory failures" and facts going to Moorwand's duty of inquiry: see [66], [97], [130], [161], [164], [167], [187], [191] and [192] of the Judgment. Whilst it is entirely right to say that regulatory failures (for instance: failure to monitor for money laundering) are not relevant to the Quincecare duty, it is an error to assert (as the Judge appears to have done) that where facts are relevant to one duty they are, ipso facto, irrelevant to another. That does not follow and is obviously wrong. Whether a bank is put on inquiry is obviously a question of fact, but one that must be considered in light of the relevant history. That history cannot be redacted because some facts which would otherwise serve to put a bank on inquiry go to other, different, regulatory breaches on the part of the bank. Facts may be pertinent and to be taken into account for more than one purpose.
vii) Thus, the Judge dismissed the tensions between RND's business purpose and the manner in which RND's account was conducted and the clear concerns arising on the opening of RND's account for an altogether bad reason. He also dismissed the concerns identified by the single joint expert for the same erroneous reason.
Disposal
THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE
IN NO EVENT SHALL COMPANY OR ANY PERSONS OR ENTITIES ASSOCIATED THEREWITH BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, PUNITIVE, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH THIS AGREEMENT OR THE SUBJECT MATTERS HEREOF (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, OR LOSS OF BUSINESS INFORMATION) EVEN IF COMPANY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES
i) First, it was contended that the exclusion clause applied to claims for damages only and could not affect Moorwand's obligation to abide by its mandate and (where a payment was made in breach of mandate) to reinstate the account (ground 8 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal). This contention is, in my judgement, plainly right. Not only does the exclusion clause apply to claims in damages only – and this claim is not a claim in damages – but also if the exclusion clause were to be read as extending to the obligation to reinstate, this would have the effect of rendering Moorwand's mandate meaningless. Moorwand would be able to disregard the limits to its mandate and would be under no obligation to reinstate the account, whatever the nature of its conduct (unless fraudulent). Essentially, the exclusion clause would be serving to re-write Moorwand's primary contractual obligations: and it is clear from the wording of the clause that this is not intended nor (if intended) achieved.
ii) Secondly, it was suggested that the exclusion clause should be construed narrowly, so as to be limited to certain types of claim (eg innocent breaches, and not negligent breaches). So far as I can see, this point was not run before the Judge and does not appear clearly in the Amended Grounds of Appeal. It seems to me that there are difficulties with this argument in any event, both because of the wording of the clause itself and because there is no innocent breach of duty capable of being excluded: it seems to me that the argument that this clause extends to negligent breach of duty is a difficult one to resist. Since it appears to be an unpleaded and new point, and since it is unnecessary to consider it given my conclusion at paragraph 25(i), I say no more on this point.
iii) Thirdly, it was suggested that the Judge wrongly applied the test of reasonableness laid down in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The contention (see paragraph 9 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal) was that the Judge had failed specifically to address the various factors going to reasonableness as set out in Schedule 2 to the Act, had disregarded the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and the proper allocation of risk, and had failed to attach any weight to the fact that Moorwand had failed to adduce any evidence specifically on this point. This last point is bad: although parties may adduce evidence going to (un)reasonableness, (un)reasonableness is usually assessed by reference to the general facts of the case, which is what the Judge did here. The Judgment is a careful – and ex tempore – judgment, and I consider that the Judge made an evaluation of reasonableness which I should only interfere with if there is manifest error. There is no such manifest error here, and I dismiss this ground of appeal.
THE CLAIM BASED ON THE PAYMENT SERVICES REGULATIONS 2009
i) Refund the amount of the unauthorised payment transaction to the payer; and
ii) Where applicable, restore the debited payment account to the state it would have been in had the unauthorised payment transaction not taken place.
(1) A payment transaction is to be regarded as having been authorised by the payer for the purposes of this Part only if the payer has given its consent to -
(a) the execution of the payment transaction; or
(b) the execution of a series of payment transactions of which that payment transaction forms a part.
(2) Such consent –
(a) may be given before or, if agreed between the payer and its payment service provider, after the execution of the payment transaction; and
(b) must be given in the form, and in accordance with the procedure, agreed between the payer and its payment service provider.
DISPOSITION