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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Total E&P Soudan SA v Edmonds & Ors [2006] EWHC 1136 (Comm) (22 May 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2006/1136.html Cite as: [2006] EWHC 1136 (Comm) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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TOTAL E&P SOUDAN S.A. |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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(1) PHILIPPE HENRI EDMONDS (2) ANDREW STUART GROVES (3) WHITE NILE LIMITED |
Respondents |
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Selwyn Bloch QC and Stuart Ritchie (instructed by Messrs Williams Holden Cooklin Gibbons LLP) for the Respondents
Hearing date: 27th February 2006
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Tomlinson:
"2. Ownership of Land and Natural Resources
2.1 Without prejudice to the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land and subterranean natural resources, including in Southern Sudan, this Agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources. The Parties agree to establish a process to resolve this issue. ..
3. Oil Resources
B. National Petroleum Commission (NPC)
3.2 The Parties agree that an independent National Petroleum Commission (NPC) shall be established during the Pre-Interim Period and its decisions shall be by consensus. ..
3.4 The NPC shall have the following functions:
3.4.1 Formulate public policies and guidelines in relation to the development and management of the petroleum sector consistent with paragraph 3.1.1.
3.4.2 Monitor and assess the implementation of those policies to ensure that they work in the best interests of the people of Sudan.
3.4.3 Develop strategies and programs for the petroleum sector.
3.4.4 Negotiate and approve all oil contracts for the exploration and development of oil in the Sudan, and ensure they are consistent with the NPC's principles, policies and guidelines.
3.4.5 Develop its internal regulations and procedures.
.
4. Existing Oil Contracts
4.1 The SPLM shall appoint a limited number of representatives to have access to all existing oil contracts. The representatives shall have the right to engage technical experts. All those who have access to the contracts will sign confidentiality agreements.
4.2 Contracts shall not be subject to re-negotiation.
4.3 If contracts are deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems the Government of Sudan will implement necessary remedial measures.
4.4 The Parties agree that "existing oil contracts" mean contracts signed before the date of signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement."
a) At all material times, Total and its co-contractors have had exclusive rights to the exploration and development of Block B, which comprises Block Ba;
b) Knowing of Total's involvement with respect to Block B, the First and Second Respondents entered into negotiations with officials in Southern Sudan with respect to Block Ba in a way that appears wholly inconsistent with Total's rights and economic interests;
c) Knowing of the conclusion of the 1980 EPSA and the 2004 Revised EPSA, the Respondents entered into the White Nile EPLA and related agreements, and are currently taking steps to explore and develop Block Ba in a way that appears wholly inconsistent with Total's rights and economic interests.
i) Before White Nile was incorporated, Mr Edmonds and Mr Groves, having knowledge of Total's interests and rights in Block Ba pursuant to the 1980 EPSA, deliberately and unlawfully interfered with Total's economic interests and rights, including by encouraging and/or persuading the Southern Sudanese regime and/or NilePet to enter into agreements the purpose of which was ultimately to purport to grant White Nile rights to conduct petroleum operations in Block Ba;
ii) Once incorporated, White Nile and its directors, having knowledge of Total's interest and rights in Block Ba pursuant to the 1980 EPSA, and subsequently the Revised EPSA, deliberately and unlawfully interfered with Total's economic interest and rights by continuing discussions with the Southern Sudanese regime and/or NilePet and persuading the Southern Sudanese regime and/or NilePet to enter into agreements, most notably the EPLA, which purported to grant White Nile rights in Block Ba; and
iii) Pursuant to (i) and (ii) above, Total has been caused damage.
"12. Documents available for inspection
The documents listed below will be available for inspection by the public The documents available are as follows:
a) A lock-in agreement between NPC [Nile Petroleum Company Limited] and the Company dated 17 February 2005.
b) A letter from the GOSS and NPC [Nile Petroleum Company Limited] to the Directors and Numerica dated 25 March 2005.
.
d) The EPLA between NPC [Nile Petroleum Company Limited] and the Company dated 25 April 2005.
e) A letter from the GOSS and the Civil Authority of the New Sudan to the Directors and Numerica dated 25 April 2005.
"
"3. A copy of the "draft joint venture agreement" referred to in the second paragraph on page 9 of the Circular
..
5. The Transfer Agreement.
8. Documents containing or evidencing the confirmation provided by the Southern Sudanese regime on 14 February 2005, referred to in the third paragraph on page 9 of the Circular.
9. A copy of the agreement referred in White Nile's announcements dated 16 February and 4 March 2005 (referred to in the latter as the "Joint Venture Agreement).
10. Correspondence between the Southern Sudanese regime and White Nile in which the Southern Sudanese regime provided the information to the directors of White Nile referred to in the second paragraph on page 14 of the Circular (i.e. that the Concession Agreement was valid and that "any contract allegedly entered into by Total with the Government in the North of Sudan on 21 December 2004 is ineffective")."
"(i) When did the Directors of White Nile first make contact with the Southern Sudanese regime and/or NilePet in relation to negotiating the Block Ba concession? (Issue 1)
(ii) With whom did the directors of White Nile have contact? (Issue 2)
(iii) What were the precise scope and nature of the discussions of the directors of White Nile with the Southern Sudanese regime and/or NilePet relating to Block Ba? (Issue 3)
(iv) What was the precise proposal which the directors of White Nile made to the Southern Sudanese regime and when was this made? (Issue 4)
(v) What was the precise level of knowledge which the directors of White Nile had of Total's rights to Block B at the time of their discussions with the Southern Sudanese regime and/or NilePet? From what point in time did White Nile and its directors have such knowledge? (Issue 5)
(vi) What is the precise nature of the rights purportedly awarded to White Nile by the Southern Sudanese Regime and/or NilePet? (Issue 6)."
"Documents Related Issues
1. The Concession Agreement Issue 1; Issue 6
2. The Lock-In Agreement Issue 6
3. A copy of the "draft joint venture agreement" Issue 1; Issue 3 referred to in the second paragraph on page 9 Issue 4; Issue 6 of the Circular
4. The 25 March 2005 letter Issue 6
5. The Transfer Agreement Issue 6
6. The EPLA Issue 6
7. The 25 April 2005 letter Issue 6
8. Documents containing or evidencing the confirmation provided by the Southern Issue 6 Sudanese regime on 14 February 2005, referred to in the third paragraph on page 9 of the Circular.
9. A copy of the agreement referred in White Nile's announcements dated Issue 1; Issue 3 16 February and 4 March 2005 (referred Issue 4; Issue 6 to in the latter as the "Joint Venture Agreement").
10. Correspondence between the Southern Sudanese regime and White Nile in which the Southern Sudanese regime provided the Issue 1; Issue 2 information to the directors of White Nile Issue 3; Issue 5 referred to in the second paragraph on page Issue 6 14 of the Circular (i.e. that the Concession Agreement was valid and that "any contract allegedly entered into by Total with the Government in the North of Sudan on 21 December 2004 is ineffective").
11. All other agreements, correspondence or notes of meetings between White Nile All Issues 1-6 and/or the Southern Sudanese regime(whether under the title of the GOSS or the CANS) and/or NilePet and/or ECL and/or Terra Seis relating to White Nile's purported rights to Block Ba and/or Total's rights to Block Ba."
"31.16 (1) This rule applies where an application is made to the court under any Act for disclosure before proceedings have started.
(2) The application must be supported by evidence.
(3) The court may make an order under this rule only where
(a) the Respondent is likely to be a party to subsequent proceedings;
(b) the applicant is also likely to be a party to those proceedings;
(c) if proceedings had started, the Respondent's duty by way of standard disclosure, set out in CPR 31.6, would extend to the documents or classes of documents of which the applicant seeks disclosure; and
(d) disclosure before proceedings have started is desirable in order to:
(i) dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings;
(ii) assist the dispute to be resolved without proceedings; or
(iii) save costs."
Authoritative guidance as to the proper approach to this provision is to be found in the judgment of Rix LJ in Black and Ors v. Sumitomo Corporation and Ors [2002] 1 WLR 1562. Of particular importance in the present case is the need to guard against allowing the ease with which the jurisdictional threshold can be passed to mislead the court into thinking that it has thereby decided the question of discretion. This is a danger because in very many if not most cases it will be possible to make a case for achieving one or other of the three purposes set out in sub-paragraph (3)(d) and, secondly, each of the three possibilities is in itself inherently desirable see per Rix LJ at paragraph 82 of his judgment, p.1586 of the report.
a) The potential claim would not be justiciable in the English Court;
b) The English courts would not be the appropriate forum;
c) The Applicant has not put forward a case with reasonable prospect of success. It has no evidence of the requisite intention on the part of the Respondents.
d) It would not be desirable for documents in categories 1 9 to be disclosed; they add nothing to the real issues, and will not assist in saving costs, resolving issues or otherwise disposing of the case; and
e) The documents sought at category 11 extend beyond standard disclosure and the category is too wide.
The principal thrust of the Respondents' objection to the application is that the proposed claim has at its core issues which are not justiciable or at any rate not justiciable in this jurisdiction. This objection operates both at the jurisdiction stage and at the discretion stage of the inquiry. What is said is that the question of the legitimacy or otherwise of the grant of rights by either the Civil Administration of New Sudan or the GOSS is not a matter justiciable by this court. This is, submit the Respondents, plainly a case for the exercise of judicial restraint by the English court.
"Sudan is emerging from a long period of civil war, and economic sanctions imposed by the United States currently remain in place. There can be no guarantee that the process of law, including the enforceability of contracts with the GOSS and NPC, and the granting of legal title in Southern Sudan will operate as it does in the United States or the European Union. The GOSS is a fledgling government that has been formed by people who have been fighting a long civil war, and they do not have the degree of legal or commercial infrastructure or sophistication of governments that has been established for longer periods."
Given the nature of the documents of which disclosure is here sought and given the singular feature which attaches to most of them to which I have already referred above, i.e. that they already have or arguably ought to have been made available for public inspection, the Respondents would in my judgment if they were successfully to resist disclosure at this stage on grounds of a potential forum non conveniens challenge need to demonstrate that such an application enjoys a really very strong prospect of success. They do not in my judgment come close to surmounting that hurdle.