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	England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Ted Baker Plc & Ors v AXA Insurance UK Plc & Ors [2012] EWHC 1779 (Comm) (29 June 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2012/1779.html Cite as: [2012] EWHC 1779 (Comm), [2012] 6 Costs LR 1023

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		29/06/2012

Mr Justice Eder :

Introduction

1. Following my judgment in relation to certain preliminary issues which I delivered on 25 May 2012, this judgment now deals with costs. In particular, the claimants apply for an order that the defendants pay to the claimants the costs of the preliminary issues to be assessed unless otherwise agreed. According to a schedule put before the court these costs are said to be approximately £660,000; and the claimants seek an order for an interim payment.
2. The court's discretion with regard to costs is set out in CPR Part 44.3. For the purposes of CPR Part 44.3 (2) there is and could be no dispute but that the claimants are to be regarded as the successful party in relation to the preliminary issues which I determined; and that subject to the three points that I deal with below the claimants would be entitled to an order for costs in their favour.
3. The three points that arise for consideration are as follows. First, the defendants contend that I should make no order for costs at all at this stage and adjourn all questions of costs until after determination of the further issues which are still outstanding, including certain further issues in relation to liability and also quantum. Second, the defendants contend that in any event, they should not have to pay a proportion of any costs that might be ordered against them on the grounds of the claimants' unreasonable conduct in respect of disclosure. That has now been accepted by the claimants. It has also been agreed between the parties that this should be reflected in an order which would, in effect, permit the defendants to deduct the sum of £20,000 from any order as to costs that might be made against them. Third, the first defendants contend that in any event, the court should order that the claimants pay on an indemnity basis the costs wasted and thrown away by their failure until just before trial to admit that the risk was co-insured (the "co-insurance costs"). I take each of these two outstanding points in turn.

A. Should the court make an order for the costs of the preliminary issues now?

4. I deal first with this threshold issue. The defendants accept that the claimants have clearly been successful on the preliminary issues. However, they submit both that it does not follow that the costs should simply follow the event and that it is not possible for the court to deal with these costs fairly at this stage. In particular, the defendants submit that it is clear on the authorities that the appropriate order is to reserve the costs until after trial of the remaining issues on liability and quantum – when the court will be able to decide who has succeeded or failed overall in the action, and to what extent, and also by comparison with any Part 36 or other relevant offers of settlement which the court can then consider.

Split trial

5. In support of such submission, the first main point advanced by the defendants is that regardless of any Part 36 or other relevant offers of settlement that might have been made, it may be proper for the court to defer any order for the costs of a split trial of the issues of liability; and in the present case that is indeed the order that should be made. In particular, the defendants rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weill Mean v Fiddler Holdings [2003] EWCA Civ 1058. In that case, following a trial on liability, a decision by the trial judge to reserve costs was upheld by the Court of Appeal even though the trial had determined all issues on liability and there was no question of any offers of settlement which might have affected costs. However, in my judgment, it would be quite wrong to regard that case as establishing any general rule that in the case of a split trial the court should ordinarily reserve the question of costs until the end of the case. On the contrary, although that was indeed the decision of the trial judge in that case and although that decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, it is quite clear that the Court of Appeal did so with some hesitation and on the rather narrow basis that it was not possible to say that the judge's decision was clearly one which he was not entitled to reach – see paragraph 32 of the judgment of Lightman J with whom Ward and Tuckey LJJ agreed. As to the proper approach of the court in such circumstances, Lightman J further stated as follows:

"33. The fact that only nominal damages are awarded after a single trial of the issues of liability and damages in the circumstances of a particular case may constitute grounds for refusing the claimant his costs or his full costs of the issue of liability. There is much to be said for the view that the incidence of costs should be the same whether or not for case management reasons there has been an order for a split trial and whether or not the order for a split trial was made on the initiative of the claimant or the defendant. If this is so, in the case where there is a split trial and it is left uncertain until conclusion of the trial on quantum whether the claimant will recover more than nominal damages, it may be proper for the trial judge to defer making any order for the costs of the trial of the issue of liability until the final outcome of the action is known. This may be the case whenever the judge considers that there is a real possibility that the outcome of the assessment of damages may affect the merits of the parties' entitlement to the costs of the issue of liability. If the Judge forms the view that it does, he must consider carefully whether justice to the defendant requires him to postpone any decision on costs until the final outcome of the action is known. I do not think that the Judge's decision in the exercise of his discretion to follow this course in this case and postpone the decision on costs can or should be disturbed."

6. The main point advanced by the defendants here is that regardless of any Part 36 or other offers of settlement (as to which see below) which might have been made, there is at least a possibility (and the defendants would say a strong probability) that the claimants will fail on one or more of the remaining issues with regard to liability which remain outstanding alternatively, even if successful on liability, the quantum of any claim will be zero. In such circumstances, the defendants contend that the claimants will not or at least may not be entitled to recover their costs in relation to the trial of preliminary issues which has just been completed.
7. I do not accept that submission in the particular circumstances of the present case. On the assumption that (i) all issues had been determined in a single trial and (ii) the defendants will succeed on one or more issues of liability and/or quantum and subject to the further point raised by the defendants in relation to possible "offers" that I consider further below, I can see no real prospect of the court depriving the claimants of the costs that have been incurred in relation to the preliminary issues that I have just determined. If that is right, the fact that there has been a split trial should not make any difference. These preliminary issues were entirely discrete and it was always open for the defendants, if they so wished, to concede these particular points. On the contrary, these preliminary issues have had to be determined in the course of what has been a protracted trial involving evidence from no less than 22 witnesses. As stated above, the claimants have incurred substantial costs which according to the schedule put before the court total in excess of £660,000. In my judgment, the claimants are in principle entitled to those costs even if they may ultimately fail on other issues of liability or make no more than a nil recovery, subject only to the further point raised by the defendants in relation to possible settlement offers which I now turn to consider.

Possible settlement offers

8. The second main point advanced by the defendants is that in deciding what order for costs should be made in relation to the preliminary issues, the court should take into account any offers of settlement that may have been made either by the defendants or the claimants whether under CPR Part 36 or otherwise; and this can only properly be done at the end of the case when the terms of any such offer can be disclosed and then considered by the court.
9. In support of that submission the defendants relied on a number of authorities including HSS Hire Services Group v BMB Builders Merchants [2005] 1 WLR 3158; Intense Investments v Development Ventures [2006] EWHC 1628 (TCC); Multiplex Constructions (UK) v Cleveland Bridge UK and Anr [2007] EWHC 659 (TCC); Shepherds Investments v Walters and others [2007] EWCA Civ 292, 6 Costs LR 837. As to these authorities, the high point of the defendants' case is the passage in para 35 of the judgment of Waller LJ in HSS v BMB:

"35. In my view Part 36.19 does not allow for the disclosure of the amount of a payment in. On its language it allows simply the disclosure of the fact that there has been one or the fact that there has not. The consequences of that being the correct interpretation of Part 36.19 seem to me to be as follows. If the court is told that there has been no payment in, then the court is free to exercise its discretion to award costs in relation to the preliminary issue and there is no difficulty with Part 44.3(4)(c). If however it is told that there has been a payment in, then, in any but perhaps the most exceptional case, I find it very difficult to think that there could be circumstances where if the issue of damages remains to be decided, the judge can do otherwise than to reserve the question of costs until after the determination of that issue."

10. However, it is important to note that the rule referred to in that passage is no longer extant. It provided in material terms as follows:

"36.19 Restriction on disclosure of a Part 36 offer or a Part 36 payment

(1) A Part 36 offer will be treated as "without prejudice except as to costs".

(2) The fact that a Part 36 payment has been made shall not be communicated to the trial judge until all questions of liability and the amount of money to be awarded have been decided."

(3) Paragraph (2) does not apply … (c) where (i) the issue of liability has been determined before any assessment of the money claimed; and (ii) the fact that there has or has not been a Part 36 payment may be relevant to the question of the costs of the issue of liability.

11. Since then, the rules with regard to offers to settle and payments into court have been substantially revised. They are now contained in CPR Part 36 and the old CPR Part 36.19 has been recast in what is now CPR Part 36.13 which provides in material part as follows:

"36.13 Restriction of disclosure of a Part 36 offer

(1) A Part 36 offer will be treated as "without prejudice except as to costs".

(2) The fact that a Part 36 offer has been made must not be communicated to the trial judge or to the judge (if any) allocated in advance to conduct the trial until the case has been decided.…"

CPR Part 36.13 includes a further paragraph (3) which provides that paragraph (2) does not apply in three stipulated circumstances. However, there is no equivalent to what was in the old rule 36.19 (3) (c). It is also to be noted that the wording of the present CPR Part 36.13 (2) is different from the old rule 36.19 (2). On behalf of the defendants, Mr Nicholson QC submitted that the present CPR Part 36.13 contains generally the same wording as the previous rule 36.19 albeit with some changes. However, Mr Nicholson QC submitted that there is no reason why these changes could have resulted in any change to the principles indicated by the Court of Appeal in HSS v BMB.

12. In my judgment, that submission ignores the change of wording and, in particular, the apparent difficulties as considered in the judgment of Henderson J in AB v CD and others [2011] EWHC 602 (Ch) :

"16. It is also relevant to note that the prohibition on disclosure in rule 36.19(2) was directory, not compulsory, with the result that upon breach the court had a discretion whether to continue to hear the case: see Garratt v Saxby [2004] EWCA Civ 341, [2004] 1 WLR 2152, at paragraphs [15] to [20]. I have no doubt that the same principles would apply to a breach of the prohibition now contained in rule 36.13(2).

17. It is easy to understand why the old rule 36.19(2) and (3) had to be recast when the 2007 amendments to Part 36 were introduced, because those paragraphs applied only to Part 36 payments which were abolished. Thereafter the single concept of a Part 36 offer included monetary as well as non-monetary offers to settle. However, it is less easy to understand why the express provision relating to split trials was removed, and no explanation is offered by the editors of the White Book in the notes to the 2010 edition at paragraph 36.13.1 (volume I, page 1047). The notes merely say this:

The position where there has been a split trial is not specifically addressed as it was under the forerunner of this provision … and absent agreement under the present r.36.13(3)(c) a strictly literal interpretation of the phrase "until the case has been decided" would result in an embargo which might well result in the court being denied information material to deciding what order as to costs if any was appropriate at the split trial stage."

18. It seems to me that there is a real problem here. If the existence of a Part 36 offer cannot be disclosed, except where the parties agree, until the conclusion of the second stage of a split trial, such agreement is unlikely to be forthcoming in any case where the disclosure might prejudice the position on costs of either the offeror or the offeree at the conclusion of the liability stage. It would seem to follow that in nearly all split trial cases where a Part 36 offer has been made all questions of costs would have to be reserved to the conclusion of the second stage, because it will be in the interests of at least one party to refuse consent to its disclosure at the liability stage. But it will often be desirable in principle, and in the wider interests of justice, for the costs of the liability hearing to be dealt with at its conclusion. Very substantial costs may well have been incurred, it will probably be clear that one party has succeeded, and the general philosophy of the CPR is to encourage the determination and payment of costs on a "pay as you go" basis. Furthermore, the Part 36 offer may relate only to the costs of the liability stage; and even if it does not, it is relatively uncommon for trials on quantum to proceed to a hearing. Why, then, should the court be compelled to deal with the costs of the liability hearing in ignorance of the fact that a Part 36 offer has been made, and in ignorance of the terms of the offer, unless the relevant parties all agree? Further, if the court is asked to reserve the costs, it will almost inevitably conclude that the reason for the request is the existence of a relevant Part 36 offer, thereby undermining the apparent policy of rule 36.13(2).

19. In the present case I fortunately do not have to resolve these questions, because each side wishes me to look at its own Part 36 offer at this stage. They have therefore agreed that I should do so, and that if the case progresses to a trial on quantum the trial judge should be someone other than me.

20. Since it is unnecessary for me to resolve the problems to which I have drawn attention, and since I have not heard full argument on them, I think it would be unwise for me to say much more about them. I will merely hazard the suggestion (perhaps foreshadowed in the notes in the White Book) that a possible solution might be to focus on the words "until the case has been decided" in rule 36.13(2), which are much less specific than the wording of the old rule 36.19(2) ("until all questions of liability and the amount of money to be awarded have been decided"). It may be that in appropriate circumstances the new wording should be construed as referring to the conclusion of the first part of a split trial. But even then the difficulty would remain that the court may only be told about the existence of the Part 36 offer, so the question of costs would in practice still have to be reserved for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal in the HSS Group case."

13. The difficulty in the present case is that I have not been told and am not aware whether any offers of settlement have been made by the claimants or by the defendants whether under CPR Part 36 or otherwise and, if so, what might be the terms of any such offer. As to this, the position of the defendants was as stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of their skeleton argument ie

"(17) Unfortunately there is at present a difficulty about informing the court whether or not any Part 36 offer(s) or any other relevant offer(s) of settlement have or have not been made. The defendants have invited the claimants to agree to the court being informed of the facts as to whether any such offer(s) have been made but as yet there has been no agreement about that.

(18) It is to be hoped that such agreement will be forthcoming. However, for the moment, the defendants think it appropriate to hold back from informing the court of these facts."

14. However, there has been no agreement between the parties in this regard. On the contrary, Mr Cogley QC submitted that the effect of the present CPR Part 36.13 (2) is, at the very least, that the fact that a Part 36 offer has been made must not be communicated "until the case has been decided" and that that stage has not yet been reached and will not be reached until all issues of liability and quantum have been determined. Indeed, it was Mr Cogley QC's submission that the defendants were already in breach of that rule by virtue of putting before the court a letter--albeit in redacted form--sent by the defendants' solicitors to the claimants' solicitors.
15. In the event, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether or not the defendants have acted in breach of CPR Part 36.13 and I should make plain that both parties expressly agreed that I should continue in any event to determine the issues arising.
16. As to the scope and effect of CPR Part 36.13 it seems to me that two points are relatively clear. First, the prohibition in CPR Part 31.13 (2) applies only to a Part 36 offer. It follows that an offer which is not a Part 36 offer is not caught by the prohibition. I did not understand the parties to suggest otherwise although I should mention that there was some debate during the hearing whether a party who had made an offer of settlement "without prejudice save as to costs" which was not a CPR Part 36 offer could at any stage unilaterally waive the privilege that would ordinarily attach to such offer and voluntarily communicate both the fact and terms of such offer to the court. In principle, I see no reason why that should not be so. However, it is unnecessary to resolve that debate in the present case because it was not suggested by either the defendants or the claimants that any offer that might have been made was of such a type.
17. Second, although CPR Part 36 (2) prohibits the fact of any CPR Part 36 offer being communicated to the court in the circumstances there specified, it does not on its language appear to prohibit the fact that a CPR Part 36 offer has not been made being communicated to the court. Again, I did not understand the parties to suggest otherwise although this may seem somewhat odd if only because if that is right and the court is not told that a CPR Part 36 has not been made then the inference would seem to be that a CPR Part 36 offer must have been made; and this would appear to undermine the prohibition in CPR Part 36.13. Be that as it may, Mr Cogley QC informed the court (without objection from Mr Nicholson QC) that the court could and should proceed on the basis that no CPR Part 36 offer has been made specifically in relation to the preliminary issues.
18. In any event, I am still ignorant as to whether any more general CPR Part 36 offer has been made. What is the proper approach in such circumstances?
19. It seems to me (as it did to Henderson J. in AB v CD) that there is a "real problem" here. In my view, there is an urgent need for CPR 36.13 to be reviewed and possibly reformulated in order to deal in particular with the question of "split trials" and the kind of difficulties which have arisen in the present case. However, in the meantime I have to grapple with the rule in its present form. The view tentatively expressed by Henderson J. was that in appropriate circumstances the new wording should be construed as referring to the conclusion of the first part of a split trial so that once that part has ended, it would be permissible to communicate the fact of any Part 36 offer to the court. That interpretation of CPR Part 36.13 (2) has obvious attractions and one which is, I suppose, an interpretation consistent, or at least more consistent, with the overriding objective.
20. Such an approach was urged by Mr Nicholson QC. In particular, he submitted that it cannot have been the intention of the Rules Committee when recasting the old rule 36.19 to narrow the circumstances in which the fact of a CPR Part 36 offer has been made; and indeed it was his submission that the intention was to the contrary ie to widen such circumstances. Thus, Mr Nicholson QC submitted that in a case such as the present ie when the court determines only some preliminary issues and the issue of liability generally is yet to be determined, the fact of any CPR Part 36 offer could not have been communicated to the court under the former Rule 36.19 because none of the exceptions in the then subparagraph 3 (c) would apply. In particular, subparagraph 3(c)(i) on its face only applied when the "issue of liability" had been determined and ex hypothesi such liability has not yet been determined.
21. Mr Nicholson QC submitted that one of the reasons for the change of wording in the new CPR Part 36.13 must have been to deal with that situation and, in effect, to permit the fact of any CPR Part 36 offer to be communicated to the court after the determination of some preliminary issues but before the determination of liability generally. In particular, he submitted that the words "until the case has been decided" in the present CPR Part 36.13(2) are different from and much less specific than the wording of the old Rule 36.19(2) ("until all questions of liability and the amount of money to be awarded have been decided") – a point which obviously impressed Henderson J. However, for my part, it seems to me that the interpretation which Henderson J. tentatively suggested and urged here by Mr Nicholson J. would stretch the present wording beyond its proper limit.
22. In the event, it seems to me unnecessary to decide this issue ie the scope and effect of CPR Part 36.13 (2) and I propose to proceed on the assumption in favour of the claimants that the prohibition applies in the present case. Notwithstanding, both counsel accepted that I can proceed on the basis that although I may not be entitled to be informed and do not know whether or not a CPR Part 36 offer has in fact been made, I can proceed on the basis that I cannot exclude the possibility that (i) a CPR Part 36 offer has been made and (ii) any such offer might, at the very least, affect the court's discretion in relation to costs in respect of the preliminary issues. I accept that that is all entirely speculative but it seems to me that however speculative that may be, such matters can properly be taken into account in considering what order I should make at this stage. Indeed it seems to me that I am bound to have regard to such matters by virtue of CPR Part 44.3 (4) which provides in material part as follows

"(4) In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court must have regard to all the circumstances, including …"

23. On behalf of the claimants, Mr Cogley QC submitted that this approach was, in effect, misguided. In particular, Mr Cogley QC submitted that such speculative matters are not properly to be regarded as relevant "circumstances" for the purposes of the opening words of CPR Part 44.3(4) and any suggestion to the contrary would in effect be inconsistent with the CPR Part 44.3(4)(c). I do not accept that submission. I do not see why the matters which I have referred to above are not part of "all the circumstances" and it seems to me that they are, at the very least, potentially relevant. Nor do I consider that such conclusion would be inconsistent with CPR Part 44.3 (4)(c). In particular, I bear in mind that the opening words of the CPR Part 44.3(4) (in particular the last word "including") make plain that subparagraphs (a)(b) and (c) are not exhaustive of the circumstances to which the court must have regard and that such subparagraphs are only given by way of example.
24. In further support of his submissions, Mr Cogley QC relied upon Kew Bettamix Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 1535 and RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co (2008 - unreported). The former case was concerned with the trial of a preliminary issue relating to limitation. The trial judge exercised her discretion to disapply the primary provisions in relation to limitation thus permitting the action to proceed. That decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal. For present purposes, the interest of the case relates to the way in which the court dealt with the issue of costs. The trial judge ordered the defendant to pay all the costs. In the event, this part of the judge's order was reversed on appeal. As to this aspect, various arguments were raised but for present purposes, Mr Cogley QC relied heavily on paragraph 50 of the judgment of Leveson LJ (with which Walker LJ) agreed:

"50. Finally, Mr Cooksley informed the court that the Claimant had made a Part 36 offer, so that he submitted that costs should be reserved to the trial judge for resolution depending upon the ultimate conclusion of the trial. I see no merit in this argument at all. However well or badly the Claimant fares in relation to any Part 36 offer will not affect the question of costs unnecessarily incurred in relation to an issue that failed."

25. In the second case, RTS v Molkerei Alois Muller, Christopher Clarke J had to deal with the question of costs following a trial of preliminary issues. In the event, he decided (see pp 32-34 of the Transcript) that despite the fact that, as he was told, CPR Part 36 offers had been made, nevertheless, the claimant should pay the defendant the costs in relation to three issues but not others.
26. However, I do not regard either of these two cases as laying down any general principle. In Kew v Bettamix, it does not appear that any of the earlier authorities I have referred to (including HSS v BMB) had been cited and although what Leveson LJ said in paragraph 50 of his judgment does, in one sense, support Mr Cogley QC's submission here, I do not regard it as laying down a general principle in particular because if that were so, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with Weill Mean v Fiddler Holdings which I have already referred to earlier in this judgment. As to RTS v Molkerei Alois Muller, there is no doubt that HSS v BMB was cited, but again it seems to me that the judge was not laying down any general principle. Indeed, the fact that the judge ordered the claimant to pay the costs of some issues but not others is to the contrary.
27. Thus, I remain of the view that although I have not been told and do not know whether a CPR Part 36 offer has been made, the possibility that such an offer has been made and, if so, that it might affect any order as to costs are part of all the circumstances to which I must have regard in deciding what order as to costs I should make. I recognise that, as stated by Henderson J, it will often be desirable and in the wider interests of justice for the costs of the liability hearing to be dealt with at its conclusion; and that such desirability would also generally extend to the costs of a hearing dealing with preliminary issues. However, it seems to me that justice demands that in the particular circumstances of the present case I should not make any immediate order for costs nor any order for an interim payment in favour of the claimants.
28. In reaching that conclusion, I bear in mind, in particular, the following matters. First, the claimants' costs are very substantial. Second, as stated above, it is common ground that I cannot exclude the possibility that a CPR Part 36 offer has been made and that any such offer might, at the very least, affect the court's discretion in relation to the costs of the preliminary issues. Third, notwithstanding the general desirability of dealing with costs at the conclusion of this part of the case, it seems to me that it would be most unjust to make an order for costs in favour of the claimants in ignorance of any offer that might have been made in circumstances where, if a Part 36 offer has in fact been made and the court were aware of such offer, the court would make a different order. Fourth, the order for a "split trial" was essentially a matter of case management. In my judgment, this should not have an effect on the substantive rights of the parties, or at the very least, the court should, if possible, strive to avoid such a result. In my view, this is consistent with the passage from the judgment of Lightman J in Weill Mean v Fiddler Holdings cited above ie that there was much to be said for the view that the incidence of costs should be the same whether or not there has been an order for a split trial. Fifth, although the decision to reserve costs is, of course, of some prejudice to the claimants, in exercising the discretion under CPR part 44.3, it is, in my view, important to bear in mind the interests of the defendants as well as the claimants and, so far as possible, to balance such interests having regard, in particular, to the overriding objective. Here, the claimants constitute a significant trading group and there is no suggestion that the absence of an immediate order for costs and an order for an interim payment in their favour would cause the claimants any irreparable damage. Further, the defendants conceded that if the court decided not to make any immediate order, the judge who determined costs at the end of the case would have the power and discretion to order the defendants to pay interest on any costs payable to the claimants from today's date at such rate as the court thinks just. In particular, the defendants accepted that it would be open for the court in the exercise of its discretion to order interest to be paid at the "ordinary" rate up to the judgment rate ie 8%. In my judgment, such concession goes a long way to reducing if not eliminating the prejudice which might be suffered by the claimants not having the benefit of an immediate order for costs and an interim payment in their favour.

B. Co-insurance costs

29. As to the co-insurance costs, as I indicated during the hearing it seems to me plain that, in principle and subject to any offer that might have been made (whether pursuant to CPR Part 36 or otherwise), the defendants are entitled to such costs on an indemnity basis. In my view, the case originally pleaded by the claimants and advanced until shortly before the trial (viz that AXA was, in effect, the sole insurer) was hopeless from the outset. In particular, the closing sheets were plain and, in cross-examination, both Mr Page and Mr Anderson gave evidence that they knew that the risk was co-insured. Notwithstanding, Mr Marland submitted that if I were to reserve costs generally, I could not or at least should not make any specific order with regard to these co-insurance points. I do not agree. In my view, I see no reason why I should not make an order now dealing in principle with these co-insurance costs subject only to the question of any offers that might have been made and which will, if necessary, have to be considered in due course. As to the quantum of such costs, the defendants submitted a costs schedule and, initially, I thought that it might be possible to carry out a summary assessment of such costs even on a contingent basis. However, in the event, this proved impossible and, if necessary, these will have to be dealt with on a detailed assessment in the usual way.

Conclusion

30. In light of the above and subject to any further submissions that counsel may wish to make as to the precise wording, it is my conclusion that the appropriate order is as follows: "The costs of the preliminary issues shall be reserved for final determination until after the case has been decided or further order save that it is hereby declared that subject to any offers of settlement that might have been made (whether pursuant to CPR Part 36 or otherwise) (i) the defendants shall pay to the claimants the costs of the preliminary issues to be assessed in detail if not agreed less the sum of £20,000 in respect of disclosure and (ii) the claimants shall pay to the defendants the costs in respect of the co-insurance issues on an indemnity basis to be assessed in detail if not agreed." In addition, the order should record expressly the concession by the defendants referred to above with regard to interest on any costs which the court may order in due course.
31. As to the costs of the hearing on 18 June, it is true that the defendants failed on certain important points in particular in relation to leave to appeal, an extension of time to serve an appeal notice and an order for payment of the co-insurance costs in any event. As to the hearing on 22 June which took place at my own initiative in the hope that the coinsurance costs could be summarily assessed, it is also true that this proved, in the event, indeterminative. However, the defendants have been largely successful in relation to the three main issues (ie reservation of costs generally, disclosure and co-insurance costs) which took up the substantial part of at least the first hearing and, having regard to all the circumstances, this should, in my view, be reflected in a substantial costs order in the defendants' favour. Doing the best I can, it is my conclusion that the defendants are entitled to 60% of the costs (which I summarily assess in the sum of £15,000) ie £9,000 subject to the same caveat as stated above. Thus, subject to any further submissions as to the precise wording, the order should be: "The costs of the hearing on 18 and 22 June shall be reserved for final determination until after the case has been decided or further order save that it is hereby declared that subject to any offers of settlement that might have been made (whether pursuant to CPR Part 36 or otherwise), the claimants shall pay the defendants £9,000 ie 60% of the costs thereof summarily assessed in the sum of £15,000."
32. In light of the above, counsel are requested to agree a draft order. Failing agreement, I will deal with any outstanding issues.

POSTSCRIPT

I refuse leave to appeal. Although I accept that difficult issues of general importance arise with regard to the proper construction of CPR Part 36.13 which of themselves would justify leave to appeal, I have assumed, in favour of the claimants, that the prohibition contained therein applies. Thus, my decision rests upon the exercise of my discretion having regard to the circumstances of the present case as to which there is, in my view, no real prospect of success having regard to the matters set out above in particular in paragraph 28.