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	England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> London Borough of Haringey v Mrs E [2004] EWHC 2580 (Fam) (12 November 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2004/2580.html Cite as: [2004] EWHC 2580 (Fam)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		12/11/2004

Mr Justice Ryder

Mr Justice Ryder :

Introduction:

1. This is a case about a young boy who is believed to be just one year old. I shall call him 'C'. Although he was given a name in a religious ceremony, he does not have a true identity: that was stolen from him by a cruel deception perpetrated by adults who are involved in international child trafficking. Their motive is simple, one of the most base of human avarices: financial greed.
2. C has two married adults who believe they are his parents. Sadly, they are not and they are also victims of the deception. For that reason, I have ordered that they must not be identified and I shall call them 'Mr and Mrs E'.
3. I give permission for this Judgment to be published provided the identity and whereabouts of the child C and Mr and Mrs E are not disclosed. For reasons that I hope will become very clear, there is a significant public interest both in trying to prevent a repetition of this deception and in obtaining appropriate publicity to try and trace C's birth parents.
4. Let me emphasise what this case is not about. It is not about a court's approval or disapproval of anyone's beliefs. It is not about the truth or otherwise of a particular religious belief. I do not presume to have that knowledge. Likewise, and despite some of the evidence that I have heard, this is not a case about the relative merits on the one hand of rational scientific theories of creation and life and on the other of charismatic belief i.e. divinely inspired power and revealed truth.
5. These proceedings involve two applications under the Children Act 1989: the first by the London Borough of Haringey for a care order in respect of C and the second, with this court's permission, by Mr and Mrs E for a residence order.
6. In broad terms Parliament's purpose under part IV of the Act is to protect children who have suffered or are likely to suffer significant harm. It is not to enforce any one view of positive morality.
7. I am told that C is an engaging, robustly healthy, contented and happy child who is reaching the normal developmental milestones. In other words, he is doing well.
8. Mr and Mrs E's strongest desire is to care for C. The local authority's plan is to provide C with a permanent placement, if necessary outside of his birth family and of the care that Mr and Mrs E can offer. However, all parties including the child's representatives now agree with the court, that if I decide that C is not the child of Mr and Mrs E and that the circumstances of his need for protection satisfy the threshold for the State's intervention in section 31 of the Act, then as a preliminary step I should seek to ascertain whether C's birth parents can be found.
9. The primary purpose of this Judgment is to make findings of fact that will inform the decision as whether the threshold is satisfied and the future consideration of C's welfare. In doing so I have at all times had regard to the well known principles regarding the standard of proof and the satisfaction of the threshold question described by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re H (Minors) (Sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] AC 563 at pages 585 to 591 and Re O and N; Re B (Minors) [2003] 2 WLR 1075 at paragraphs 16 and 17.
10. Further, having regard to the sensitive ethical arguments that have arisen, I have reminded myself that a factual decision must be based on all available materials i.e. be judged in context and not just upon medical or scientific materials, no matter how cogent they may in isolation seem to be. Just as best interests are not defined only by medical or scientific best interests (see for example Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at page 555) likewise, investigations of fact should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors (see also Re H supra at page 591 and Re U (Serious Injury: Standard of proof); Re B [2004] 2 FLR 263 at paragraph 26)
11. At the end of this Judgment I shall continue the court's protection of C by making a further interim care order and I shall give directions in private to ensure that C's best interests are safeguarded while a permanent family, preferably his birth family, are found. A family that will provide for and safeguard his needs.

The Background:

12. Mrs E is aged 38 and has lived in England for approximately 15 years. She married Mr E who is aged 47 in a traditional ceremony in Nigeria in 1992. Mr E came to England from Nigeria in 1996 and they took part in a civil ceremony of marriage here in 1998.
13. Mrs E tells me that she has suffered from sickle cell anaemia all her life. It is an inherited disorder. Until two years ago she described the pattern of her adult life as extreme pain with hospitalisation every 2 to 3 weeks so that she has spent ¾ of her adult life in hospital, as she put it "in crisis". The crises were met by the use of oxygen, strong pain relief and blood transfusions every three months.
14. Whether related to Mrs E's condition or not (and the court has not been asked to consider this issue) Mr and Mrs E have been unable to have children of their own.
15. In 2002 and as part of their search for a faith based solution, they left their previous charismatic Christian church and joined the 'Gilbert Deya Ministries'.
16. The Gilbert Deya Ministries is a personal ministry founded and led by Mr Gilbert Juma Deya. Mr Deya tells me that he was ordained a minister in 1986 and that he was subsequently consecrated as an Archbishop by the then president of the United Evangelical Churches of America in 1992. He is the President of the United Evangelical Church of Kenya. I do not know whether these assertions are true but I record what he says and the fact that he refers to himself as 'Archbishop Deya' in relation to his personal ministry here in the United Kingdom and in at least six other countries across the World.
17. His ministry, as described to me in the oral and written words of himself and his adherents, is an eclectic mix of traditional African custom and charismatic Christian belief. The ministry practices exorcism, asserts the truth of the power of divine intervention to facilitate 'miracle births' and to cure afflictions of the mind or body that modern medical science would regard as conditions or diseases that do not spontaneously resolve. Miracle births as described to the court occur without conception, are lacking in any of the scientific indicia of pregnancy and do not have a natural gestation period.
18. Mr Deya's wife has her own role within the ministry. She is called Mary Deya and is known as Mama Mary. Although she lives in Nairobi in Kenya, she visits the ministry in the United Kingdom and provides, by appointment, counselling sessions. As Mr Deya prosaically put it, "people don't get to see me, with all these miracles, they must go through counsellors first…".
19. Mrs E claims that on the first day she attended the Gilbert Deya Minstries on the 2^nd February 2002 she was miraculously cured and for the last two years she has not had a health crisis, symptoms of sickle cell anaemia and asthma nor any medical treatment or intervention save that which she says surrounds the birth of 'her' three children.
20. Mrs E claims to have given birth to 3 miracle children between the 4^th September 2003 and the 2^nd June 2004. I shall refer to them as 'A', 'C' and 'G'. She believes that she is now pregnant again. Mr E accepts that he is not the biological father of any of the children. Mr and Mrs E accept that DNA tests have demonstrated conclusively that there is no biological connection between either of them and the two children A and C (i.e. neither Mrs E nor Mr E can be the birth parents of A or C). It is also the case that the children A and C are not biologically related to each other. The tests relating to the child G are in the hands of the Kenyan authorities and are not yet known to this court.
21. Mr and Mrs E say that despite the DNA evidence, C is their child (as is G and as was A) and that each of the children was born to Mrs E. For them, faith is the answer to that which medical science cannot or will not explain.

The Precipitating Events:

22. Mrs E describes C as having been born on the 1^st October 2003 in Kenya in circumstances that I shall describe in more detail. He was undoubtedly brought to the United Kingdom by Mrs E on the 11^th October 2003 on a flight from Nairobi. Accompanying Mrs E was the body of a baby girl A who Mrs E claims was born to her on the 4^th September 2003, some 27 days before C. A was a little girl who apparently died in Kenya on the 22^nd September 2003.
23. On arrival in the UK Mrs E took C home and subsequently decided to register him with a general practitioner who had been the family doctor since February 1997. The GP confirmed in evidence that there was no attempt to conceal the existence of C or A, quite the contrary, but as a consequence of what Mrs E said child protection referrals were properly made to the local authority.
24. Both Mr and Mrs E say they experienced the tremendous joy and fulfilment of making their family and home complete and for the record I find on un-contradicted evidence that they were good and loving carers of the child. It is agreed that, subject to what I shall in due course describe, they are able to provide good physical and emotional care for C. It is not agreed that they should in fact resume his care.
25. On the 28^th October 2003 social services and police officers attended at Mr and Mrs E's home to question them on the basis that C was not their child. There appears to have been a measure of agreement on that day about one issue namely, that any decision to remove C would be precipitate and should await DNA test results. Those results were received in writing on the 13^th November 2003 and on the next day the local authority applied to the Inner London and City Family Proceedings Court without notice to Mr and Mrs E for an emergency protection order and for permission to refuse contact between Mr and Mrs E and C. Both orders were granted.
26. I have already made clear my view that in light of the contact there had been between social services, the police and Mr and Mrs E there was little justification for the procedure that was adopted that denied Mr and Mrs E any immediate right to make representations. They could and should have been present at court on short notice, a step that might have avoided the distressing scenes that accompanied the forced removal of C on the 15^th November 2003 and which more than adequately would have guarded against the supposed risk of flight. Practitioners and courts should be more aware of the limits that there must be to the proper use of without notice emergency applications as described, for example, in the decisions of Munby J. in Re M (Care Proceedings: Judicial Review) [2003] EWHC 850 (Admin) [2003] 2 FLR 171 and X Council v. B & Ors [2004] EWHC 2015 (Fam).
27. Prior to Mrs E giving evidence to this court no description existed of the circumstances of the births of A, C and G. This was a consequence of the stance taken by Mrs E and both the local authority and the children's guardian. They came to an unhelpful and superficial impasse that on the one hand in the absence of acceptance of the possibility of miracle birth there was nothing to discuss and on the other that until Mr and Mrs E accepted they were lying, no assessment was necessary or practicable.
28. In the knowledge of this stance, Johnson J. with, if I may say so, his characteristic insight, gave Mr and Mrs E permission to make an application for a residence order for C. Eventually with the agreement of the parties at an earlier hearing, this court directed a culturally appropriate assessment of the context of the case by a consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist who I shall call Dr O.
29. This court has accordingly and for the purpose of these proceedings treated Mr and Mrs E as significant adults in C's life who for a short time enjoyed with C the existence of de facto family life. This has had the consequence that they have taken a full part in these proceedings and the court has had the benefit of hearing from them about the circumstances of the case. Had the court not taken steps to promote the Article 6 and 8 rights of all involved, the circumstances of this case would not have become as clear as they now are.
30. I accept in large part the cogent submissions made to me by Ms Cover who has with skill and clarity represented Mrs E's interests and helped Mr E who has very ably represented himself in the absence of public funding. I agree that it is not just the child C but also Mr and Mrs E whose rights are engaged. Those rights are the right to a fair trial under Article 6, the right to respect for family life under Article 8 together with the enjoyment of those rights without discrimination inter alia on the ground of their religion.
31. Neither the child protection process nor the early stages of decision making in this case demonstrate an adequate consideration of those rights. The superficial impasse that I have described has had to be remedied by this court. It is the court not the local authority that was concerned to ensure that the appropriate assessment materials were available and in the limited sense that the court disagrees with the child's guardian, it does so on the basis that her professional objectivity was damaged by her opinion that Mr and Mrs E must be untruthful because she personally could not entertain their religious beliefs.
32. In the circumstance where an individual's Convention rights are engaged, there is a duty on a court not to act incompatibly with those rights and a positive duty to secure the individual's rights against interference by others. I have taken steps to protect each of the rights I have described and by these proceedings have rectified the defaults and redressed the arbitrary interferences that I have identified and that have been identified to me. Strong though Ms Cover's submissions may be, she impliedly acknowledges that, in consequence, no additional or different remedy is now appropriate within these proceedings.

The Pre-birth Chronology:

33. Mrs E says that she realised she was pregnant with her first child from about January 2003. In 2002 Mrs Deya had prayed for Mrs E in front of the whole congregation. Mr Deya described this as the regular prayers for "barren women" to receive "the fruit of the womb". Two months later Mrs E felt what she described as the maternal signs of pregnancy: sickness, distended abdomen, enlarged breasts and foetal movements. She went to her general practitioner on the 14th January 2003 and was referred to the North Middlesex Hospital for blood tests and an ultra sound scan. The tests and scan were negative.
34. On the 3^rd April 2003 Mrs E sought a second opinion at the Royal Free Hospital where after negative tests including a further ultra sound scan a consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist confirmed there were no symptoms or evidence of pregnancy. Despite what Mrs E has told me, the gynaecologist specifically records that Mrs E reported no symptoms of pregnancy on this occasion. On the 1^st July 2003 a woman doctor at the GP's practice concluded that she could find no foetal heart beat.
35. Mrs E felt that she wasn't getting any help from anywhere and so she booked an appointment to see Mrs Deya. She says that Mrs Deya told her that she had had a similar experience in 1999 i.e. that she had a negative ultra sound scan in this country but subsequently gave birth in Kenya. Mrs Deya informed this court in a written statement that she had given birth to 3 miracle children. Mrs E says that she pleaded with Mrs Deya to take her to Kenya for a further opinion.
36. Mrs E told me that she thought that the miracle had already occurred before the medical tests were performed because she had by then experienced the symptoms she described. Mr E agreed. The miracle would accordingly be of a nature not just to induce conception but to hide the existence of the pregnancy from standard Western medical techniques.
37. On the 2^nd September 2003 Mrs E and Mrs Deya flew to Kenya. Mr E could not fly as he needed a visa which he did not have. On arrival on the 3^rd September 2003 they went straight to a clinic recommended by Mrs Deya that is known as the Lucy Medical Clinic. There a man known as Dr Matano told Mrs E that she was well over 12 months pregnant and that the baby could be born at any time. Mrs E recollects that she was also told that although she had experienced labour pain in the UK she had not been able to give birth here because she was not dilating. She says that she was given both injections and medication by the doctor.
38. I note in passing that the existence of regular pain was something she had not previously revealed and if that pain was not labour pain, her evidence contradicts her assertion that she had been pain free and healthy in the two year period prior to September 2003. It may also be relevant, though I make no finding about it, that Mrs E confirmed in her written statement to the court in May of this year that she had been re-tested for sickle cell anaemia which was still present.
39. Mrs E says that she gave birth to A at the Lucy Medical Clinic under the supervision of Dr Matano and a midwife known as Esther. The clinic was a single storey building with a stretcher and running water but no other equipment. She says she gave birth to C at the New Gatheca Nursing and Maternity Home also under the supervision of Dr Matano and two midwives known as Esther and Betty or Beatrice. The New Gatheca had a labour ward that was a plain room without windows with 2 stretchers on each side but no facilities other than something on a table covered in a sheet. She says she gave birth to G at the Lucy Medical under the supervision of a Dr David or Dr Joseph and a midwife called Grace.
40. I have seen photographs of all three clinics operated by the 'Lucy Medical' family and Mrs E has identified for the court the two clinics where she gave birth. I have evidence from Kenya whose authenticity has been confirmed by the Kenyan High Commission that these clinics are not and never have been registered with the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board of the Ministry of Health. They have now been closed down as a consequence of the ongoing Kenyan investigation. I was told that the clinics had been set up by a midwife known as Mama Lucy who is now dead but that her children had continued to operate them.

The Circumstances of the Births:

41. Mrs E has now described her experience of childbirth in detail and it deserves repetition in full. It should be remembered that Mr E has at all times acknowledged he is not the biological father of any of the children and that he remained at all times in the United Kingdom and therefore has no independent knowledge of the births.
42. Mrs E's description of the birth of A and then C is the same. The birth of G is similar but involves additional detail that I shall also describe.
43. In each case, Mrs E was in severe episodic pain before the birth and was taken to the clinic or hospital by Mrs Deya. At one point in cross examination (though she later equivocated and eventually changed her mind) Mrs E described the pain as the same as that which she had experienced with her sickle cell crises. Mrs Deya did not come into either room where birth took place but remained on the premises. Mrs E was examined by a man who she believed to be a doctor who told her the birth was a breach presentation. She was put on a drip of clear liquid and was given an injection to the inside of her vagina, the effect of which was, she said, to reduce her pain to the extent that she was comfortable.
44. The doctor examined her internally and with his hand still inside the birth canal he internally rotated the child. She pushed, they manually assisted and by what Mrs E described as traditional methods she gave birth easily and quickly some 20 minutes or a little more after arriving in the clinic. She never saw the moment of childbirth because of her distended abdomen and her position on the stretcher. In each case the child was held up for her to see, was wrapped up and then removed. She next saw each child in the company of Mrs Deya half an hour later when she had showered and cleaned herself.
45. Mrs E was adamant that each birth was a breach birth that required internal manipulation and rotation and that she never required stitches. Mrs E produced medical notes from the Lucy Medical clinic that purport to relate to C's birth. They do not describe a breach birth.
46. The one difference relates to the birth of G where a cold instrument the length of an arm was used apparently because she said she could not push because of injuries she says she had sustained in an assault. Mrs E recollects that this birth took 5 or 6 hours. I was told and saw evidence of the fact that the family made strenuous efforts after C had been removed from them to have the birth of G verified by someone in authority. All of their efforts came to nothing but they succeeded in persuading a representative of International Red Cross to witness and video record the birth of G.
47. In the event and, I find, with a coincidence that is too great to ignore, the red cross worker was kept waiting until he could wait no longer for the birth and departed before it took place. Only after that had happened (as was revealed in the cross examination of Mrs E) was an injection given to Mrs E and the baby was revealed to her within half an hour. I find that the length of the process in respect of baby G was directly connected to the possibility of external observation and hence independent verification.
48. If Mrs E neither saw nor felt all of what was happening, then logically it follows that her memory is in part dependent upon what she was told by others. I have to question what substances she was given and what she can independently remember.
49. A was apparently very poorly when she was born. She weighed 2 Kgs and was very small. On the 22^nd September 2003 she was rushed to the Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi having been found by Mrs E not to be breathing properly. Sadly, she died.
50. After A's death Mrs E says Mrs Deya prayed and fasted for her for 2 days. Mrs E noticed continuing discomfort and her abdomen remained large. She wasn't expecting to carry a second child. Everyone agrees that it would be unlikely that the existence of a second child in the womb could have been missed at the point of delivery of A.
51. Mrs Deya massaged her twice daily and as is the custom her abdomen was tied or strapped to help it go down. It didn't go down, it was painful. After the second day of Mrs Deya's prayers, Mrs E noticed a very big kick. Mrs Deya felt her abdomen and told her she thought she might be pregnant again. They went to the clinic and saw a doctor who confirmed that she was pregnant again. Child C was born in the same manner as A, save that for reasons that are not clear Mrs E was taken to the New Gatheca Clinic rather than the Lucy Medical Clinic.
52. On the 17^th October 2003 and while C was still in the care of Mr and Mrs E, he was dedicated at a service in London and given his name. It was during this service of dedication that Mrs E says that she felt movement in her abdomen again. She immediately told Mr Deya who told the assembled congregation. Mrs E was again tested by her GP and in hospital in November 2003. The tests were negative.
53. Mrs E obtained the release of her passport from the police and again travelled to Kenya, giving birth to her third child G on the 2^nd June 2004 in the circumstances I have described. G was left in the care of Mrs Deya in Nairobi. It is known that G has been removed from the care of Mrs Deya by the Kenyan authorities.
54. Mrs E says that she left G in Kenya with Mrs Deya because she had no travel documents for him. That was in consequence, she says, of the fear she had of going to the British High Commission in Nairobi. She alleges that on the 27^th May 2004 she was humiliated and assaulted by a security officer who had been instructed by a consular officer to remove her by force. There has been solicitor's correspondence and a formal complaint about the incident. It is not necessary for me to make a finding as to that incident, save to say that I have not heard any cogent evidence to find that it did occur. That is an issue for others to determine elsewhere.
55. Mrs E says that she is now pregnant again. She does not know the date of her expected confinement, not least because a scan has again been performed on her obviously distended abdomen and there is no sign of a foetus.
56. For the record I note that the periods of gestation on Mrs E's own evidence are for child A: over 12 months, for child C: up to but not more than 27 days and for child G just over 7 months. Mrs E does not suggest that C was the later born twin of A. Her account is of separate miracles and separate births, although the court has read and taken account of evidence about the possibility and likelihood of such an event.

The Independent Evidence of Pregnancy:

57. As part of Mrs E's case that each of the children was a miracle birth, she has relied upon the evidence of others.
58. Mr E has given evidence that he felt the baby before Mrs E travelled to Kenya in September 2003.
59. Dr Francis Obeng, a member of the Gilbert Deya congregation, apparently examined Mrs E in July 2004 and told the court that she was by then about 28 weeks pregnant despite the fact that in May 2004 there had been no sign of a pregnancy. He said he palpated her and thought he felt movement. He arranged for a private ultra sound scan to be performed in Harley Street. He very kindly provided me with the results of that scan by a report which is dated the 2^nd September 2004 and which is negative. In oral evidence he said for the first time that after the scan he had palpated Mrs E again and had been unable to feel anything.
60. I have come to the clear conclusion, in particular having regard to what Dr Obeng said of his second palpation, that whatever Mr E and Dr Obeng discerned, it was not on either occasion a sign of pregnancy.
61. Mrs Doris Smith-Dublin told the court that she was a retired trained midwife who had worked with Dr Patrick Steptoe. She is a member of the congregation at the Gilbert Deya Ministry. She gave evidence of palpating Mrs E and feeling the lie of the foetus and its movement. Her evidence was a piece of theatre and wholly lacking in any credibility. Doris Smith-Dublin found what she wanted to find. She wanted and still wants to be in the limelight of attention but her evidence was no more than disjointed anecdotal supposition.
62. Dr A.R. Essien is also a member of the ministry. He was very careful to describe Mrs E's presentation as having the same features as a pseudo pregnancy. He readily accepted that her births could not be medically accepted or medically explained. As medicine is clear, he opined, we must consider faith or fact for the explanation of what happened. With respect to him I agree. He added that he was of the view that the only explanation was divine intervention. Having said which, he had no evidence of pregnancy other than that which Mrs E had related to him.
63. Dr Essien is not an adult psychiatrist nor is Dr O. Both raised the question of whether Mrs E has suffered episodes of pseudocyesis. Mrs E has to date declined to be assessed by an adult psychiatrist on the basis that to do so would be to doubt what God has done.
64. When Mrs E was asked why she could only have births in Kenya, she replied that she had been unable to obtain medical assistance here and that she had tried to get someone to verify the truth of the births in Kenya.
65. Mrs E says that she knows of the existence of 22 miracle births through the ministry and she believes there are more. The court has been told that more than 50 families have come forward in Kenya to try and match their DNA to those of the children seized by the Kenyan authorities from the home of Mrs Deya.
66. I have recorded what Mrs E told me of the circumstances of the births. She was not a good witness of fact i.e. her recollections changed, she was inconsistent and she attempted to rationalise that which she had knowledge of with that in which she believes. So far as I am able, I have set out what she has consistently reported, while remembering that despite what she says, I find that that is in part only what she has been told by others.
67. I have regrettably also had to conclude that she is in part disingenuous i.e. she knows or suspects that some of her account is not the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth but she chooses to be silent about that. This is in distinction to Mr E who has an absolute, genuine and entire belief in his faith and accordingly has nothing to question. He of course has no independent knowledge with which to test his belief.

The Registration of the Births:

68. An element of Mrs E's evidence that I do accept was that she did not register the births of any of the children. She told me that Mrs Deya did that. In each case the clinic where the child was ostensibly born issued Mrs E with a receipt for the medical file that they said they had sent to the registration authority. This was to enable Mrs E to obtain a birth certificate for the child from that authority. In each case it was Mrs Deya who took the receipt from Mrs E and subsequently handed over a birth certificate to Mrs E. Mrs E has no knowledge of what in fact transpired. That is known only by Mrs Deya who is presently detained in Kenya.
69. After considerable efforts on the court's part, reliable written evidence has now been received from the Kenyan High Commission in London and the British High Commission in Nairobi as follows: the alleged signatory on the child C's birth certificate is a births registration officer in the Department of Civil Registrations in the Office of the President of Kenya i.e. she exists; she did not sign the birth certificate i.e. the signature on the face of the certificate is not authentic and the birth certificate itself though apparently authentic is not i.e. the registration number on its face was not in use at the relevant time and in the relevant place by the Kenyan registration authorities.
70. The solicitor with conduct of these proceedings for the local authority gave evidence to the court and told me that she had had a personal conversation by telephone with the relevant registration officer in Kenya to verify that C's birth certificate was not genuine. The written evidence I have received was transmitted hand to hand to this court through a series of verifiable steps and confirms the content of that conversation. Whatever explanation there may be, I find as a fact that the registration of C's birth was not an authentic exercise and was undertaken in an attempt to legitimise the birth.

The Case for Mr E:

71. Whereas Mrs E relies entirely upon the truth of 3 miracle births and an expected fourth, Mr E asks me to consider 2 additional factors:

a. Whether there has been political interference from the Government of the Republic of Kenya; and b. Whether the lack of any personal relationship with Mr and Mrs Deya is probative.

72. Mr Deya and Mr E both say that what is happening in Kenya is politically motivated because of Mr Deya's connections with the regime of the former President of that country, Mr Daniel Arap Moi. They believe that every attempt is being made to tarnish Mr Deya's reputation and they give examples of interference in due process, namely the alleged assassination of an investigating police officer, the alleged replacement of a Judge and the disappearance of Mr Deya's mother in Kenya. Mr Deya goes further and alleges the torture of doctors and nurses in Kenya. It is not for me to decide the truth of these matters, about which I have no evidence at all other than the ipse dixit of Mr Deya repeated by Mr E. All I can do is to say that if there is political interference it does not extend to this courtroom and that every document I have relied upon has been checked by this court, the local authority and both the Kenyan High Commission in London and the British High Commission in Nairobi. No assertion has been taken at face value and I have been careful to guard against mere suggestion or false imputation.
73. Neither Mr nor Mrs E dispute the medical evidence but they overtly urge me to find that the birth of C is a miracle. I am asked to put in the balance the existence of other miracle births in this church: not just A and G but 3 children of Mrs Deya and the children of another family whose circumstances are widely known in the public domain. The evidence I have heard about these births and about the whole context of the involvement of Mr and Mrs Deya compels me to find that they are both intimately involved in what occurred regardless of the nature and extent of any personal relationship there may or may not be between either of them and Mr and Mrs E.
74. As to the possibility of a cruel deception both Mr and Mrs E are adamant that such a conclusion would (to use Mr E's words) be in ignorance of the laws of God.

Factual Conclusions:

75. I have come to the following conclusions on the evidence. Mrs E has never been pregnant. She did not give birth to A, C or G. In a cruel deception to further the financial ends of those involved Mrs E was deceived into thinking that she had given birth. She was seriously assaulted and a live child who had been born to another family was presented to her as her child. I cannot say where the child originated from. Mrs E recollects seeing an umbilical chord which if true would suggest a recent birth but this was an example of an embellishment in her evidence that I find difficult to accept.
76. The birth certificate of C is false and it is likely that for the same reasons those of A and G will subsequently be proved to be false. The process of registration was organised by Mrs Deya.
77. C's birth is not a miracle and he is not the child of Mr and Mrs E. On the balance of probabilities, the same must sadly be said of A and G.
78. I have already commented upon the reliability of Mr and Mrs E. Mr Deya is economical with the truth. I found him to be a self serving and superficial witness who was only too happy to distance himself from the facts and even from his own wife when it suited his purpose. He would have the court believe that he has no personal knowledge and no personal involvement. For a man who deals in revealed truth he is remarkably sceptical and conditional about the words and experiences of others upon whom he supposedly depends.

Motive:

79. I have been urged by the supporters of Mr Deya to consider what the motive for such a deception could have been. More than one witness has pointed out that there was no obvious financial transaction, certainly none involving Mr and Mrs E.
80. The answer to the question came from the evidence of Mr Deya himself. It was not that those who so urgently desire children pay; in this case they did not. The financial benefit comes from the very success of the ministry. Mr Deya explained in evidence the success of his ministry by reference to the miracles which took place and then inadvertently explained one of the principles of the ministry by reference to the book of Malachi Ch 3 vv 8 to 10 which is the traditional Biblical rebuke to those who fail to abide by the principles of tithing (as found in Deuteronomy Ch 15 vv 22 et seq). As he said paraphrasing the text "those who do not pay a tithe rob God".
81. The element of condemnation in the hands of the unscrupulous is all too easy to imagine, but I do not need to imagine it, I am satisfied it exists having regard to the force of Mr Deya's rhetoric which I heard in court on this and other issues. Mr Deya relies upon that condemnation but also upon the grateful contributions of those who believe. It is a sad example of the dangers of literal interpretation in the hands of the corrupt.
82. The funds of his ministry have been generated at least in part by the tithes collected from a congregation that, on the facts I have found, has been deceived by the claims that have been made about Mr and Mrs E's miracle births.

Threshold and The Welfare of C:

83. I have decided that fact not faith is the explanation for the birth of C. I have been greatly assisted by Dr O who was asked to consider whether in consequence C is likely to suffer significant harm. Dr O has described to the court the dangers inherent in C growing up with a false view that he is a miracle child with carers who are of the same view if that is not in fact the case.
84. All children should be able to understand where they come from and where in the context of life they belong. C cannot do that because he has no accepted identity with Mr and Mrs E. The claimed relationship with Mr and Mrs E would be founded on a lie which when discovered would likely lead to a profound disruption. If the basis of his existence is denied there will be adjustment problems, feelings of grief, loss and rejection. The risk is great. The lack of any family medical history may present C with additional difficulties as he grows older. I accept the evidence of Dr O. My summary does not do full justice to the careful and professional manner he brought to his task.
85. Mrs E in one aspect of her evidence that does her no credit sought to deny Dr O's reported discussion with her to the effect that C would be a miracle child. At the very least she hopes he will have special powers and gifts, though she accepts that will be a matter for God alone. Dr O was clear that both Mr and Mrs E were of the opinion that as C grew up he would realise that he had a special purpose in life. Mrs E equally denies her discussions with the social worker that if C does not accept his birth, he would be left to his own fate. She now says that he would always be a part of her family.
86. Mrs E said that although she would support the return of C to his birth parents if I find that his birth is not a miracle, she would not believe any DNA test that matches C to any other adults as their child. Mr E agrees and says that he will work with professionals but points out that he cannot be expected to accept a lie (i.e. that C is not his child by miracle birth).
87. Although I have decided that C's birth as described was a falsehood not a miracle, Dr O urged upon me a professional consideration of Mr and Mrs E's response to that finding not least because they wish to pursue their application that C should return to live with them and Dr O was able to identify some positives in addition to their abilities to care for C e.g. their high degree of motivation and the emotional warmth of their relationship. It also has to be said that Dr O agreed with Mr E that if C's birth parents cannot be found, many of the emotional risks that he faces (absent living a lie) may also present themselves through adoption. In light of their evidence to me, the step of further assessment (if accepted by Mr and Mrs E) must be taken in parallel with an urgent investigation into C's origins and must not delay his long term and hopefully permanent placement with a family.
88. C is entitled to know who his birth parents are and to have a relationship with them, if they can be found. It may be that even with the benefit of DNA testing C's origins will remain unknown. C may not be Kenyan though he is almost certainly African. The Director of Children's Services in the office of the Vice President of Kenya has offered to arrange care for C and that may also be a matter that should be investigated. C has no psychological roots other than with his day to day carers, but he has long term cultural and religious needs. If an alternative permanent placement has to be found he needs that as soon as possible, to be able to develop the security, stability and attachments of family life.
89. Having regard to the facts I have found I hold that the threshold in section 31 of the Act is satisfied as follows:

a. C is not the child of those adults who have claimed to be his parents;

b. C is the natural child of unknown parents from whom he was by an unknown means removed;

c. C's identity is at present unknown;

d. If C's future care is founded upon a lie he will likely suffer profound harm;

e. At the point that protective steps were taken C's care was based upon a fundamental lie.

90. I am not in a position to make a final decision about C's future although I have no doubt that the balance of the evidence as to the risk of harm is against Mr and Mrs E and strongly suggests that C's welfare demands that he remain in the protective care of the local authority for the time being. An interim care order is both necessary for his protection and proportionate. There will be further and difficult arguments that Mr and Mrs E must face, namely that for them to succeed it would have to be in the interests of C to place him with them despite the comprehensive protective code of law and practice relating to the immigration and adoptive placement of children from overseas.
91. The local authority wish to move to a permanent placement with a family in the United Kingdom but have very properly agreed to use their best endeavours to work with central Government and police agencies here and abroad to try and trace C's birth parents. I urge those agencies to act swiftly: C needs his future to be settled without delay.
92. I shall direct a monthly review of the case before me to ensure that C's care is expeditiously determined.

Consequential:

93. I have made serious findings about a deception that involved the trafficking of children. In deciding to open this hearing to the public I have had regard to Articles 8 and 35 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 i.e. that the State undertakes to respect the right of every child to preserve his identity and to be provided with appropriate assistance and protection with a view to re-establishing speedily his identity and also that the State shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form – an aim which I hope will be promoted by this step.
94. Mr Deya has given an undertaking to the court not to publish any of the court's documents on his web site or elsewhere and has removed the documents that were on that website that identify C and Mr and Mrs E and which could only have originated from the court's papers. He has also undertaken not to identify C or Mr and Mrs E in any materials that he or his ministry are responsible for producing. I shall invite Mr Deya to re-new those undertakings at the conclusion of this hearing, in default of which I shall make appropriate orders in similar terms.
95. I have protected the identities of the medical witnesses who are outside the Gilbert Deya Ministry and who gave evidence to the court. I have done so because there has been evidence that more than one of them has been impliedly threatened. In fairness I should add that only one implied threat could be traced back to the ministry and I decided not to take any further action in respect of that. However, I wish to make it clear that this court will immediately take steps to protect any of its witnesses or its process from interference.
96. During the course of this case the question of media reporting has been raised more than once. On one occasion I asked the parties to consider whether injunctive relief was necessary to supplement the statutory protections that ordinarily exist and indeed an application was properly made to the court. In the event, I made no press orders and accepted the undertakings proffered by Mr Deya. The media reporting of the circumstances of this case and the investigation in Kenya has been, if I may say so, a proper exercise of parallel rights and freedoms.
97. Aside from the public interests that I highlighted at the beginning of the judgment, there is also a public interest in knowing of the work that is done in the family courts an interest that is sometimes narrowly characterised and equated with one of its components i.e. public scrutiny of the fairness of family justice. Provided the private and family lives of people are respected, i.e. inter alia their personal confidentiality is protected from prurient interest and salacious comment and that the vulnerable are protected, a greater measure of public information about the work of the family courts may go some way to engender public confidence in the sensitive balancing of people's rights and needs that is an essential component of the social contract that is family justice. For my part I would welcome careful consideration of whether and if so in what way family proceedings should be more open to the press and to the public. The trust in the media has been amply re-paid in this case and I am grateful.
98. I shall now adjourn so that there might be a brief private hearing to put in place necessarily confidential protections for C.

That is the end of the public Judgment.