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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> M v G (Hague Convention: Article 13 (b) defence) (Rev 1) [2020] EWHC 1450 (Fam) (15 May 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2020/1450.html Cite as: [2020] EWHC 1450 (Fam), [2020] 2 FLR 1295 |
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FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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M |
Applicant |
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G |
Respondent |
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Ms Jacqueline Renton (instructed by Access Law LLP Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 14th and 15th May 2020
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Theis DBE:
Introduction
Relevant background
Legal framework
"[31] Both Professor Pérez-Vera and the House of Lords referred to the application, rather than the interpretation, of Art 13. We share the view expressed in the High Court of Australia in DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director-General NSW Department of Community Services [2001] HCA 39, paras 9, 44, that there is no need for the Article to be 'narrowly construed'. By its very terms, it is of restricted application. The words of Art 13 are quite plain and need no further elaboration or 'gloss'.
[32] First, it is clear that the burden of proof lies with the 'person, institution or other body' which opposes the child's return. It is for them to produce evidence to substantiate one of the exceptions. There is nothing to indicate that the standard of proof is other than the ordinary balance of probabilities. But in evaluating the evidence the court will, of course, be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague Convention process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Art 13(b) and so neither those allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination.
[33] Second, the risk to the child must be 'grave'. It is not enough, as it is in other contexts such as asylum, that the risk be 'real'. It must have reached such a level of seriousness as to be characterised as 'grave'. Although 'grave' characterises the risk rather than the harm, there is in ordinary language a link between the two. Thus a relatively low risk of death or really serious injury might properly be qualified as 'grave' while a higher level of risk might be required for other less serious forms of harm.
[34] Third, the words 'physical or psychological harm' are not qualified. However, they do gain colour from the alternative 'or otherwise' placed 'in an intolerable situation' (emphasis supplied). As was said in Re D, at para [52], '"Intolerable" is a strong word, but when applied to a child must mean "a situation which this particular child in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate"'. Those words were carefully considered and can be applied just as sensibly to physical or psychological harm as to any other situation. Every child has to put up with a certain amount of rough and tumble, discomfort and distress. It is part of growing up. But there are some things which it is not reasonable to expect a child to tolerate. Among these, of course, are physical or psychological abuse or neglect of the child herself. Among these also, we now understand, can be exposure to the harmful effects of seeing and hearing the physical or psychological abuse of her own parent. Mr Turner accepts that, if there is such a risk, the source of it is irrelevant: eg, where a mother's subjective perception of events leads to a mental illness which could have intolerable consequences for the child.
[35] Fourth, Art 13(b) is looking to the future: the situation as it would be if the child were to be returned forthwith to her home country. As has often been pointed out, this is not necessarily the same as being returned to the person, institution or other body who has requested her return, although, of course, it may be so if that person has the right so to demand. More importantly, the situation which the child will face on return depends crucially on the protective measures which can be put in place to secure that the child will not be called upon to face an intolerable situation when she gets home. Mr Turner accepts that if the risk is serious enough to fall within Art 13(b) the court is not only concerned with the child's immediate future, because the need for effective protection may persist.
"The critical question is what will happen if, with the mother, the child is returned. If the court concludes that, on return, the mother will suffer such anxieties that their effect on her mental health will create a situation that is intolerable for the child, then the child should not be returned, It matters not whether the mother's anxieties will be reasonable or unreasonable. The extent to which there will be, objectively, be good cause for the mother to be anxious on return will nevertheless be relevant to the court's assessment of the mother's mental state if the child is returned."
Submissions
(1) The mother's own difficult background as a child and young person, which are detailed in the papers;
(2) The mother's lack of family or other support in Australia.
(3) The history of domestic abuse including evidence of the father being physically and emotionally abusive. There are a number of allegations of serious physical assault, often witnessed by X. The last one in April 2017 resulted in the police attending. According to the mother she was unable to give evidence at the subsequent criminal proceedings due to pressure from the father. There are a number of contemporary documents to support the allegations, in particular the letter from Ms Y in May 2017 reporting what the mother said to her, the mother's emails in July 2017, January 2018 and March 2019 and the medical records from 2017 where she describes the father's abusive behaviour.
(4) The mother's allegations regarding the father's drug taking and dealing, which she repeated to Dr Z.
(5) The allegations regarding sexual abuse arising from what X said in September 2019.
(6) The mother's wish to have a double mastectomy due to the family history, and her wish to have that procedure in England where more support is on hand.
Discussion and decision
(1) Due to the mother's difficult background and life experiences and her pre-existing depressive and anxious tendencies these are a reality to the mother's life wherever she is and cannot be solely or mainly linked to a return to Australia.
(2) The mother has demonstrated that she has the resources to readily seek support and manage her psychological difficulties. The history demonstrates she requested and effectively accessed support between 2014 and 2018, assisted when required with prescribed medication. At no stage during that period is there any evidence that she was not in a position to provide care for X and was not able to access support, either professionally or otherwise. For example, in June 2017, Ms Y, the clinical psychologist the mother was seeing at the time around the time of the very real difficulties the mother was experiencing following the recent separation between the parents 'I found Ms G to be a capable, resilient, and resourceful woman…a devoted and loving mother..[and] her son…is a thriving, active and content toddler.' She continued in that letter to note the mother had 'made Australia her home' and 'has significant support persons and systems in place here'. The mother continued seeing Dr Z until November 2018.
(3) Whilst not diminishing the seriousness of the allegations and taking them at their highest I do not regard the background features of domestic abuse and allegations of drug taking and dealing have been such a prominent feature of the parties relationship since October 2018, as that would not be consistent with the significant periods of time X was spending with his father, with the mother's agreement. That does not in any way undermine the seriousness of the allegations, which will require proper investigation, but it puts them into context in the assessment the court is undertaking within these proceedings.
(4) The allegations made by the mother of what X is reported to have said regarding sexual abuse are serious and will require investigation but they too have to be seen in the context of no further evidence of them and the mother subsequently suggesting the father comes to collect X, as set out in the mother's statement.
(5) All the indications are that the mother was planning to return to Australia in November, for example with the steps she took in relation to X's schooling. It is right that there are some references in Dr Z's original notes that the mother was saying to her in 2018 she may want to return here, but that is not reflected in the practical steps she took. Her position now could, in part, be influenced by a newly formed relationship that the mother has which she told her GP in January she was afraid of losing.
(6) I have factored in the difficulties the mother has regarding the prospect of surgical treatment due to the maternal family history. There remains some uncertainty as to whether she has had the relevant genetic test. The evidence points to some delays before anything can be done, whichever jurisdiction the mother is in. Whilst I accept there is likely to be more support for the mother here for such a procedure, the information the court has on this issue is very limited and not altogether clear regarding the timetable.