[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> A, Re (A Child) [2022] EWHC 2250 (Fam) (26 August 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2022/2250.html Cite as: [2022] EWHC 2250 (Fam) |
[New search] [Printable PDF version] [Help]
FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust |
Applicant |
|
- and - |
||
(1) A (A Child, through his r.16.4 Guardian) (2) F (as a Litigant in Person) (3) M (as a Litigant in Person) (4) A Local Authority (Intervener) |
Respondents |
____________________
Miss Claire Watson QC (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for the First Respondent
Ms Yasmeen Jamil (instructed by a Local Authority) as the Intervener
Hearing dates: 25th August 2022
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE HAYDEN:
"1. There are bilateral areas of mixed density extra axial blood, mainly subdural with smaller amounts within the subarachnoid space, lying along the convexities, falx and tentorium which are increased in extent. A small right temporal contusion appears new. No secondary complication such as hydrocephalus or compartmental/midline shift. A neurosurgical opinion is advised regarding the areas of intracranial haemorrhage, if not previously obtained.
2. Diffuse hypodensity of the brain parenchyma is highly suspicious of diffuse ischaemia, in this given clinical context.
3. The constellation of imaging findings, in the absence of any suitable explanation, is suggestive of traumatic head injury. Non accidental injury is a strong consideration if there is no history of accidental trauma. Note is made of the recent findings on chest radiograph, where bilateral rib fractures are demonstrated.
Further evaluation with skeletal survey and MRI of the brain/spine, as per local protocol is advised, along with discussion at the paediatric neurology radiology clinical meeting."
"There is extensive brain parenchymal abnormality involving both cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres and parts of the brainstem with features suggestive of hypoxic ischaemic injury, multiple intracranial subdural and subarachnoid haemorrhages and spinal cord abnormalities. In the absence of a suitable medical explanation and in view of the constellation of brain and spine findings along with multiple fractures and retinal haemorrhages, the appearances would be highly suggestive of non-accidental injury."
"Factual Report:
This 30-minute EEG was recorded at the bedside on PICU. He was not on medication.
No identifiable physiological activity could be identified throughout the EEG. He had a nappy change during recording with no changes on the EEG. Following the bagging during recording he was triggering the ventilator from a baseline of 24 up to 40. No changes were seen on the EEG.
…
Conclusion:
2nd EEG. No recordable electrical activity is seen on this occasion. The subtle chest movement was not accompanied with an ictal EEG correlate."
"Summary: Expected interval maturation of the prior acute hypoxic ischaemic changes in the brain and acute changes of the spinal cord, with evolution into severe multicystic encephalomalacia/myelomalacia and parenchymal volume loss, as described. There has also been some maturation of the extra-axial haemorrhages, with increase in size of some of the subdural collections but without any significant mass effect or midline shift. Interval enlargement of the ventricles and basal cisterns is in keeping with diffuse neuroparenchymal volume loss."
"Factual Report:
This was an urgent 30-minute portable EEG performed on PICU. The patient was not on any medication. The nurse at the bedside reported that he has been consistently triggering the ventilator since around 08:00 am this morning. No movements were observed other than head movement in association with respiration - this produced associated respiration artefact. Pupils were unequal, (size 4 on the left/size 4 on the right), fixed and dilated.
The trace shows no discernible physiological activity. Auditory, tactile and suction stimulation failed to elicit any significant changes.
…
Conclusion:
3rd recording. No recordable electrical activity was seen. When external stimuli were applied, no recordable electrical activity was seen. No seizures were seen.
Opinion:
No seizures, clinical or electrographic, are seen.
No recordable electrical activity is seen during the recording.
Clinical correlation is advised."
"For, [A], his current clinical state and prognosis are far more critical than the fact he fulfilled clinical criteria for brain death as they currently stand but no longer. Most examples from the world literature regarding infants verified dead using neurological criteria (brain dead) in who the situation reversed and who were, therefore, alive, followed medical errors in the performance of the tests. The most frequent of these was complying adequately with the preconditions required before brain death testing. Essentially, this means ensuring no other cause of the clinical situation – coma and absent brain stem reflexes – is present. In infants, this can be hypothermia (as a treatment or due to exposure), sedative drugs, endocrine system abnormalities or electrolyte issues. None of these was the case in A.
Brain death tests were performed several times by a number of senior clinicians, including from another centre, entirely in line with current UK Academy of Medical. There is a plausible explanation for [A's] recovery from a situation where his death was determined, which I suggest, and explored with his parents. I commenced by explaining that [A's] brain injury was complicated with at least two aetiologies over at least two time periods. An initial brain injury led to his collapse on the 10th of June, was associated with subdural and subarachnoid bleeding, in the setting of bilateral multilayer retinal haemorrhages and multiple fractures of different ages AND then a > forty-minute cardiac arrest led to a lack of oxygen and blood flow to an already damaged brain."
"I explained that the brainstem, the more embryologically primitive bit at the base of all our brains, controls the most basic functions needed to be alive such as breathing, heart rate and waking up. It is less likely to be damaged by lack of oxygen or blood flow than the more complex parts on the outside of our brains – the frontal lobes giving us personality and thought, the middle bit emotion, memory and understanding, hearing and the back bit the understanding vision and coordination. In the most severe brain injuries caused by lack of oxygen and blood flow to the brain, the outside structures are most severely affected, whilst sometimes the brain stem is not badly affected and continues working usually. The mechanism of action by which children become 'brain dead' is not usually due to direct damage to the brain stem but due to severe swelling of the brain above it. As the brain swells, the pressure inside the brain cavity grows, but the brain cannot expand upwards as the skull acts as a close box; it can only push downwards, so the brainstem is pushed down through a small bony hole where the spinal cord comes off the brainstem, this can cut off the brainstem blood supply causing it to die.
However, in infants such as A, the skull bones are not fused, so some of the swelling can be dealt with by the bones spreading apart and the skull expanding. It is possible that A's brainstem was directly affected by the lack of blood and oxygen from the cardiac arrest, and then itself became very swollen. The extent to which parts of the brainstem have become irreversibly damaged and which parts temporarily impaired due to swelling, which eventually allows function to return, only becomes apparent over time. As with any child who survives the initial phase of a severe brain injury, the full extent of the damage can only be assessed after the initial swelling and inflammation have passed. For A, this is now very clear - he has sustained a severe level of damage to the brain, demonstrated by the clinical picture supported by imaging (MRI) and neurophysiology (EEG)."
"Clearly, these changes are already happening, and when I visited him, A required a peak pressure of 30 mmHg, a very high setting, having previously needed a moderately raised pressure of 23. (20/07) A setting as high as 30 mmHg usually precludes elective tracheostomy insertion in infants and is not a level usually considered suitable for the institution of long-term ventilation. Usual potential complications of continuing PICU include the risk of infection, decreased ability to develop, experience and interact, and the pain and discomfort associated with mechanical ventilation and other interventions. For A, there is no current alternative to continued ICU other than withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy and certain death. Sadly, in my opinion, issues of development, experience and interaction are not a realistic concern. Pain and discomfort are subjective, but due to the severity of his brain injury, it is impossible to assess either in A realistically."
"Ventilation is more impaired (requiring higher pressures on the manual ventilator circuit, although the set ventilator pressures are the same, but achieving less good tidal volumes).
His breathing is less consistent or effective when taken off the ventilator onto a manual circuit.
His heart rate is falling.
Temperature homeostasis has been lost.
Moving his limbs' during examination is resulting in involuntary mass movement of head or neck, probably due to the truncal stiffness".
"All these feelings are subjective, meaning only the person affected can determine what is experienced. A did not display any response to pain when I assessed him, nor any external signs of experience such as pleasure or comfort. However, with disorders of consciousness, a single examination is inadequate. More useful are the accumulated observations of the medical and nursing team and of A's dedicated parents, who spend considerable time with him. The nursing and medical staff do not describe or record any purposeful movements or reactions to pain. In addition, they do not see any signs of interaction or comfort from stimuli such as touch or voice, and there was no response to external noise/stimuli described on the concurrent EEG trace. A's parents, whilst understanding the clinical diagnosis of severe irreversible brain injury, consider some of the changes in 1 above to indicate he is 'there' and can experience and respond to the external environment. We spent time discussing these signs and their possible implications."
"Movement of his head, including movement from side-to-side;
Both As team and his parents have seen several spinal reflexes, well described in the most severely brain injured children. However, the clinical team do not recognise the side-to-side movements as purposeful but consider them secondary head movements – though more up and down – due to A's very pronounced truncal hypertonia and the effects of the mechanical ventilator. No such movements happened during my examination; however, I have not seen such minimal head movements in children indicate neurological improvement in severe brain injury. In this context, it is essential to reflect that no medications are suppressing A's consciousness or ability to move at this stage.
Variation of his heart rate;
Whilst a decrease in heart rate variation can occur in severe brain injury and is frequent in patients diagnosed with brain death, the presence of a small degree of variability is not a favourable prognostic sign in my experience. The bottom of A's brain, the brain stem, has some function left, as demonstrated by his respiratory effort (see 3). Autonomic nervous system activity is also a brain stem activity, so some heart rate variation may be present without indicating consciousness or emotion. I understand that there are no described heart rate changes to stimuli, such as suctioning. If changes in heart rate could be demonstrated to correlate with interaction such as parent voice or touch, this could support the existence of a level of awareness".
The framework of the law
"Though it is an ambitious objective to seek to draw from the above texts, drafted in differing jurisdictions and in a variety of contexts, unifying principles underpinning the concept of human dignity, there is a striking thematic consistency. The following is a non-exhaustive summary of what emerges:
i. Firstly, human dignity is predicated on a universal understanding that human beings possess a unique value which is intrinsic to the human condition;
ii. an individual has an inviolable right to be valued, respected and treated ethically, solely because he/she is a human being;
iii. human dignity should not be regarded merely as a facet of human rights but as the foundation for them. Logically, it both establishes and substantiates the construction of human rights;
iv. thus, the protection of human dignity and the rights that flow therefrom is to be regarded as an indispensable priority;
v. the inherent dignity of a human being imposes an obligation on the State actively to protect the dignity of all human beings. This involves guaranteeing respect for human integrity, fundamental rights and freedoms. Axiomatically, this prescribes the avoidance of discrimination;
vi. compliance with these principles may result in legitimately diverging opinions as to how best to preserve or promote human dignity, but it does not alter the nature of it nor will it ever obviate the need for rigorous enquiry."
"[39] The most that can be said, therefore, is that in considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude towards the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or are interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be.
"[45] Finally, insofar as Sir Alan Ward and Arden LJ were suggesting that the test of the patient's wishes and feelings was an objective one, what the reasonable patient would think, again I respectfully disagree. The purpose of the best interests' test is to consider matters from the patient's point of view. That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail. We cannot always have what we want. Nor will it always be possible to ascertain what an incapable patient's wishes are. Even if it is possible to determine what his views were in the past, they might well have changed in the light of the stresses and strains of his current predicament. In this case, the highest it could be put was, as counsel had agreed, that "It was likely that Mr James would want treatment up to the point where it became hopeless". But insofar as it is possible to ascertain the patient's wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or the things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken into account because they are a component in making the choice which is right for him as an individual human being." (per Baroness Hale)
"the presumption of domestic law is strongly in favour of prolonging life where possible, which accords with the spirit of the Convention (see also its findings as to the compatibility of domestic law with Article 2 in Glass v. the United Kingdom, no. 61827/00, § 75, ECHR 2004-II)."
"Hence the focus is on whether it is in the patient's best interests to give the treatment, rather than on whether it is in his best interests to withhold or withdraw it. If the treatment is not in his best interests, the court will not be able to give its consent on his behalf and it will follow that it will be lawful to withhold or withdraw it. Indeed, it will follow that it will not be lawful to give it. It also follows that (provided of course that they have acted reasonably and without negligence) the clinical team will not be in breach of any duty towards the patient if they withhold or withdraw it."
"Permeating the determination of the issue that arises in this case must be a full recognition of the value of human life, and of the respect in which it must be held. No life is to be relinquished easily."
"The court must face head on the question of whether it can be said that the continuation of life sustaining treatment is in Tafida's best interests. There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of the child to subject him or her to treatment that will cause increased suffering and produce no commensurate benefit, giving the fullest possible weight to the child's and mankind's desire to survive. In this context, I do not discount the grave matters prayed in aid by the Trust. However, the law that I must apply is clear and requires that the best interests decision be arrived at by a careful and balanced evaluation of all of the factors that I have discussed in the foregoing paragraphs.
Having undertaken that balance, in circumstances where, whilst minimally aware, moribund and totally reliant on others, Tafida is not in pain and medically stable; where the burden of the treatment required to keep her in a minimally conscious state is low; where there is a responsible body of medical opinion that considers that she can and should be maintained on life support with a view to placing her in a position where she can be cared for at home on ventilation by a loving and dedicated family in the same manner in which a number of children in a similar situation to Tafida are treated in this jurisdiction; where there is a fully detailed and funded care plan to this end; where Tafida can be safely transported to Italy with little or no impact on her welfare; where in this context the continuation of life-sustaining treatment is consistent with the religious and cultural tenets by which Tafida was being raised; where, in the foregoing context, transfer for treatment to Italy is the choice of her parents in the exercise of their parental responsibility and having regard to the sanctity of Tafida's life being of the highest importance, I am satisfied, on a fine balance, that it is in Tafida's best interests for life sustaining treatment to continue.
It follows from this conclusion that I am also satisfied, the court having determined the dispute regarding best interests in favour of the treatment being offered to Tafida in Italy, there can be no justification for further interference in Tafida's EU right to receive services pursuant to Art 56."
Postscript