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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> A Local Authority v Mother & Ors [2024] EWHC 3511 (Fam) (17 December 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2024/3511.html Cite as: [2024] EWHC 3511 (Fam) |
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FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
A Local Authority | Applicant | |
- and - | ||
Mother | First Respondent | |
- and - | ||
Father | Second Respondent | |
- and - | ||
Lucy and Chantelle | ||
(Children, through their Children's Guardian) | Third and Fourth Respondents |
____________________
Ms Elizabeth McGrath KC and Mr Stephen Abberley (instructed by Jackson Quinn) for the First Respondent
Mr Brendan Roche KC and Ms Hannah Simpson (instructed by Jones and Co) for the Second Respondent
Ms Louise Sapstead and Ms Sian Waldron (instructed by Timms) for the Third and Fourth Respondents
Hearing dates: 4 -13 & 15 22 November 2024
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
With the exception of Counsel, the names used in this judgment are pseudonyms.
Mrs Justice Lieven DBE :
Factual History
1. Unclassified neurological condition associating:
i. Symptomatic focal epilepsy (seizures involving one part of the body);
ii. Early developmental impairment;
iii. Asymmetric spastic tetraparesis (muscle weakness and increased stiffness involving all four limbs, with legs more affected than arms).
2. Possible osteopetrosis/cranio-tubular dysplasia (progressive expansion and thickening of the skull bone).
3. Chromosome 9q 33.1 microdeletion (change in Lucy's genetic make-up, clinical significance unclear).
4. Recurrent respiratory tract (chest) infections.
5. Difficulties with swallowing - currently gastrostomy-fed (tube directly into her stomach through her abdominal wall).
6. Constipation.
7. Previous episode of urinary retention requiring intermittent catheterisation currently passing urine on her own.
8. Gastroesophageal reflux (food coming back up her food pipe).
9. Bilateral mild hearing loss most likely sensorineural (due to nerve damage) hearing aids fitted.
10. Thoracolumbar scoliosis (curvature of the spine) under review by Orthopaedic team.
11. Polypharmacy (on a significant number of medications).
12. Parental reporting disturbed sleep pattern requiring multiple medications.
13. Parental reporting chronic pain/discomfort leading to requests for multiple pain killers.
14. Visual impairment myopic astigmatism (short-sighted).
"Topiramate (anticonvulsant, for epilepsy)
Lacosamide (anticonvulsant, for epilepsy)
Clobazam (anticonvulsant, for epilepsy)
Buccal midazolam (rescue medication for seizure)
Amitriptyline (strong pain killer)
Baclofen (for increased muscle tone)
Chloral Hydrate (to help aid sleep)
Melatonin (to help fall sleep)
Cefixime (prophylactic antibiotic)
Colomycin nebulisers (antibiotic prophylaxis)
Sodium Chloride nebulisers
Glycopyrronium (to reduce oral secretions)
Omeprazole (to help treat acid reflux/heartburn)
Docusate (laxative, for constipation)
Lidocaine 5% patch (topical pain relief)
Colecalciferol (vitmain D supplement)
Biogaia Protectis (probiotic)"
The Chronology of the Admission
a) 1st/2nd June 2023 12.30am;
b) 23rd June 2023 7.15pm;
c) 12th July 2023 7.35pm;
d) 13th July 2023 10am;
e) 13th July 2023 3pm;
f) 19th July 2023 5pm;
g) 22nd July 2023 10.20am;
h) 30th July 2023 8.45am;
i) 9th August 2023 2.40pm;
j) 10th August 2023 12.40am;
k) 15th August 2023 1.45am;
l) 4th September 2023 11.30pm;
m) 6th September 2023 5.53pm.
a) A period of unresponsiveness followed by fluctuating consciousness;
b) Low oxygen levels;
c) Increased heart rate.
Unresponsive Episode 1 /2 June 2023
Messages around the use of Chloral on 2 and 8 June 2023
"[The F] (21:12) 'U want melotonin or Charal';
[The F] (21.22) 'She can have 2g the internet says lol';
[The F] (21:13) 'Give her 10 mls out the wardrobe haha';
[The M] (21:13) 'Ohh what's 2grams';
[The F] (21:13) - Not sure it's high I think'."
"[The M] (22:04) 'I want to go to sleep';
[The F] (22:04) 'the bottle of choral lol';
[The F] (22:05) '150 mls of it lol';
[The M] (22:15) 'Lol no';
[The F] (22:16) 'Need to get them to sort it through X'."
Unresponsive Episode 23 June 2023
Unresponsive Episode 12 July 2023
Unresponsive Episode 13 July 2023
Unresponsive Episode 19 July 2023
Unresponsive Episode 22 July 2023
Unresponsive Episode - 30 July 2023
Messages around the use of Chloral 9 August 2023
"[The M] (06:48) 'U need to also tell neuro about the seizure and ask if we can go up on chloral as I think she needs a bigger dose with a back up still if needed now she's older xx';
[The F] (06:49) 'Yeah to keep her settled.'"
Unresponsive Episode 9 August 2023
"[The M] (7.04am) 'how is she';
[The F] (7.05am) 'She woke up at 4 then back. To sleep she's ok though no rush x'"
"[The M] (12th August 2023) (07:23) - 'Maybe upping chloral might work';
[The F] (07:24) 'Not sure we can ask xx'
[The M] (14th August 2023) (07:20) 'Think chloral needs upping as from 1am she couldn't cope x.'"
The F's aggression towards LUCY and the Medical Staff
Unresponsive Episode 15 August 2023
Messages around the use of Chloral on 23 and 24 August 2023
"[The F] (08:48) 'She was up at 5 lol';
[The M] (08:49) 'I know she rang me lol need to ask neuro to look at upping her chloral.'"
"[The M] (19:28) 'How much chloral did [Lucy] have';
[The F] (19:29) '15ml';
[The M] (19:29) 'Ohh normal';
[The F] (19:29) 'Then just 5 extra if she needs it';
[The M] (19:30) 'As before lol thought they sed she could have more in hospital';
[The F] (19:30) 'Other Niro said no lol';
[The M] (19:35) 'Ahh ok.'"
"[The F] (12:31) 'The horrible Niro women is outside let the war begin lol';
[The M] (12:32) 'Ffs she's a fukin nightmare ask her about chloral tho lol she might say different lol xx"
Multi-Disciplinary Team Meetings on 24 August 2023 and 30 August 2023
"During 1:1 [Lucy] remained well, no oxygen requirement, no seizures, retching that is normal for [Lucy], no vomits. [The M] went home over the weekend due to [Lucy's] sibling being unwell and [the M] being unwell with a stomach bug.
Once 1:1 removed [F] reported increased retching, vomiting and loose stools. That [Lucy] wasn't tolerating her feeds. They also reported milky aspirate in her gastrostomy bag whilst on free drainage, hallucinations/seizure and that they were unhappy to take her home on the planned date of 29/8
[F] reported to Jenny and ward staff that Dr Hallet had said all [Lucy's] medications are to go via her JEJ. Neurology have clearly stated that her epileptic medications are to go gastric, nursing staff made it clear to [F] that they wouldn't be changing anything until Dr Hallet had documented this or given them instruction to do so, however [F] kept pushing the matter."
Police Involvement
Police Search
"7.1 From 8th September [Lucy] was noted to make considerable progress with regards her medical treatment, social interactions, and access to education.
This change has been observed by multiple health and allied professionals who have been involved with Lucy during her recent admission or prior to that in the community."
"In the days and weeks after her parents were removed, she was alert, asserting opinions, chatting, being grumpy and generally behaving like a teenager. She no longer needed catheterising, was sleeping without medication and demonstrating a significant change in her muscle power and ability to move. We saw no further episodes of unconsciousness unexplained tachycardia or flushing and she was weaned off many of her medications and tolerated her feeds. Colleagues universally commented positively on her improvement."
The Evidence
Dr Parkes
Dr Jones
Dr King
Miss Samson
Evidence on Chloral Hydrate Prescriptions
Expert Evidence
Dr Velayutham
Dr Berry
Dr Morrell
"2.09 I assume to explore this further, it would be necessary to examine each unresponsive episode in detail and examine whether on those days [Lucy] had received a different drug combination (or a different dose of those drugs), and the episode of unresponsiveness occurred shortly after that drug combination was given. This may be very difficult to establish unless very accurate records of the drug administrations are available".
The Mother
The Father
The law
"21. The judgments of Baker J in A Local authority and (1) Mother (2) Father (3) L & M (Children, by their Children's Guardian) [2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam) and Peter Jackson J in Re BR (Proof of Fact) [2015] EWFC 41 are of particular assistance in guiding the court's approach to a finding of fact hearing. More recently, MacDonald J summarised the principles to be applied in Re A Local Authority v W and others [2020] EWFC 68 I derive the following principles from those cases and the authorities that those judges reviewed:
a. The burden of proof lies on the Local Authority that brings the proceedings and identifies the findings they invite the court to make. There is no obligation on a respondent to provide or prove an alternative explanation.
b. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, Re B [2008] UKHL 35. If the standard is met, the fact is proved. If it is not met, the fact is not proved. As Lord Hoffman observed in Re B:
"If a legal rule requires facts to be proved, a judge must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are nought and one."
c. There is no burden on a parent to produce an alternative explanation and where an alternative explanation for an injury or coHallete of conduct is offered, its rejection by the court does not establish the applicant's case.
d. The inherent probability or improbability of an event should be weighed when deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred but regard to inherent probabilities does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue, the standard of proof required is higher.
e. Findings of fact must be based on evidence not suspicion or speculation - Lord Justice Munby in Re A (A child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12
f. The court must take into account all the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. As Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President observed in Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558, [2004] 2 FLR 838 at paragraph 33 :
"Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion of whether the case put forward by the Local Authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof."
g. The opinions of medical experts need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. In A County Council v KD & L [2005] EWHC 144 Fam at paragraphs 39 to 44, Mr Justice Charles observed:
"It is important to remember that (1) the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and (2) it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge must always remember that he or she is the person who makes the final decision."
h. Later in the same judgment, Mr Justice Charles added at paragraph 49:
"In a case where the medical evidence is to the effect that the likely cause is non-accidental and thus human agency, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence either (a) that on the balance of probability an injury has a natural cause, or is not a non-accidental injury, or (b) that a local authority has not established the existence of the threshold to the civil standard of proof The other side of the coin is that in a case where the medical evidence is that there is nothing diagnostic of a non-accidental injury or human agency and the clinical observations of the child, although consistent with nonaccidental injury or human agency, are the type asserted is more usually associated with accidental injury or infection, a court can reach a finding on the totality of the evidence that, on the balance of probability there has been a non- accidental injury or human agency as asserted and the threshold is established."
i. The evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court must form a clear assesLucyent of their credibility and reliability.
22. It is not uncommon for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the coHallete of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything: see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 . In the recent Court of Appeal judgment in A, B, and C (Children) [2021] EWCA 451, Macur LJ advised at [57],
"I venture to suggest that it would be good practice when the tribunal is invited to proceed on the basis, or itself determines, that such a direction is called for, to seek Counsel's submissions to identify: (i) the deliberate lie(s) upon which they seek to rely; (ii) the significant issue to which it/they relate(s), and (iii) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. The principles of the direction will remain the same, but they must be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the witness before the court."
Similar caution should be exercised in relation to a respondent giving unsatisfactory explanations or failing to give any explanation for the allegations made against them the fact that they are unsatisfactory or missing may not be probative of the truth of the allegations or of the culpability of the respondent.
23. As observed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss President in Re U, Re B [2004] EWCA Civ 567 supra "The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today's medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research may throw a light into corners that are at present dark". In Re R (Care Proceedings: Causation) [2011] EWHC 1715 Fam Mr Justice Hedley, developed this point further at paragraph 19:
" there has to be factored into every case which concerns a discrete aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established on the balance of probabilities."
24. In The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Company SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 , Lord Brandon considered an appeal from the first instance judgment of Bingham J upon the question of whether a ship had been lost due to "perils of the sea", a matter which the owners had to establish. The owners contended that the vessel had been lost due to a collision with a submarine. The underwriters contended that the loss was due to wear and tear. In his well-known judgment Lord Brandon stated as follows,
"The passages which I have quoted from Bingham J.'s judgment amply support the observations about his approach to the case which I made earlier. These observations were to the effect that he regarded himself as compelled to make a choice between the shipowners' submarine theory on the one hand and underwriters' wear and tear theory on the other, and he failed to keep in mind that a third alternative, that the shipowners' had failed to discharge the burden of proof which lay on them, was open to him.
As regards the shipowners' submarine theory, Bingham J. stated in terms that he regarded it as extremely improbable, a view with which I think it unlikely that any of your Lordships will quarrel. As regards underwriters' wear and tear theory, he regarded the wear and tear theory not as impossible, but as one in respect of which any mechanism by which it could have operated was in doubt.
My Lords, the late Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in his book "The Sign of Four", describes his hero, Mr. Sherlock Holmes, as saying to the latter's friend, Dr. Watson: "how often have I said to you that, when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?" It is, no doubt, on the basis of this well-known but unjudicial dictum that Bingham J. decided to accept the shipowners' submarine theory, even though he regarded it, for seven cogent reasons, as extremely improbable.
In my view there are three reasons why it is inappropriate to apply the dictum of Mr. Sherlock Holmes, to which I have just referred, to the process of fact-finding which a judge of first instance has to perform at the conclusion of a case of the kind here concerned.
The first reason is one which I have already sought to emphasise as being of great importance, namely, that the judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying that the party on whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to discharge that burden. No judge likes to decide cases on burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so.
There are cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course for him to take.
The second reason is that the dictum can only apply when all relevant facts are known, so that all possible explanations, except a single extremely improbable one, can properly be eliminated. That state of affairs does not exist in the present case
The third reason is that the legal concept of proof of a case on a balance of probabilities must be applied with common sense. It requires a judge of first instance, before he finds that a particular event occurred, to be satisfied on the evidence that it is more likely to have occurred than not. If such a judge concludes, on a whole series of cogent grounds, that the occurrence of an event is extremely improbable, a finding by him that it is nevertheless more likely to have occurred than not, does not accord with common sense. This is especially so when it is open to the judge to say simply that the evidence leaves him in doubt whether the event occurred or not, and that the party on whom the burden of proving that the event occurred lies has therefore failed to discharge such burden.
In my opinion Bingham J. adopted an erroneous approach to this case by regarding himself as compelled to choose between two theories, both of which he regarded as extremely improbable, or one of which he regarded as extremely improbable and the other of which he regarded as virtually impossible. He should have borne in mind, and considered carefully in his judgment, the third alternative which was open to him, namely, that the evidence left him in doubt as to the cause of the aperture in the ship's hull, and that, in these circumstances, the shipowners had failed to discharge the burden of proof which was on them."
25. Re SB (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 1048 confirms that the test for identifying a perpetrator of harm to a child is the balance of probabilities "nothing more and nothing less". There are many potential advantages in identifying the perpetrator of non-accidental injuries but the court should not "strain to find a perpetrator" and sometimes the task is impossible, Re D (Care proceedings: Preliminary hearing) [2009] 2 FLR 668 In an appropriate case the court should identify the "pool" of potential perpetrators of significant harm applying the test of "real possibility" North Yorkshire CC v SA [2003] 2 FLR 849
26. Witnesses at this hearing gave evidence in a large courtroom and were questioned by up to twelve Counsel as well as the Judge. Tailored warnings under s98 of the Children Act 1989 were given to the parents. Those warnings add to the pressure on the parents, in particular the mothers in this case who are facing possible criminal charges. Macur LJ in Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 at [11] and [12] , cautioned that,
"Any judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box and to expressly indicate that they have done so".
I have heeded that warning. In Lancashire County Council v M and F [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam) Peter Jackson J made the following observations which are pertinent to the present cases,
"To these matters I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death, the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record keeping or recollection of the person hearing or relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural a process that might inelegantly be described as " story-creep " may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith."
27. As discussed earlier in this judgment, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is no longer the preferred term in the UK for the phenomenon alleged to have resulted in harm to the three children with whom I am primarily concerned. The term now used is Fabricated or Induced Illness. However, the warning given by Ryder J in A County Council v A mother and others [2005] EWHC 31 (Fam) at [175] to [178] applies to the present case,
"The terms 'Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy' and 'Factitious (and Induced) Illness (by Proxy)' are child protection labels that are merely descriptions of a range of behaviours, not a paediatric, psychiatric or psychological disease that is identifiable. The terms do not relate to an organised or universally recognised body of knowledge or experience that has identified a medical disease (i.e. an illness or condition) and there are no internationally accepted medical criteria for the use of either label.
In reality, the use of the label is intended to connote that in the individual case there are materials susceptible of analysis by paediatricians and of findings of fact by a court concerning fabrication, exaggeration, minimisation or omission in the reporting of symptoms and evidence of harm by act, omission or suggestion (induction). Where such facts exist the context and assessments can provide an insight into the degree of risk that a child may face and the court is likely to be assisted as to that aspect by psychiatric and/or psychological expert evidence.
In these circumstances, evidence as to the existence of MSBP or FII in any individual case is as likely to be evidence of mere propensity which would be inadmissible at the fact finding stage (see Re CB and JB supra). For my part, I would consign the label MSBP to the history books and however useful FII may apparently be to the child protection practitioner I would caution against its use other than as a factual description of a series of incidents or behaviours that should then be accurately set out (and even then only in the hands of the paediatrician or psychiatrist/psychologist). I cannot emphasise too strongly that my conclusion cannot be used as a reason to re-open the many cases where facts have been found against a carer and the label MSBP or FII has been attached to that carer's behaviour. What I seek to caution against is the use of the label as a substitute for factual analysis and risk assessment."
28. In cases of alleged FII the court will often be tasked with considering whether the evidence establishes a pattern of behaviour on the part of the respondent parent demonstrating their character and propensity to harm their child. Must each individual element of that pattern be proved on the balance of probabilities? In R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088 the court considered that the approach to similar fact evidence taken in O'Brian v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] UKHL is applicable to civil (and family) cases.
"Where the similar fact evidence comprises an alleged pattern of behaviour, the assertion is that the core allegation is more likely to be true because of the character of the person accused, as shown by conduct on other occasions. To what extent do the facts relating to the other occasions have to be proved for propensity to be established? That question was considered by the Supreme Court in the criminal case of R v Mitchell [2016] UKSC 55 [2017] AC 571 , where it was said that the defendant, who was charged with murder by stabbing, had used knives on a number of other occasions, none of which had led to a conviction but which on the prosecution's case showed propensity. Lord Kerr addressed this issue in the following way:
"Propensity - the correct question/what requires to be proved?
39. A distinction must be recognised between, on the one hand, proof of a propensity and, on the other, the individual underlying facts said to establish that a propensity exists. In a case where there are several incidents which are relied on by the prosecution to show a propensity on the part of the defendant, is it necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt that each incident happened in precisely the way that it is alleged to have occurred? Must the facts of each individual incident be considered by the jury in isolation from each other? In my view, the answer to both these questions is "No".
43. The proper issue for the jury on the question of propensity is whether they are sure that the propensity has been proved. That does not mean that in cases where there are several instances of misconduct, all tending to show a propensity, the jury has to be convinced of the truth and accuracy of all aspects of each of those. The jury is entitled to - and should - consider the evidence about propensity in the round. There are two interrelated reasons for this. First the improbability of a number of similar incidents alleged against a defendant being false is a consideration which should naturally inform a jury's deliberations on whether propensity has been proved. Secondly, obvious similarities in various incidents may constitute mutual corroboration of those incidents. Each incident may thus inform another. The question is whether, overall, propensity has been proved.
44. the jury should be directed that, if they are to take propensity into account, they should be sure that it has been proved. This does not require that each individual item of evidence said to show propensity must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It means that all the material touching on the issue should be considered with a view to reaching a conclusion as to whether they are sure that the existence of a propensity has been established."
26. Again, this analysis is applicable to civil and family cases, with appropriate adjustment to the standard of proof. In summary, the court must be satisfied on the basis of proven facts that propensity has been proven, in each case to the civil standard. The proven facts must form a sufficient basis to sustain a finding of propensity but each individual item of evidence does not have to be proved.""
"34. I suggest, therefore, that in future cases judges should no longer direct themselves on the necessity of avoiding "straining to identify a perpetrator". The unvarnished test is clear: following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B (2019), he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inflicted the injury in question."
The Submissions
Conclusions