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	England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> F (A Minor) (Permission To Appeal) [2025] EWHC 638 (Fam) (17 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/638.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 638 (Fam)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		17/03/2025

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 17^th March 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Mr Justice Hayden :

1. This is an application for permission to appeal findings of fact made by Her Honour Judge Helen Arthur, following a three-day hearing on 26^th, 27^th and 28^th June 2024 at the Family Court sitting in Wolverhampton.
2. At paragraph 98 of her detailed judgment, the Judge conveniently summarised her factual findings against both parents:

"98. Having reviewed all the evidence carefully, I make the following findings:

1. On 23/3/2014, when M was 7 months pregnant with Z, during an argument F ripped M's shirt, grabbed her throat, slapped her, and pushed her to the ground, causing her to fear that she would miscarry. M defended herself with a wooden stick or spoon from the kitchen – not a knife which is an exaggeration by F. M did not rip F's shirt or smash a laptop. 

2. On 9-10/5/2014 (only 3 weeks after Z was born) F grabbed M's arm (causing the injury she photographed) and slapped her. 

3. On 14/11/2018 (when M was around 6 months pregnant with O) F shouting at M to get off the telephone and threatening to slap her. F has not proved that M bit F's hand.

4. In September 2019, F threatened to throw a vase at M which she kept in the hallway, witnessed by Z. 

5. Both Ps were verbally and emotionally abusive towards each other, but F's behaviour was considerably worse and more frequent, and F has not proved that M did it regularly in front of the Cs.

6. F followed M and the Cs to and from school, which was inappropriate as he knew contact would not be facilitated.

7. M fed hot sauce to J as a punishment for sucking her tongue, and occasionally to O as a punishment for sucking her thumb, but rarely to Z. M then persuaded J and Z to retract the allegations because she feared that the Cs might be removed from her care, either by social services or F. F encouraged J and Z to disclose M's use of hot sauce as a punishment, but the allegations themselves were true.

8. F has physically chastised the Cs on numerous occasions, by hitting Z with a belt on at least one occasion, and hit all three Cs with a stick with more force than a tap, on more than one occasion.

9. F has not proved that M has physically chastised or abused the Cs by hitting or pinching them.

10. F has not proved that M has verbally abused F or the Cs. 

11. F failed to protect the Cs from the harm he asserts they were suffering at the hands of M, albeit that I have not found that M in fact posed a risk to the Cs.

12. M has made up a false allegation against F, and manipulated the Cs to make a false allegation against F, that he gave them hot sauce, but not regarding any of the other allegations.

13. F has not proved that Mrs S sought to influence any of the Cs against F.

14. F has not proved that M neglected the Cs by:

a. Abandoning O in the Gambia, or in respect of her burns whilst she was there.

b. Abandoning her older son in the Gambia.

c. Failing to supervise the Cs adequately such that O cut her forehead when she fell off a bed.

d. Leaving the Cs home alone whilst she works.

15. F has exaggerated all of these neglect allegations (apart from the last one) in an attempt to damage M's reputation and credibility within proceedings, and bolster his application for the Cs to live with him. 

16. Unless specifically stated, where I have found that an allegation was not proved, I do not make a counter-finding that the party making the unproven allegation has exaggerated or made up the allegation."

3. The Judge also made the following additional finding:

"99. I therefore find that F poses a risk of physical and emotional harm to M and the Cs, which requires assessment before the Court can consider whether, and if so how, contact with F should be reintroduced. I do not find that M poses any risk to the Cs that would require reconsideration of the Cs living with her."

4. The application for permission to appeal was filed on 2^nd January 2025 and issued on 3^rd January 2025. It was therefore, in excess of five months out of time. However, the reasons for the delay in filing the application are far from straightforward. On 12^th October 2024, the Applicant sought permission to appeal from the Judge, out of time, explaining that he had only recently received the judgment.
5. On 25^th October 2024, HHJ Arthur heard the application for permission to appeal out of time and permission to appeal. The Judge delivered a written judgment on the application. In relation to permission to appeal out of time, the Judge set out her approach thus:

"4. As F's email is outside the time limit for such applications, the first step is permission to appeal out of time. On 9^th September 2024, I received email correspondence from F (via the Court Office) dated 27^th August 2024 asking "if there has been any comeback from the judge" yet. I had delivered the judgment via email over a month earlier on 25^th July 2024. As F was not legally represented I could not email it to him directly, so I asked M's solicitor to forward it to F to avoid any delay in him receiving it officially via the Court Office. M's solicitor confirmed that he had done so on 26^th July 2024. However, I asked both him and the Court Office to send it to F again just to make sure, which M's solicitor did on 9^th September 2024. On 11^th October 2024, I received further email correspondence from F (via the Court Office) dated 10^th October 2024 complaining about the delay in receipt of the judgment, which he said he had only received from M's solicitor on 9^th October 2024. It is unclear why he did not receive it from M's solicitor or the Court Office on any of the previous 4 occasions when it had been sent. The Court Office received confirmation of receipt from F's email address when they re-sent the judgment on 11^th September 2024 and F's email address has remained consistent throughout as he continues to email the Court Office from the same address now."

6. Having set out the history of the communications, as above, the Judge gave F "the benefit of the doubt" that he did not receive the judgment until 9^th October 2024. Having seen the industrious way in which he pursues his case, particularly on the written documentation, I consider the Judge was entirely right to accept F's account of late receipt of the judgment. As the Judge said, "it is hard to see what benefit F would have from pretending not to have receipt of the judgment and emailing the Court to chase it…". Because an important jurisdictional point hinges upon it, I set out the Judge's conclusions:

"5. There is therefore no evidence other than F's word for it that F did not receive the judgment on 26^th July 2024. However, it is hard to see what benefit F would have from pretending not to have received the judgment and emailing the Court to chase it on 27^th August 2024, and I am aware that sometimes emails go directly to the "junk" folder without alerting the recipient, so I will give F the benefit of the doubt that he did not receive the judgment until 9^th October 2024 as he states. I therefore grant him permission to appeal out of time as he sought permission within 21 days of receiving the judgment."

7. Having granted permission to appeal out of time, the Judge then turned to consider the permission application. The question arises however, as to whether the Judge, on 25^th October 2024, retained jurisdiction to consider the out of time application at all. This requires consideration of the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 (FPR), 30.3(3):

(3) An application for permission to appeal may be made –

(a) to the lower court at the hearing at which the decision to be appealed was made or, if the hearing is adjourned to a later date, the hearing on that date; or

(b) to the appeal court in an appeal notice.

8. In McDonald v Rose and others [2019] WLR(D) 13, [2019] 1 WLR 2828, [2019] WLR 2828, [2019] 2 All ER 318, the Court of Appeal reviewed the approach to interpreting the "date of the decision of the lower court which the appellant wishes to appeal". Underhill LJ, Vice President of the Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities dealing with when the 21-day period, in that case in the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), started to run and the procedure that must be adopted in respect of any application to the lower court for permission to appeal. There is no distinction, on these provisions, to be drawn between the FPR and the CPR.
9. Underhill LJ identified the starting point as Sayers v Clarke Walker [2002] EWCA Civ 645, [2002] 1 WLR 3095:

"This establishes that "the date of the decision of the lower court which the appellant wishes to appeal" for the purpose of CPR 52.12 (2) (b) is the date that the decision is formally announced in court. Thus the 21 days within which an appeal must (in the absence of an extension) be filed run from that date and not the date – which may be days, or sometimes even weeks, later – that the formal order recording the decision is issued. That is uncontroversial and should be known to any practitioner, though experience shows that it is often overlooked."

10. It must be said that times have changed since the above judgment was delivered, particularly post-pandemic, where many, I suspect most, judgments are now handed down electronically. In this process, which usually involves a draft judgment being sent to the parties for corrections, amendments, anonymisation and compliance with Transparency Orders, the date that the decision is formally handed down can sometimes get lost. I suspect that compliance with the Rules may frequently be "overlooked".
11. Underhill LJ anticipated the challenges of how an application for permission to appeal should be made in a case where judgment is reserved and handed down in the parties' absence. This, in any case of complexity, is now commonplace in the Family Court. Underhill LJ noted as follows:

"15. … The normal practice is for the party wishing to appeal to make the application in writing in the interval between the judgment being circulated in draft and the hand-down hearing. The application is treated as having been made "at" the hearing, notwithstanding the non-appearance of the parties, and the judge will usually deal with it on that occasion (though if he or she needs more time or further submissions there is no reason why they cannot do so by producing a written decision later – it is the application, not the decision, which must be "at" the hearing)."

12. So far so good, but there may be circumstances where a party really needs more time to consider an application for permission to appeal. Most judges will, I suspect, be appreciative of careful thought and reflection being given to a decision to appeal their judgments rather than an application that is driven by the exigencies of rules and procedures.
13. Brooke LJ addressed this in Jackson v Marina Homes Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1404, [2008] CP Rep 17. After referring to the position where judgment was delivered orally at the conclusion of the hearing, he said:

"6. Problems arose, however, if the judge delivered a written reserved judgment; particularly if the attendance of the parties was dispensed with when judgment was formally handed down. In Owusu v Jackson & Ors [2002] EWCA Civ 877 at [24-27] I said that there must be an occasion when the judgment was formally delivered in court, and that the time for appealing will run from the date of this formal hand down. The Civil Procedure Rules Committee then acceded to a request that practice might be changed so as to permit the judge in the court below to grant an adjournment to allow a party further time to make an application to that court for permission to appeal. This led to a new paragraph, 4.3B, being added to the practice direction for CPR part 52 in the following terms:

'Where no application for permission to appeal has been made in accordance with rule 52.3(2)(a) but a party requests further time to make such an application, the court may adjourn the hearing to give that party the opportunity to do so.'

7. Nothing was said in the Rules at the time when this amendment was made about the time within which permission to appeal should be made to the Court of Appeal if the judge in the lower court refused permission to appeal at this adjourned hearing…

8. If all the parties including the judge have their wits about them there should be no difficulty in practice. If, when the judge says he will reserve judgment and excuse the appearance of the parties and one of them wishes to seek permission to appeal should the decision go against him, the judge should, after handing down judgment in an empty court, formally adjourn the hearing to give that party the opportunity to apply for permission to appeal. Then when he has granted or refused permission, he should make a direction extending the period within which Notice of Appeal should be filed at the Court of Appeal. Strictly he should grant this extension at the time when he adjourns the hearing. Ordinarily he would grant a further three weeks from the date of his refusal of permission.

(The paragraph in the PD referred to by Brooke LJ at paragraph 6 is the predecessor of the current paragraph 4.1 (a) of PD 52A: see paragraph 9 above.)"

14. In Lisle-Mainwaring v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1470, [2018] WLR 4766, the Court of Appeal addressed the situation where a party wished to appeal after the judgment had been handed down and had not sought an adjournment to consider and reflect on any permission application. The Court endorsed the approach of Warby J, as he then was, in Monroe v Hopkins (no. 2) [2017] EWHC 645 (QB), [2017] 1 WLR 3587:

"14. It seems to me that the fairly settled practice that I have described above reflects a proper interpretation and application of the rules. The words of the rule and PD must mean something fairly close to what they say. A reserved judgment is given, and the decision is made, when the judgment is handed down at a hearing in court. On the face of it, the application to the lower court must be made then, or at some later date to which the hearing is then adjourned for that purpose, at the request of the potential appellant or at the instigation of the court. If an application is not made at one or other of those times, it can only be made to the appeal court. This is a clear and understandable regime, which places the onus on the party who may wish to appeal to make a decision, or to ask for time to make one. The standard practice of circulating reserved judgments should make it easier for a party to decide whether to seek permission, and to identify grounds of appeal which can be argued at the hand down. It is inherently desirable to avoid afterthoughts, and to avoid the uncertainty for the opposite party that would result if these were permitted."

15. Warby J is emphasising the importance of a robust and workable regime of appeal. One which is, as he puts it, "clear and understandable" and which, ultimately, places the responsibility on the party making or contemplating permission to appeal either to make the application or to ask for time to do so. As Warby J recognises, the now almost universal practice of circulating reserved judgments in advance has the advantage of affording thinking time for a party who is considering an appeal. In many ways, contemporary practice fits far more comfortably with the applicable rules. What is required is for the profession and the judiciary to reacquaint ourselves with the relevant rules and to apply them consistently.
16. In McDonald v Rose (supra), Underhill LJ observed that the authorities, referred to above and the rules procedures, were not widely understood by prospective appellants. This application provides a further, timely, opportunity to remind practitioners and judges of the scope and reach of FPR 30.3(3). The position is set out by Underhill LJ, in the context of the CPR, but applies equally, as I have said, to the FPR:

"21. (1) The date of the decision for the purposes of CPR 52.12 is the date of the hearing at which the decision is given, which may be ex tempore or by the formal hand-down of a reserved judgment: see Sayers v Clarke and Owusu v Jackson. We call this the decision hearing.

(2) A party who wishes to apply to the lower court for permission to appeal should normally do so at the decision hearing itself. In the case of a formal hand-down where counsel have been excused from attendance that can be done by applying in writing prior to the hearing. The judge will usually be able to give his or her decision at the hearing, but there may be occasions where further submissions and/or time for reflection are required, in which case the permission decision may post-date the decision hearing.

(3) If a party is not ready to make an application at the decision hearing it is necessary to ask for the hearing to be formally adjourned in order to give them more time to do so: Jackson v Marina Homes. The judge, if he or she agrees to the adjournment, will no doubt set a timetable for written submissions and will normally decide the question on the papers without the need for a further hearing. As long as the decision hearing has been formally adjourned, any such application can be treated as having been made "at" it for the purpose of CPR 52.3 (2) (a). We wish to say, however, that we do not believe that such adjournments should in the generality of cases be necessary. Where a reserved judgment has been pre-circulated in draft in sufficient time parties should normally be in a position to decide prior to the hand-down hearing whether they wish to seek permission to appeal, and to formulate grounds and such supporting submissions as may be necessary; and that will often be so even where there has been an ex tempore judgment. Putting off the application will increase delay and create a risk of procedural complications. But we accept that it will nevertheless sometimes be justified.

(4) If no permission application is made at the original decision hearing, and there has been no adjournment, the lower court is no longer seized of the matter and cannot consider any retrospective application for permission to appeal: Lisle-Mainwaring.

(5) Whenever a party seeks an adjournment of the decision hearing as per (3) above they should also seek an extension of time for filing the appellant's notice, otherwise they risk running out of time before the permission decision is made. The 21 days continue to run from the decision date, and an adjournment of the decision hearing does not automatically extend time: Hysaj. It is worth noting that an application by a party for more time to make a permission application is not the only situation where an extension of time for filing the appellant's notice may be required. It will be required in any situation where a permission decision is not made at the decision hearing. In particular, it may be that the judge wants more time to consider (see (2) above): unless it is clear that he or she will give their decision comfortably within the 21 days an extension will be required so as to ensure that time does not expire before they have done so. In such a case it is important that the judge, as well as the parties, is alert to the problem.

(6) As to the length of any extension, Brooke LJ says in Jackson v Marina Homes (para. 8) that it should normally be until 21 days after the permission decision. However, the judge should consider whether a period of that length is really necessary in the particular case: it may be reasonable to expect the party to be able to file their notice more promptly once they know whether they have permission."

17. Since March 2020, the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, reserved judgments in the Family Courts and in the Court of Protection have, in most cases, been handed down remotely in accordance with a "Covid Protocol". The practice has worked well and is now so embedded that it is been retained, notwithstanding that the Courts have resumed routine sitting in attended hearings. However, there has been some confusion as to the point at which the decision (to be appealed) is actually made, see FPR 30.3(3), para. 7 above. The regime, as discussed above, is both clear and understandable, but it is, as I have foreshadowed, one with which some practitioners and judges have become unfamiliar.
18. It is, I hope, helpful to reiterate what is required:

An oral hand-down or ex-tempore judgment:

For the purposes of an application for permission to appeal to a first instance judge, the decision to be appealed is made either at the time of the oral hand-down or the date on which the judge adjourns the permission application to be heard. After that point, the first instance judge has no further jurisdiction and recourse must be had to the Appellate Court.

If no permission application is made at the decision hearing and, accordingly, there has been no adjournment, the lower court has no further jurisdiction and cannot consider any retrospective application for permission to appeal.

A reserved judgment, handed down either in court or electronically:

A judge who has written a reserved judgment will, ordinarily, circulate the draft of the judgment to the parties. This will be to afford the opportunity, most particularly where the parties are represented, for corrections, amendments, anonymisation and compliance with Transparency Orders, et cetera.

The judge will and ought to set a deadline for response, indicating that following consideration of any suggested amendments, the perfected judgment will be handed down. In the majority of cases, this will be an electronic hand-down and thus not require the attendance of the parties.

When the judge has perfected the draft, he or she must communicate to the parties the date on which the judgment will be handed down. This will afford them further opportunity to consider or indicate whether they wish to appeal.

In the event that an application is to be made, the judge will either provide that the hand-down hearing should be attended, so that the application may be made, or set a separate date for the application to be heard. It is also possible that an application for permission may be made in writing, where the judge agrees. Again, this may be either at the hand-down date or the adjourned date.

In McDonald v Rose (supra), the Court of Appeal emphasised that adjournments should not be necessary in the generality of cases. In contemporary practice, as I have referred to above, this has even greater force. The judgment will have effectively been pre-circulated in draft and ordinarily that will provide sufficient time for the parties to decide, prior to the hand-down hearing, both whether they wish to seek permission to appeal and to formulate grounds and such supporting submissions as may be necessary. Adjourning the application will inevitably serve to increase delay and generate a risk of some procedural complication. But, as the Court of Appeal accepted, "it will nevertheless sometimes be justified".

To reiterate, for the purposes of FPR 30.3(3), the 'decision to be appealed' date is either the date of hand-down, if no application is made, or the date on which the application for permission to appeal is determined.

Notice of hand-down of reserved judgment must be given in the daily Cause List. The following wording is likely to be helpful:

"This judgment will be handed down remotely by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email."

Where appropriate, the following should be added:

"…and released to the National Archives. A copy of the judgment in final form as handed down should be available on the National Archives website shortly thereafter."

19. In order to achieve clarity, when the perfected judgment is sent to the parties, it seems sensible to include the following:

"I attach the judgment in this case by way of hand-down, which will be deemed to have occurred at [time] on [day, date, month, year]."

20. Compliance with the above should avoid any ambiguity as to when a judgment was handed down and, accordingly, clarify when a first instance judge may hear an application for permission to appeal their own decision.

A trap for the unwary.

21. Whenever a party seeks an adjournment of the decision hearing to consider whether to make an application for permission to appeal or to prepare for it, they should also seek an extension of time (see McDonald v Rose para. 21(5)). The Court of Appeal was very clear that, even though a decision hearing may be adjourned, the 21 days (within which an appeal must be filed, in accordance with the FPR) run from the date the decision was formally announced and not the date that the formal order recording the decision was issued. Underhill LJ regarded this as "uncontroversial" and considered that it "should be known to any practitioner, though experience shows it is often overlooked".

Did HHJ Arthur have jurisdiction to hear permission to appeal?

22. The Applicant has not raised this point. As a litigant in person, he could not be expected to have done so. When granting permission to appeal out of time, HHJ Arthur considered that she had delivered the judgment, via email, over a month earlier, i.e. on 25^th July 2024. She had intended that F should have the judgment delivered to him, by "M's solicitors via email". As related above, this did not happen. The judgment was eventually sent to the Applicant on 9^th October 2024. Though the Judge was sceptical of the chronology, she gave the Applicant "the benefit of the doubt". Accordingly, I must proceed based on this chronology.
23. Both parties continued the litigation and proceeded on the basis that a judgment was handed down at some point. However, in the circumstances, I have not been able to identify when that date most likely was. The procedure that I have laboured to set out above is the one that requires to be followed. The judgment is deemed to be handed down in Court and communicated electronically. This is why it requires to be posted on the Cause List. This is different from emailing the judgment directly to the parties, without the formalities of a hand-down process, which seems to have occurred here. Emailing a perfected judgment directly to the parties, without the procedural compliance identified above, is unsatisfactory and to be deprecated.
24. Accordingly, I can not be satisfied that HHJ Arthur had jurisdiction to hear the application for permission to appeal. The grounds of the appeal advanced by the Applicant all relate to the fact-finding judgment. This is an entirely logical position on his part. The findings of fact, made by the Judge are integral to her ultimate welfare conclusions. It is entirely right that they should be. Were they not, there would have been no point in having a fact-finding hearing. I propose therefore, to consider the permission application afresh, having concluded that the application requires to be heard by the High Court. The delays in the County Court were replicated in the appeal process. I do not propose to address them. They arose in consequence of an administrative confusion and the challenges faced by a litigant in person. In the circumstances, I grant permission to appeal out of time.
25. The grounds of appeal are interwoven within the skeleton argument. It is quite an extensive document and very wide ranging in its scope. It alleges "scapegoating, procedural errors and bias". It also asserts that there were "false applications", calculated deliberately to mislead the Court. Some of the points raised have no place in this appeal. These include a claim of "slander and reputational harm", "perverting the course of justice" and a "request for a criminal investigation". All these are outwith this Court's jurisdiction in a Private Law appeal of this kind. This is merely a statement of the legal position, it is not a criticism of the Applicant, who, I reiterate, is a litigant in person.
26. The following grounds can, in my judgement, properly be distilled from the Applicant's documentation:

i. Ground 1: Procedural errors resulting in unfairness;

ii. Ground 2: The Judge erred in the exercise of her discretion when declining to revisit earlier case management decisions made by District Judge McQueen;

iii. Ground 3: The Judge was wrong to make findings on evidence predicated on assumptions and/or inferences;

iv. Ground 4: The Judge ignored evidence of abuse and neglect by M; and

v. Ground 5: The Judge exhibited bias in favour of M.

27. Having read the Applicant's document carefully, I am satisfied that the above does justice to his pleaded case. Rule 31.3(7) FPR 2010 provides that permission for appeal will only be granted where there is (a) real (realistic as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success; or (b) there is some other compelling reason to hear the appeal. This requires to be read in conjunction with FPR Rule 30.12(3) which provides that an appeal may be allowed where the decision was wrong or unjust for procedural irregularity.

Ground 1: Procedural errors resulting in unfairness

28. There is very considerable overlap between Ground 1 and Ground 2 in the Applicant's documentation. The criticism of the case management substantially falls under Ground 2, but the Applicant argues "that there has been a procedural error in the way these falsehoods have been handled by the court". The Applicant continues: "R v K (2008) demonstrates the duty of the court to investigate claims of perjury and misleading statements when presented with evidence of such conduct. The failure to act on the false statements made by the Respondent, both in court and to officials, has undermined the integrity of the proceedings". The reference there, which has not been cited in full, may be, R v K (2008) EWCA Crim 185. That is a case which deals with allegations of abuse of process in the context of Section 58, Terrorism Act 2000. I have not found it to be of any assistance in advancing the Applicant's argument. It may be that the Applicant is intending to refer me to the case of R v Kirk [2008] EWCA Crim 434, which related to admissibility of evidence, including bad character, in the context of an allegation of rape. Though this seems more likely, the contextual basis of that case is also so far removed from the circumstances here, as to present little assistance. It is also a criminal case, engaging a different standard of proof.
29. Essentially, the Applicant profoundly disagrees with the Judge's evaluation of the evidence and challenges her assessment of which evidence she found to be reliable. In the absence of an error of law or insufficient cogency of reasoning, this court cannot interfere with findings that are within the generous ambit of the Judge's discretion. Of course, unlike this Court, the Judge had the advantage of hearing the evidence.

Ground 2: The Judge erred in the exercise of her discretion when declining to revisit earlier case management decisions made by District Judge McQueen

30. The Applicant's focus in this Ground revolved around the Judge's refusal to revisit the case management decisions of District Judge McQueen. This, as I follow the argument, relates substantially to WhatsApp audio evidence which the Applicant considered relevant. Though the Applicant asserts that this material was vital, he has failed to establish an evidential basis for this assertion either in this application or when he raised the matter before HHJ Arthur. Judges are permitted a wide ambit of discretion in case management decisions and are usually best placed to take them. Additionally, though the Applicant has illustrated an articulate and adroit ability to navigate the legal process, he did not, as HHJ Arthur noted, seek to appeal DJ McQueen's decision. The Judge would appear to have seen some transcripts of recordings when she made the following observations:

"Unfortunately the transcripts of the recordings had been produced by F not a professional transcriber, the recordings themselves were not produced to M or to the Court (at least for this fact-finding hearing) so the accuracy of the transcripts could not be confirmed – in fact it was not even possible to confirm that the people recorded were indeed the Ps. There are also the usual difficulties with covert recordings, namely that the person recording knows that others will hear what they say so can modify their behaviour whereas the person being recorded does not; they may be edited or selected to choose/exclude evidence showing the person recording in a negative light, and may have been manipulated or set-up. The Court therefore treats the reliability of the covert recordings that were admitted with extreme caution."

31. It is plain that the Judge is properly evaluating both relevance and evidential weight in respect of which there can be no basis upon which to impugn her forensic approach. Further, under this Ground, F makes complaint about the Judge's failure, as he perceives it, to address all the findings within the parties' respective Scott Schedules. The Judge found the Schedules, presented by both parties, to be "extremely unhelpful". She correctly considered them to be "generic", lacking in detail, relevance and focus. A Judge in these circumstances need only, perhaps should only, make such findings as are required effectively to resolve the welfare needs of the child.

Ground 3: The Judge was wrong to make findings on evidence predicated on assumptions and/or inferences

32. This Ground focuses largely on an incident on 23^rd March 2014, ten years before the hearing date. What is conspicuous about the allegations M makes, generally, is the detail that surrounds them. Sometimes, the detail given is not always favourable to herself and as such, paradoxically, serves to reinforce the reliability of her allegations. The Judge looked at each of the allegations separately, considered the evidence and then evaluated them by reference to earlier conduct and behaviour. In this context, she was entitled to draw reasonable inferences. Drawing inferences from available evidence is an integral part of the investigative process and is wholly different from making the "assumptions" the Applicant contends were made. See Re A (A Child) (No 2) [2011] EWCA Civ 12, [2011] 1 FCR 141, Para 26, per Munby LJ.

Ground 4: The Judge ignored evidence of abuse and neglect by M

33. This Ground simply cannot be reconciled with the judgment. From paragraph 74 to 92, the Judge, under separate headings, deals meticulously, with each of F's allegations which she broadly rejects for entirely cogent reasons. The preposition that she "ignored" this evidence is unarguable.

Ground 5: The Judge exhibited bias in favour of M

34. It follows, inevitably, from my reasoning above that there is no evidence at all upon which to support an allegation of bias against the Judge.
35. Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused. The application is, on the requisite legal test, totally without merit. No further application may be made.
36. This judgment concerns an application for permission to appeal which has been determined on consideration of the papers. As these decisions do not involve hearing of oral argument, they are relatively rarely reported. Here however, the procedural issues relating to appeal are of wider relevance and require to be placed in the public domain.