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	England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> A Local Authority v X (Mother) & Anor [2025] EWHC 900 (Fam) (11 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/900.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 900 (Fam)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		11/04/2025

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 11 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Ms Kate Grange KC:

Introduction

1. These proceedings concern a 1 year old baby, Y, (born on 2 April 2024). Y's mother, X, is now 17 years old and gave birth to Y in circumstances where she concealed her pregnancy from all family members apart from her mother and father, who were only told of the pregnancy when she was 29 weeks. Since before Y's birth X has wanted Y to be adopted. Accordingly, Y has been in foster care since birth and in February 2025 he was placed in a foster-to-adopt placement where he is doing well.
2. The Local Authority has made an application under Part 19(2)(c) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 for the Court to determine whether it must try to identify and locate Y's birth father to give him notice of Y's birth and its intention to place Y for adoption. It has also made an application under the inherent jurisdiction (a C66 application) seeking guidance from this Court about whether it must make enquiries with Y's extended family in South Africa to give them notice of the birth, to inform them of its intention to place Y for adoption and to ascertain if any of them wish to be assessed to care for him. The Local Authority's position on the applications is that I should not require it to take any further steps to identify and locate the birth father or any extended family out of the jurisdiction before it presses on with the adoption proceedings in respect of Y.
3. The matter came before me at a case management hearing on 22 January 2025 when I made directions including for a witness statement to be filed and served from X, providing for Y to be joined as a party to the proceedings and for Cafcass to be appointed as his Guardian. In support of the Local Authority's applications, I have been provided with two witness statements from a Social Worker at the Local Authority dated 6 November 2024 and 17 January 2025 and a witness statement from the Regional Adoption Agency dated 17 January 2025.
4. In accordance with my directions, X provided a witness statement dated 14 February 2025 in which she addressed various matters including the identity of Y's father, the nature of her relationship with the father and the impact upon her if the court did require further steps to be taken to make contact with the birth father or her extended relatives. Cafcass also provided a final analysis dated 27 March 2025. In the event the final hearing took place before me on 31 March 2025 at the end of which I indicated that I would allow the applications with full written reasons to follow. This is my judgment on the applications.

Background

5. When X was 15 years old she became pregnant following a brief encounter with a boy who she understood to be 16 years of age. According to X she met the boy on the social media app, Snapchat, and communicated with him for a short period before they agreed to meet up. They met in person on one occasion during which time they had sexual intercourse. Later the same day he blocked her on Snapchat and they have had no further contact thereafter.
6. X first came to the attention of the Local Authority in January 2024 when a referral was made from a safeguarding midwife who raised concerns that X was not registered in mainstream education, had a history of self-harm, had a pregnancy which presented as concealed and was also showing signs of social isolation. X concealed her pregnancy from her parents until it was in its 29th week. Thereafter only her parents knew about the pregnancy which was not disclosed to any other family members or friends. X's mother requested maternity care be provided from outside their local authority area as they didn't want local services or others to know about the pregnancy given their own profession.
7. X was clear that she did not want to see Y following his birth and that she wanted him to be adopted. On 2 April 2024 Y was born by caesarean section and X was discharged without having sight of Y. After some encouragement from her parents X did name Y and, when he was 7 weeks old, she met him for the first (and final) time in the presence of a Social Worker and Y's foster carers.
8. On 10 July 2024 X gave advance consent for Y to be made the subject of an adoption order under section 20 of the Adoption and Children's Act 2002 ('the ACA 2002'). The signing of advanced consent was witnessed by Cafcass. It remains the case that X's parents are the only people in their family or support network who know about Y's birth.
9. Since his birth Y has been in foster care. A search for foster-to-adopt carers commenced in August 2024 and in November 2024 a good cultural match was identified with carers who had elements of South African and Indian cultures. Y was placed with those carers in February 2025 and the placement has been very successful with Y developing well. The current plan is for an Adoption Approval Panel to meet on 23 April 2025 to discuss approval of the adoption plan in principle with the placement to be considered by the matching panel on 17 June 2025.

The mother's evidence

10. In her witness statement dated 14 February 2025 X provided further information about the circumstances of her pregnancy and the reasons she wanted Y adopted. She said that Y's father had brown eyes, brown skin and straight hair but she was unable to provide any further information about him because she had only met him on Snapchat and they did not exchange any detailed information about each other. She did not exchange telephone numbers with him and once he had blocked her on Snapchat after they met she was unable to remember his username. She said that they probably communicated for a couple of hours on Snapchat and he "seemed like a nice person" which is why she decided to meet with him. She spent 1-2 hours with him in Staines and after they had sexual intercourse she gave him directions about how to get to the bus or tube. She was not told his address. When she got home at about 6.00pm that night, she had been blocked by him on Snapchat and she had not seen or heard from him since. She had no way of getting in contact with him.
11. X explained in her witness statement the reasons why she wanted Y adopted and the impact on her if the applications weren't granted. She said that she was doubtful whether Y's father would have any interest in him. He had never been her boyfriend and he was young and was likely to want to move forward with his life. She said that she only had her parents and her younger brother in the UK and the rest of her family were in South Africa. She had considered whether any of her South-African-based family could provide for Y but they were all in their 50s. She did not have much of a relationship with them and did not regard herself as being close to them. They had adult children and she did not want to impose on them by asking them to look after Y. She had considered the possibility of asking a family friend in South Africa to take care of Y but she didn't think it was in Y's best interests for that to happen. She did not want there to be any link with the father or with her family in South Africa which would be a stressful process for her in circumstances where it was better for her and Y to have a fresh start. She also said she would be concerned about her own mental health if the father or her extended family was to be contacted. She was not ready to be a mother and wanted Y to have the best life possible which she thought would be achieved by him being adopted.
12. I note in the evidence of the Social Worker that X reported to the Local Authority that she had self-harmed on a number of occasions during 2023, with the last incident taking place in September/October 2023. X also reported that she had been bullied while attending school which had led to her being home schooled. On 14 November 2024 the Local Authority received three letters from X explaining the reasons why she felt she could not care for Y. X reported that she had been struggling with her mental health, including experiencing depression and occasional suicidal thoughts, which had led to her previous self-harming behaviours.

The positions of the parties

13. Mr Liebrecht submits on behalf of the Local Authority that the Court should not require the Local Authority to do any more to try to identify and locate Y's birth father so as to give him notice of intent to place for adoption nor should it require it to make enquiries of the extended family. He referred me to the leading authority of A, B & C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers And Relatives) [2020] EWCA Civ 41 and the tests set out therein which I discuss further below. He points out that there are key factors in this case which support the conclusions which the Local Authority have reached, including that it has not been possible to identify the father and it seems most unlikely it will be possible to do so. He submitted that the father appears to be a child without parental responsibility and that there was no family life with the mother; it being a fleeting encounter which gave rise to Y's conception. He also emphasises that X does not appear to be close to her extended family in South Africa and he notes the likely delays which would occur if the Local Authority was to try to identify relatives in that jurisdiction which would be a process of some complexity and uncertainty (and which would have to involve at least the following steps: identifying the relatives, ascertaining willingness to care for the child, making an assessment in the foreign jurisdiction, satisfying the court under Schedule 2 paragraph 19 of the Children Act 1989 that the child can live outside the jurisdiction and obtaining any mirror orders necessary in South Africa). He submits that such a process could descend into the grotesque given the potential impact on X and the uncertainty that process would bring.
14. I should record that the Local Authority accepts that the Part 19 application was delayed and should have been made earlier, but thankfully that has not led to any particular difficulties in this case. I note however the remarks of Peel J in A Local Authority v JK [2021] EWHC 33 (Fam) at paragraphs 48-54 on the potential prejudicial effects of delay and the need for promptness in these cases which should ordinarily be followed in any such case.
15. On behalf of X Ms Chapman submits that X has given a consistent account of the historical position in terms of Y's conception and X has been clear throughout that she believed it was in Y's best interests for him to be adopted. Ms Chapman emphasises that X has taken a great deal of time to consider her decision and her position is in line with the Guardian's analysis of the position. X believes that it is in Y's best interests for the process to conclude as soon as possible in order to provide certainty for Y so that he can move forward with his life in the care of his current carers, with whom he is thriving.
16. The Guardian's analysis is contained in her report dated 27 March 2025. In preparation for that report the Guardian met with X, spoke with Y's Social Worker, saw Y in his current placement and spoke with his current carers. X told the Guardian that while she was managing well now, she was not in a position to meet all of Y's emotional, as well as his physical, needs. X said she felt strongly that Y deserved to be raised by people who wanted to be parents. X explained to the Guardian that she did not have a close relationship with her extended family in South Africa and the relationship with them was quite limited. X felt that contacting them and requesting that they care for Y would be the equivalent of asking a stranger to do so.
17. The Guardian reported that Y was developing extremely well and meeting his milestones. He was described as a very sociable child. She had observed him with one of his carers and he presented as very settled and happy within her care. The carers understood the difficult position which X was in and said they would promote contact with X in the future if this was sought. The Guardian noted that X and her parents had been supported with preparing memory books for Y including information about South Africa and their culture. Having applied the various factors identified by the Court in the case of A, B & C the Guardian indicated that she was in agreement with the Local Authority's position that it should not take any further steps to identify the father or any extended family. The Guardian emphasised that this decision was a significant one with a lifelong impact for Y but it was better for Y to remain with his current carers and have the opportunity to have his needs met permanently.

Legal principles to be applied

18. The duties imposed upon Local Authorities in relation to babies who may be adopted are set out in the Children Act 1989, the ACA 2002 and in the associated procedural rules, practice directions and guidance. Although the legislative framework provides a route for adoption with the consent of the mother alone (see sections 18-20 of the ACA 2002), the procedural rules provide a specific process by which the interests of a father without parental responsibility can be considered and if necessary protected, including by being joined as a party to any adoption proceedings.
19. Accordingly, Rule 14.21 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 provides: "Where no proceedings have started an adoption agency or local authority may ask the court for directions on the need to give a father without parental responsibility notice of the intention to place a child for adoption." By Rule 19.2(c) the Part 19 procedure is mandated for applications under Rule 14.21. As to any non-notification application in relation to close relatives, there is no rule specifically designed for that purpose, but Jackson LJ in A, B & C concluded that such an equivalent application should be made under the inherent jurisdiction where the local authority has doubts about notification of a close relative.
20. In A, B & C Jackson LJ (in a judgment with which Nicola Davies LJ and Sir Andrew McFarlane P agreed) identified the legal principles to be applied in cases where mothers concealed their pregnancies and did not want the fathers or other relatives to know of the births and the Local Authority was seeking direction from the court about the proper approach to be taken. At paragraphs 2-3 of his judgment Jackson LJ introduced the topic as follows:

"2. Respect is due to the position of any mother who goes through pregnancy without family support and then chooses to relinquish the child at birth in the belief that it is for the best. Respect is also due to the position of the unsuspecting relatives. Some may have been a fleeting presence in the mother's life, but others may be more significant figures who have been kept in the dark and would be astonished to find that a baby (their child, sibling or grandchild) had been born and adopted without their knowledge, particularly if they were in a position to put themselves forward as carers. Most of all, the notification decision has life-changing implications for the baby. It may influence whether adoption happens at all and, even if it does, a sound adoption has its foundations in the integrity of the process by which it is achieved.

3. For social workers and courts these are not easy decisions. They have to be made without delay, on incomplete information, and in the knowledge of the profound consequences for everyone concerned. The law aims to distinguish those cases where a 'fast-track' adoption without notification of relatives is lawful from the majority of cases where the profound significance of the decision for the child demands that any realistic alternatives to adoption are given proper consideration. But in the end each case is unique and the outcome must depend on the facts."

21. Having undertaken a comprehensive review of the authorities in the area Jackson LJ concluded that the approach which had been taken by the courts was sound and required no major revision. He summarised the general position as follows at paragraphs 59 and 84:

"59. Pausing at this point, this body of authority at first instance and on appeal affirms that there is a discretion to be exercised by the local authority and by the court as to whether fathers and other relatives should be notified of the birth of a child. The discretion requires the identification and balancing up of all relevant factors. While the mother's right to confidentiality is important it is not absolute. The presence or absence of family life is an important, though not a decisive feature and where it exists strong countervailing factors are required to justify withholding knowledge of the existence of the child and the proceedings. The tenor of the authorities is that in most cases notification will be appropriate and the absence of notification will be the exception; but each case will in the end depend on its facts. In each case, the welfare of the child was regarded as an important factor but, significantly, there is no suggestion that the exercise of the discretion is governed by the paramountcy principle. …

84. For these reasons I conclude that while child welfare, prompt decision-making and a comprehensive review of every relevant factor, including those mentioned in the checklists, are all central to the notification decision, the decision is not one that is formally governed by the provisions of s.1 of the CA 1989 or of the ACA 2002 and the welfare of the child is not the paramount consideration of the local authority and the court in this context.

22. At paragraphs 86-88 of the judgment Jackson LJ noted the need for urgency and also thoroughness in the procedure to be followed. As to the principles governing decisions of this sort these were summarised at paragraph 89:

"1. The law allows for 'fast-track' adoption with the consent of all those with parental responsibility, so in some cases the mother alone. Where she opposes notification being given to the child's father or relatives her right to respect for her private life is engaged and can only be infringed where it is necessary to do so to protect the interests of others.

2. The profound importance of the adoption decision for the child and potentially for other family members is clearly capable of supplying a justification for overriding the mother's request. Whether it does so will depend upon the individual circumstances of the case.

3. The decision should be prioritised and the process characterised by urgency and thoroughness.

4. The decision-maker's first task is to establish the facts as clearly as possible, mindful of the often limited and one-sided nature of the information available. The confidential relinquishment of a child for adoption is an unusual event and the reasons for it must be respectfully scrutinised so that the interests of others are protected. In fairness to those other individuals, the account that is given by the person seeking confidentiality cannot be taken at face value. All information that can be discovered without compromising confidentiality should therefore be gathered and a first-hand account from the person seeking confidentiality will normally be sought. The investigation should enable broad conclusions to be drawn about the relative weight to be given to the factors that must inform the decision.

5. Once the facts have been investigated the task is to strike a fair balance between the various interests involved. The welfare of the child is an important factor but it is not the paramount consideration.

There is no single test for distinguishing between cases in which notification should and should not be given but the case law shows that these factors will be relevant when reaching a decision:

(1) Parental responsibility. The fact that a father has parental responsibility by marriage or otherwise entitles him to give or withhold consent to adoption and gives him automatic party status in any proceedings that might lead to adoption. Compelling reasons are therefore required before the withholding of notification can be justified.

(2) Article 8 rights. Whether the father, married or unmarried, or the relative have an established or potential family life with the mother or the child, the right to a fair hearing is engaged and strong reasons are required before the withholding of notification can be justified.

(3) The substance of the relationships. Aside from the presence or absence of parental responsibility and of family life rights, an assessment must be made of the substance of the relationship between the parents, the circumstances of the conception, and the significance of relatives. The purpose is to ensure that those who are necessarily silent are given a notional voice so as to identify the possible strengths and weaknesses of any argument that they might make. Put another way, with what degree of objective justification might such a person complain if they later discovered they had been excluded from the decision? The answer will differ as between a father with whom the mother has had a fleeting encounter and one with whom she has had a substantial relationship, and as between members of the extended family who are close to the parents and those who are more distant.

(4) The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption. This is of particular importance to the child's lifelong welfare as it may determine whether or not adoption is necessary. An objective view, going beyond the say-so of the person seeking confidentiality, should be taken about whether a family member may or may not be a potential carer. Where a family placement is unlikely to be worth investigating or where notification may cause significant harm to those notified, this factor will speak in favour of maintaining confidentiality; anything less than that and it will point the other way.

(5) The physical, psychological or social impact on the mother or on others of notification being given. Where this would be severe, for example because of fear arising from rape or violence, or because of possible consequences such as ostracism or family breakdown, or because of significant mental health vulnerability, these must weigh heavily in the balancing exercise. On the other hand, excessive weight should not be given to short term difficulties and to less serious situations involving embarrassment or social unpleasantness, otherwise the mother's wish would always prevail at the expense of other interests.

(6) Cultural and religious factors. The conception and concealed pregnancy may give rise to particular difficulties in some cultural and religious contexts. These may enhance the risks of notification, but they may also mean that the possibility of maintaining the birth tie through a family placement is of particular importance for the child.

(7) The availability and durability of the confidential information. Notification can only take place if there is someone to notify. In cases where a mother declines to identify a father she may face persuasion, if that is thought appropriate, but she cannot be coerced. In some cases the available information may mean that the father is identifiable, and maternal relatives may also be identifiable. The extent to which identifying information is pursued is a matter of judgement. Conversely, there will be cases where it is necessary to consider whether any confidentiality is likely to endure. In the modern world secrets are increasingly difficult to keep and the consequences, particularly for the child and any prospective adopters, of the child's existence being concealed but becoming known to family members later on, sometimes as a result of disclosure by the person seeking confidentiality, should be borne in mind.

(8) The impact of delay. A decision to apply to court and thereafter any decision to notify will inevitably postpone to some extent the time when the child's permanent placement can be confirmed. In most cases, the importance of the issues means that the delay cannot be a predominant factor. There may however be circumstances where delay would have particularly damaging consequences for the mother or for the child; for example, it would undoubtedly need to be taken into account if it would lead to the withdrawal of the child's established carers or to the loss of an especially suitable adoptive placement.

(9) Any other relevant matters. The list of relevant factors is not closed. Mothers may have many reasons for wishing to maintain confidentiality and there may be a wide range of implications for the child, the father and for other relatives. All relevant matters must be considered."

23. With regard to paragraph 4 of this summary and the need to establish the facts as clearly as possible, I note that Jackson LJ highlighted several authorities in which the mother did not identify the father or refused to do so. Those included Re L [2007] EWHC 1771 (Fam) where Munby J considered the position where a mother declined to name the father, with whom she had had a very brief relationship. In that case both the local authority and the Guardian suspected that the mother might be in a position to say more about the father if she chose to do so. While Munby J thought it arguable that the court had the power to compel the mother to reveal the identity of the father (although the point was not entirely clear) he expressed the view that it would be "a very different thing" whether it was appropriate and prudent to compel an unwilling mother to do so. At paragraphs 37-41 Munby J stated:

"37. But what am I to do? The mother has told me herself in court – not in the witness box on oath but from the well of the court – that there is nothing more she can tell us. There is no reason to believe that she would say anything different were she to be required to go into the witness box and either take the oath or affirm. It would (sic) naïve to imagine that someone who on this hypothesis is prepared to lie when addressing a judge direct is suddenly going to volunteer the truth merely because put on her oath.

38. And is it to be suggested, if she maintains her denial, that she should then be cross-examined (and if so with what degree of vigour?) so that the truth can be extracted from her? I confess that I find the idea very disturbing. There is something deeply unattractive and unsettling in the idea that a woman in the mother's position should be cross-examined in order to compel her to reveal the name of her child's father. And there is something deeply unattractive and unsettling in the idea that a woman in the mother's position should be cross-examined (as on this hypothesis would almost inevitably be the case, for how else is cross-examination likely to elicit the relevant information) as to the nature, extent and duration of her relationship with the father. In relation to matters as personal and intimate as this we should be wary of seeking to open windows into people's souls. And would it in any event be right to subject the mother to prying cross-examination on the (probably dubious) double hypothesis that she is at present not telling the truth but that, if cross-examined, the truth will out?

39. And in any event, where would cross-examination get us? It is possible that the mother would in fact make further disclosures, though I rather doubt it. Suppose, as I think much more likely, that she makes no further disclosures of any significance. I might, for all I know, be left with a powerful impression that she was not telling the truth, but that of itself would get us nowhere. Contempt could not be proved unless I was satisfied to the criminal standard – satisfied so that I was sure; satisfied beyond reasonable doubt – that the mother was telling lies. That, I suspect, is an unlikely outcome. And suppose that I was satisfied to the criminal standard that she was telling lies. Could it seriously be suggested that she should be punished, even sent to prison? Surely not. Punishment would surely be unthinkable.

40. The whole process smacks too much of the Inquisition to be tolerable. And it is not to be justified merely because we believe, however strongly, that what we are doing is being done in the best interests of a child. Here again, as it seems to me, the wise words of Holman J have a powerful resonance.

41. We can reason with someone in the mother's position. We can seek to persuade. But we should not seek to force or to coerce – and how else in this context could one sensibly characterise the threat of cross-examination or the threat of punishment for contempt. Of course, as Holman J pointed out (see Z County Council v R [2001] 1 FLR 365 at page 375), the matter is not to be determined on the say-so of a mother, but we have to face the realities. And the reality here, in the particular circumstances of this case is, I am quite satisfied, that we have to accept what the mother has told us. It would be wrong to push matters any further. I decline to do so."

24. The "wise words" of Holman J referred to in paragraph 40 of Munby J's judgment in Re L were also highlighted by Jackson LJ in A, B & C at paragraph 52. In Z County Council v R [2001] 1 FLR 365 Holman J had had to consider the position where a mother concealed her pregnancy from her family and made pre-birth arrangements with the local authority for the baby to be fostered with a view to adoption. The mother refused to disclose the identity of the father and the child was placed with a potential adoptive family. A question arose about whether the mother's relatives should be told of the baby's existence and consulted about whether any of them wanted to care for the child. Holman J said this:

"The dilemma must, in fact, be a very old one. Although no statistics are available, many children must have been adopted over the years, outside their birth families, with no knowledge by, or investigation of, other members of the birth family. Adoption exists to serve many social needs. But high among them has been, historically, the desire or need of some mothers to be able to conceal from their own family and friends, the fact of the pregnancy and birth. So far as I know, it has not previously been suggested, nor judicially determined, that that confidentiality of the mother cannot be respected and maintained. If it is now to be eroded, there is, in my judgement, a real risk that more pregnant women would seek abortions or give birth secretly to the risk of both themselves and their babies… There is, in my judgment a strong social need, if it is lawful, to continue to enable some mothers, such as this mother, to make discreet, dignified and humane arrangements for the birth and subsequent adoption of their babies, without their families knowing anything about it, if the mother, for good reason, so wishes."

25. Later in the judgment Holman J emphasised that the balance he had struck in favour of preserving the confidence of the mother was reached on the particular facts of the case and was not in any way to be taken as suggesting that the extended family should simply be ignored. On the contrary there should normally be "wide consultation with and consideration of the extended family; and that should only be dispensed with after due and careful consideration".
26. Coming back to the thoroughness of the enquiries which must be made by local authorities in these cases, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Re C v XYZ County Council [2007] EWCA Civ 1206 (Arden LJ, Lawrence Collins LJ and Thorpe LJ) was also considered by Jackson LJ in A, B & C. Although Jackson LJ concluded that he was not bound by the observations made by Arden LJ about the issue of welfare paramountcy, he did think it was good authority for the proposition that, in a "proper case" adoption could take place without notification to the father or relatives. As to the process which needed to be followed Arden LJ stated as follows at paragraph 3:

"…when a decision requires to be made about the long-term care of a child, whom a mother wishes to be adopted, there is no duty to make enquiries which it is not in the interests of the child to make, and enquiries are not in the interests of the child simply because they will provide more information about the child's background: they must genuinely further the prospect of finding a long-term carer for the child without delay. This interpretation does not violate the right to family life. The objective of finding long-term care must be the focus of making any further enquiries and that means the court has to evaluate evidence about those prospects."

27. And at paragraph 41 she stated:

"I accept the submission of the local authority that the court or adoption agency cannot simply act on what the mother says. It has to examine what she says critically. It is a question of judgement whether what the mother says needs to be checked or corroborated."

28. In that case the Court of Appeal held that a local authority was not under a duty to make inquiries to see if any of the child's birth family could be suitable carers in circumstances where the mother's relationship with the father was "fleeting" and he had had no family life with the child or the mother and where the information available to the court did not suggest that there were relatives who were likely to be in a position to care for the child (see paragraphs 40-48).

Application

29. In this case there is no suggestion that the mother's evidence is unreliable. She has given a consistent account of the events which led to these applications being made and it has not been suggested by any party that there are any doubts about the veracity of her evidence. Consistent with the guidance in A, B & C a full account was sought from her about the identity of the father, the nature of their relationship and the circumstances in which Y was conceived, together with information about her wider family in South Africa. I have examined her account critically in accordance with the principles set out above. Her account is consistent with what she previously told the local authority and what she said to the Guardian. It follows that this was not a case (unlike the case of Re L heard by Munby J and discussed above) in which there were doubts about the mother's evidence and the extent to which she was being forthcoming. But, even if that had been the case, I note the limits of what is considered appropriate in these types of cases. As Jackson LJ stated at paragraph 89.6(7) of A, B & C the mother may face persuasion, if that is thought appropriate, but she cannot be coerced.
30. I turn to apply the factors identified in A, B & C which are relevant to the decision I have to make.

Parental responsibility

31. This is not a case in which the birth father has acquired parental responsibility; the mother not being in a position to identify the father and therefore he has had no chance to acquire it. It follows that he does not have the benefit of automatic notification, party status or the right to give or withhold consent to adoption.

Article 8 rights

32. There has never been any established family life within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR between the mother and father. X does not regard herself as having been in a relationship with the father having only briefly chatted to him online before meeting him once. This was a fleeting encounter with contact ending abruptly when the father blocked X on Snapchat. The father also has no knowledge of Y's birth.
33. However that does not mean that I can disregard the father's interests. Even in the absence of established family life within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR the birth father has an interest that needs to be considered and I bear in mind that he has not had any opportunity to establish any form of family life with Y given he does not know that Y exists. I bear in mind that the father's extended family may also have a relevant interest in these applications and in the potential adoption of Y.
34. As to the mother's extended family, apart from X's younger brother, they are based in South Africa and X has said she is not close to them and regards them as no more than strangers when it comes to the possibility of them caring for Y. Consequently, even if there is an established family life within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR, those are not strong ties.
35. I bear in mind that the mother's Article 8 ECHR rights are engaged as someone who has been clear from the outset that she wanted Y to be adopted so as to give him long-term stability. In making those choices, the mother's Article 8 ECHR rights are also engaged.
36. This is also a case in which the prospective adopters' Article 8 ECHR rights are potentially engaged given the bond they have formed with him, albeit I bear in mind that this has been over a short period since February 2025.
37. I have to weigh up all of these competing rights as part of the balancing exercise I must undertake.

The substance of the relationships

38. As I have set out above, the relationship between the mother and father was no more than a fleeting encounter which, as Jackson LJ indicated at paragraph 89.6(3) of A, B & C, will fall at one end of the spectrum when assessing the substance of the relationship. Accordingly, it is to be afforded less weight than e.g. in a case where there has been a meaningful or substantial relationship.
39. As to the mother's extended family it is only those relatives in South Africa who have any potential to be considered and the relationship with the mother is not a close one. The limited nature of the relationship with X combined with the fact that they are out of the jurisdiction suggests (to answer the question posed by Jackson LJ at paragraph 89.6(3) of A, B & C) that they would not have a significant degree of objective justification to complain if they later discovered they had been excluded from the decision about Y's future.

The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption

40. It is difficult to make any objective assessment about whether Y's father might be a potential carer. The abrupt way he cut off contact with X and his young age might suggest that this is doubtful, but so little is known about him that it is simply not possible to explore this as a possibility.
41. X's parents are the only family members who know about Y and have been involved throughout, but they are not able to care for him.
42. That leaves the extended family in South Africa, but this does not appear to be a realistic option given the age of those relatives and the limited relationship they currently have with X.

The physical, psychological or social impact on the mother or on others of notification being given

43. It is apparent that X has experienced past difficulties with her mental health and that she is concerned that it would have a negative impact on her mental health in the future if steps were taken to try to identify Y's father or provide information about Y's birth to her relatives in South Africa. While I do not have any expert medical evidence available to me, doing the best I can, I consider that X is someone who has mental health vulnerabilities who would be likely to suffer serious emotional distress if further steps were taken against her wishes. In my judgement this is not a situation where there might be short term difficulties borne out of embarrassment or unpleasantness. X and her mother and father have gone to great lengths to conceal the pregnancy and the birth of Y, including ensuring her maternity care was given outside her home area. X has been resolute from the beginning that it was in Y's best interests to be adopted and should I refuse to grant these applications I consider that it would represent a devastating setback for her, with potentially damaging consequences in terms of her mental wellbeing. I have weighed these matters heavily in the balancing exercise I have undertaken.

Cultural and religious factors

44. There are no particular cultural or religious factors which have been identified as impacting on the approach which I should take in this case.

The availability and durability of the confidential information

45. As I have already outlined at paragraph 29 above there are no doubts about X's credibility in this case and she is unable to provide any further details which would help to identify the father in circumstances where the association with him was fleeting and he cut off communication very quickly. At the oral hearing I pressed Mr Liebrecht on whether there was any more the local authority could, in fact, do to try to trace the father if further steps were thought necessary and appropriate, but in circumstances where the father had blocked the mother from further contact, I am told that there was nothing further which could be done in the absence of any identifying information about him.
46. As Arden LJ made clear in Re C v XYZ County Council there is no duty to make enquiries which it is not in the interests of the child to make, and enquiries are not in the interests of the child simply because they might provide more information about the child's background: they must genuinely further the prospect of finding a long-term carer for the child without delay. Given how little is known about the father and the short-lived nature of the relationship with X, I do not consider that there are realistic enquiries which could be made which might genuinely further the prospect of finding a long-term carer for Y.
47. As to the extended family in South Africa there are also a lot of unknowns about their situation and I am doubtful that further enquiries in that jurisdiction would genuinely further the prospect of finding a long-term carer for Y.

The impact of delay

48. As I have already noted, it is regrettable that there have been delays to date in making these applications and Y is now 1 year old. Given the importance of the issues at stake, delay cannot be a predominant factor, but I am satisfied that it does play a role in this case. If further steps were to have to be taken either to try and identify the father (and it is to be noted that it is not clear what those steps might be) or to locate and assess the extended family in South Africa that will inevitably lead to delays and uncertainty without the permanency that X and Y might otherwise have. As Mr Liebrecht submitted the steps involving the extended family in South Africa could become protracted and could lead to very substantial delays. I am satisfied that the impact of delay is therefore something I should take into account in his case.

Conclusions

49. As set out in A, B & C I must look at all these relevant factors in the round and make a holistic assessment of the position. I recognise the significance of this decision and the lifelong impact it will have on the potential for Y to be raised within his birth family. In my judgement however there are powerful factors in this case which point in one direction namely in favour of granting the applications and not requiring any further steps to be taken as regards Y's father or X's extended family in South Africa.
50. In the case of Y's father, two strong factors are the fleeting nature of the relationship between him and X and the impact on X given the mental health difficulties she has experienced in the past. Realistically there is little which can be done to identify the father or the paternal family and what little is known about him does not suggest there is a realistic prospect that he would want to care for Y long term even if he could be identified. I am satisfied that X's evidence is reliable and has been approached critically. She has gone to extreme lengths to conceal the pregnancy from her extended family and wider community and I accept that there would be serious consequences for her mental health if there were to be further delays in order to carry out what would likely be fruitless further investigations. Y currently has a loving home and has settled very well in his foster to adopt placement. Any further delay is clearly not in his best interests.
51. As to X's extended family in South Africa, the relevant balancing exercise also comes down in favour of granting the application and not requiring further investigations. The family ties with X are not close ones and it is difficult to see how there is a realistic prospect of identifying anyone who can provide long term care for Y. The potential damage to X's mental health and the impact on Y of what could be very substantial delays are also key factors.
52. In all the circumstances I am of the view that there are no further steps the local authority should be taking as regards notification either to the birth father or the paternal family or X's extended family in South Africa and accordingly I grant the two applications under Part 19 and the inherent jurisdiction.