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	England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Cheung v Office of Intercollegiate Services & Ors [2025] EWHC 1109 (KB) (09 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/1109.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1109 (KB)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY

		33 Bull Street Birmingham B4 6DS
		9 May 2025

This judgment was circulated to the parties in draft on 14 April 2025, handed down at a hearing on 9 May 2025 and subsequently published to the National Archives

Introduction

1. This judgment follows a hearing on 11 March 2025, when I heard the following four applications (set out in chronological order):

a. The first, second and fourth defendants' application for strike out/summary judgment, dated 25 September 2024;

b. The claimant's application, dated 25 October 2024, to vary my order made on 3 October 2024;

c. The third and fifth defendants' application for strike out/summary judgment, dated 28 October 2024; and

d. The claimant's application to adjourn the hearing on 11 March 2025, dated 10 March 2025, listed as a preliminary issue at the hearing.

2. The claimant did not attend the hearing and was not represented. The defendants were each represented by counsel. Ms Evans KC represented the first, second and fourth defendants and Ms Colter represented the third and fourth defendants.
3. The following material was provided to me for the hearing:

a. A main hearing bundle consisting of 1176 pages;

b. A supplementary hearing bundle consisting of 103 pages;

c. A defendants' authorities bundle consisting of 616 pages;

d. Three sets of written submissions from the claimant totalling 56 pages (filed on 10 March 2025);

e. A claimant's authorities bundle consisting of 355 pages;

f. The claimant's application to adjourn the hearing on 11 March 2025, sent to the court by e-mail on 10 March 2025 at 2.59pm;

g. Two further e-mails sent to the court by the claimant on 10 March 2025 at 4.34pm and 5.00pm;

h. A bundle of recently exchanged documents (sent to me on the morning of the hearing by the solicitor for the first, second and fourth defendants) consisting of 30 pages; and

i. A statement of Mr Andrew James Pickavant, solicitor for the third and fourth defendants (also sent on the morning of the hearing) dated 11 March 2025.

4. From the court file, it can be seen that the claimant sent a further document to the court, titled "The Claimant's Preliminary Response to the Witness Statement of Andrew Pickavant dated 11 March 2025 filed at 10:45 a.m." This document was not brought to my attention during the hearing and, in any event, was not received by the court until 11.49am, by which time I had already dealt with the applicant's application to adjourn the hearing (to which it relates). As such, I did not consider this document.
5. At the hearing, I dismissed the claimant's adjournment application dated 10 March 2025, for reasons I set out in an ex tempore judgment. I then proceeded to deal with the three remaining applications. At the conclusion of the hearing, I informed the parties in attendance that I would reserve judgment on the three remaining applications.

The Parties

6. The parties to this claim are as follows:

a. The claimant is Mr Yuk Ming Cheung.

b. The first defendant is the Office of Intercollegiate Services ("OIS"), a corporate body that acts for the colleges of Cambridge University in relation to disputes about admissions.

c. The second defendant is Downing College, one of the academic colleges of Cambridge University ("Downing").

d. The third defendant is Ms Imogen Proud ("IP"), a barrister who represented OIS in judicial review proceedings brought by the claimant in 2021.

e. The fourth defendant is Hewitsons solicitors ("Hewitsons"), who acted for Downing in the judicial review proceedings.

f. The fifth defendant is Mr Michael Armitage ("MA"), a barrister who represented Downing in the judicial review proceedings.

7. For ease, I will refer to the defendants collectively as follows:

a. The first, second and fourth defendants as "the Beale defendants", because they are all represented by the same firm of solicitors, Beale & Co.

b. The third and fifth defendants as "the barrister defendants".

The Factual Background

8. In this claim, the claimant seeks declaratory relief against the five defendants based on events that took place during judicial review proceedings (case no CO/4810/2020) involving the claimant, OIS and Downing in 2020 and 2021.
9. The claimant was an unsuccessful applicant to study land economy at Downing in late 2019. In 2020, he unsuccessfully appealed to OIS against the decision not to offer him a place. In late 2020, he brought judicial review proceedings against OIS, with Downing named as an interested party. Dr Kamran Yunus, an admissions tutor at Downing, submitted a witness statement (dated 19 January 2021) in support of the positions of OIS and Downing in opposing the application for judicial review. On 2 March 2021, Mr John Howell KC, sitting as Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission to the claimant to bring judicial review proceedings, on paper, and made a costs order in favour of OIS (but not in favour of Downing) for acknowledging service.
10. The claimant applied for reconsideration of this refusal. An oral hearing was listed on 14 April 2021 before Mr Philip Mott KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. Prior to the hearing, Dr Yunus produced a second witness statement, dated 12 April 2021, which had attached to it various admissions data. At the start of the hearing on 14 April 2021, the claimant's counsel, Mr Lachlan Wilson, applied for an adjournment, on the basis of Dr Yunus' second witness statement having been produced only very shortly before the hearing. At that stage, counsel for OIS and Downing (who were IP and MA respectively), elected to withdraw the statement and the hearing proceeded. Mr Mott KC maintained the refusal of permission to bring judicial review proceedings. He did not interfere with the costs order already made in favour of OIS, but acceded to a submission that a costs order should be made in favour of Downing.
11. The claimant then applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal Judge Mott KC's order. On 4 November 2021, Simler LJ (as she then was), refused permission to appeal. In her reasons for refusing permission, she said the following:

"2. I have considered the application for permission to appeal and the supporting material. I have concluded that no arguable ground with reasonable prospects of success is raised; and there is no compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

"3. It is common ground that the judge did not consider the late witness statement lodged by Downing College the day before the renewed hearing. The late witness statement afforded no basis for granting an adjournment in these circumstances there was no arguable error by the judge in his refusal to grant an adjournment accordingly.

…

"5. As to grounds 4 and 5, the normal rules permit recovery of the costs of an acknowledgment of service. The applicant argues that Downing should not get its costs because its acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of resistance replicate the respondent's summary grounds. It is inevitable that there will be some overlap but Downing's summary grounds of resistance had a different focus to the respondent's, namely the applicant's allegations that Downing was guilty of procedural unfairness. Downing was well placed to address this, and reasonably accordingly submitted summary grounds and a witness statement from the relevant academic. In any event, the applicant has not come close to showing that he has realistic prospects of overturning this decision given the wide discretion afforded to judges on the question of costs."

12. On 28 July 2022, the claimant's mother, Ms Yung, brought a claim in the King's Bench Division of the High Court against the same five defendants as are named in the current claim ("the Yung claim"). The Particulars of Claim in Ms Yung's claim, in substance, raise the same issues as are raised in the present claim. Although she initially sought damages, as well as declaratory relief, at a hearing before Master McCloud on 8 November 2023, she withdrew the damages claim. Like in this case, the defendants applied for strike out and/or summary judgment. After numerous hearings and delays, by an order dated 15 April 2024, Senior Master Cook directed that there be a hearing on the sole issue of whether Ms Yung had standing to bring the claim. At a hearing on 23 July 2024, Senior Master Cook concluded that she lacked standing and struck out the claim. Ms Yung has applied for permission to appeal that decision.
13. The current claim was issued on 4 July 2024 by Mr Cheung. In the Particulars of Claim, under "Brief details of claim", it says the following:

"3. This claim seeks declaratory reliefs against the Defendants for misconduct during the CO/4810/2020 Judicial Review Proceedings. This is a non-monetary claim concerning the conduct of the Defendants.

"4. In conducting CO/4810/2020, the 1st to 5th Defendants (collectively referred to as 'the Defendants'):

• Submitted false written statements (including statements in an email dated 13 April 2021) and skeleton arguments to the Administrative Court.

• Presented incorrect and/or false oral evidence and submissions during the hearing on 14 April 2021.

• Worked together and or colluded with the Claimant's former legal representatives.

• Failed to comply with the Duty of Candour.

• Engaged in obstruction of justice and interference with the administration of justice.

"5. These actions led to the refusal of permission to apply for Judicial Review. These misconducts have not been adjudicated in any prior proceedings. It is the Claimant's case that the Defendants, whether collectively or individually, engaged in obstruction of justice and interference with the administration of justice."

14. The claimant seeks 18 declarations (labelled A to R), which I summarise as follows:

a. Declarations A, F and J: Downing, Hewitsons and/or MA misrepresented the reason for submitting Dr Yunus's second statement.

b. Declarations B to E: Dr Yunus misled the court in his second statement by presenting false, edited and/or augmented data and misrepresenting the reasons for preparing the statement.

c. Declaration G and P: IP misled the court by representing that the claimant held $21 million in investments, leading Judge Mott KC to award costs.

d. Declarations H and I: The defendants and the claimant's counsel for the hearing before Judge Mott KC colluded to include an authority on costs (which was adverse to the claimant's position) in the hearing bundle.

e. Declaration K: The defendants colluded with the claimant's counsel for the hearing before Judge Mott KC not to bring to the court's attention a false part of Dr Yunus's second statement where he mentions not being aware that he was required to present full admissions data to the court.

f. Declarations L and M: The defendants advanced deceiving statements, representations and submissions about Dr Yunus's statements, including a failure to point out that the data attached to the statement was edited, augmented and not original, and thereby tried to influence the judge's evaluation of that evidence.

g. Declaration N: IP, MA and the claimant's counsel for the hearing before Judge Mott KC strategically and collectively withdrew Dr Yunus's second statement.

h. Declaration O: MA sought to mislead the court about the significance of Dr Yunus's second statement, asserting that it was less significant when withdrawing it but then arguing it was more significant when it came to costs.

i. Declaration P: The defendants failed to observe the duty of candour.

j. Declaration R: The defendants engaged in obstruction, or interference with administration of, justice.

15. The Particulars of Claim do not explicitly plead any recognised cause of action. In the claimant's written submissions, the defendants' alleged conduct is, at points, framed in terms of an unlawful means conspiracy. This follows the same being mentioned by the defendants in their applications and skeleton arguments as a possible basis on which the claimant might have intended to bring the claim.
16. OIS, Downing, IP and MA all accept that they have been validly served with the proceedings, but Hewitsons do not. The claimant has twice sought default judgment, initially against all the defendants (which was refused) and then against the Beale defendants only. By an order dated 3 October 2024, I refused the latter of those requests. The defendants have yet to file defences. The applications at paragraph 1, a-c were first listed to be heard by me on 8 January 2025. That hearing was vacated after the claimant successfully applied for an adjournment.

The Applications and Issues

17. The Beale defendants' application dated 25 September 2024 is made on the following grounds (as well as seeking some other consequential orders):

a. The Claim Form and Particulars of Claim, in substance, disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim or the claim lacks any real prospect of succeeding, and should be struck out, or summary judgment should be entered, broadly for the following reasons:

i. The claimant's allegations are fanciful or irrelevant and unsupported by evidence;

ii. The claimant is not entitled to declaratory relief as a matter of law;

iii. In so far as the claimant alleges dishonest conduct by Dr Yunus, he is protected by witness immunity.

b. Alternatively, the claim amounts to an attempt to re-litigate, or mount a collateral attack on, issues already determined in other litigation and is an abuse of process. The claim should, therefore, be struck out.

c. Alternatively, Hewitsons have not been validly served with the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim and the claim against Hewitsons should be struck out.

18. The barrister defendants' application dated 28 October 2024 also seeks strike out and/or summary judgment, for substantially the same reasons as at a. and b. above, save that advocates' immunity, rather than witness immunity, is relied upon.
19. The claimant's application dated 25 October 2024 seeks to set aside my order of 3 October 2024, refusing the claimant's request for default judgment against the Beale defendants (that order having been made on paper and subject to a liberty to apply). The claimant also raises the issue of abuse of process/collateral attack against the defendants in respect of their applications, based on Senior Master Cook, in the Yung claim, having directed a hearing on the sole issue of standing and not seeing it necessary to determine the other issues raised by the defendants, which are substantially the same issues as they now raise in their applications in this claim.
20. Therefore, to dispose of the applications, the following issues need to be decided:

(1) Are the claimant's allegations fanciful/irrelevant/unsupported by evidence?

(2) Is the claimant entitled to declaratory relief, as a matter of law?

(3) Is Dr Yunus/are the barrister defendants protected by immunity?

(4) Are these proceedings, and/or are the defendants' applications, an attempt at re-litigation/mounting a collateral attack?

(5) Were Hewitsons validly served with the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim?

(6) Should I set aside my order of 3 October 2024 refusing default judgment?

21. The summaries of the parties' submissions on the issues, as set out below, are taken from the skeleton arguments of Ms Evans and Ms Colter and their oral submissions made at the hearing, and from the written submissions of the claimant, as well as his statement dated 25 October 2025 (in support of his application), where relevant.

Issue (1): Are the claimant's allegations fanciful/irrelevant/unsupported by evidence?

Legal Principles

22. The Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR") r. 3.4 provides:

(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court –

(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;

(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court's process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or

(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.

23. CPR r. 24.3 provides:

The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on an issue if—

(a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and

(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.

24. "A striking out application requires analysis of the statement of case, without reference to evidence. Unless demonstrably and patently hopeless, the Court proceeds on the assumption that the relevant factual averments will be established by evidence at trial" (Farley v Paymaster (1836) Ltd [2024] EWHC 282 (KB) at [86]).
25. The notes in the White Book (2024) at 3.4.2 say:

"For the purposes of a r.3.4(2)(a) application, the applicant was usually bound to accept the accuracy of the facts pleaded unless they were contradictory or obviously wrong, MF Tel Sarl v Visa Europe Ltd [2023] EWHC 1336 (Ch) (Master Marsh) (in contrast to the position under CPR r.24.2 where the court is considering the claim or an issue in it and may be required, without conducting a mini-trial, to examine the evidence that is relied upon to prove the claim and consider the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial, see para.24.2.3). However in Libyan Investment Authority v King [2021] 1 WLR 2659 Nugee LJ suggested that there nothing wrong in the practice of bringing an application under Pt 3 and Pt 24 on the basis that the claim was factually hopeless (see also the Maranello Rosso Ltd v Lohomij BV [2021] EWHC 2452 (Ch) at [23]–[25])."

26. Conversely, the notes at 3.4.2 go on to say:

"A statement of case is not suitable for striking out if it raises a serious live issue of fact which can only be properly determined by hearing oral evidence (Bridgeman v McAlpine-Brown, 19 January 2000, unrep., CA). An application to strike out should not be granted unless the court is certain that the claim is bound to fail (Hughes v Colin Richards & Co [2004] EWCA Civ 266; [2004] PNLR 35, CA."

27. Per Cockerill J. in King v Stiefel & Ors [2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm) at [21]: "…in the context of summary judgment the court is by no means barred from evaluating the evidence, and concluding that on the evidence there is no real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success … there will be cases where the Court will be entitled to draw a line and say that … it would be contrary to principle for a case to proceed to trial." The same case holds that it can be appropriate to enter summary judgment in cases involving allegations of fraud (see [23-24]).

27. The claimant, in his written submissions, refers to Barrett v Enfield Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550, where Lord Browne-Wilkinson said "unless it was possible to give a certain answer to the question whether the plaintiff's claim would succeed, the case was inappropriate for striking out."
28. In so far as the claimant seeks to rely upon an unlawful means conspiracy, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 24^th Ed. says the following (at [23-108]):

"[An unlawful means conspiracy] is committed where two or more persons combine and take action which is unlawful in itself with the intention of causing damage to a claimant who does incur the intended damage. It is not necessary for the injured party to prove that causing him damage was the main or predominant purpose of the combination but that purpose must be part of the combiners' intentions."

Parties' Submissions

29. On behalf of the Beale defendants, Ms Evans submits that the claimant's various allegations about collusion are clearly built on nothing. She further submits that the allegations about Dr Yunus's second witness statement are irrelevant because neither OIS nor Downing relied upon it. Further, the idea that the accused parties colluded over any part of the conduct of the judicial review is fanciful and has no foundation in fact. For example, the inclusion of the costs authority in the bundle was perfectly normal conduct by barristers before a hearing.
30. For the barrister defendants, Ms Colter says there is not a shred of evidence underlying the allegations. She observes that there is no evidence whatsoever that Dr Yunus's statement was deliberately withheld for some illegitimate reason or that there is anything objectionable, false or misleading about the contents of it, or the attached tables. As to the allegation that IP misled the court about costs, Ms Colter notes that, whilst IP did make a submission describing the US$21 million investment made by the claimant as though it were real rather than simulated (which it apparently was), there is no evidence that this was deliberate or improper or anything other than a bona fide mistake. In any event, Ms Colter notes that Judge Mott KC did not accede to IP's submission about costs.
31. The claimant refers to correspondence in the run up to the hearing before Judge Mott KC, where the claimant had been asking for a full breakdown of admissions statistics. Thus, it is said, Downing/Hewitsons had been misleading in suggesting that the statement was served in response to the claimant's skeleton argument. It is also said that MA misled the court further by suggesting, at the hearing, that Dr Yunus's second statement was not, in fact, in response to the claimant's skeleton argument. The claimant argues that Dr Yunus's second statement, and its attachments, provided false, edited and augmented data; augmented to reflect the "post-proceedings" position, rather than the original, position and containing the false assertion that it was difficult to rank applicants by predicted grades, whereas Cambridge University publishes such statistics as a whole.

33. The claimant submits that IP's false submission about his resources (that he owned US$21 million in investments) led Judge Mott KC to make a costs order in favour of Downing and was "collusive action" between OIS and Downing. The claimant says that the three barristers (IP, MA and the claimant's own counsel, Mr Wilson) communicated with each other and planned how to seek costs against the claimant. This, the claimant asserts, constituted collusion and conspiracy. The claimant says: "This claim seeks declarations of wrongdoing for conspiracy to injure, based on the defendants' conduct during the judicial review proceedings…"

32. The claimant says: "The defendants, in collaboration with the claimant's former barrister, Mr. Lachlan Wilson, engaged in an unlawful/lawful means conspiracy during the proceedings." On the question of damage, the claimant says: "The Claimant suffered damages and losses as a result of the defendants' unlawful/lawful actions", including: "a. Court and legal fees paid to Messrs. Sinclairs Law [the claimant's own solicitors] and instructing barristers; b. Costs liabilities arising from the refusal of permission to commence judicial review; c. Lost future earnings; and d. Damages, not only for financial loss but also for inconvenience and emotional harm."

Discussion

33. The claim as presented is confused. As noted above, in the Particulars of Claim, the claimant does not seek to rely on any specific cause of action and has expressly averred that he is not seeking any damages. Conversely, in the claimant's written submissions, he refers to being the victim of an unlawful means conspiracy and asserts that he has sustained damage as a result (which is an essential component of the same, as is an intention by the defendants to cause him damage). Nonetheless, on whatever legal basis this claim is brought, the claimant's factual averments remain the same, as set out in the Particulars of Claim and expanded upon in his written submissions.
34. Whether the court is considering the matter from the perspective of striking out or summary judgment, the authorities make it plain that it is appropriate to evaluate the strength of the evidence, albeit the scope for doing so is far broader in the context of summary judgment. The central thesis of the claim is that the defendants, at times in concert with the claimant's own barrister, conspired, in various ways, to injure the claimant. The claimant does not proffer any evidence, per se, in support of his allegations; in essence, he has interpreted various events as happening in such a way as to be consistent with the thesis of his case.
35. I can take each of the claimant's key factual assertions as follows:

a. That Dr Yunus's second witness statement contained false, edited and augmented data: In my judgment, there is no basis for suggesting there has been any disingenuous falsification or augmentation of data by Dr Yunus or anyone else. It may be that the claimant wanted different data to be provided or would have sought to interpret it in a different way than as set out in the statement, but Dr Yunus's second statement did little more than append a set of relevant data. In any event, in so far as the claimant asserts to have been caused damage by the submission of Dr Yunus's second statement, this cannot be the case because it was not relied upon; it was not before the court.

b. That Downing and Hewitsons provided false reasons for serving Dr Yunus's second statement: In my judgment, even if it is correct that the admissions data had been requested before the claimant's skeleton argument, it was nonetheless open to Downing and Hewitsons, without any suggestion of impropriety, to take the position that the skeleton argument was the trigger for them electing to serve Dr Yunus's second statement. There is no basis for suggesting there was anything misleading or conspiratorial here. A court could not conceivably infer from these facts that there was any deliberate act designed to injure the claimant.

c. That MA misled the court by asserting that Dr Yunus's second statement was not, in fact, served in response to the claimant's skeleton argument: I have not seen any material which would suggest that MA was aware of Downing and Hewitsons' earlier assertion (that the statement was served in response to the skeleton argument) and thus he misled the court, less so that he did so deliberately. In any event, given the statement was not relied upon, MA's submission was not of any consequence and cannot, therefore, have caused injury to the claimant.

d. That Dr Yunus's second statement was strategically withdrawn: Any party who serves a witness statement is at liberty to withdraw it. There is no property in a witness and thus, generally, nothing to stop another party relying on the statement that has been withdrawn. OIS and Downing legitimately wanted to avoid an adjournment and the late service of Dr Yunus's second statement was the reason the claimant was seeking an adjournment. There is no credible basis for saying that OIS and Downing set out to injure the claimant in this regard, nor any possibility that a court might infer the same, in my view.

e. That IP misled the court by saying that the claimant held US$21 million investments: There is some foundation to this allegation in so far as IP did assert that the claimant held actual investments of US$21 million, whereas he had, it would seem, built up a virtual portfolio of investments of that amount. There is, however, no basis to infer that this mistake was deliberate or calculated to injure the claimant. Moreover, Judge Mott KC did not make any award of costs in favour of OIS at the hearing on 14 April 2021. Therefore, Judge Mott KC did not accede to IP's submission and, it follows, there was no damage caused to the claimant as a result of her misleading statement.

f. That IP and MA colluded with the claimant's own counsel: The claimant alleges that the three barristers colluded to include a costs authority, which was adverse to the claimant's position, in a bundle for the court. It is normal for advocates to cooperate in this way. In fact, it is encouraged. There is no basis for inferring that there was any form of impropriety here. The bundle may also have included authorities that were favourable to the claimant's position and there could be no suggestion that this was part of a conspiracy to injure OIS and Downing.

g. That the defendants colluded not to draw to the court's attention misleading (or false, edited or augmented) parts of Dr Yunus's second statement: I have already concluded there is no basis for seeking to impeach Dr Yunus's second statement in the way the claimant has. It must follow, therefore, that there cannot have been any failure by the defendants in this regard.

h. That the defendants failed to observe the duty of candour and engaged in obstruction, or interference with the administration of, justice: Having concluded that all of the preceding allegations are without foundation, it must also follow that these generalised allegations are also baseless.

Decision

36. For the reasons above, I am satisfied that this claim is effectively unsupported by evidence. In so far as the claimant might invite the court to draw inferences about the defendants' conduct from the various events that took place, in my judgment, there is no real possibility that the court might do so. Further, in so far as the claimant seeks to assert that there has been an unlawful means conspiracy, there is no evidence at all that any of the defendants set out to cause him damage. In any event, there is no pleaded claim for damage; the claimant positively asserts that he is not seeking damages.
37. In my judgment, this claim falls into the category of being a case which is based on "demonstrably and patently hopeless" factual averments, as per Farley v Paymaster (1836) Ltd [2024] EWHC 282 (KB) at [86]. I am satisfied that the claim is certain to fail, that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing it, and that it should be struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a). Moreover, as per CPR r. 3.4(6), I am also satisfied that I should declare the claim to be totally without merit.
38. Alternatively, albeit for the same reasons, I am satisfied that this claim is, at best, fanciful and does not have a real prospect of succeeding, as per CPR r. 24.3(a). I am also not satisfied that there is any other compelling reason to allow the claim to proceed to trial (CPR r. 24.3(b)). As such, in the alternative, I will grant summary judgment in favour of the defendants.

Issue (2): Is the claimant entitled to declaratory relief, as a matter of law?

Legal Principles

39. The leading case on the court's power to grant declaratory relief is Rolls-Royce v Unite the Union [2010] 1 WLR 318 (per Aikens LJ at [120]):

"(1) The power of the court to grant declaratory relief is discretionary.

(2) There must, in general, be a real and present dispute between the parties before the court as to the existence or extent of a legal right between them. However, the claimant does not need to have a present cause of action against the defendant.

(3) Each party must, in general, be affected by the court's determination of the issues concerning the legal right in question.

(4) The fact that the claimant is not a party to the relevant contract in respect of which a declaration is sought is not fatal to an application for a declaration, provided that it is directly affected by the issue.

(5) The court will be prepared to give declaratory relief in respect of a "friendly action" or where there is an "academic question" if all parties so wish, even on "private law" issues. This may particularly be so if it is a "test case", or it may affect a significant number of other cases, and it is in the public interest to decide the issue concerned.

(6) However, the court must be satisfied that all sides of the argument will be fully and properly put. It must therefore ensure that all those affected are either before it or will have their arguments put before the court.

(7) In all cases, assuming that the other tests are satisfied, the court must ask: is this the most effective way of resolving the issues raised? In answering that question, it must consider the other options of resolving this issue."

40. In his written submissions, the claimant refers to a decision of the Court of Appeal in In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court's Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam. 1 at 18-20, in which Sir Thomas Bingham MR summarised previous case law and discerned a number of principles, including (as relied upon by the claimant):

"… it can be suggested that where a serious justiciable issue is brought before the court by a party with a genuine and legitimate interest in obtaining a decision against an adverse party the court will not impose nice tests to determine the precise legal standing of that claimant."

41. In that case, the court referred to the speech of Lord Goff in In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 82, where it was said (again, as referred to by the claimant):

"Here the declaration sought does indeed raise a real question; it is far from being hypothetical or academic. The plaintiff has a proper interest in the outcome, so that it can properly be said that she is seeking relief …"

42. The claimant also refers to two cases decided in Hong Kong. He has not provided citations for either. They are: Koo Ming Kown v Mok Kong Ting and Others; and Ip Cheung Kwok v Ip Siu Bun & Others.

Parties' Submissions

43. On behalf of the Beale defendants, Ms Evans asks the court to be alive to the claimant's attempt to use a claim for declaratory relief to circumvent the very limited, legitimate ways that one former party in litigation can challenge their opponent(s), such as through contempt of court proceedings. She says that Rolls-Royce involved the parties trying to "square off" arrangements to avoid a dispute in the future. As to the Hong Kong cases, Ms Evans notes that the claimant has not cited either nor provided copies in his authorities bundle. She says that they may state the law in Hong Kong but they are not relevant to the legal position in England and Wales. In summary, Ms Evans submits that the declarations sought by the claimant serve no purpose. Ms Colter aligns herself with Ms Evans' submissions on this issue for the barrister defendants.
44. In his written submissions, the claimant argues that the court's power to grant declaratory relief is discretionary, extremely wide and not limited by the claimant having a cause of action against the defendants. What is required, the claimant submits, is a real interest in obtaining a declaration against the other party. The claimant further contends that the principles set out in Rolls-Royce are not of general application but limited to the circumstances of that case. Instead, the claimant argues that the courts have adopted a "practical utility" approach to declarations. He submits this case "involves serious misconduct and conspiracy by the defendants during the judicial review proceedings" and that his allegations are "real and significant."
45. In support of his argument about the practical utility of the declarations he seeks, the claimant says:

"The findings of fact against Messrs. Hewitsons LLP and the Barristers Defendants would form the basis for disciplinary investigations by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Bar Standards Board for their breaches of the Code of Conduct. The claimant seeks an order directing the Barristers Defendants to remove a news article published on the Monckton Chambers website on 21 April 2021, shortly after the hearing of the claimant's application for permission to commence judicial review."

Discussion

46. It seems to me that the legal position is as stated in Rolls-Royce. The domestic authorities the claimant has cited do not materially conflict with that decision and the Hong Kong authorities, although apparently influenced by domestic jurisprudence, are first instance decisions and (may) only reflect the law in a different jurisdiction. In any event, without having been provided with citations or copies of those judgments, the court must be cautious about placing any reliance on them. Despite all this, the claimant's analysis of the legal position is not too far wide of the mark. Whilst it is, in my judgment, a mischaracterisation to say that court's discretion to grant declaratory relief is extremely wide, the claimant's focus on the practical utility of the declarations sought chimes, to a large extent, with the guidance in Rolls-Royce.
47. Essentially, the claimant advances three bases on which he says there is some purpose to the declarations he seeks: (i) to provide a foundation on which to complain to the Bar Standards Board ("BSB"); (ii) to go on to seek an order that an article be removed from Monckton chambers' website; and (iii) to bring a claim in respect of an unlawful means conspiracy. All of these are standalone matters; they do not require prior grounding in declarations. Notwithstanding that the court has concluded above that the claimant's allegations are baseless, he could, in principle, complain to the BSB (which would conduct its own investigation) about the barrister defendants (or his own barrister), sue for an injunction requiring the article to be removed from the website or bring an action in damages in respect of the alleged unlawful means conspiracy.

Decision

48. Rolls-Royce is clear that there must be some concrete benefit or purpose to the declarations sought, such as avoiding future litigation. There has been no such benefit or purpose identified in this case. In my judgment, the claimant seeking vindication for the way he says he was treated (without foundation, for the reasons above) in the judicial review proceedings, is not a legitimate use of the court's power to grant declaratory relief. I am satisfied that there is no realistic possibility that the court might, in the circumstances of this case, grant declaratory relief to the claimant.
49. As such, drawing upon the earlier legal principles set out at paragraph 22 to 28 above, the claim, as a matter of law, is bound to fail, is fanciful at best, and should be struck out (under CPR r. 3.4(2)(a)) or summary judgment should be entered in favour of the defendants (CPR r. 24.3(a)). Further, I cannot identify any compelling reason why the issues around declaratory relief should go to trial (CPR r. 24.3(b)).

Issue (3): Is Dr Yunus/are the barrister defendants protected by immunity?

Legal Principles

50. In Daniels v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] EWCA Civ 680, Lloyd Jones LJ (as he then was) summarised the law on witness immunity:

"33. It is well established that the immunity or privilege, where it applies, bars a claim whatever the cause of action, with the exception of suits for malicious prosecution (and analogous claims involving malicious initiation of criminal proceedings) and prosecution for perjury and proceedings for contempt of court …"

"36. A number of the speeches in [Darker v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435] emphasised that the immunity is essentially a witness immunity. Thus Lord Hope observed (at p. 448 D-E):

"But there is no good reason on grounds of public policy to extend the immunity which attaches to things said or done by [police officers] when they are describing these matters to things done by them which cannot fairly be said to form part of their participation in the judicial process as witnesses. The purpose of the immunity is to protect witnesses against claims made against them for something said or done in the course of giving or preparing to give evidence. It is not to be used to shield the police from action for things done while they are acting as law enforcers or investigators.""

"39. In order to achieve the objective of enabling witnesses to speak freely in judicial proceedings it has been necessary to extend the absolute immunity beyond the giving of evidence by witnesses when they are actually in the witness box. Thus it has been extended to statements made by a witness in the course of the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove (Watson v M'Ewan [1905] AC 48). It has also been extended to statements made out of court which could fairly be said to be part of the process of investigating a crime or a possible crime with a view to prosecution."

51. As to advocate immunity, the more recent case of El Haddad v Al Rostamani & Others [2024] EWHC 448 (Ch), Fancourt J. provides the following summary of the law (notably, in the context of a case where the claimant had sued the opposing lawyers involved in prior litigation):

"105. While accepting that the immunity rule is a rule of public policy that is based to some extent on an advocate's duty to their client and to the court, there is no support for the proposition that immunity is conditional on compliance with those duties. If the focus were solely on whether a particular advocate should be entitled to rely on the rule, one can see a certain attraction to the proposition that someone who has flouted their duties by knowingly misleading the court ought not to have the benefit of immunity. However, the many passages in the authorities that explain the foundation of the rule are focused instead on the interests of justice as a whole. The rule is calculated to encourage well-meaning and honest persons to give truthful evidence and advocate fearlessly, in both these cases without fear of the possible consequences. As Auld LJ explained, the price of such a rule is the possibility that it may benefit dishonest and malicious persons."

"106. So far as the immunity of advocates is concerned, the rule is unlikely to encourage dishonesty and malice for the very reason that, as Dr Haddad emphasises, they owe duties to the court that the court can enforce (as Mr Justice Ipp explains in his article) and they are subject to quite onerous regulatory standards that, if breached in such a way, are likely to lead to prosecution and disbarment, or striking off the Roll of Solicitors, as the case may be.

"107. If, on the other hand, advocates' immunity is conditional, as Dr Haddad contends, there would be an open door to any disgruntled litigant who failed to establish the truth of their cause against their opponent to bring a claim against the opponent's lawyers, alleging that they had misled the court by knowingly advancing a false case. That, as Fry LJ indicated in Munster v Lamb, is the very mischief that the rule serves to prevent. The two public interest grounds for the rule identified by Lord Hope in Darker (protection against vexatious claims and the prevention of re-litigation) would be undermined if the immunity rule were conditional."

"109. Accordingly, I find myself in respectful agreement with Cockerill J that there is no exception to the immunity rule, even in a case where what is alleged is that a witness or advocate was party to a dishonest conspiracy to mislead, and did mislead, the court."

"112. My decision on immunity is sufficient to dispose of the applications before me, as each of the Lawyer Defendants was either a witness in the Partnership Claim or the partner who had primary responsibility for the preparation of the evidence that was filed, or the firms of solicitors who in their names filed the evidence and the written submissions on behalf of the First to Eighth Defendants, or were Counsel who presented arguments to the Court on paper and orally at the hearing of the jurisdiction challenge. Each of those persons and firms is entitled to the benefit of the immunity rule ...

"113. … [the Lawyer Defendants] … are in my view correct to say that the immunity that they enjoy operates as a threshold bar to a claim against them, and it is therefore right that this issue should be determined on that basis, without considering first the merits of the particular allegations against them or the criticisms that have been levelled against the style in which they are pleaded."

52. In his written submissions, the claimant relies on the case of Takhar v Gracefield Developments Limited [2024] EWHC 1714 (Ch) at [559] (per His Honour Judge Tindal), which also serves as a useful summary of the law on witness immunity:

"559. …I would agree with [counsel for the defendants'] helpful summary of the principles relevant to witness immunity in the context of 'litigation forgery'

559.1. No action lies against parties or witnesses for anything said or done, although falsely or maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause, or in circumstances directly preparatory to giving evidence, in the course of legal proceedings, even if framed as conspiracy: [JSC BTA Bank v Khrapunov [2020] AC 727 (SC)].

559.2. The core immunity also comprises statements of case and other (genuine) documents placed before the court prepared before the litigation: [Singh v Reading BC [2013] 1 WLR 3052 (CA)].

559.3. The policy reasons for the rule are: first, those engaged in litigation should be able to speak freely without fear of civil liability; and second, the wish to avoid a multiplicity of actions where one court would have to examine whether evidence given before another court was true or not: [Singh / Taylor v SFO [1999] 2 AC 177 (HL)].

559.4. If giving of false evidence is not a necessary allegation in the claim but merely an incidental part of wider conspiracy, there is no immunity: [Surzur v Koros [1999] 2 Lloyds Rep 611].

559.5. The rule does not extend to cover the fabrication of false evidence: Darker."

Parties' Submissions

53. For the Beale defendants, Ms Evans submits that this is the sort of case that witness immunity exists to prevent. She notes that the authorities, in particular Darker, held that witness immunity did not apply to the fabrication of evidence, but there could be no suggestion that Dr Yunus had gone so far as to do that, in this case. Ms Colter, for the barrister defendants, describes El Haddad as a 'knock out blow' to the claimant.
54. The claimant argues that Dr Yunus did fabricate evidence, and thus is not protected by witness immunity. He argues that El Haddad does not apply. He submits that there is no binding authority directly applicable to the present claim involving an unlawful means conspiracy by both the claimant's own lawyers and the opposing party's lawyers. El Haddad, he says, only addressed immunity for the defendant lawyers.

Discussion

55. I have already concluded that the allegations levelled at Dr Yunus and his second statement are baseless. I have concluded that there are no grounds to suggest that he falsified or augmented his evidence. By extension, the situation identified in Darker, where there has been fabrication of evidence, does not apply. It is trite that immunity extends to the preparation of statements. Notwithstanding that Dr Yunus's second statement was never before the court and, as concluded above, the claimant's arguments are academic, I am satisfied that Dr Yunus is protected by witness immunity.
56. As to the barrister defendants, it seems to me that the position is even more clear-cut. The claimant's argument that El Haddad does not apply is, in my judgment, fallacious. Here, the claimant is suing opposing lawyers in respect of alleged misconduct in previous proceedings. Mr El Haddad did the same. Whether it was alleged that those lawyers had colluded with Mr El Haddad's lawyers or not is immaterial. Save for stating that El Haddad does not directly deal with that scenario, the claimant has not set out any reasoned basis for submitting that it does not apply.

Decision

57. I am satisfied that Dr Yunus is protected by witness immunity in relation to all the claimant's allegations concerning him. As such, declarations B to E are bound to fail and the corresponding parts of the Particulars of Claim ought to be struck out (CPR r. 3.4(2)(a)) or summary judgment entered (CPR r. 24.3(a)), again, drawing on the principles at paragraphs 22 to 28 above. Further, having found that the barrister defendants are protected by advocate immunity, which, in my judgment, must apply to their alleged misconduct in the run up to and during the hearing before Judge Mott KC, all the declarations, in so far as they relate to the barrister defendants, are also bound to fail and the corresponding parts of the Particulars of Claim should be struck out or summary judgment entered. There is no other compelling reason identified why any of the issues should go to trial (CPR r. 24.3(b)).

Issue (4): Are these proceedings, and/or are the defendants' applications, an attempt at re-litigation/mounting a collateral attack?

Legal Principles

58. In Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 the House of Lords defined as an example of abuse of process:

" … the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which had been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court in which it was made."

59. In Allsop v Banner Jones Ltd (t/a Banner Jones Solicitors) [2021] EWCA Civ 7, Marcus Smith J. provided the following further explanation of this type of abuse:

"27. Collateral challenges to prior decisions ex hypothesi do not give rise to res judicata estoppel. For the purposes of this judgment, a collateral challenge is one where – no matter how similar the issue in question – the parties to the later dispute are different from the parties to the earlier dispute that is the subject of the collateral challenge. As a matter of principle, collateral challenges should not give rise to an estoppel because – even though a dispute or issue has been determined by an anterior final judicial decision – that decision was binding only as between A and B, whereas the later claim arises between A and C. In short, whereas B could allege that A is estopped from bringing a later claim as against B, C can make no such assertion, because C was not a party to the anterior decision. Generally speaking, where no res judicata estoppel arises, A is permitted to bring a claim without being fettered by what has been decided previously…

"28. Of course, the courts retain a general jurisdiction to control abuses arising out of proceedings that come before them, and the real question on this appeal is the extent of that jurisdiction."

"44. … the following points emerge [from the case law]:

i) The jurisdiction to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process is one that should not be tightly circumscribed by rules or formal categorisation. It is an exceptional jurisdiction, enabling a court to protect its procedures from misuse …

ii) … there can be identified a class of abuse which involves the relitigation of issues which have already once been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in earlier proceedings.

iii) … the cases make clear that to regard relitigation as even prima facie amounting to an abuse of process would be to adopt too rigid an approach and to disregard the importance of individual circumstance and the need to consider each case on its own facts.

iv) In terms of the facts and circumstances that render relitigation potentially abusive, the following points are of particular relevance:

…

c) … it is necessary to be very clear what is meant by "relitigation". In my judgment, relitigation means arguing the same issue, that has already been determined in earlier proceedings, all over again in later proceedings … The abuse doctrine will only arise where one of the parties to the earlier litigation sues a stranger to that litigation. In such a case, the claim will typically be permissible and not abusive, and that will generally be because the case is not one of relitigation at all …

"45. In short, the doctrine of abuse of process is best framed, at least in the context of a collateral attack on a prior civil decision, by reference to the test expounded by Lord Diplock and Morritt V-C:

If the parties to the later civil proceedings were not parties to or privies of those who were parties to the earlier proceedings then it will only be an abuse of the process of the court to challenge the factual findings and conclusions of the judge in the earlier action if (a) it would be manifestly unfair to a party to the later proceedings that the same issues should be relitigated or (b) to permit such relitigation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute."

Parties' Submissions

60. Ms Evans, for the Beale defendants, refers to an appendix to Sarah Hinton's witness statement dated 25 September 2024 (in support of the Beale defendants' application), which provides a summary of the issues raised on the appeal in the judicial review proceedings compared to the allegations made in this claim. On appeal in the Judicial Review Proceedings, she says, Simler LJ had to look at the totality of the material before her and decide whether the appeal had reasonable prospects of success and/or whether there was some other good reason why it should be heard, which inevitably involved a holistic review of the evidence.
61. For the barrister defendants, Ms Colter adds that, even if the claimant's conduct is not abusive by application of the principles of res judicata or collateral attack, it clearly falls within the wider pool of abusive conduct which not only vexes litigants in respect of issues which the Court has already considered and determined, but which also tends to undermine and to seek to circumvent the due process of the court. She further submits that this claim amounts to a collateral attack on the decision of Senior Master Cook made in the Yung claim.
62. The claimant has accused Ms Hinton of lying and misleading the court in her statement (as referred to above), in particular in relation to the previous raising of allegations on the appeal in the judicial review proceedings. He argues that Simler LJ's order refusing permission to appeal does not address the allegations of misconduct made against the defendants. The claimant further argues that the defendants' applications are abusive because the same issues were raised in their applications in the Yung claim, and Senior Master Cook only decided to deal with the issue of standing. The claimant notes that none of the defendants applied to vary Senior Master Cook's order of 15 April 2024 (which listed the hearing on the sole issue of standing).

Discussion

63. The circumstances here are novel. None of the allegations made in this claim in this were raised at first instance in the judicial review proceedings, only on appeal. There were three documents submitted by the claimant in the appeal: grounds of appeal; a skeleton argument in support; and separate skeleton argument in support of an application to stay enforcement of the costs orders. The grounds, more or less, confine themselves to the substantive issues in the judicial review proceedings; the skeleton arguments raise most, if not all, of the same allegations that the claimant raises in this claim. Simler LJ's reasons for refusing permission to appeal, however, only consider the substantive issues raised in the grounds, not the allegations made in this claim.
64. Similarly, Senior Master Cook did not determine the allegations made in this case (which were raised at first instance in the Yung claim) because he disposed of that case based on the issue of Ms Yung's standing alone. The same applies, in reverse, to the issues raised by the defendants in their applications. Whilst those same exact issues were raised in the Yung claim, they were not the subject of determination by Senior Master Cook. In his judgment in the Yung claim, Senior Master Cook does rely on the Rolls Royce case, but that case was deployed in support of the argument that Ms Yung, rather than the claimant, lacked standing to sue.
65. I must consider the twin considerations of fairness and the administration of justice, as set out in Allsop. There is, undoubtedly, an element of unfairness in the defendants facing the same allegations again, but they were not required to respond to them, either in the appeal or before Senior Master Cook. In fact, it seems to me quite plain that the reason this claim has been issued is in an attempt to cure the defect in the Yung claim, as identified by Senior Master Cook, namely Ms Yung's lack of standing. It is also relevant to consider, at least in relation to the judicial review proceedings, that none of the issues were raised at first instance, only on appeal.

Decision

66. I am not satisfied that the claimant having brought, for the first time, a standalone claim at first instance in his own name, has done so in a manner which is so vexatious or abusive as to amount to a collateral attack upon a final decision by a court of competent jurisdiction (as per the test in Hunter, confirmed in Allsop). The same analysis must apply to the claimant's argument about the defendants' applications; the applications have been made precisely because Senior Master Cook chose, as a matter of case management, not to deal with all of the issues raised by the applications in the Yung claim. Allsop is clear that the court's jurisdiction to strike out a claim as abusive on the basis of collateral attack is exceptional; on balance, I am not satisfied that the circumstances given rise to in this case are exceptional and warrant striking out.
67. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there has been an abuse of process in the ways identified by the claimant or the defendants and the court should not dismiss the defendant's applications, or strike out the claim/enter summary judgment, on that basis.

Issue (5): Were Hewitsons validly served with the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim?

68. I will deal with this issue in much shorter order, having already concluded that the claim against Hewitsons should be struck out on several bases. The argument advanced by Ms Evans is that Hewitsons were, at best, served with a copy of a Claim Form and Particulars of Claim – not the original versions – on 25 September 2024. Prior to that, attempts had been made to serve by e-mail, without Hewitsons (or their solicitors, Beale & Co) having agreed to be served in that way. There was also an attempt at service by post on Hewitsons directly (on 20 September 2024) after Beale & Co had been nominated to accept service.
69. It is the case that, where a party nominates a solicitor to accept service, service must be effected on the solicitor (CPR r. 6.7(1)). Similarly, service can only be effected by electronic means, such as e-mail, where the party to be served has given a sufficient, written indication that they agreed to be served in that way (CPR PD 6A, paragraph 4.1). The nub of the issue, it seems to me, is whether there was valid service on 25 September 2024. Ms Evans submits that the documents served on that date were not originals, relying on Ideal Shopping v Mastercard [2022] 1 WLR 1541. Essentially, she argues that the documents served were demonstrably copy documents.
70. This is a claim which falls under CPR PD 51O – the electronic working pilot scheme – which provides:

Electronic sealing

7.1 When the Court issues a Claim Form, appeal notice or other originating application which has been submitted using Electronic Working and accepted by the Court, the Court will electronically seal the Claim Form, appeal notice or originating application with the date on which the relevant Court fee was paid and this shall be the issue date, as per the provisions of paragraph 5.4.

7.2 The electronic seal may differ in appearance to the seal used on paper.

Service

8.1 The Court will electronically return the sealed and issued Claim Form, appeal notice or originating application to the party's Electronic Working online account and notify the party that it is ready for service.

71. In Hills Contractors and Construction Ltd v Struth [2013] EWHC 1693 (TCC) at [38-41] onwards, Ramsey J. said:

"40. In my judgment the effect of those two rules [CPR r. 7.2(1) and 2.6(1)] is that, as a general rule, a Claim Form is the document issued by the court on which the court seal is placed. When therefore CPR 6.3(1) states that "A Claim Form may… be served by any of the following methods…", I consider that, again as a general rule, it is the document issued and sealed by the court which is the relevant Claim Form."

72. In Ideal Shopping, relied upon by Ms Evans, Sir Julian Flaux said:

"137. … I agree with the respondents that the starting point under the CPR , in a case where Electronic Working does not operate, is that the general rule is that the Claim Form must be sealed before it can be validly served …"

73. Thus, normally, valid service must be service of the original Claim Form sealed by the court. Typically, where a claimant elects to effect service, they will send enough copies of the Claim Form to the court to be sealed, and then will serve each defendant with a separately sealed Claim Form. Here, however, because CPR PD51O is engaged, at most, the court applies an electronic seal to the Claim Form and then makes the sealed, electronic version of the Claim Form (and Particulars of Claim) available to the claimant to serve. Therefore, in cases proceeding under the electronic working pilot, in my judgment, service of an electronically sealed copy of the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim is good service.
74. Accordingly, I reject Hewitsons' argument about invalid service and refuse the application to strike out the claim for want of jurisdiction on that basis.

Issue (6): Should I set aside my order of 3 October 2024 refusing default judgment against the Beale defendants?

75. This issue can also be dealt with in short order.
76. CPR r. 12.3 provides:

(3) The claimant may not obtain a default judgment if at the time the court is considering the issue—

(a) the defendant has applied—

(i) to have the claimant's statement of case struck out under rule 3.4; or

(ii) for summary judgment under Part 24,

and, in either case, that application has not been dealt with.

77. I considered the claimant's request for default judgment on 4 October 2024. At that time, the Beale defendants had applied to strike out the claim/for summary judgment (they did so on 25 September 2024). As such, the claimant was not entitled to default judgment and there is no reason to set aside or vary my order. I am satisfied that the claimant's application in this regard is totally without merit (as per CPR r. 23.12).

Conclusion

78. Before disposing of the applications, I must consider whether to give permission to the claimant to amend the Particulars of Claim, where to do so might avoid his claim being struck out (as per, e.g. Soo Kim v Youg [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB)). I am not satisfied that I should give the claimant such permission, for the following reasons:

a. The claimant's evidential difficulties are not curable by amendment, nor are the difficulties for the claimant in establishing a claim declaratory relief.

b. I have acceded to the defendants' applications for strike out and summary judgment; consideration of amendment is only relevant to the former.

c. The claimant has not applied for permission to amend, despite having been served with defendants' applications over four months before the hearing.

79. In conclusion, therefore, I am satisfied that:

a. The claim should be struck out under CPR r. 3.4(2)(a).

b. I should give summary judgment to the defendants under CPR 24.3.

c. My order dated 4 October 2024 should not be set aside or varied.

d. The claim should be declared to be totally without merit under CPR 3.4(6).

e. The claimant's application dated 25 October 2024 should be declared to be totally without merit under CPR r. 23.12.